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38 Sylvester v. Chicago Park District,488 for example, the ing signs and barriers on the property.496 However, court held that the applicability of the recreational use there are cases from other jurisdictions holding that statute did "not depend only on the plaintiff's active under these circumstances a landowner does not have engagement in a recreational activity at the time of the the protection of the recreational use statute.497 injury."489 The prevailing view appears to be that a recreational In the Boaldin case, supra, the plaintiff argued that use immunity statute may apply to property that has the area in question had to be designated as recrea- both a recreational and a nonrecreational use or pur- tional property. The plaintiff argued that if the recrea- pose. There is authority that a recreational use statute tional use statute "is applied to property other than applies even without a property being primarily used that which has been expressly designated as recrea- for recreational purposes. Furthermore, a bicycle acci- tional, then governmental entities would also escape dent and injury may not have to be the result of recrea- liability for personal injuries arising on sidewalks or tion for the recreational use statute to apply and im- public streets, since such areas are sometimes used for munize a public entity for a bikeway claim. The recreational purposes."490 The court rejected the argu- majority view also appears to be that a bicyclist's sub- ment, stating that governmental entities had an inde- jective intent (e.g., recreation or commuting) at the time pendent duty "to maintain public streets and public of the accident is not relevant to the applicability of a sidewalks in a condition reasonably safe for use" and recreational use statute. that a holding that the recreational use statute applied Guidance "in the present case will not affect or vary the responsi- A public entity in a state in which the state's recrea- bility of governmental entities to maintain public tional use statute applies or has been held to apply to 491 streets and public sidewalks...." bicycles will want to determine whether its courts follow what appears to be the majority view that a bikeway D. Immunity When Recreational Use Is Restricted does not have to be exclusively or even primarily for rec- A public authority may wish to limit the use of a des- reational use for a public entity to have recreational use ignated bikeway in some manner. The courts have held immunity. Even the minority view appears to be that as that a landowner is not required to open its property to long as a recreational use is more than merely inciden- all persons;492 that land open only to a particular class of tal, a public entity may be protected from liability under the public is still within the recreational use statute;493 a recreational use statute regardless of whether a plain- and that a landowner may place reasonable restrictions tiff alleges faulty design or maintenance as the proxi- on the use of its land.494 In some jurisdictions a land- mate cause of a bikeway accident. owner still has immunity even if the landowner has prohibited recreational use495 or has placed no trespass- SECTION VIII. LOCAL LAW AND POLICY REGARDING THE DESIGNATION OF BIKEWAYS A. Localities' Laws and Policies Regarding that the injury occur as the result of recreational activity), aff'd, 286 Kan. 809, 189 P.3d 517 (2008). Bikeways 488 179 Ill. 2d 500, 689 N.E.2d 1119 (1997), reh'g denied Although there appears to some commonality in the (Feb. 2, 1998). approach to the designation of bikeways, there are also 489 Id. at 508, 689 N.E.2d at 1124. some significant differences. This section discusses 490 Boaldin v. Univ. of Kan., 242 Kan. at 292, 747 P.2d at whether localities have laws and policies regarding the 814. designation of bikeways; the types of bikeways; the pub- 491 Id. lic entities responsible for designating bikeways; design 492 Mansion v. United States, 945 F.2d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 1991). 496 Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 629, 493 Herring v. Hauck, 118 Ga. App. 623, 624, 165 S.E.2d 198, 547 N.W.2d 602, 603 (1996) (no signs); Larini v. Biomass In- 199 (Ga. 1968) (stating that an owner may "permit the free use dustries, Inc., 918 F.2d 1046, 1048, 1049 (2d Cir. 1990) (hold- of his facilities or land by the public generally or by a particu- ing that the owner had immunity and that although the prop- lar class of the public"). erty was posted with "No Trespassing" signs and blocked by 494 Scrapchansky v. Town of Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 452, both a metal gate and a wall of snow, the landowner's efforts 627 A.2d 1329, 1332 (Conn. 1993). were irrelevant "because the statute extends to landowners 495 Albright v. Metz, 88 N.Y.2d 656, 663, 672 N.E.2d 584, whose land is available for recreational pursuits"). 497 588, 649 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that the rec- Hughes v. Quarve & Anderson Co., 338 N.W.2d 422, 427 reational use statute applied because access regulations were (Minn. 1983) (holding that "the Recreational Use Statute has targeted at unauthorized dumping in the facility rather than no application where the defendant landowner does not offer banning potential public recreational use); Bloom v. Brady, 171 the quarry pond in question for public use and, indeed, claims A.D. 2d 910, 566 N.Y.S.2d 783 (N.Y. App. 3d Dep't 1991); here that it has discouraged the public from using the pond as Friedman v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc., 524 Pa. 270, 271, a public facility"); Ga. Power Co. v. McGruder, 229 Ga. 811, 571 A.2d 373-373 (Pa. 1990) (holding that the recreational use 812, 194 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Ga. 1972) (holding that the recrea- statute immunized the owner from liability even though the tional use statute did not apply when the owner had expressly land was posted with "No Trespassing" signs). denied use of the land by posting "keep out" signs in the area).