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the actual incentives supplied by the employer. From this comparison, level of employee awareness was calculated as the number of employees reporting that an incentive was available, divided by the number of employees who actually had the incentive available according to their employers. Employees whose employer did not report providing a particular incentive were not included in the computation. Table 19-21 shows how these awareness levels were found to vary across the dif- ferent types of strategies. Table 19-21 Average Levels of Employee Awareness of Offered TDM Strategies in Los Angeles and Sacramento Programs Percent Percent TDM Strategy Awareness a TDM Strategy Awareness a Bike Racks 55% Company Vanpool Vehicles 67% Showers, Lockers, Changing 38 Guaranteed Ride Home 36 Facilities Rideshare Matching 70 Bus Pass Discount 17 Rideshare Prizes 64 Bus Pass Sales On-Site 41 Transportation Coordinator 45 Carpool Preferential Parking 77 Transportation Fairs 15 Note: a Calculated as the number of employees who reported having each strategy, divided by the number of employees whose employer reported providing the strategy. Each calculation excludes employees whose employer did not report providing the measure. Source: Comsis (1993a). While two-thirds of employees were aware of employer-offered measures such as preferential park- ing and rideshare matching, awareness of certain other measures like transportation fairs and bus pass discounts was below one-fifth of employees. The findings were a revelation to all concerned, and argued strongly for more aggressive information and marketing efforts by the programs. The study concluded that annual TDM marketing plus administrative cost per employee offered the best explanation for variations in awareness. The implication of this relationship is that higher levels of marketing, outreach, and information exchange lead to better informed employees capable of more conscious transportation choices, which in turn translates to the TDM strategies having greater use and impact (Comsis, 1993a). The research effort in question is further described under "Related Information and Impacts"--"Modeling Studies"--"California Air Resources Board Survey and TDM Program." Voluntary Versus Regulatory Employer Motivation To appreciate the full array of factors underlying employer and institutional TDM effectiveness, it is essential to recognize that degree of employee motivation is in large measure a function of employer motivation. TDM programs are generally motivated by one of two conditions: The employer or institution is facing issues with employee transportation, which are either affecting employee morale and retention or are raising the prospect of high costs and increas- ing resources devoted to employee transportation needs, particularly parking. 19-85

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The employer or institution is required under law or regulation to reduce its vehicle trip generation--particularly peak-period vehicle trips--in order to mitigate congestion, vehicle miles of travel (VMT), or emissions, or to forestall the need for new road capacity. While a regulatory requirement can compel an organization to implement a TDM program, it is the first of these motivations that is most likely to lead to a productive in-house program. If its employees are suffering congestion delay with few existing options, or entailing the expense of driving long distances, the employer or institution has an economic self-interest in its TDM pro- gram success. Economic self-interest will also apply if the organization is seeking to avoid a major employee parking provision expense, be it building and maintaining more of its own facilities or subsidizing the cost of employee parking through a third-party provider. There are also other examples where self-interest pertains, such as when the organization needs to expand, but is opposed by neighbors concerned about traffic and pollution impacts. In the case of a regulatory requirement, the employer or institution is obligated to implement a program of measures that have the objective of reducing its vehicle trip rate to a specified level. There is little doubt that such a requirement will capture the employer's attention regarding its employees' transportation activity, and equally little doubt that the vast majority of employer TDM programs have been initiated under such circumstances. Beyond that, however, the composition and ultimate impact of a program depends on factors that are much more related to the employer or institution, including: Whether the organization perceives employee transportation options improvement, trip reduc- tion, and the opportunity to be a good citizen as a clear advantage to its operation or is simply out to meet the letter of the law. Whether the employer holds a fear of losing competitive advantage with its peers in attracting and retaining employees. Whether the company administration has an understanding of which strategies will have the desired impact. While a regulatory requirement may force an employer's hand in implementing a TDM program, the actual composition of that program can vary widely. No known employer TDM regulation specifies the exact strategies to be implemented, or penalizes an organization for failing to achieve a trip-reduction goal. Even in the experience of California's Regulation XV--one of the most strin- gent TDM regulatory programs tried--employers faced only the pressure of having to revamp their plans at the end of an annual or bi-annual review cycle if they failed to achieve their trip reduction targets. Penalties were incurred only for failure to submit a plan, not for failing to achieve targets. Lacking direction to the contrary, employers who fail to meet trip reduction targets have been found to generally opt for "more" TDM measures in their revamped plans rather than shift to the more influential financial incentive or disincentive measures. In a review of employer perfor- mance under Regulation XV for the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), instances were found where employers had introduced literally dozens of measures into their programs in the hopes of finally finding the right combination. However, most often the simplest programs--those with few measures but including monetary incentives and perhaps one or more transportation services--had the most demonstrable impact on travel behavior and vehicle trip reduction (VTR) (Comsis, 1993b). It is generally difficult to persuade employers or institutions to adopt financial measures, partic- ularly disincentive actions like parking management or pricing, unless they see a clear benefit to 19-86

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their bottom line. Hence, the existence of a regulatory requirement is no guarantee that this class of measures will be widely adopted. The experience gleaned from the 82-program sample rein- forces this conclusion, in that while a number of "success stories" may emanate from areas with regulatory requirements, almost as many of the successful examples come from areas where there is no formal motivation beyond economics, concern for employees, or peer pressure. These conclusions are supported by the data in Table 19-22, which shows the frequency with which particular TDM strategies are applied in regulatory versus voluntary environments. The first two columns characterize the types of strategies offered by employers and institutions in the 82-program sample, in which 59 programs were conceived under regulatory pressures while the remaining 23 were "voluntary" (although this latter group may have experienced tacit pres- sure from the community or peers to participate). What can be seen in this initial two-column com- parison is that, overall, there is not a substantial difference in terms of how frequently many of the strategies appear in TDM programs. Most regulatory programs have required provision of certain basic measures, especially market- ing and promotion, information on alternatives, rideshare matching, an employee transportation coordinator (ETC), guaranteed ride home, bike racks, and preferential carpool parking. In this respect, the regulatory programs do show somewhat higher participation in these strategies. How- ever, for the more material measures, such as pioneering a vanpool program, managing parking, or providing financial incentives, the voluntary programs in the sample have action inclusion rates that are similar--and sometimes superior--to the regulatory programs. While there is a higher rate of occurrence of parking fees among the regulated employers, in the vast majority of cases--both voluntary and regulatory--the parking fees existed before the TDM program was enacted. Almost none of the firms reviewed in the sample explicitly chose to levy parking fees as an integral part of their program. Those that did, such as CH2M Hill and US WEST in Bellevue, Washington, encountered parking fees as a consequence of office relocation, and sim- ply went on to use the fees as a mechanism in their program. Most with pre-existing parking fees altered the structure of those fees, generally to provide cost incentives to carpools and vanpools through High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) parking discounts, and/or they used the parking revenues to help subsidize other program measures, such as modal subsidies. These pricing strategies, how- ever, were not found to be unique to either regulated or voluntary programs. Indeed, turning from parking pricing to parking availability, the voluntary examples exhibit a slightly greater degree of restricted parking. Constrained parking may help explain the employer's interest in having an effec- tive TDM program. Strategy-frequency assessments of two specific regulatory programs, those in Los Angeles and Sacramento, are highlighted in the last two columns of Table 19-22. Here a slightly different perspec- tive is seen in the approach to TDM. In particular, the "perfunctory" measures are shown to occur with high frequency, including marketing and information (90 to 100 percent of all employers offering); rideshare matching (84.7 percent in Los Angeles); bike racks, showers, and changing facilities (70.7 to 80.6 percent); and guaranteed ride home (65.5 to 71.8 percent). ETCs were not bro- ken out in these studies, but are specified in the regulations and are probably subsumed in the mar- keting and information category. 19-87

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Table 19-22 Relative Frequency of TDM Strategy Offerings in Employer TDM Programs 82 Programs a 82 Programs a Los Angeles b TDM Strategy "Regulated" "Voluntary" Regulation XV Sacramento c Marketing, Informa- 30.5% 30.1% 90.5% 100.0% tion, and Promotions Rideshare Matching 72.9% 65.2% 84.7% n/a Employee Transpor- 64.4% 47.8% n/a n/a tation Coordinator Guaranteed Ride 67.8% 57.2% 71.8% 65.5% Home Preferential Parking 49.1% 39.1% n/a 62.1% On-Site Pass Sales 20.3% 30.4% 54.6% n/a Bike Racks, Lockers, 52.5% 43.4% 80.6% 70.7% Showers Vanpool Program 18.6% 39.1% n/a n/a Shuttle/Buspool 49.1% 13.0% n/a 15.3% Use of Company 11.9% 8.7% n/a n/a Vehicles Flextime 59.3% 47.8% 29.5% n/a Compressed Work 44.1% 26.1% 23.3% 70.7% Week Telecommuting 18.6% 17.4% 10.2% 23.3% Transit Subsidies 71.2% 65.2% 48.5% 53.4% Other Modal 47.5% 65.2% 29.8% 21.9% Subsidies Parking Cash Out 8.5% 4.3% 0.7% 8.3% or Transportation Allowance Parking Fees 40.6% 30.4% 6.3% 36.2% Restricted Parking 45.7% 52.2% 5.8% 22.6% Sample Size 59 23 4,999 58 Sources: a Classified as "regulated" (59 programs) or "voluntary" (23 programs) from the 82-program sample, Appendix Table 19-A. b Young and Luo (1995). c Schreffler (1997). 19-88

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Transit subsidies were also relatively common offerings in both locations--48.5 percent of all cases in Los Angeles and 53.4 percent in Sacramento--probably because of the tax advantages and the strong statement it makes in the employer's transportation management plan as a legitimate finan- cial incentive. Transit use by commuters in both of these California metropolitan areas is relatively small by national standards, primarily because transit service is not a strong alternative in many loca- tions. Hence, most of the trip reductions have been the result of shifts to carpooling, even though subsidies for modes other than transit were considerably less frequent (21.9 to 29.8 percent). The higher incidence of parking fees in the Sacramento findings compared with Los Angeles is a result of the Sacramento program having been instituted by the city, leading to more focus on employers within the core urban area (Young and Luo, 1995; Schreffler, 1997). Alternative work schedules are an interesting element in all programs. For the most part, the rel- atively frequent appearance of flextime in these examples was for the purpose of facilitating alter- native mode use, rather than for encouraging travel outside the peak period. Most of the legal requirements studied here did not grant credit for peak shifting. However, most of the regula- tory programs did grant trip reduction credit for CWW and telecommuting. One analysis found employers in the Los Angeles Regulation XV environment to have opted for such strategies in later stages of their programs, when the traditional mode shift strategies were not proving sufficient to achieve targets (Comsis, 1994). (Data presented further on in Table 19-27 present a more mixed picture for program Years 1 and 2 in this regard.) There has been considerable question about the effectiveness of mandatory employer TDM pro- grams, particularly from the standpoint of their regional benefit in reducing congestion or improving air quality in relation to the cost imposed on employers. The issues of air quality and cost- effectiveness are addressed in a subsequent section (see "Energy and Environmental Relationships" and "Cost-Effectiveness" under "Related Information and Impacts"). In terms of net behavior change, however, Table 19-23 provides some insight on the measured impact of the programs on choice of commute method (including both mode and alternative work arrangements). Shown in the table are before-and-after percentage shares obtained from three regulatory programs. The first two are the Los Angeles and Sacramento examples, which were profiled in Table 19-22. The third is taken from Portland, Oregon's Employee Commute Options program, for which equivalent data on adopted TDM measures were not available (TriMet, 2000). In all 3 cases, the averages presented are for employers in the mandatory program only, exclusive of exempted employers. The Los Angeles program was perhaps the most stringent of the three, requiring employers with 100 or more employees to meet a specified Average Vehicle Ridership (AVR) goal within one year of approval of a trip reduction plan. A rigorous plan approval process was designed to determine whether individual plans were capable of achieving their goal. If they were deemed not sufficient, the employer was persuaded to try new or additional strategies. Employers could be fined for non- compliance, but in virtually all cases where fines were levied, it was for not submitting a plan or for failing to implement strategies that were promised rather than failing to meet an AVR target. Results shown in Table 19-23 for Los Angeles are over a 5-year period, for 4,999 employers that had submitted at least two plans. In Sacramento, an initial ordinance required employers to reduce peak-period employee single occupant vehicle (SOV) use by 35 percent, and required annual travel surveys and management plans. However, the city attorney's office soon determined that the city could not mandate such a requirement, at which point participation became voluntary. The results shown in the table are for 58 large employers (100 or more employees) participating in the program between 1990 and 1996. 19-89

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Table 19-23 Shifts in Commute Mode Shares (Percent)--Three Regulatory Programs City of Sacramento b Portland, OR c Los Angeles a (Employer TSM (Employee Commute (Regulation XV) Ordinance) Options Rule) Commute Before After Pct. Pt. Before After Pct. Pt. Pct. Pt. Option (1988) (1993) Change (1990) (1996) Change Before After Change Drive Alone 73.5% 67.2% - 6.3% 80.6% 73.0% - 7.6% 79.5% 74.1% - 5.4% Carpool 15.5 21.4 + 5.9 12.8 17.7 + 3.9 9.9 9.8 - 0.1 Vanpool 1.2 1.9 + 0.7 0.5 1.9 + 1.4 Transit 4.0 4.3 + 0.3 2.6 3.5 + 0.9 7.1 11.1 + 4.0 Walk/Bike 3.0 3.0 0.0 2.8 3.7 + 0.9 3.1 2.9 - 0.2 Compressed 1.3 1.9 + 0.6 n/a n/a n/a 1.3 1.7 + 0.4 Work Week Telecommute 1.4 0.3 - 1.1 0.0 0.3 + 0.3 0.2 0.5 + 0.3 Sources: a Young and Luo (1995). b Schreffler (1997). c TriMet (2000). The program in Portland required all employers with 50 or more employees to reduce vehicle trips by 10 percent over 3 years; there were no penalties for non-compliance. The data in Table 19-23 rep- resent 503 employers and 127,000 employees, with a mixture of participation time ranging from 320 sites with only 1 follow-up survey (average of 1.3 years), to 165 sites with two follow-up sur- veys (average of 2.6 years), and 18 sites with three follow-up surveys (average of 3.9 years). The overall results in Table 19-23 indicate that each program resulted in a reduction of SOV share of less than 10 percentage points--from a high of 7.6 percent in Sacramento to a low of 5.4 percent in Portland--among the population of large employers. There are interesting differences in how those reductions came about. In Los Angeles and Sacramento, the changes were primarily achieved through a shift to carpool and vanpool, whereas in Portland--with its strong regional focus on its MAX light rail transit (LRT) system and complementary bus services--more of the reductions were the result of shifts to transit. There was little or no change observed in walk or bike use, or in telecom- muting, though both Los Angeles and Portland showed above average increases in CWW. These are, of course, jurisdiction-wide perspectives. A look at one specific district within Portland is provided by the example "Lloyd District Travel Demand Management--Portland, Oregon," found in the "Case Studies" section. In the Lloyd District, initial shifts were to carpooling, followed by a later overriding shift toward greater transit usage--quite possibly associated with LRT ser- vice expansion. Between 1997 and 2005, the employee drive-alone share dropped from 60 percent to 43 percent (Bianco, 2000; Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2008; TriMet, 2009). Also of inter- est in assessing the local area potential of mandatory TDM (under favorable circumstances) is the description of central Seattle I-5 corridor CTR program outcomes. This description starts in the "End Results of Dissipation" discussion under "Related Information and Impacts"--"Site- Versus System-Level Impacts" and is taken through the "Cost-Effectiveness" and "Energy and Environmental Relationships" subsections. The CTR program is credited with avoiding, on aver- 19-90