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6 mation to the general public. A detailed discussion of is likely to threaten transportation security, and may be required security measures is beyond the scope of the used where the distinction between SSI and restricted digest.1 security information is not legally significant. The digest does not provide a state-by-state analysis on all relevant points; rather, it highlights the issues 1. Vulnerability of Public Transit Systems to that transit agencies should consider in devising their Attack/Recent Threats to Public Transit Systems policies for handling security information in the pro- The openness of transit systems, as opposed to air curement and records management processes. Exam- transport, makes them particularly vulnerable to attack ples of state requirements are provided so that transit and difficult to secure. For example, transit vehicles agencies can "learn from the experiences and practices that operate above ground, often equipped with large of others to find a balance between security require- windows and doors, are vulnerable to close-range at- ments and the need for open government." 2 tack. In addition, transit systems must maintain acces- sibility, which eliminates some options for hardening B. Background of Threats to Public Transit access.4 Rail transit systems in particular present high Systems consequence targets because of the potential loss of life The background of threats to public transit systems, and economic disruption. The Transportation Security both in the United States and abroad, provides some Administration (TSA) has identified factors that make context for the need to protect transit security informa- rail transit a high-consequence target: large numbers of tion. This section discusses the general vulnerability of passengers, confined environment, stations located near public transit systems to attack, including examples of or below major government buildings, significant office recent threats, and government response to threats of complexes, and iconic structures.5 attack. Worldwide, 182 public transit systems have been A note on terminology: as discussed below, federal subjects of terrorist attacks.6 Among the most notable of legislation defines a class of information as sensitive these were a subway bombing in Moscow (February security information (SSI). (See List of Acronyms.) This 2004) that killed at least 39 people and injured more is a term of art and is only used in the report to describe than 30 others;7 bombing of trains in Madrid by Basque information that meets the federal definition. However, separatists in March 2004; a suicide bombing outside a it is possible for information not to meet the federal Moscow subway reportedly carried out by an Al Qaeda definition of SSI and still be worthy of protection from affiliated group;8 and attacks on the London transit disclosure because of the transportation security ramifi- system on July 7, 2005, killing about 50 people and in- cations of disclosing it.3 Transit agencies routinely pro- juring more than 700.9 The London attacks came about tect such information, but the author is not aware of a standard term. Therefore, throughout the report such 4 MATTHEW RABKIN, ROBERT BRODESKY, FRANK FORD, sensitive but non-SSI information is referred to as "re- MARSHA HAINES, JORDAN KARP, KRISTIN LOVEJOY, TERRY stricted security information." The term "security in- REGAN, LINDA SHARPE, & MARGARET ZIRKER, TRANSIT formation" refers to information the disclosure of which SECURITY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS, ch. 3, Security in the Transit Environment (2004), http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov /security/SecurityInitiatives/DesignConsiderations/CD/ftasesc. 1 Numerous reports discuss recommended security meas- pdf (accessed Sept. 19, 2009). 5 ures, e.g., YUKO NAKANISHI, TRANSIT SECURITY UPDATE, A Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Secu- SYNTHESIS OF TRANSIT PRACTICE (Transportation Research rity Administration, Proposed Rule, Rail Transportation Secu- Board, Transit Cooperative Research Program Synthesis 80, rity, Fed. Reg. 71, No. 245, 76852, 76854, Dec. 21, 2006, 2009), http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/pdf/E6-21512.pdf. 6 http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_syn_80.pdf; Section 1403, Findings, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 401 JOHN N. BALOG, ANNABELLE BOYD, & JAMES E. CATON, THE (Tit. XIV, Public Transportation Security), codified at 6 U.S.C. PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM SECURITY AND EMERGENCY 1132. PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDE 2003, http://transit- 7 Moscow Mourns Metro Bomb Victims, CNN, Feb. 7, 2004, safety.volpe.dot.gov/publications/security/PlanningGuide.pdf. www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/02/07/moscow.blast/index. See also TRANSTECH MANAGEMENT, INC., GUIDANCE FOR html (accessed July 30, 2009). TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES ON MANAGING SENSITIVE 8 Steven Lee Meyers, Suicide Bomber Kills 9 at Moscow INFORMATION (National Cooperative Highway Research Pro- Subway Station, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, gram Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Vol. 5, www.nytimes.com/2004/09/01/international/europe/01moscow.h Transportation Research Board, 2005), http://onlinepubs.trb. tml (accessed July 30, 2009). org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_rpt_525v5.pdf. 9 2 Precise numbers varied, but the death tolls appeared to Right to Know vs. Need to Know: States Are Re-examining have been about 50, with many more injured. Cf., Don Van Their Public-Records Laws in the Wake of Sept. 11, Homeland Natta Jr. & David Johnston, London Bombs Seen as Crude; Security Brief, The Council of State Governments, 2003, Death Toll Rises to 49, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/Brief1003RightToKnow.pdf (ac- www.nytimes.com/2005/07/09/international/europe/09intel.htm cessed Sept. 20, 2009). l?scp=5&sq=london%20+%20bomb%20+%202005&st=cse (ac- 3 See TRANSTECH MANAGEMENT, INC., supra note 1, at 2. cessed July 30, 2009); Glenn Frankel & Fred Barbash, Death See II.B, infra, Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Toll From London Blasts Rises: 50 Killed in Attacks, 22 More (PCII)/Sensitive Security Information (SSI). in Critical Condition, WASH. POST, July 8, 2005; Statement to