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number of privately owned vehicles in Porto Alegre much like a light rail operation, but with rubber-tired is growing. The government of Brazil provides sig- vehicles operating on pavement. In some cases, the nificant financial incentives to purchase automobiles BRT operates on street segments where lanes have and motorcycles, as they are domestically produced been closed to traffic. Stations are generally of a and are thus key drivers of the country's economy. common design, although some stations in the down- The recent economic downturn has spurred the town area were sponsored by the private sector and government to enhance such incentives for buyers. feature a different design (Figure 3). Some Brazilians see the incentives to purchase pri- The system features an integrated feeder net- vate autos and motorbikes as a much more finan- work of buses that connect the BRT network with cially attractive option than relying on public transit. lower density population centers located beyond the With the incentives, purchasing and operating a terminal stations. The feeder bus routes use standard- motorbike in Brazil is, in some cases, more afford- size buses, which are better suited than articulated able than the cost of a monthly pass for transit. buses for circulating through residential areas. In This cycle of dwindling ridership coupled with some cases, the feeder buses bring passengers to one the need to balance the budget each year with fare of the terminal stations where passengers transfer to increases is causing fares to increase faster than the BRT service serving the central business district. inflation, which could at some point make the cur- In other cases, the feeder buses circulate in residen- rent formula unworkable. EPTC hopes that system tial areas and then operate adjacent to portions of the improvements, such as the use of smartcard technol- BRT system's dedicated lanes to bring passengers ogy, will improve the revenue flow at a lower cost. closer to their final destinations. Fares are integrated between the feeder buses and the BRT, and transfers are seamless. SERVICE DELIVERY The BRT network introduced new fare policies Guayaquil, Ecuador and fare collection procedures. Prepayment and fare integration were concepts new to Guayaquil. Pre- The Metrovia BRT and integrated bus feeder viously, passengers transferring between privately system are based on several operating features designed to offer a high-capacity, rapid urban tran- owned buses had to pay a new fare each time they sit service. These features include the use of high- boarded a different bus. Because fares were col- capacity articulated buses operating at frequent lected onboard the buses, drivers had to carry cash headways on trunk corridors, high-platform station and make change; not only was this an added task boarding and off-vehicle fare collection to minimize and worry for the drivers, who had to ensure each vehicle time at stops, and the use of dedicated tran- rider paid the proper fare, but it also made the driver sit lanes and signal prioritization at key intersections an attractive target to thieves. to give buses an advantage in heavy traffic. Guayaquil has two BRT corridors in operation; another corridor is expected to open in 2011, and four additional corridors are in the early planning stages. When the first BRT line started service in 2006, approximately 250 privately owned buses were replaced with 40 new, modern, safer buses. The first line, which measures approximately 15 km has 34 stations, two terminals, and a daily ridership of 140,000. When the second line began service in 2008, it replaced 650 privately owned buses; today it carries 650,000 riders each day on a 14-km route. Buses depart terminal stations on schedule, and passengers are given notice that the doors will be closing. Because of the short headways, typically 5 to 7 min on weekdays, riders at terminal stations sometimes opt to wait for the next bus, so they can be Figure 3 Metrovia downtown BRT station sponsored assured of having a seat. The system functions very by private sector. 9

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Metrovia adopted a new integrated fare policy in which most fares are collected at station kiosks rather than on the bus itself. The only exception involves the feeder buses, onto which riders board at a bus stop, rather than at a terminal or station. Within the Metro- via system, all transfers between buses are free at major terminals and station stops, as long as the pas- senger remains within the prepaid area. Passengers transferring from one BRT corridor to the other can do so within the prepaid area at common stations, and passengers transferring between Metrovia feeder buses and trunk BRT service can do so within termi- nal stations. Fare payment can be made by cash at station kiosks and onboard the feeder buses or by electronic fare payment. The introduction of electronic fare pay- Figure 4 Transantiago BRT bus sharing dedicated ment has improved revenue collection procedures lane with taxis and motorcycles. and accounting. The electronic fare payment card is contactless and can be recharged for ongoing use. Metrovia uses an extensive system of closed- capacity articulated buses on exclusive bus lanes circuit cameras to monitor its vehicle operations and along major arterials. These lanes are open to taxis to observe passenger activity at the stations. The con- and motorcycles, but not private vehicles (Figure 4). trol center is located at its Rio Daule terminal. The Transantiago began service in 2007 with high cameras allow staff to quickly respond to operational expectations. The new system was expected to sig- interruptions, such as accidents, disabled buses, or nificantly reduce the number of buses operating on nontransit vehicles blocking the bus lanes. The cam- Santiago's streets, and nearly 8,000 standard-size era system has improved passenger safety and secu- or smaller privately operated buses were replaced rity, resulting in a more positive perception among the by 4,500 new articulated and standard-size buses, public that the Metrovia system is safe and reliable. creating a modern, unified image. One of the new features of the system was the method of fare payment, which required all passen- Santiago, Chile gers to use an electronic stored-value card known as the "bip!" card. Cash fares would no longer be Santiago's extensive subway system--Metro de collected on buses. The bip! card provides an inte- Santiago--has three lines, 92 stations, and 85 kilo- grated fare system between buses and allows for meters of track. Each year, 641 million passengers one free bus-to-bus transfer, which was not allow- are carried on the Metro. able under the previous bus system. Passengers are Transantiago was created to coordinate and also able to make bus-to-Metro transfers for a single, streamline the existing privately operated bus ser- integrated fare. vice, reduce congestion and pollution, and relieve ridership pressures from the Metro system. The strat- Bus Capacity and Travel Demand egy behind the Transantiago service plan was to pro- vide a trunk and feeder system that would improve One of the greatest problems was a miscalcula- access in the city and supplement the Metro system. tion in the number of buses that the new system The service plan divided the city into nine zones out- would require at start-up. On the first day of service, side of the central core. Each of the nine zones would only about 4,000 buses were in service, not the 5,600 have its own unique color-coded feeder network, buses that had been planned. The number of buses and passengers would transfer onto BRT service or planned was based on aggressive estimates of travel the Metro to reach the city core. Terminal facilities time savings from the use of new bus-only lanes. would enhance the transfer experience between the Unfortunately, not all of the new bus lanes were feeder bus and the trunk line. The bus services would available for the system's launch, and traffic signals be further enhanced by the use of frequent high- had not been modified to expedite bus movements. 10

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Only 10 mi of the planned exclusive bus lanes or had been deployed by Transantiago to manage the bus-only streets were available at the start, which street operations. represented less than 25% of what was anticipated. The result was that buses took longer to make each Management of Contract Operations trip and could not turn around quickly enough at ter- Initially, Transantiago had contracts with 14 dif- minals to provide sufficient capacity. ferent operators. Some of these operators were Because congestion was worse during peak peri- ods, the bus shortage was worse during the peak family-run businesses that had provided bus service period than during the off-peak period. In anticipation during the regulated period of the 1990s. Unfortu- of the new and improved bus system, many more peo- nately, poor management practices at some of the ple than expected turned out to use the system. There companies carried over into their early operations were not enough buses to meet the increased demand, under Transantiago, resulting in missed trips and particularly for passengers attempting to travel during vehicle breakdowns. Other, larger national or multi- peak periods for work trips. Dissatisfaction with the national contractors evidenced fewer performance new system was immediate. problems. Transantiago had initially negotiated compensa- Fare Payment Procedures and Route Information tion for the contractors based on a lower level of demand. When demand exceeded projections and it There was little or no public information about became necessary to add service, the contractors did how to use the new bus routes. In instances where a not have a means of recouping their costs. This direct bus trip under the old system was replaced by phase of the project led to contractor dissatisfaction feeder line service to a trunk line, passengers did not and did not help the already tenuous operation of the know where they needed to make a transfer, which service on a day-to-day basis. bus to transfer to, or how to pay their fare. Passengers The service delivery challenges created with the who did not have an electronic farecard came pre- rushed implementation of Transantiago ultimately pared to pay their fare in cash but found themselves led to service improvements in both the Metro and barred from boarding because none of the buses had the bus systems. Those changes are detailed in the fareboxes. Fares remained the same as what the service optimization section of this report. private operators had charged, leading the public to conclude that the new system provided even less value for the money than the old system. Buenos Aires, Argentina Fare payment procedures were inconsistent. The Buenos Aires transportation system consists Passengers with bip! cards found that when they of 15,000 buses, 800 km of railway lines, 46 km of transferred between trunk and feeder buses, they subway network, and 7 km of light rail line. Metro- were charged a second fare because of an inadequate vias coordinates transportation on the rail and subway time window for making free transfers. Other pas- lines. Bus services are provided by private operating sengers found that they could make a round trip companies holding permits/franchises from the gov- without being charged a new fare. Others simply ernment. There is no local public transit authority waved their bip! card at the farebox without actually in Buenos Aires. Public buses operate almost totally making contact, and then proceeded to board with- without regard to the subway and rail network out having any fare deducted from their card. Some- and with little or no service coordination between times this fare evasion was inadvertent; in other the modes. cases, it was deliberate. Present day operations of the Metrovias system Bus drivers were also not properly educated appear to be focused on maintaining subsidy levels. about the new routes, and their lack of knowledge Operation of the system is limited by the inability to about the new system fueled the public's dissatis- raise fares despite increasing costs. Fares remained faction. Coordination and oversight among the var- at the same level between 2004 and 2008, despite ious bus services were not provided. Passengers increases in labor and other operating costs. During who used the trunk lines to travel from the center of this period, the federal government made a policy the city to outlying areas often found no feeder buses decision to subsidize operations to compensate for waiting when they got to a transfer point. No staff cost increases, rather than raise fares. Yet during the 11

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same period, labor contracts (with the federal gov- rather than a long-range, integrated transportation plan ernment, not Metrovias) were renegotiated to give that links operations and investments. Funding con- workers a guaranteed 6-hour workday, while receiv- straints further limit system expansion. ing 8 hours of pay. Other labor-related issues have slowed progress. Bus Services in Buenos Aires The union blocked efforts to install ticket vending machines (TVMs) in stations, citing a fear that jobs Bus service in Buenos Aires initially developed would be lost. Labor rules also require that trains as competition for the subway and tramway lines in have two operators, even though only one is needed. the 1930s and took the form of private collectives. Such barriers to innovation have been problematic These services went through a time of government and serve to increase costs. Fares have also been control (1940s) and were then again privatized in the kept artificially low (when Metrovias wanted to early 1960s. When subway and commuter rail lines charge higher fares during the peak period, the gov- were privatized in the 1990s, with an added empha- ernment insisted that the fares be lower in the peak sis on providing efficient service, bus ridership fell, period); as a result, the subsidy needed to support mostly due to deteriorating vehicles and facilities. As revenue declined, private operators increasingly operations must keep increasing year after year. directly competed with one another for passengers. Government subsidies cover 60% of operating By 2002, the federal government again inter- costs, while fare revenue only cover 40%. A small vened, announcing that permits or franchises would fare increase in 2008 did not change that ratio. be issued to private operators to protect their routes The demand for expansion is being met with from competition. As a condition of receiving a per- system improvements and developments, including mit, the operator had to agree that all vehicles would renewal of tracks, station adaptations, and improve- be less than 10 years old, have rear engines, and be ments and installation of other amenities on the outfitted with pollution controls. Passenger safety Urquiza railway line. Renewal and remodeling of equipment, such as door controls, was also mandated, subway stations and cars has also contributed to the as were minimum headways of 30 min during periods improvements of the transit system. of lower demand. Because the remaining companies Capacity improvements on some of the subway from the private collective era were undercapitalized, lines have been addressed through retrofitting second- they were gradually replaced by operating companies hand commuter rail cars. A complete fleet of very that had the resources to bring in new vehicles with well maintained, 25-year-old cars was purchased amenities such as low-floor boarding. Some of the from Japan, and those cars began running on Line B private collective companies failed to obtain permits in 1995. because they could not meet the requirements. A bid- The Metrovias system includes electronic fare ding process took place among other firms to deter- collection technology, which is estimated to be uti- mine a new operator, and the successful bidder was lized by approximately 60% of the passengers. often a formal operating company. Bus services have evolved in Buenos Aires from Electronic Monitoring private, small-scale collective operators that com- Metrovias utilizes electronic monitoring of the peted with the subway to a more formalized structure system. A control center allows staff to immediately where professional operating companies provide the determine if operations are proceeding as scheduled bulk of service. Prior to 1987, there were more than and to provide rapid response to emergencies. This 120 private bus operators, and only one company had monitoring system includes 416 closed-circuit more than 350 vehicles. Today, there are 66 opera- security cameras and 230 closed-circuit television tors, and 5 of those companies provide a total of (CCTV) cameras providing station surveillance. more than 350 vehicles. Companies with less than With the subway operations now in private hands, 100 vehicles represented 56%of bus operations the government has largely turned system planning in 1987; today, they represent only 21% of bus over to the concessionaire. The government reviews operations. the various options proposed by the concessionaire The formalized structure and the government- and chooses which to support. Extensions to the rail mandated minimum vehicle requirements have system mainly advance as a result of political support, resulted in newer buses with better equipment and 12

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ease of access. Operators still compete with one lection system and is responsible for disbursing rev- another, particularly on major corridors where there enue to Carris and the private concessionaires. is no subway service. Agreements are in place between Carris and the three concessionaires to reduce overlap and compe- tition for passengers and to ensure that "social" or Porto Alegre, Brazil lifeline routes, which are necessary but often under- Transit service in Porto Alegre consists of a perform, are cross-subsidized by the more profitable coordinated bus transit service and a single suburban routes. commuter rail line. EPTC is responsible for a fleet BRT service has been implemented in phases, of 1,572 buses, 403 minibuses, 623 school buses, with various segments of the BRT network offer- and 3,922 taxicabs. The bus infrastructure in Porto ing different types of stations and vehicles. Some Alegre consists of 55 km of dedicated busways, corridors feature high-platform stations with left- 92 stations, and more than 5,000 bus stops with door boarding, while others offer standard low- 330 routes. The system's ridership averages 953,000 floor buses boarding at conventional-level platforms. on weekdays and more than 73 million passengers Many BRT stations are rather modest stops along the per year (2008 figures). Completing the transit net- busways, while others are grade-separated stations work is an electrified surface rail line that is referred with stairs to an upper level where transfers are made to as the Metro. The rail line carries approximately to connecting bus routes (Figure 5). Some articu- 160,000 passengers per day, which represents about lated buses are in use, but the majority are standard- 14% of the city's total transit ridership. size vehicles. Transit service is coordinated by EPTC and ATP. EPTC provides the infrastructure, including bus lanes, Technological Enhancements stations, and a traffic monitoring program involving Porto Alegre utilizes technology as a means of an extensive network of cameras. ATP, a consortium improving the efficiency of its transit network. A of the transportation providers (Carris and three pri- variety of technological enhancements have been vate concessionaires--STS, Unibus, and Co. Norte), implemented, ranging from electronic fare collec- provides integrated bus service in Porto Alegre. tion to an integrated traffic camera and automatic Carris is a public corporation that traces its roots vehicle location (AVL) system designed to provide back more than 100 years to privately operated rapid response to problems and to offer customers tramways in the city, which were discontinued in up-to-date information. The camera system man- 1970. The three concessionionaires represent 14 pri- aged by EPTC allows better management of bus vate operators. Carris provides radial service that operations and allows security or police to be rapidly links the center of the city with various subregions, dispatched if, for example, a private automobile while the private operators provide most local ser- vice within the subregions. Each of the three pri- vate concessions manages bus operations within its sector and may reassign vehicles and drivers from its constituent private operators to each route to ensure that adequate capacity is being offered. Each private operator within a consortium is respon- sible for providing buses and drivers and for ensuring that the vehicles are maintained in good operating condition. ATP represents the corporate interests of its member companies, coordinates financial informa- tion, and calculates the ratio of expenses to fares in determining fare increases. ATP also determines the distribution of routes between Carris and the pri- vate concessionaires, sometimes transferring routes between operating companies to balance costs and revenue. ATP also manages the electronic fare col- Figure 5 Porto Alegre grade-separated BRT station. 13