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under § 1983.349 (States, however, retain no sovereign not considered part of the state for Eleventh Amend-
immunity as against the federal government.)350 A ment purposes."356
plaintiff may bring a § 1983 action against state offi- In sum, the majority view appears to be that § 1983
cials in their official capacities for prospective, injunc- is not a basis for a suit alleging a violation of disparate-
tive relief.351 impact regulations.357 In any event, states and state
As for whether a transportation authority organized agencies have immunity with respect to § 1983 ac-
as a public corporation qualifies as a state entity, in tions.358
Mancuso v. New York State Thruway Authority352 the
Second Circuit held that the New York State Thruway VI. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI
Authority did not have sovereign immunity because COMPLAINTS
New York State would not have been affected finan-
cially by an award of damages against the defendant.353
In reaching its decision that the Authority did not have A. Procedures Applicable to Complaints
immunity, the court identified six factors to determine As a condition to receiving federal financial assis-
whether a public corporation has sovereign immunity: tance, the recipient and subrecipients must provide
1) how the entity is referred to in the documents that assurances to the USDOT of their compliance with Title
359
created it; 2) how its governing members are appointed; VI requirements. The regulations list the types of dis-
3) how the entity is funded; 4) whether the entity's crimination prohibited by any recipient through any
function is traditionally one of local or state govern- program for which federal financial assistance is pro-
ment; 5) whether the state has a veto power over the vided by the USDOT.360 The Secretary of the DOT must
entity's actions; and 6) whether the entity's obligations seek the cooperation of a recipient and provide guidance
354
are binding upon the state. in an effort to secure voluntary compliance with the
As for municipal transit agencies and § 1983 actions, regulations.361
in Monell v. New York355 the Court held that municipal The disparate-impact regulations identify two ways
corporations are persons that are amenable to suit un- in which the disparate-impact policies are enforced.
der § 1983. In ruling that the Eleventh Amendment is First, federal financial assistance may be refused if an
not a bar to municipal liability, the Monell Court's hold- applicant "fails or refuses to furnish an assurance re-
ing was limited to "local government units which are quired under [49 C.F.R.] § 21.7 or otherwise fails or
refuses to comply with a requirement imposed by or
362
pursuant to that section...." Section 21.13 identifies
the procedures that apply when the Department seeks
349
Vickroy v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 73 Fed. Appx. 172 (7th to terminate financial assistance or refuses to grant or
Cir. 2003); Gregory v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 289 F. Supp. 2d continue such assistance. A hearing, which occurs be-
721, 723 (2003) (holding that a claim that the state defendants fore either the Secretary or a hearing examiner, must
targeted the defendant and his neighborhood for a systematic
undervaluation appraisal because of his race in connection
with the state's use of eminent domain to acquire property for
a specific bridge project was barred by the Eleventh Amend-
356
ment); Manning v. S.C. Dep't of Highway and Pub. Transp., Id. at 691, n.54. The Court reaffirmed that the doctrine of
914 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1990); Toledo, Peoria & W. R. Co. v. State respondeat superior is not a basis for holding local govern-
of Ill., Dep't of Transp., 744 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1984 (dismiss- ments liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of their
ing action against state transportation department because a employees. See also Donnelly v. McLellan, 889 F. Supp. 136,
state agency is not a "person" within the meaning of the Civil 140 (D. Vt. 1995) (noting that the New York City Transit Au-
Rights Act)). thority "has been held to be an agency of the City of New York
350
United States v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 321 F.3d 495, by a variety of courts and for a broad range of statutory pur-
498 (5th Cir. 2003 (involving the ADA)); West Virginia v. poses").
357
United States, 479 U.S. 305, 312 n.4, 107 S. Ct. 702, 707 n.4, ANDREW H. BAIDA, CIVIL RIGHTS IN TRANSPORTATION
93 L. Ed. 2d 639, 647 n.4 (1987). PROJECTS 18 (Transportation Research Board, Legal Research
351
Heartland Academic Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d Digest No. 48, 2003) ("Section 1983 remains an option for pri-
525, 530 (8th Cir. 2005). vate parties seeking relief from such action, but the future
352
86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1996), citing Feeney v. Port viability of these suits is questionable, given the current com-
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 63031 (2d Cir. position of the Supreme Court.")
358
1989). The question of whether a § 1983 claim may be brought
353
Id. at 296 (stating that "the state treasury is not even against a specific agency is beyond the scope of the digest.
359
minimally at risk"). 49 C.F.R. § 21.7 (2009).
360
354
Id. at 293. Id. §§ 21.3, 21.5 (2009).
361
355
Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, Id. § 21.9 (2009).
362
69495, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 203738, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 638 (1978). Id. § 21.13(b) (2009).
