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35 court held, inter alia, that, unlike the access-to-justice statute of limitations for actions arising under federal issue in the Lane case, "there is no fundamental right to statutes enacted after December 1, 1990.)510 public transportation."503 Furthermore, "Title II is not a In Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Southeast- congruent and proportional response to the history of ern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,511 the plain- disability discrimination in the provision of public tiff Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania argued that transportation to the disabled, a public accommodation "under the plain language of the statute, its claims ac- to which they have no fundamental right."504 crued `upon the completion' of alterations to two Phila- On the other hand, the court held that the plaintiffs' delphia subway stations,"512 the statute in question be- claim under the Rehabilitation Act could proceed be- ing 42 U.S.C. 12147(a).513 First, the court noted that cause INDOT had waived its Eleventh Amendment neither Title II of the ADA nor Section 504 of the Reha- immunity when it accepted federal funds.505 The court bilitation Act included an express statute of limitations; observed that 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7 "conditions a state's the court borrowed Pennsylvania's 2-year statute of receipt of federal money on its waiver of Eleventh limitations for personal injury claims.514 Second, the Amendment immunity to actions under 504."506 What- court held that "it is only when renovations are com- ever INDOT actually knew or believed when it accepted pleted that individuals with disabilities will be excluded 507 federal funds was irrelevant. from accessing and using such facilities while others In an action against the Washington Metropolitan will not. This is the time at which disabled individuals Area Transit Authority (WMATA), the court dismissed are subjected to the disparate treatment that ADA claims against WMATA on the basis of sovereign 12147(a) was enacted to prevent."515 Thus, the dis- immunity. As a quasi-public entity, WMATA partakes criminatory acts defined by 12147(a) occurred and the of the state sovereign immunity conferred by the Elev- statute of limitations began to run upon the completion enth Amendment on Virginia and Maryland. However, of the alterations to the public transportation facili- 516 the court treated the dismissed ADA claims as if they ties. had been brought under the Rehabilitation Act.508 VIII. TITLE III OF THE AMERICANS WITH H. Statute of Limitations in ADA Cases DISABILITIES ACT AND PRIVATE Finally, it should be noted that a recent development TRANSPORTATION ENTITIES in ADA litigation has concerned when the statute of limitations commences. Federal courts usually borrow the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in A. Prohibition of Discrimination in Public the state where a Title II claim arose.509 (It may be Accommodations noted that following the Goodman decision cited in the Title III of the ADA applies to public accommoda- preceding footnote, Congress enacted a catchall 4-year tions and services operated or provided by private enti- ties, including private transportation entities serving 503 Everybody Counts, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39607 at 510 28 U.S.C. 1658. Subsection (a) provides: "Except as oth- *29. erwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of 504 Id. at *40. Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this sec- 505 Id. tion may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause 506 Id. at *42. Section 2000d-7 provides: of action accrues." 511 539 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2008). A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment 512 of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal Id. at 201. court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 513 42 U.S.C. 12147(a) (2009) provides: 1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of With respect to alterations of an existing facility or part 1964, or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting thereof used in the provision of designated public transportation discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance. services that affect or could affect the usability of the facility or (Emphasis supplied). part thereof, it shall be considered discrimination, for purposes 507 of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for a Everybody Counts, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39607 at public entity to fail to make such alterations (or to ensure that *46. the alterations are made) in such a manner that, to the maxi- 508 Disability Rights Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. mum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are Metro. Area Transit Auth., 239 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2006). readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, 509 including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon the completion Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660, 107 S. of such alterations. Ct. 2617, 96 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1987), superseded by statute as 514 stated in Panariello v. Nassau County, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS Disabled in Action of Pa., 539 F.3d at 208. 515 27045 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009); Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45, Id. at 211. 516 49 (2d Cir. 1987). Id. at 213.