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13 specialist risk assessors. The objective of the FHA is to explore · National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Accident relevant operational scenarios and identify hazards associated Database and Synopses with them. The output of the FHA is typically a "hazard log," · Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) which includes all hazards identified and preliminary informa- · Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) tion about them that can be provided by the workshop team. · Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Avi- A recent study developed by the Flight Safety Foundation ation Civile (BEA) (2009) gathered information worldwide on runway excursion · UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) accidents occurring from January 1995 to March 2008. The · New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commis- study presents a matrix of contributing factors that identified sion (TAIC) common causes and followed trends. The study resulted in the · Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore following major conclusions. · Ireland Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) The major contributing factors for takeoff excursions · Spain's Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Inci- include the following: dentes de Aviación Civil (CIAIAC) · Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee · Rejecting takeoff after V1 was the most cited factor, which (NTSC) in turn was caused by · Netherlands Aviation Safety Board (NASB) Pilot's perception of a catastrophic failure · MITRE Corporation Accident and Incident Database Inability to rotate due to incorrect center of gravity (CG) location, mistake in performance calculation, or flight A list of accidents and incidents containing the cases used control anomalies for model development is presented in Appendix D. In addi- · Loss of directional control, which is generally associated with tion to the taxiway incidents identified, the list includes run- Mechanical anomalies (30 percent of cases) way veer-off events that occurred within 1,000 ft of the run- Contaminated runways way centerline. Every identified event that has occurred since Crosswind 1978 and for which reports were available was included in the database for this study. The major contributing factors for landing excursions Portions of the data are complemented with other sources include the following: of information, particularly information sources on aircraft, airport, and meteorological conditions. For example, in many · Human errors and neglect of standard operating procedures cases information on the weather during the accident was such as missing, and the research team obtained the actual METAR for Landing long and/or fast during unstabilized approaches the airport to retrieve the data. In other situations, the runway Failing to go around despite unstabilized approach used was missing, and the research team consulted the FAA Other pilot's errors, such as hard landing · Mechanical problems leading to the following: Enhanced Traffic Management System Counts (ETMSC) and Spontaneous collapse of the landing gear the Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) to retrieve Asymmetric forces due to thrust reverse or braking relevant information. problems Additional filtering criteria were used so that the events · Environmental factors such as the following: were comparable. The first set of filtering criteria was applied Crosswind and tailwind conditions so as to retrieve only information from regions of the world Runway surface under wet or contaminated conditions having accident rates that are comparable to the U.S. rate. In addition, the filtering criteria described in Table 3 were applied Information on runway, taxiway, and taxilane events was in this study. Filtering was necessary in order to make data not readily available to use in this study. Relevant accident collection a feasible task and to ensure that the data used in and incident reports were identified in worldwide databases. the modeling process were fairly homogeneous. The basic idea was to collect information that could be used to develop risk models based on evidence from past accidents Aircraft Veer-Off and incidents. Runway and taxiway veer-off accident and Database Organization incident data were collected from the following sources: The accident and incident database was developed in · FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS) Microsoft Access. The system provides the software tools · FAA/National Aeronautics and Space Administration needed to utilize the data in a flexible manner and includes (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) facilities to add, modify, or delete data from the database;