National Academy of Sciences | 150 Year Anniversary

Questions? Call 800-624-6242

| Items in cart [0]

The National Academies Press

Rights & Permissions

topleft topright

HMCRP Report 5: A Guide for Assessing Community Emergency Response Needs and Capabilities for Hazardous Materials Releases (2011)
Hazardous Material Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP)

Citation Manager

Transportation Research Board. "Chapter 8 - Identifying Shortfalls where Additional/Different Capabilities Are Warranted." HMCRP Report 5: A Guide for Assessing Community Emergency Response Needs and Capabilities for Hazardous Materials Releases. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2011.

Please select a format:

BibTeX EndNote RefMan


Page
41
bottomleft bottomright
Page
41
Front Matter (R1-R9)
Introduction (1-2)
How to Use This Document (3-4)
Balancing Assessment with Planning Capabilities of a Local Emergency Response Organization (5-6)
Defining the Risk Metric (7-7)
Vulnerability (8-8)
Summary of Risk Metric Evaluation Steps (9-10)
Terminology to Represent Emergency Response Capability (11-11)
Defining Emergency Response Capability Tiers (12-14)
Determining Your Teams' Capability Tiers (15-15)
Establishing Your Performance Objectives (16-21)
Material Categorization - Incident Release Types (22-23)
Additional Sources of Information (24-24)
Documentation - Creating a Hazardous Materials Portfolio (25-25)
Transportation Corridors (Mobile Sources) (26-27)
Defining Consequences (28-28)
Estimating Human-Health Consequences (29-30)
Estimating Environmental Consequences (31-31)
Selecting the Consequence Value (32-32)
Emergency Response Capability Factor (33-34)
Response Time Factor (35-35)
Quantifying the Mitigating Effects (36-36)
Adding Risk to the Hazardous Materials Portfolio (37-38)
Hazardous Materials Portfolio Example (39-40)
Chapter 8 - Identifying Shortfalls where Additional/Different Capabilities Are Warranted (41-41)
Reallocating Resources (42-42)
Hazardous Materials Route Restrictions (43-43)
Sharing Emergency Response Capability Assessments (44-44)
Acronyms (45-45)
Appendix A - Information Sources (46-61)
Appendix B - Estimating Vulnerability (62-65)
Appendix C - Estimating the Consequence Term in the Risk Metric Equation (66-70)
Appendix D - Additional Details on Capability Assessment (71-72)
Appendix E - Estimating Emergency Response Times (73-75)
Appendix F - Bibliography (76-77)
Appendix G - Final Report for HMCRP Project 03 (78-108)
Abbreviations used without definitions in TRB publications (109-109)

Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page 41
CHAPTER 8 Identifying Shortfalls where Additional/Different Capabilities Are Warranted In Chapter 3 some shortfalls were developed by comparing the current tier level capability in the region identified in Chapter 2 with the tier level capabilities required based on the Jurisdictional Class selected for the region in Chapter 3. These basic shortfalls should be addressed first. For example, when evaluating the tier level performance capabilities, the lower tier level may have been specified because the emergency response organization could not perform up to the higher tier level requirement in those few areas. Thus, to perform at the higher tier level expected for the selected Jurisdictional Class, only a few capability upgrades might be required. Since these affect the overall performance of the emergency response organization, these should be addressed as soon as resources permit. 250 The next part of the shortfall analysis focuses on upgrading the tier level performance for 200 those scenarios that have the highest risk metric value. Frequently, the upgrade will affect several 150 scenarios. Consequently, many shortfalls might be addressed by a single upgrade activity. 100 The first step in this part of the approach is to order the scenarios by decreasing risk metric value. For this example (refer to Table 21), a large release of chlorine is the biggest concern, followed by 50 a BLEVE of a rail tank car carrying ethylene. While this Guide does not recommend specific 0 thresholds above which a scenario's risk metric warrants action, each jurisdiction can easily identify the top scenarios and examine the range of values for breakpoints that could be used as thresh- Figure 3. Chart old values. Examination of Table 21 (see Figure 3) shows possible breaks at risk metric values of of risk metrics 75 and 24, so either can be used as a threshold for focusing the initial remediation efforts. from Table 21. 41