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Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security (2011)

Chapter: Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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68 Marine Carrier A major improvement in navigation technology has been the advent of the Automatic Identification System (AIS). This system provides a means for boats to electronically exchange vessel identification, position, course, and speed with other nearby ships and Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) stations. AIS is now operational in major maritime traffic areas and is a required installation on vessels moving through these areas. AIS information is integrated into electronic navigation system software provided to the industry by commercial ven- dors. AIS and other geographic information can be overlaid on GIS-based navigation charts to provide both a visual ref- erence and to support calculations indicating the proximity of oncoming hazards. The ability to send and receive safety related messages are also supported. Examples of integrated electronic navigation system func- tionality include Collision avoidance functionality that shows both the closest point of approach and provides a prediction of where and when the vessel will make contact. Customized alarms can be set accordingly. Use of GPS to set up “virtual buoys,” a form of geofencing that triggers alarms if vessels deviate from these areas. An important application is avoidance of what have been his- torically high grounding areas. A recent technology development is the ability to predict outdraft (cross-current), which can be a serious navigational problem around locks, bridges, and other major structures. Sensors submerged at these locations determine the direction and velocity of the outdraft, and the information is transmitted to the AIS for dissemination. To deal with allisions (vessels striking stationary objects rather than other moving vessels), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Coast Guard have established standards at bridges and locks to assist with safe vessel maneuverability. A technology being adopted by the industry is the ability to read a signal emitted at these locations which will enable a boat to determine its distance from the structure in question. From an institutional standpoint, mariners have had a high acceptance of and reliance on these new technologies, partic- ularly compared with 3 to 4 years ago. It has reached a point where mariners are reluctant to navigate without having access to electronic information. Boat pilots have an opportunity to train on simulators owned and operators by Seaman’s Church Organization. Seaman’s has four simulated wheelhouses, each of which con- tains a representation of the entire bridge of the boat. The simulator provides a 180 degree visual and contains a full set of controls. A wide range of scenarios that a vessel operator is likely to encounter on the waterways can be simulated. By September 2008, all mariners and support personnel were required to have a Transportation Worker Identifica- tion Credential (TWIC). The TWIC has biometric features, including fingerprints and eye scans. Around docks, some companies have installed underwater sensors, used to detect any foreign objects that may have been accidentally or purposely placed, with the potential to cause harm to the docking vessel. The oil industry is known to be deploying this technology. A technology is currently being tested to detect pressure changes of container contents, with the readings sent via satel- lite. One safety concern is how to make these systems spark resistant. Many boats are outfitted with a panic button which trans- mits an alarm to a centralized location. When an incident has occurred that requires an emergency response, a single call to the National Response Center (NRC) initiates the response process. Interestingly, the industry has yet to leverage GIS infor- mation technology to identify the nearest response assets in proximity (e.g., police, medical personnel, recovery resources, etc.) to the incident site. A P P E N D I X C Summary of Key Results from Initial Research Interviews

Dock navigation is still an issue. Presently, dock operations are performed using hardcopy reference documents that are available on computers in pdf form. Level 2 Emergency Responder Organization: Chief of Fire Department The worst nightmare would be a phone call about a major wreck involving multiple vehicles (i.e., rail and truck Hazmat) and catastrophic release of a flammable compressed toxic sub- stance in a congested area. Pipeline leaks are usually localized, although they can happen in congested areas. Waterways seldom have these types of catastrophes. There is a move to route Hazmat shipments so as to bypass major cities. But this can mean routing it through areas whose response capabilities are less able to handle this type of emergency. Evacuation in response to a catastrophic Hazmat release can be extraordinarily difficult to orchestrate. Sheltering in place may be the better solution. The capability for standardization of Hazmat response training is present but implementation is not, particularly among volunteer fire departments. An emerging issue is the need for capable Hazmat response equipment such as detec- tion systems released with their capabilities validated and the knowledge with which to use them. Decision support systems such as those that detect and alert in response to patterns can be put to good use at a high level. However, it is disconcerting to respond to false alarms. We are going to see more alternative fuels being shipped, similar to how ethanol shipments rapidly ramped up. This will affect both rail and trucking equally. For example, we should expect to see more future shipments of hydrogen, which requires specialized firefighting techniques. Technologies for this can be “high gap—low market adoptability.” There will be more emphasis for emergency responders on biological agents. New equipment and countermeasures such as germicidal foams will be needed along with the techniques for using them. Some small percentage of shipping containers at ports (perhaps 3 to 5 percent) do not contain what their markings say they contain. This is a problem. Level 1 Emergency Responder: Company Emergency Manager First responders need technologies that are simple and straightforward. There are many cases in which funding has been made available for emergency responders to procure sophisticated instruments, but they have found that those instruments are harder to understand, interpret, and use. As a Hazmat shipment crosses (boundaries such as) county lines, politics can come into play and cause response not to be as smooth as it could be. The first 15 minutes following an incident is a critical period in which real-time information needs to flow on the hazardous substance(s) being faced. Security Agency Officials There is a need to facilitate the ability to have continuous on-demand locating of the truck tracking trailer element. With rail, the biggest need is to protect the conveyance. This starts with deterrence, but if deterrence fails, it is important to be able to detect the problem so the threat can be mitigated. There is need for improved security mechanisms. Some dan- gerous chemicals shipped by railcar are subject to theft. Shippers install a security seal, which can be a heavier cable wire seal for more dangerous cargo. The current design of hatches is more than 30 years old and is mostly for physical protection. Railroads are work- ing to make access to valves more difficult. Better security from locking mechanisms is needed, but when something on a railcar malfunctions mechanically, emergency respon- ders need to get access. Who will pay for improved locking mechanisms? What is the balance between more difficult general access to valves for security needs and rapid access to valves by emergency responders? Railroads are moving to improve the survivability of pressurized tank cars through designs such as self-sealing technologies. There is greater emphasis on product security and anti-tampering systems. It is possible to manufacture some chemicals in a safer form for transportation. From both a security and an emergency response perspec- tive, there is much value in early detection of product release. Early warning systems such as chlorine sensors are needed for loss of container integrity. However, electro-chemical sensors are largely not yet up to the environmental rigors of rail transport. Levels 2 and 5 Emergency Responder Organization: National Emergency Responder Association It is very important for emergency responders to be able to determine contents (at the site of a Hazmat incident). They need to verify contents from placards and get their hands on the shipping documents. Chemicals may be shipped by trade names or chemical names. Part of the emergency responder’s job is to eliminate “what it is not,” facilitated by having infor- mation about the commodity and its chemical properties. If shipping papers are destroyed, a placard helps eliminate more than it helps identify. 69

Chemical and biological hand-held assays that can sam- ple a product are needed. Not knowing what a commodity is soon enough can cause a major transportation tie-up. Detec- tion devices can help determine what (dangerous substances) you have within a certain range. Other devices can help indicate how much you have that is a problem and warrants evacuation. The work that has been done on railcar (GPS) tracking such as that conducted by Dow Chemical is important. Automatic crash notification is a good idea. For example, if a Hazmat truck overturns, notification of that event and its location would be automatically sent to a PSAP (Public Safety Answering Point: a call center responsible for answering calls to an emergency telephone number). Even better would be (PSAP) notification of the chemical cargo so that after 911 is called, responders will know what substance is involved with minimal delays. Containers with unique identifiers would help during emergency response, such as a 3-D barcode like the railroads’ Automatic Equipment Identification (AEI) system. Class I railroads have improved (their awareness of commodities being shipped) by leaps and bounds. What the railroads face is low frequency, high risk events. It is currently hard to justify technology expenditures based on safety and response alone. Motor Carrier Association The capability to remotely disable a commercial vehicle exists. Current safety features work. So do security features, and they are robust enough (to resist malicious intent). Tech- nology improvements must have a return on investment and pay for themselves. An electronic manifest would improve efficiency. However, its value is only as good as the information entered, and the weak link is that someone has to key in the information. The driver realizes what is onboard but the system does not until the shipment reaches the terminal. What is the best way to get information on what is in the truck into the system? Have the shipper enter information into a master database? Another weak link is emergency response. Getting infor- mation to emergency responders in a rural area can be a real challenge. If there were the capability for all involved to have smart phones, that would help, but it is not feasible to equip all (Hazmat) trucks with that capability. Diverting or routing Hazmat around highly populated areas translates to more miles driven and more time on the road during which an incident can occur. It also can mean there will be bigger delays (in getting adequate response to the scene because of more rural or remote locations). How can technologies be made more efficient so that indus- try embraces them? On international shipments, brokers as well as carriers are involved in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP’s) Automated Cargo Environment (ACE) (the commercial trade processing system being developed by CBP to facilitate legit- imate trade and strengthen border security). An Electronic Truck Manifest (e-manifest) is part of the ACE process. A package in a Less-than-Truckload (LTL) shipment may need to be handed off (to other vehicles). Which truck it may go on depends on (criteria such as) fullness, capacity, and compatibility. There is a need for a security credential that is universally accepted. What hasn’t received traction is that there are a lot of private facilities that need to provide security for their assets, but (a carrier) doesn’t want to have to deal with 30 dif- ferent credentialing systems. TWIC is available and is a good idea but there is a hidden cost from aspects such as the time it takes to get (a driver) enrolled. Rollover prevention technologies are helpful. Non-intrusive (screening) technologies such as radiation portal monitors have their place. The possibility of a PIH Zone A accident when you do not know what caused it is an example of something that is worri- some. (NOTE: PIH Zone A materials are relatively small quan- tities of PIH that require additional specialized packaging when transported via highway. The final packaged material can be very bulky and consequently can also be quite expensive to ship.) It is not feasible to dedicate trucks with sensors that transport only Zone A PIH. Incentives or deductibles are possibilities for encouraging the use of technologies (for safety and security). Level 1 Emergency Responder Organization This organization maintains a list of contractors to respond on-scene and facilitates Level 2 and 3 response through mutual agreements. Previously, the Dow Chemical Company implemented a “Track and Trace” program that integrates GPS, GIS, and radio frequency identification (RFID) to improve the safety and security of its Hazmat shipments. Dow and the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC) expanded the concept to Dow’s Railcar Shipment Visibility Program, an initiative for using tracking and sensing technologies for surveillance of TIH being transported by rail, and improved communications between the two organizations as well as with emergency responders should an incident occur with Hazmat in transit. In addition to GPS-based tracking with satellite communi- cations, this initiative includes tank car sensors such as load 70

indicators, external sniffers, dome open/close indicators, tem- perature indicators, and pressure gages (NOTE: while not all sensors had been be activated at the time of the interview, the system was in use). Geofencing at locations such as cus- tomer docks or in High-Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs) is also involved. Signals can be automatically generated when an instrumented tank car enters or exits a HTUA. Railroad and DHS alerts can be tied to the system and railcar GPS devices can be queried. The system helps determine whether a (safety and/or security) event has occurred. When an alert is generated by this system, CHEMTREC is notified and is charged with implementing protocols. There is no such thing as a “typical” incident. The telephone is the most valuable tool (for Hazmat res- ponse). Nothing will replace someone picking up the phone and calling to say they need help and someone to help solve the problem. In responding to an emergency, it is desirable to have three (sources of information) that say the same thing (since initial information is so often wrong). Previously, deciphering a train consist was difficult. But now, cooperation between CSX Railroad and CHEMTREC has greatly streamlined the process with CSX’s Network Operating Workstation (NOW). If there is notification or a derailment, using NOW, the train number, tank car number, and approximate location (integrated with Google Earth) can be pulled up on a computer screen within about 1 minute. A graphic portraying the railcars is shown along with Hazmat shipping description information such as shipper, consignee, and status. Hapag-Lloyd, a global container shipping line, has a system with which shipper and container content information can be determined from the container number. There is conflict between proprietary information and an open architecture. The issue is information exchange, not technology exchange. If (technology) is not necessary to the business bottom line, it is harder for it to be adopted. Technologies are (rel- atively) easy to understand and adopt. Standards become the issue. Ideally (to be adopted), technologies need to have a self-sustaining component and more than one benefit. Rail Hazmat Technology Academic SME Micro-Electromechanical devices have promise for a smart apparatus on railcars that can detect hunting, hot bearings, and acceleration. (NOTE: “hunting” is a railcar motion phe- nomenon in which severe, low frequency, lateral accelerations are experienced. Typically, this is caused by wheel and track wear, track conditions, and speed. The phenomenon can be severe enough to damage rail shipments or even raise the risk of derailment.) When emergency responders arrive at the scene of a Hazmat railcar derailment or truck crash, it would be desirable to have a hand-held device capable of remotely getting information from the affected vehicles concerning their contents, such as what is on the placard. These devices themselves would not have to be expensive, but instrument cost is not the only fac- tor. Many personnel would have to be trained on how to use it and how to gain access to the Hazmat information. Carri- ers would have to make shipment information available, and that has a security aspect to it. Achieving a safely distant stand-off range with the hand-held devices would be a problem. The greater the range required, the greater the reason for the vehicle to have active technology, thus the greater the cost (compared to passive technology). And the farther away from the scene the emergency responders are, the greater the challenges for them to manage the information. Railcar devices (e.g., RFID) would need to have a relatively sophisticated programming capability. There must be univer- sal compatibility with devices. The information would have to be updated whenever the Hazmat contents change, or more harm can be done than good could by the misinformation. The driver will not have the capability to certify the load. Thus, you lose control unless you have strong verification that the Hazmat you are told a vehicle is carrying (or not carrying) is actually so. Barcodes can get very dirty and hard to read, especially on trucks in the winter. If the interest is primarily in the substance, the placard gives that. Hazmat Emergency Response Technology Provider The Intelligent Road and Rail Information System (IRRIS) is a powerful tool (and existing technology product) that has been developed with capabilities for visibility and tracking of assets. IRRIS was originally developed for the U.S. Military to track, manage, and document the movement of surface cargo transported throughout the world. It is designed to integrate data for the customer’s use and has the capability to be tied into the systems of various government and military organi- zations. It works with the Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS), which provides satellite tracking capability for truck shipments of sensitive conventional Arms, Ammu- nition, and Explosives (AA&E) shipments, and Other Sensitive Material (OSM). It is capable of tracking cargo on a “parent- child” relationship and can look at data on trends such as malicious acts. It provides the ability to drill down to the con- tents of pallets and containers. Shipments being tracked can be managed by exception alerting. 71

Class I Railroad Officials This rail carrier’s Network Operating Workstation (NOW) is a proprietary development that allows point-and-click func- tionality to access railcar and rail traffic databases through a mainframe computer. Extracting information is done through different screen lookups. Through NOW, it is possible to get information that includes a train’s consist, crew, origin and destination, and route points. NOW facilitates train, railcar, and locomotive management. It can be used for situational awareness for homeland security and incident response. There is an internal version and an external version, the latter of which can be used with fusion centers. NOW doesn’t provide an insider’s view such as whether a train is running late. Five agencies (four states and the Transportation Security Opera- tions Center) and CHEMTREC have access to NOW data. When a railcar’s information is pulled onto a screen, it displays the railcar’s placard. An icon of the car was added as a feature. Information can be obtained four different ways: (1) GPS on the locomotive, which “knows” and displays the consist, (2) a computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system, (3) the Automatic Equipment Identification (AEI) system of RFID railcar tags and railside readers, and (4) updates made by cer- tain personnel. At the time of the interview, approximately 50 percent of locomotives were thought to have GPS (NOTE: do not know whether that figure was for all Class I railroads or only this one). This rail carrier operates in 31 HTUAs (more than any other Class I railroad). With NOW, alerting parameters such as geofencing can be set. Alerts can be test or e-mail. NOW is a great tool for derailment response and security planning. Local communities want an advance consist. When NOW started to deal with states and fusion centers, they thought having a central, well-trained point of contact was the best concept. They could communicate with free access and were able to get critical information out. If a third party logistics (3PL) firm is vetted by NOW, they can get the latest database information on location. What hasn’t changed is the need for emergency responders to seek out locomotive conductors who will have paperwork such as the train’s consist. With NOW, it is possible to iden- tify what is in the schematic within seconds. This railroad sees a day when a sensor can automatically notify the closes dis- patch center if an event occurs. Also, there may be telemetry devices communicating the locations of both the front and back ends of the train. There is also the concept of a radio broadcast in which, if there were an undetermined emergency, a message could be generated and sent to an emergency services band that includes the railroad’s identity and the train’s identification. A device on the train would make the broadcast. Through encryption, emergency responders could get useful status information on certain commodities such as whether the cargo is upright or overturned or a chemical has been released. Protecting information on the customer base will con- tinue to be paramount, and railroads may never agree to have the same system. But having a common platform is vitally important. There needs to be a uniform system that offers consistency and ease of use. The focus needs to be on what can be done to help emergency responders and federal and state homeland security organizations. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Someday there may be embedded technology in the road- ways to guide robotic Hazmat response modules. Many of the Hazmat problems are associated with specific routes. This state EPA sees driver behavior as a major cause of Hazmat incidents. Medical devices that monitor the driver and other sensors that monitor outside status such as ground surface conditions or following too closely would be helpful. Diabetic and cardiac emergencies could be detected by med- ical monitoring devices. Certain conditions might preclude the driver from starting the vehicle. With the highway mode, danger from Hazmat events is lower per mile on Interstate freeways than on rural roads. It is more likely that a Hazmat shipment will run into trou- ble in a rural area. In metropolitan areas, accidents tend to be “fender benders” that frequently do not involve other vehicles, or even if they do, there is little cargo damage. In contrast, there is more likelihood that a Hazmat shipment will run into trouble in a rural area, such as running off the shoulder of the road and overturning. With the rail mode, tank cars experience a reduced rate of incidents. It is hard for rural fire departments to afford specialized training. There normally is training on a quarterly basis on the types of railcars that come through a certain area. Some firefighter training is not useful because it is not geared to the level of protection, danger zone, and equipment (required). Training in the “20-second evaluation” is important (i.e., if you get a certain reading, here’s what you do). Many times, shipping papers are not in the door pocket (of a truck cab) where they should be. First responders can find themselves dealing with a mixed consignment. It is sometimes hard to know what is leaking. Better definitions are needed. A brand name is always useful. When fire departments buy meters, it is desirable that the meters clearly indicate what they are responding to, such as numbers that show concentration. Many big companies have response teams. Rural fire depart- ments are well-trained (for Hazmat emergencies). Metro fire departments can be over-specialized. People are less likely to panic (over a Hazmat release) if they know something about the hazard rather than a total unknown. 72

Sensors along rail beds may someday be able to provide information such as identity of railcars, whether they are mov- ing, and unauthorized access. Diesel fuel and gasoline account for about 80 percent of this state EPA’s (incident) activities. Hazmat Environmental Response and Information Organization In the near term (i.e., from the present out 5 years), infor- mational technologies will reign. More traditional tech- nologies can be made to work in new ways for remediation, packaging standards, safety, and keeping the most danger- ous materials away from population centers while enabling better efficiencies. In the mid-range (i.e., 6–9 years out), technologies that capture information will reign. They will more easily compile data and seamlessly collect and integrate information. This information can include items such as protective equipment and response planning needed. In the longest range (i.e., 10–15 years), technologies will answer questions not yet asked. Response technologies and information and communications technologies will move to a predictive nature such as predicting the characteristics of a Hazmat release, what equipment will be needed, and where and how it needs to be used. In the longest range, neural net- works will assist with predictive modeling. Activities of shippers are growing into the predictive nature of things. Information currently available (e.g., through GPS- based tracking) is good, but given the right information, com- munication can be made more predictive. There is a vast amount of location-related data. Intelligent agent software can be designed to “chew” through these data to identify pat- terns associated with risk. The (generic) functional requirements (selected by the HMCRP Project 04 team) sound appropriate. There is a difference between building a better mousetrap and something that has never been deployed before. The ability to get bill of lading information from a vehicle (remotely) will be important. There is a concept for a “mem- ory stick on a truck” that ties into a truck’s 9-pin connector. It can be loaded remotely with bill of lading (BOL) data, and the BOL data can be read remotely by an emergency vehicle using shortwave communications. The insurance industry will seek technologies that can man- age claims and litigation, pushing the process back to an oper- ational setting such as going back in time to dispatch. If they know what it takes to win a claim and then design that into a (data collection) system, they increase their chances of prevail- ing in court. Avoiding the need for regulation, response, and cleanup (are incentives). Regulatory processes are usually not technology-based. Shortcomings (in the Hazmat transportation industry) include (1) business operating systems, load management, and accounting that are antiquated. For example, motor carriers make investments but do not learn how to use the full capabilities. (2) Online, on-demand training is needed on sys- tems, including automated information gathering. How does a firm bill costs, get paid, and assign a driver? The industry will be hamstrung until the back office improves. But Hazmat may be the best way to justify the expense and provide the best incentive to change. There are costs to cleanup, injury, etc. How hard would it be to place a macro on an onboard (truck) system that says “this is who I am, where I am, what I spilled, and what I need?” Marketing of new technologies is very important. Good marketing can cause good deployment. A technology can get a lot of R&D and work but not be well-sold. (Consequently) it does not get well-rounded feedback or the best critiques. (It is helpful) to have a website—this gives (users) a way to determine whether something should work for them. Conversely, there has been over-marketing of incremental improvements. Great examples of technology deployments are few and far between. Lack of deployment is sometimes used as a reason why new technology is not as good as “lower” technology. Big inte- grators go with big technology providers, but it is sometimes better to go with a smaller solution. It is always important to get the right people on the team (when deploying new technology). And it is helpful to showcase (a technology’s) problem-solving abilities for first responders, consignees, carriers, etc. What is the problem we need to solve? Trans- portation treats technologies as an end in themselves. Some (carriers) are reluctant to invest in technologies because of perceived liability. But they should absolutely want an emergency response/spill alert system, which would help mitigation, regulatory, and compliance so third-party liability can be much less. Technology has to tell (its information to) someone. Tell who needs to know on an exception basis. Officials of Air Transport Association There is a link between safety and security. The biggest dif- ference between air transport (of Hazmat) and the surface modes is individual package volumes (i.e., 400 Kg/450 Liters or less), which pose significantly lower risks. The Hazmat com- modities that can be moved (by air) are a subset (of what can be moved by other modes). Some substances are forbidden. This association has a field guide reflecting technical instruc- tions. The basis for both the field guide and the ICAO model is the United Nations (UN) model (but not commodity limits). Air transport has lower risk of accidents. There are few occurrences of Hazmat delivery from rail or ship to aircraft. 73

Security for air transport has been in place a long time and is well-established. Another area in which (air transport of Hazmat) is ahead of other modes is in mandatory dangerous goods training for all who touch Hazmat cargo. Concerning technologies, packaging is under constant review. If incident reporting suggests a problem with pack- aging, use of packaging gets scrutiny. Most technologies fall on the safety, not security, side. Use of RFID (in air transport) is still emerging. It becomes a matter of cost-benefit analysis. The need to know (Hazmat cargo) location constantly is not yet in-place. If a technology drives a competitive advantage, it can even drive the industry to get it adopted. If a technology saves $10,000 in fuel costs, it probably has a reason (to be adopted). RFID is probably the same – if it can prevent theft, minimize cost, and guarantee product integrity, it will have an advantage. RFID is a tech- nology that people can see minimizing loss and guaranteeing integrity. Flammable and toxic substances are generally not trans- ported, although perfume and gasoline samples for analy- sis are exceptions. Infectious substances are something that needs to move quickly. Radio-pharmaceuticals, corrosives, and dry ice are some examples of other substances that can be transported by air. With the regulations, shippers want to have as much flexi- bility as possible. The pharmaceutical industry is using smart tags to ensure substances do not get out of their temperature range. They also use holograms, visible to consignees, to reduce the use of counterfeit drugs. They are in the process of tracking these goods better. The biggest challenge to Hazmat air transport safety and security are people who do not know the rules. The problem is the things that can be on the plane that you do not realize are there because the rules were circumvented. Education needs to get out. Vendors’ goods do not pose the highest risk, but rather illegal trade such as arms and drugs. The amounts of Hazmat put on a plane (legally) represent a minimum level of threat. Other transportation modes are easier to hit, with greater volumes in a single container or package. It is desirable to ensure the security of the full supply chain. All secure programs by country come under ICAO, but coun- tries have differences (in their implementation). Also, each airline has different levels of security. It is a goal to try to har- monize these differences and bring in best practices from the countries that are doing best. First Responder Training Organization The challenge in responding to Hazmat incidents is not a gadget problem, it is a people problem. It is difficult to get per- sonnel to learn, use, and maintain equipment. They cannot practice with the equipment every day. Officers sometimes get the training when responders do not always. It is important to take the correct action right away so (the problems from) a spill do not get bigger. For unification to responses, a standard operational guideline is needed for the country. (Certain) alerts need to be sent to NOAA, DOD, DOT, or DHS. The quintessential question is “given the same emergency/ Hazmat release/time, would anyone respond differently? Every- one teaches to the standard but we respond in chaos. (In a Hazmat incident first response scenario), a person who has authority but no knowledge is dangerous. Ohio Hazmat Teams Conference In a case study of a certain train derailment involving Hazmat, it was noted that the railroad’s emergency response and the assets they bought to bear were impressive. How- ever, it took 5 hours to get the train’s consist and responders had to use the fax at a Home Depot store to get the consist. Cell phones had to be used, although their drawback was that not everyone could hear what was being discussed, so that had to be separately relayed. During the early part of the Hazmat derailment incident, news helicopters were the emer- gency responders’ eyes and ears. Their video feed was invalu- able, and, in fact, helped the emergency response team real- ize they had a butane car in proximity to burning railcars that were in a jumble. There is no good list of how many Hazmat teams there are nationwide, much less their competence levels. A flammable atmosphere is what is most dangerous to fire- fighters. An assessment needs to be done in minutes, not hours. Corrosives account for about 20 percent of spills. Marine Regulatory Agency Hazmat Officials Stability of ships must be calculated, and there is need for new technologies. This is more of a “blue water” (open ocean) concern (as opposed to a “brown water,” or inland concern). The worst nightmare is a major near-shore collision that both damages critical infrastructure and releases large quan- tities of poisonous Hazmat in the vicinity of a populated area. There is a need to make distress calls in English. Linguistic tools are being developed for that use. There is a push toward full maritime domain awareness. The AIS system is like IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) in aviation in that it provides a vessel’s identity. It is being required nation- ally as Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS). An international body is looking at tracking a ship 500 miles before making port using satellite-based tracking. AIS for the brown water fleet is different than for the blue water fleet with regard to their announcements of position. 74

There is much work going into cargo status, including RFID tags on each package and interrogators with cargo ships. Some ships have large containers stacked 8 to 10 deep, and the ship may have 4,000 containers. This makes networked sensors important. There is aging infrastructure at some ports, and some are rel- atively shallow. However, ships are getting bigger with deeper draft, increasingly forcing them to come in at high tide. Ports currently only track ships headed to them (i.e., to that specific port). Receivers need to go out beyond 200 miles, which they cannot do now. Routing of ships in response to a storm is changing. Within recent years, there have been regulations requiring more hazardous substances to be further away from the skin of the ship (now 3⁄4 meter). Lashing systems keep containers from being washed over- board. There are improvements being made to these systems involving many companies. Motor Carrier Safety Official The biggest concern is a truck on its side and not knowing whether the driver is all right. After 9/11, selection of drivers became very important. Background checks revealed problems that did not show up on motor vehicle registration checks. If you hire right, you can train a vehicle operator well. This company’s fuel trucks now have a lower center of gravity, a wider wheelbase, and roll stability. Retrofitting with newer technologies is desirable, but it is not practical to take older trailers costing $80,000 to $90,000 out of service. Technologies in use include a black box providing location over the web, remote door locking, installed security switches with panic buttons, and some remote shutdown capability. Owner-operators are hesitant at first to try new technolo- gies. From a safety and security standpoint, technologies need to be improved. Information can be corrupted, and vehicles can be in a dead zone where no information is flowing. Mil- lions of dollars have been put into technology, and the gov- ernment should hold vendors to higher standards. There are new technologies needed for product integrity such as chemical analyzers and barcodes that must agree before fuel can be pumped. Gasoline and kerosene when mixed can explode in a heater. Cell phones are good technology but are locked down when in transit so they are not used while on the road. Motor Carrier Security Official Hiring the right person is the most important aspect of security. The industry needs a single security credential assigned to a Hazmat driver; a common identification card recognized universally, simple to use with a single standardized reader. Updating databases to remove access for departing personnel is important. Integrity of the package and risk exposure is typically better on short-haul transport. There is a move to take things away from the driver and instead provide technology to lessen risk. Dynamic security profiling is an example of risk reduction. There is a requirement for Hazmat haulers to immediately locate Hazmat containers through GPS-based tracking. How- ever, there is no access to a government database that provides PSAP information. If there should be a criminal (or terrorist) incident involving Hazmat, there should be a way for the carrier to push information to the PSAP without having to rely on the government for that. Owner-operators might not want the government watching their shipments. Flow sensors are a technology that could help Hazmat truck transport. Specialty Motor Carrier Representatives Hazmat accounts for about 10 to 15 percent of their ship- ments. They rely on customers accurately telling them what is being shipped, for placarding, and on the driver checking. They do not transport Hazmat waste. They have 24-hour opera- tions and do not want drivers to mix potentially dangerous materials such as organic peroxides with other substances. There are computers on their trucks and GPS tracking with two-way communication. There are certain “white glove” vehicles that have a panic button with emergency alert. These vehicles carry high value or dangerous substances such as PIH, explosives, and radioactive and infectious materials. There is always a security concern when drivers stop. In certain security circumstances, two drivers will be required. One of the technologies needed is a better way to determine what infrastructure like bridges and tunnels will not allow Hazmat shipments, at least during certain times of the day. It is important to provide the driver with that information; otherwise there can be a fine or delay from rerouting over additional miles, and this is not just with more dangerous materials. There is some software for this now, but it is piece- meal (i.e., not a unified system). Emergency Response Technology Provider The biggest challenge for emergency response equipment is identification: decreasing the time needed to come up with a survey and come up with an answer. Radiation detection devices should be set up for expo- sure rates, not activity. First responders are not the biggest 75

customers for radiation devices, but those devices can be calibrated to be accurate for specific isotopes. Standard alarm level settings need to be developed. Hazmat incidents are dynamic. They need to be identified in minutes, then mitigated and remediated. If that happens in a rural area, the capability may be much less (than in a metro area). Know- ing the response distance and having a game plan developed are important. Technology Research Consultant There is great strength in wireless technologies. There are lots of communications available with huge potential and value: roadside-to-roadside, vehicle-to-vehicle, and DSRC. With technologies, everyone wants to be a “close follower.” However, technologies need leaders to take charge. Mobile phones with GPS and navigation capabilities are currently providing useful results. In the range of 5–10 years out, people are increasingly looking at behavior, especially risk perception. Gain sometimes means loss: people may drive faster since they know they have protection from seat belts or automatic braking. There are clever algorithms that could be used to determine whether a driver is driving safely. It is possible to set out a base- line of “normal” and so determine a risk profile. Impulse radar has been used in missile scoring. It is very good for measuring distance and tracking. An “infiltrator” vehicle moving into the line of view can be recognized and tracked. A predictive algorithm can determine whether two vehicles are on a collision path. Impulse radar can constantly pick up an object in a cone and do (collision) predictions using probabilistic calculations. Decision support tools have been developed to deal with lower-level decisions like subway service recovery (follow- ing an emergency shutdown). Situational awareness still resides with the operator, but technology could be applied in a clever way to deal with higher-level challenges. Technology should not be confined due to legacy systems. People who are willing to think outside of the box and try out things may find that algorithms and expert systems can solve new problems. National Laboratory Scientists It is possible to penetrate containers without going through the usual seals and access doors. Detecting that is a difficult challenge. A number of technologies have been considered for this problem, but until now all have been too expensive. Volumetric sensors include IR, ultrasonic, and bi-static radar. Effectiveness can be impacted by the type of contents in the container. This national lab is a proponent of ubiquitous sensing: clusters of sensors on an active network detecting status of cargo contents and transmitting results that can be picked up by other sensors. Costs to make this happen are going down. These can be in a sleep mode most of the time, but con- stantly “sniffing” for substances that can trigger an alert con- dition, such as chemical or radiological detection. One such sensor could be a fiber-optic seal with radio frequency com- munications that could monitor cargo condition and attitude. There are now plastic fiber-optics that are very inexpensive. But input could be from many different types of sensors performing continuous monitoring. Sensor thresholds can be set with alarm levels. An external seal could have such an alarm. Sensor information could be picked up for multiple containers, and alerts could be collected by a receiver talking to the world via cell phone, satellite, or GSM-R. There could also be state of health sensors. And if a transmis- sion is not made when expected, the reason can be determined on the next transmission. All monitors can have substantial memory and storage information. All messages would be stored at the data collection point, with a series of redundancies to recover from malfunctions. Authentication encryption can be made very tamper- resistant. There is an application to develop a low-cost, long- life fiber-optic seal that incorporates this. It is called the remotely monitored sealing array (RMSA). It contains public key authentication, with messages cryptographically authenti- cated with very strong security. National Motor Carrier Association Official Some food products are Hazmat. Having harmful sub- stances get into food products is a concern. Another worry is having someone follow a truck with flammable cargo to a fuel station and blow it up (a greater concern to this respondent than a chlorine leak). Fuel doesn’t go far, usually less than 50 miles, but up to 100 miles in some cases. Grant incentives for safety and security may not be right. If a safety or security step is important enough, do not make it voluntary—require it. A lot of things are going on in safety and security. Of all of these, measures to provide frequent or instant communica- tion are among the most impressive. It used to be said that “trucking is the largest unsupervised workforce.” Now trucks are monitored frequently. How much can you put into a driver’s environment with- out affecting the driver? Worker identification and credentialing is a mess. Worker verification is an area that begs to be addressed, a single sys- 76

tem that everyone will accept. Military bases ask for drivers’ social security numbers, which bothers the drivers. Remote sleep apnea monitoring is being tested by a certain large motor carrier. Needs to be addressed include cross-deliveries (i.e., gasoline is put into a diesel tank). Technology could help this problem. Chips on hoses could be made to “talk” to a tank when the wrong fuel is about to be pumped. People die every year from chemical reactions resulting from the cross-delivery problem. Nitrogen in cargo tanks also kills people every year. Rail Tank Car Designer The Next Generation Railcar is underway. The design involves balancing competing issues. Physics and deforma- tion models are well-developed and can be used to evaluate new models. Engineered metal structure (corrugate) pro- vides strength and absorption and a means to allow a struc- ture to have deformation over a relatively long period. Industry wants a compliant container with a strong puncture-resistant layer; that is an area that needs more research. Anything impinging can deform the container. Fiberglass is a strong but affordable material. Performance has been increased 2 to 3 times but that is only one aspect of the solution. There can be added benefits if we understand the needs better. Metals and structures need more work. Regulator Agency Representative: Pipeline Safety and environmental protection are the primary focus. There is some gray area in security, but security improve- ment is highly relevant as a secondary effect of technology improvements. One big culprit in pipeline damage is third- party digging. Where a pipeline comes out of the ground is a vulnerability. Pipeline location data includes some vulnerabilities. Knowl- edge of interconnections is well-guarded. In rulemaking, the U.S. Office of Management and Bud- get (OMB) requires regulatory agencies to conduct a burden analysis. Having a safe, efficient, and secure pipeline is a cost element. Pipeline corrosion is one area that needs more research. Leak detection at altitude can be made by fixed-wing, heli- copter aircraft, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). A number of specific research areas were provided includ- ing the following: DTRS56-02-T-0005, “Digital Mapping of Buried Pipelines with a Dual Array System” DTRS56-02-T-0006, “Pipeline Damage Prevention Through the Use of Locatable Magnetic Plastic Pipe and a Universal Locator” DTRS56-04-T-0006, “Effectiveness of Prevention Methods for Excavation Damage” DTRS56-04-T-0007, “Infrasonic Frequency Seismic Sensor System for Preventing Third-Party Damage to Gas Pipelines” DTPH56-06-T-000005, “Differential Impedance Obstacle Detection Sensor (DIOD)—Phase 2” DTRS57-05-C-10110, “Infrasonic Frequency Seismic Sensor System for Pipeline Integrity Management” DTPH56-07-P-000046, “Determine the Requirements for Existing Pipeline, Tank and Terminal Systems to Transport Ethanol without Cracking” DTRS56-04-T-0012, “Hazardous Liquids Airborne LIDAR Observation Study (HALOS)” DTPH56-05-T-0004, “Use of Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) for Pipeline Surveillance to Improve Safety and Lower Cost” DTPH56-08-T-000017, “GPS-Based Excavation Encroach- ment Notification” DTPH56-08-T-000019, “Advanced Development of Pro- active Infrasonic Gas Pipeline Evaluation Network” DTRS56-01-X-0023, “Airborne LIDAR Pipeline Inspection System (ALPIS) Mapping Tests” DTRS57-04-C-10002, “Infrasonic Frequency Seismic Sensor System for Pipeline Integrity Management” DTRS57-04-C-10012, “Intrinsic Distributed Fiber Optic Leak Detection” DTRS57-04-C-10016, “Piezo Structural Acoustic Pipeline Leak Detection System” First Responder Information Provider The interviewee’s top technology thrust areas include (1) dependable (rail) infrastructure and inspection, (2) rail tank car puncture resistance, and (3) improved emergency response techniques. It is baffling that there is so much “dark” (unsignalled) territory. There is a huge amount of available technology (that could alleviate that). Rail tank car puncture resistance has improved but has not gotten to where it needs to be if infrastructure inspection tech- niques and positive train control are not there. The backup plan is a better package. The goal is to achieve improvement somewhere around 5 to 10 times that of current designs. Structural foams are another area for improvement. It would be good to get to a point where there would be no puncture (for collisions) at or below 50 mph. An industry research pro- gram has been formulated (for tank integrity). 77

There needs to be better infrastructure inspection tech- niques. There have been Hazmat rail incidents resulting from failure of a rail. One technology area that is important to more rapid Haz- mat incident remediation, is how to better transfer a com- modity from a breached railcar. Suction (a slight vacuum to pull off vapors) and liquid transfer pumps provide that capa- bility, although there are not many of these pumps around. With such a pump, Hazmat commodity from a breached tank car may be capable of being transferred within a day. There have been noted Hazmat incidents in which transfer took many days due to circumstances. If an incident remediation can be safely sped up, people (who were evacuated) can return to their homes more quickly. There is need for improvements in other remediation technologies. There has been work in the United States looking at railcar valve and fitting designs that will not release product if sheared off in an accident. Similar work has taken place in Europe. Other approaches have included recessed valves and fittings, but these have not been adopted. Older steel can be brittle. (In terms of collateral benefits from technology improve- ments), puncture resistance provides a security bonus from better resistance to an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) or projectile. However, outside of tank truck or (other) motor carrier shipments, it is hard to justify (the cost of) GPS (track- ing) for security alone. Level 1 First Responder: Incident Command Consulting Service There is concern over intentional damage directed at rail tank cars. One counter is to make tank cars as slick as possible, so that a glancing blow from another object will be deflected. There can also be crumple zones to help absorb energy. There have been looks at foam spray-on protection for the commod- ity. Rock wool and fiberglass are little protection to the shell. From the emergency response side, the biggest question is “if we prove something can be built, what is done with the tools available?” There needs to be more vision for implementing and executing (helpful technologies). There needs to be a long- term plan to design and market (improvements) to industry. Air monitoring for CBRN (chemical, biological, radiolog- ical, and nuclear) agents is needed. There are some chlorine tank cars that have what is called “enhanced fittings” or “next generation fittings” (associated with the Next Generation Railroad Tank Car Program). These fitting designs require some different techniques when using the “Chlorine C” and “Midland” kits (two frequently-used chlorine emergency response products). When a general service car is on its side and the bottom out- let valve is sheared off, there is no way to shut off (the flow). It is difficult to get access (to fix this problem). However, PIH or TIH substances are not shipped in that type of tank car. Lots of tools could be developed (to help in Hazmat response and mitigation). The truck tank car industry has pretty good tools. Fire services and the municipal side have gotten a lot of funding, and much of it has gone toward elaborate rigs that are difficult to know how to operate. It is possible to have the best of the best equipment but not know how to make it work. When it comes to Hazmat incidents, it is possible to get “hidebound” by rules. That can result in “paralysis by analy- sis,” and lead to (over reactions such as) evacuating for exces- sive distances. With all of the technology that is out there, we are still in our infancy. Truckers are better-versed in Hazmat (response) best practices and have protective clothing. Rail engineers have hours of service also (like on the truck- ing side). In the Graniteville (South Carolina rail tank car) chlorine release, (some) chlorine was absorbed by foliage and trees. (Depending on circumstances), sheltering in place can be a better response than evacuation. The Next Generation (Railroad Tank) Car has lots of improvements but is focused just on North America. Europe designs different valving with no external valves to shear off. An affordable protective clothing suit with air packs for more than short-duration use is needed. So is monitoring equipment that is easy to be trained how to use, for a wide range of commonly carried materials. (Updated) modeling of chlorine incidents is needed. Some real-world incidents have turned out differently than expected. Offload of product using pumps and hoses (e.g., from a breached tank car) is now down to hours. Official of Chemical Manufacturer: Shipper A number of solutions (in rail tank car integrity) have not been high-tech but rather (improvements in) materials performance. Those can be looked at as emerging technolo- gies too. It requires finding the “sweet spot” balancing weight issues and cost vs. performance. Industry has only scratched the surface (of improvements that could be made) and could achieve more. Two things should be noted. First, in North America, we are heavily dependent on the railroads for shipping TIH (90 per- cent goes by rail). There have been some well-known incidents, and cities are taking steps to ban (Hazmat rail) movement. What can be done to reduce risk? Safer railcars, better working arrangements with railroads, improved containers and emer- gency response (can all play a part). Second, small cylinders of TIH are shipped around the world. These can be stolen, 78

diverted, and used as weapons of mass destruction because they have passed out of (responsible) control. Track and trace technology should be able to help this challenge. Railcars are in the third generation of technologies. Many improvements come from power management and delivery systems. There is some pain from being on the leading edge (of emerging technology implementation). GPS devices on rail- cars (can be programmed to) wake up every 15 minutes and also wake up if an event triggers (an alert). GPS devices can be recharged through solar power. Industry is looking at new concepts such as processing in the (GPS) unit itself. Technologies do not always live up to what they are touted to be. The Next Generation Railcar did a lot of material char- acterization. (The program sought to know) how to achieve performance without sacrificing weight and cost. Some gov- ernment agencies looked at the use of engineered metal structures. Industry looked at corrugated structures that could absorb energy with much less weight. Thought has been given to introducing oblique angles, so a projectile like a high caliber bullet would be deflected and not penetrate a tank car. (It would be ideal to have) a single design concept that can implement crashworthiness as well as ballistics pro- tection with one technology. Rail tank cars have three functions: (1) contain the (Hazmat) commodity, (2) manage train loads, and (3) protect the com- modity from insults (e.g., derailment). One protective mea- sure is the tank within a tank concept. Another is to take weight out of the tank but still contain the commodity. Approaches to that include composites and fiber-reinforced plastics. The tank can be “skinnied down” and wrapped in composite materials. The weight can be taken to the external shell. Increasing crashworthiness will help mitigate damage from an external explosion. A low profile design with all closures below or within a pressure plate offers protection since leaks would not result even if the valves were sheared. Emergency responders are willing to try new things. Two- way communications technology can help when emergency responders have to stand off (at an incident like the derail- ment of a Hazmat tank car). The right people with the right tools and authorization can get access (to critical informa- tion). But we must ensure we do not make it easier for the “bad guys” to also get access. A certain chemical manufacturer/shipper is actively involved with Railinc to assess how the existing CLM system can be more fully integrated and used for railroad and emergency response communications. With a stand-alone system, it is difficult to bring the two together. There are significant differences between European and North American tank cars, not the least of which are differ- ences that reduce head-to-head damage. For example, in a European derailment, the tank car may be intact although on its side, whereas in the United States, there may be accor- dion stacking. Union Pacific railroad has taken a leading role in the devel- opment and implementation of Positive Train Control. Many of the initiatives to better protect rail tank cars can be applied to other transport modes as well. Improvements in cargo screening and inspection tech- nologies are needed. National Laboratory Scientist The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has implemented the Safety Status Measurement System (Safe- Stat), an automated analysis system that combines current and historical safety performance data to measure the rela- tive safety fitness of interstate commercial motor carriers. With SafeStat, a carrier has a score that can change monthly based on a culmination of Level I/II/III inspection findings and a carrier’s ability to adhere to safety standards. After 9/11, radiation detection introduced security. Now there is interest in certain freight configurations, materials, and the legitimacy of the carrier. On the safety side, there is interest in radiation as Hazmat. A certain national lab that pioneered radiation detection as a safety measure found that it could also be used for security. At first, some substances found in common products can trigger radiation detectors. Now there can be a high degree of certainty that a material with naturally occurring radiation is not from a threat category. Ubiquitous sensing is a technology that offers much promise. A hybrid battery-powered RFID tag that is acti- vated by an actuator has shown positive testing results. Data can be analyzed and provided through trade data exchange, which involves getting the commercial sector to share data with trusted agents. Social networking and digitizing will play a role in ubiquitous sensing. The Smartfreight initiative could be tied in. Technologies for ubiquitous sensing are there but policies complicate their potential use. Rail Trade Association Representative The greatest concern is the release of bulk TIH (from rail tank cars) such as has been seen in the past few years. There has been good collaboration among several indus- try partners such as Dow Chemical, Union Tank Car Com- pany, and Union Pacific Railroad to improve tank car design. Research by the U.S. DOT and others is continuing. Spent nuclear fuel casks are different from tank cars. Improving the package (is a logical step). Also evaluate safety and security. Not all are convinced that preventing release of Hazmat is the best use of resources. For example, passenger trains can also be attacked. 79

The highway mode is different (when it comes to use of technologies). With a railcar, there is no power supply, so technologies depend on the life of the battery. Dow Chemical has taken the lead on an initiative concerned with a com- mon system of common reporting to the railroad so a deter- mination can be made whether there is an issue (such as an incident). What action does the railroad take? Technology reliability is a big concern. (It is not feasible to) stop trains for too many false alarms. Axle generators are being looked at. Electronically Con- trolled Pneumatic (ECP) brakes are showing up—some coal trains now have ECP brakes. Current pneumatic brakes can take up to a mile to stop a freight train. ECP brakes (1) stop the train more quickly, (2) are a conduit for railcar informa- tion, and (3) are a power source for items on a train. It is possible for a train consist to be transmitted electron- ically. Lots of paper is currently being shuffled. Emergency responders may not have the manifest, which messes up communications, and indeed crews can be impaired (by an accident). Railroads have implemented shelf couplers, head shields (the part of a tank car most likely to get punctured) and pres- sure relief valves. Thermal protection has gone a long way toward eliminating boiling liquid expanding vapor explo- sions (BLEVEs) and flame impingement. When railroads have accidents, they do not make money and it costs them. So they have high motivation to be safe. 80

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Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security Get This Book
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TRB’s Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) Report 4: Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security explores near-term (less than 5 years) and longer-term (5–10 years) technologies that are candidates for enhancing the safety and security of hazardous materials transportation for use by shippers, carriers, emergency responders, or government regulatory and enforcement agencies.

The report examines emerging generic technologies that hold promise of being introduced during these near- and longer-term spans. It also highlights potential impediments (e.g., technical, economic, legal, and institutional) to, and opportunities for, their development, deployment, and maintenance.

The research focused on all modes used to transport hazardous materials (trucking, rail, marine, air, and pipeline) and resulted in the identification of nine highly promising emerging technologies.

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