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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D - Modal Screening Process." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14526.
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81 Modal Screening Process This section provides each of the transportation modes’ specific functional requirements. It portrays the application of their functional requirement development priorities to the project’s initial screened technologies as a key step leading to the eventual selection of the most promising technologies. For each mode, the screened research list was reviewed and from it the team extracted technologies that applied to the func- tional requirements shown in the modal-specific technology development needs graphic. A technology selected for a mode was associated with one or more functional requirements in the cells that are classified as high, medium, or low priority needs in the technology development needs graphic for that mode. The selected technologies were then summarized in the extracted screened technologies table for that mode. Each extracted technology row in the table is characterized by tech- nology need (referenced to one or more functional require- ments), description, and potential solution(s). If the selected technology was associated with a high priority need func- tional requirement, it is in bold type. That is important for understanding the development of the technology selection criteria (described in Section 2.4) and the subsequent appli- cation of the methodology to select the most promising tech- nologies (described in Section 2.5). The subsection titled Technology Development Priority that follows for each mode has a graphic called functional require- ment technology development priority. 1.1 Highway (Truck) Mode Functional Requirements—Highway Mode NOTE: The highway mode has 11 functional requirements: 8 generic and 3 additional functional requirements, more than any other mode. A. Package Integrity—Package is robust such that material contents are not breached during normal transport oper- ations and typical accident conditions. Capability exists to sense/detect pressure build-up and/or material release. Technical capability rating: 9 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Motor carriers transport bulk (non-divisible) Hazmat shipments in specially designed tanker trailers that comply with stringent construc- tion standards. These standards are designed to minimize the potential for cargo releases in the event of a traffic incident. Tankers also feature cargo pressure gauges for drivers to mon- itor internal pressure. Divisible Hazmat shipments typically hauled in barrels or on pallets rarely have monitoring devices. Drivers may be unable to inspect these shipments prior to travel if a Hazmat shipment is loaded in the nose of the trailer or the shipper has sealed the trailer. Though Hazmat ship- ments must be properly packaged or transported in special tanker trailers, the integrity of divisible and non-divisible packaging/containers may be compromised by load shift, mechanical failure or if the vehicle is involved in a severe traf- fic incident. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Tanker status and pressure gauge readings are typically available only to the driver by reading gauges, located on the tanker trailer for pressure, volume, temperature, etc. Emerging technolo- gies that provide constant tanker status monitoring include data that are transmitted via terrestrial or satellite technology. These readings may be sent directly from a device on the tanker or via in-cab communication systems. Other emerging tech- nologies for divisible Hazmat shipments include trailer track- ing and trailer status devices that monitor different aspects of trailer status. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Due to stringent regulations governing the transport of Hazmat on highways, many carriers have already deployed in-cab communication systems. Also, tanker trailers are significantly more expensive A P P E N D I X D Modal Screening Process

that van trailers, prompting carriers to maximize tanker trailer utilization. Use of trailer monitoring devices is becoming more commonplace. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Due to the capi- tal costs and support systems required for in-cab communica- tion systems as well as trailer tracking devices, these systems are typically used by only larger carriers. B. Equipment Reliability—Vehicle and cargo equipment are structurally sound and properly maintained. Capability exists to sense/detect problems such as engine failure or loss of steering. Vehicle is able to protect its crew from serious injury under most accident circumstances. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low technical capability need)* Rationale for technical capability rating: Truck drivers are required to inspect their tractor and trailer at least once per day and many carriers require both a pre-trip and post- trip vehicle inspection. Large trucks and trailers are subject to routine vehicle inspections by enforcement personnel at weigh stations or roadside. In addition, motor carriers must docu- ment that any vehicle deficiencies have been repaired. Carriers are also required to maintain vehicle preventive maintenance records. However, vehicle inspections, preventive maintenance programs, and equipment sensors may not detect all possible mechanical failures. *NOTE: Radioactive Materials shipments such as Highway Route Controlled Quantities (HRCQ) require a Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) Level VI Inspection at the point of origin. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Newer large trucks display vehicle faults, namely engine fault codes, on a display located on the truck’s dashboard. Some in-cab communication systems transmit real-time engine fault codes to back office systems. Market adoptability rating: 8 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Older vehicles do not provide a dashboard display of vehicle faults. Though newer vehicles provide more information to the driver on engine/vehicle status, engine faults are available to back office personnel on an irregular basis if the data are not transmitted real time and downloaded either at the end of each day or when the vehicle is serviced. In-cab communication systems are more frequently used by larger and medium-sized carriers. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The cost of new vehicles prevents many carriers and owner-operators from replacing older vehicles. In addition, the costs of in-cab com- munication systems and resources needed to support these sys- tems impede further industry adoption. C. Operator Performance—Operator is able to successfully maneuver vehicle under normal and off-normal condi- tions. Capability also exists to sense operator performance degradation due to fatigue, acute health problem, sub- stance abuse, and so forth, and to alert the operator and back office to this situation. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Before a driver can operate a commercial motor vehicle transporting Hazmat shipments, the driver must demonstrate the ability to oper- ate a vehicle under normal and, to some extent, off-normal conditions. Drivers must obtain a medical certificate, a com- mercial driver’s license (CDL) and a Hazmat endorsement. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Sev- eral new technologies can indirectly alert drivers and back of- fice personnel of driver performance degradation by measur- ing vehicle operating characteristics. Examples include roll stability systems, collision warning systems and lane depar- ture warning systems. In addition, some measure of driver performance may be available via the Engine Control Mod- ule (ECM) readings (for example, top speed, the number of hard brakes, etc.). Additionally, in-cab communication sys- tems oftentimes have a driver distress feature that allows a driver to send a distress alert. Providers monitor these sys- tems 24/7 for driver alerts. Market adoptability rating: 4 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Though the first generation of these systems has been on the market for sev- eral years, certain sectors of the trucking industry have been slow to adopt these technologies. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: High capital costs and driver attitudinal issues with some of these systems have played a role in relatively low industry adoption rates. In addition, motor carriers may lack the safety data necessary to identify which of these technologies best meet their needs. D. Hazmat Commodity Identification and Awareness— Ability to identify the cargo being shipped either in person or via remote access. Technical capability rating: 9 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: There is a clear need to know/confirm the type of Hazmat being transported, and the primary methods for doing so include vehicle placard- ing and Hazmat information on the bills of lading. There is lim- ited use of advance transmittal of Hazmat information to the carrier, shipper, or consignee, although some of the concepts seem promising. Trailers consisting of less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments may have several shipping documents that could get lost or destroyed in the event of a severe accident. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Elec- tronic transmission of Hazmat information, via Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) or Extensible Markup Language (XML), by 82

the shipper to the motor carrier and the consignee. Transmis- sion of data must occur at the time of pickup. Market adoptability rating: 4 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Shippers of cer- tain types of Hazmat already transmit, or could easily begin transmitting, electronic Hazmat shipment data. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The transmis- sion of data can be costly and time-consuming. In addition, all senders and receivers of data must have standards and processes in place to know when bad data have been received or data are missing. In addition, system maintenance and data transmission can be a significant, ongoing cost. E. Communication—Vehicle operator and back office have two-way communication capability at all times. Technical capability rating: 9 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Most truck drivers have either personal or company-provided cell phones. In addition, many fleets have equipped their vehicles with in-cab communication systems that provide cellular and/or satellite communication. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: In rural areas with sporadic cellular coverage, satellite phones could improve two-communication capability. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Motor carriers desiring satellite coverage would likely choose an in-cab com- munication system. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: In-cab commu- nication systems have not been adopted by all segments of the industry. F. Tracking—Vehicle and cargo location are known at all times. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need)* Rationale for technical capability rating: In-cab communi- cation and satellite tracking devices typically track truck loca- tions. Use of these systems continues to grow, especially among larger carriers, followed by medium-sized carriers. Owner- operators and small fleets are less likely to use these systems. In addition, some of these systems are terrestrial-based systems, providing more limited communications (although the GPS signal has the same effectiveness as satellite systems). Integrated satellite and terrestrial technologies provide more coverage, especially in rural areas, though mountains or tall buildings (i.e., urban canyon) may inhibit real-time data transmission. *NOTE: transport of HRCQ shipments and transuranic waste under the DOE shipping program would have a higher score due to more stringent requirements. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Teth- ered and untethered trailer tracking devices provide the ability to track trailers. RFID tags and electronic seals can provide a certain level of cargo tracking. Some of these technologies pro- vide automatic real-time location updates. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Several of these technologies have costs that are higher than the market is will- ing to bear. In addition, the challenges and expense of RFID tag deployment in other industries has stymied use of this technology. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Carriers must be presented credible cost/benefit analyses for each of these tech- nologies. In addition, these technologies may offer benefits to certain segments within the industry. Lastly, more research and design work is needed to standardize and augment the hardware and software for systems such as RFID. G. Security—Vehicle, cargo, and operator are resistant to theft, diversion, sabotage and other intentional acts. Trucking capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Protecting the vehicle, cargo, and operator from security-related risks requires technology solutions specific to each. Drivers are restricted to specific routes and must comply with regulations dictating where a driver can take a break and how often the driver must be in contact with back office personnel. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Driver authentication technologies, such as biometrics and smart cards, may reduce the risk of vehicle/trailer theft. Hazmat route geofencing ensures Hazmat loads are not diverted from planned routes. Electronic seals provide trailer seal status and an indication whether any efforts are or were being made to tamper with the device. Market adoptability rating: 3 (Low adoptability = High market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: The initial and ongoing costs of these systems have impeded more wide- spread use. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Since no com- prehensive solution exists to protect the vehicle, cargo, and operator, carriers must vet each technology independently by cost/benefit analysis and ease of integration into existing operations. H. Emergency Response—Qualified emergency response is delivered to incident site in a timely manner wherever it may occur. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low technical capability need) 83

Rationale for technical capability rating: It is critical that first responders are fully prepared for addressing Hazmat spills and events. The present system is relatively low-tech and usu- ally requires first responders to arrive on the scene to determine the Hazmat involved and the appropriate response, procedures, and protocols. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: There are technical systems in place that could send each vehicle’s Hazmat load information to first responders in advance of their dispatch. These “Mayday plus” systems are relatively simple but require other technologies such as communica- tion and GPS technologies. Market adoptability rating: 3 (Low adoptability = High market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: These systems must be used in conjunction with other technologies. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Based on the origin of the shipment, either from a customer location or a terminal, multiple parties would need to produce the advance information. In addition, carriers may perceive a low benefit- cost ratio for a program that requires data transmission on every Hazmat shipment. I. Vehicle Identification—Vehicles can be quickly identi- fied by first responders as well as back office personnel. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Vehicles must dis- play the name of the carrier, the city and state of domicile, the U.S. DOT number, a tractor number, and a trailer number. However, carriers may use rental trailers or tractors that have no identifiable carrier specific markings. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: None identified. Market adoptability rating: 9 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Motor carriers must comply with these regulations. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: None identified. J. Hazmat Route Restrictions—Some roadways, bridges, and tunnels prohibit trucks with Hazmat shipments. Addition- ally, motor carriers may impose further route restrictions on trucks hauling Hazmat shipments. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Capability exists to determine whether a truck is traveling on the designated route. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: GPS- based vehicle tracking systems for both tractors and trailers must be integrated with GIS mapping software to create geofences on specified routes. Market adoptability rating: 4 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) 84 Rationale for market adoptability rating: Similar to in-cab communication systems, these technologies are used mostly by medium to large carriers. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Financial con- straints and the need for technically sophisticated support staff. K. Driver ID Known—The present system used for identify- ing drivers is the Commercial Drivers License (CDL). Op- erators of vehicles hauling hazardous materials are required to possess both a valid CDL and a Hazmat Endorsement. Capability exists to quickly verify that a driver is credentialed to operate a commercial motor vehicle and certified to haul Hazmat. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: In the past, CDL fraud was viewed as relatively commonplace (45). Emerging technologies that address capability gap: At- tempts to strengthen the program have included proposals to use biometrics and smart cards. Other systems have tested biometric devices on the truck for confirming driver ID. Market adoptability rating: 1 (Low adoptability = High market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: As an emerging technology, these systems must be supported by substantial financial resources and back office personnel. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Financial and institutional issues have typically interfered with these efforts. Technology Development Priority— Highway Mode Table D-1 is a recap of the functional requirement gap rating—highway. Table D-2 is a recap of the mode importance rating. Based on Tables D-1 and D-2, Table D-3 provides the development priorities for the highway mode functional requirements. Extracted Screened Technologies— Highway Mode Table D-4 contains technologies the modal lead selected from the screened research list as being most applicable for the highway mode. Technologies considered high priority devel- opment needs are in bold type. 1.2 Rail Mode Functional Requirements—Rail Mode NOTE: The rail mode has 10 functional requirements: 8 generic and 2 additional functional requirements.

85 High Medium H. Emergency Response K. Driver ID Known High G. Security High Medium Low A. Package Integrity C. Operator Performance D. HM Commodity ID E. Communication J. HM Route Restrictions Medium F. Tracking High Low Low B. Equipment Reliability I. Vehicle ID Low Medium Market Adoptability Need Rating Low Medium High Technical Capability Need Rating Table D-1. Functional requirement gap rating—highway. High MediumAir High Rail Barge High Medium Low Medium High Truck Pipeline Low Low Low Medium Low Medium High Modal Activity Level (Ton-Miles) Table D-2. Mode importance rating. High Medium A. Package Integrity B. Equipment Reliability C. Operator Performance D. HM Commodity ID E. Communication I. Vehicle ID J. HM Route Restrictions High F. Tracking H. Emergency Response K. Driver ID Known High G. Security Medium Low Medium High Low Low Low Medium Mode Importance Rating Low Medium High Functional Requirement Gap Rating Table D-3. Functional requirement technology development priority—highway. A. Package Integrity—Package is robust such that material contents are not breached during normal transport opera- tions and typical accident conditions. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Existing rail tank cars have a proven record of survivability for typical accident/ derailment conditions. Other types of railcars do not generally survive typical accidents without significant damage and loss of cargo, although they are sometimes used to transport poten- tially hazardous materials of many kinds. Spent nuclear fuel/ waste from nuclear facilities is transported in highly devel- oped, crash survivable casks developed per the Nuclear Regu- latory Commission (NRC) and other federal requirements. The railcar on which the cask is carried does not provide any substantial additional protection against hazards. Rail tank cars

86 Table D-4. Extracted screened technologies—highway. Technology Need Description Potential Solution(s) HIGH PRIORITY Cargo container status sensors (Tracking, Emergency Response) Sensors that document the presence, and potentially the amount, of cargo or other aspects of the container/trailer status. These sensors may detect the integrity, temperature, or the position of the door hatch. Improvements to current sensors that can detect the existence of cargo include ultrasonic and IR sensors; pressure gauges and/or chemical detection sensors; fiber-optic sensors and photonic sensor integrated wireless systems; and container vibration patterns gathered from wireless RF sensor tags. HIGH PRIORITY Cargo/facility sensors (Tracking, Emergency Response, Commodity Identification) Sensors to detect different types of cargo/substances. Photonic or fiber-optic sensors are fixed point monitoring and mobile tracking. In fixed point monitoring, sensors monitor bridge and tunnel structural health and environment problems such as toxic gases in a tunnel. Mobile tracking sensor systems designed to track shipboard cargo containers and trucks have multifunctional sensor requirements including intrusion (tampering), biochemical, radiation, and explosives detection. May also include non-intrusive radiation portal monitors. These sensors may be used to detect accidental or malicious releases of hazardous materials. HIGH PRIORITY Innovative power sources for vehicle components (Tracking) Battery charging, flexible batteries that never need to be recharged, electronics that can power themselves. Wireless electrical or motion-powered technology; plastic thin-film organic solar cells with flexible polymer batteries; nanogenerators harnessing power from movement of flexible wires; very fast storage for solar power or a flash charge for cell phones and laptops. HIGH PRIORITY Improved area access control (Security, Driver ID Known) Technologies that prevent unauthorized personnel from accessing restricted areas or identify behaviors indicating a security threat. Improvements to current biometric authentication technologies including fingerprint, voice recognition, iris/optical scans and finger-vein recognition. A finger-vein identification system that could be used to allow a door to be opened simply by gripping the handle. Behavioral monitoring technologies. Trucks equipped with RFID tags. Directive antenna with middleware and received signal strength indication (RSSI) feature that makes the system more accurate and robust and avoids conventional problems. HIGH PRIORITY Advanced cargo locks & seals (Security) Cargo locks and seals that can transmit cargo or trailer/container status to back office systems. Improvements to positive locking mechanisms that can disarm and disable conveyance hatches and locks using low cost, plastic indicative seals with RF communications running on single battery with 4 years of life to support continuous monitoring; the external seals would have status and alarm notifications sent to a receiver with all messages stored at a data collection point, and using a remotely monitored sealing array (RMSA) with cryptographically authenticated messages (highly resistant to defeat). Electronic seals and other anti-theft monitoring devices. HIGH PRIORITY Vehicle security (Driver ID Known, Security) Vehicle may be started and or operated by authorized operators once predetermined protocols are met. Improvements to current Vehicle Disabling Technology (VDT) and Vehicle Shutdown Technology (VST). VDT does not allow vehicle restart while VST shuts down a vehicle that may be in motion. HIGH PRIORITY Operator Credentials (Driver ID Known) Universally accepted security identification credential. Credential should be simple and universally read and could include biometric authentication using smart card technologies. HIGH PRIORITY Vehicle/Trailer Tracking and Monitoring (Tracking) Real-time vehicle or trailer tracking and visualization. Also used by geofencing technology. Improvements to a current GPS-based instrument; cellular or satellite based tracking; Internet-delivered, remote asset telemetry Asset Management Platform using GSM communications; GSM-based GPS device with built-in RF receiver (for sensor reception), camera, and impact detector; and the use of geofencing to monitor vehicle or trailer movements. HIGH PRIORITY Intelligent Video Surveillance/Tracking (Tracking) Capability to visually track Hazmat vehicles of interest (mainly trucks but possibly railcars and barges) along their passage in critical areas. Intelligent video surveillance system capable of tracking Hazmat vehicle through high-threat urban area in real time using automated handoff from camera to camera; networked RFID combined with GPS and cargo monitoring. HIGH PRIORITY Alert/incident notification systems (Security, Emergency Response) Hazmat safety monitoring software/applications. Event data including Hazmat information received by sensor technology is transmitted to appropriate parties when an event occurs. In addition, exception-based notifications can be generated when events do not occur when scheduled. System also includes the ability to inventory vulnerable targets (e.g., critical infrastructure) and generate customized alerts of criminal incidents to appropriate officials. Digital photograph (using an IR flash for conditions of darkness) can also be included in the report.

will not survive all accident conditions. They have the poten- tial to be punctured (by couplings from adjacent cars, dis- placed rail, ballistics, etc.). Other types of standard railcars are not highly suited to protecting potentially hazardous material from damage in an accident or derailment, and limitations on their use may vary by interpretation of rules or regulations by the shipper or the railroad. There is a significant effort to further improve tank car sur- vivability. These efforts involve both a retrofit of existing tank cars and new tank car designs. The FRA now requires that any new hazardous material tank cars built after March 16, 2009 must conform to new interim design specifications. These interim designs specify a stronger container which usually means a thicker tank. There is also an effort to improve sur- vivability of the service connections on these tank-cars. New product loading and unloading valves that incorporate inner tank check-valve systems can now survive a top shearing event or rollovers without leaking. Because of these research efforts the technical capability of future designs will likely exceed the current interim designs. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Several technologies are being designed to improve tank car package integrity and survivability. The Federal Railroad Adminis- tration (FRA) is expected to require Hazmat tank cars to meet the resulting more stringent design specifications. There are 3 emerging redesigns of Hazmat tank cars. Volpe Design—Specifications and a design from FRA for a super-tanker (nothing built yet). This specification was issued for comment April 1, 2008 (46). As a result of the comments and because no prototype car was built that could meet this specification, the FRA has delayed the issuance of a final spec- ification. Instead the FRA has required that new cars built after March 16, 2009, must meet a new set of “interim” car specifications. Advanced Tank Car Collaborative Research Program (47)— The roots of this effort began with a prototype design led by Dow Chemical and the AAR. Their design preceded the release of FRA specifications. The initial prototype car could not meet head-on impact specifications in the Volpe design. Currently this research program and the Next Generation Railroad Tank Car Program (NGRTC) have participation from both industry and government. It is expected that their work focused on improving the integrity of Hazmat tank cars will last several years and could drive a final specification from the FRA. Trinity Car—The prototype car built by Trinity also pre- ceded the FRA Volpe design specification. Currently, it will not meet head-on or side impact specifications in the Volpe design. The car does meet the FRA “interim” specifications. This car was available for purchase in early 2008 but was not readily adopted until the interim specification was made by the FRA allowing its use. An FRA specification for a new super tank car design was released for comments in April 2008 (Volpe design). Because there were no proven prototypes that could meet the design, the FRA ruled in November 2008 that an interim car design is acceptable. The cost of fleet replacement is very significant so a phased-in approach is expected. In the interim rule, the FRA only requires that tank cars constructed of non-normalized steel must be retired before cars constructed of normalized steel. No changes were made to shorten an existing tank cars’ lifespan. Because this is an FRA rule there will be 100 per- cent market adoption. However, it is expected that due to the research efforts led by the Advanced Tank Car Collabora- tive Research Program and the FRA, additional rule changes will likely occur as technology develops. Enhanced tank car valves and fittings are also emerging as part of the technology packages that improve package integrity. For example, there is a new chlorine angle valve design whose primary seals are actually check valves located beneath the pressure plate which should survive without leaking even if the protective housing is sheared off. The newer designs in- clude locating the pressure relief valves underneath the pres- sure plate also reducing the chances of a product release. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Existing rail Hazmat transport packaging is regulated (Specifications for Railroad Tank Cars Used to Transport Hazardous Materials, 49 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) 3468;3473 January 27, 1984). Shippers must use the approved container for the material transported. A rule was issued in November 2008 that requires chlorine car retirements to be replaced with an im- proved interim car designed to better withstand derailments. Even though an improved design is currently mandated by the FRA for replacement Hazmat tank cars, the market adopt- ability rating is discounted to 6 because there are only a few improved interim car designs currently deployed and no pro- totype cars exist that meet the FRA Volpe design specification. It is also likely that the existing interim design specifications will change as new package integrity improvements are made. In addition to the tank car design, ancillary equipment, such as product loading/unloading valves, is also being improved to better survive shearing and rollovers. These new valve designs are just beginning to gain market adoptability. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: When designs and specifications are being adjusted and prototypes have not been proven, there is a tendency for a car owner to postpone adoption until final designs are approved. Currently, all new Hazmat tank cars built must be an improved interim design. These cars are more expensive than existing fleet designs and may not be the final design issued by the FRA. Car owners will likely postpone purchases of the new interim design as long as possible. It is also possible that replacements with the newer 87

interim designed cars will be by attrition and only if there is no existing used stock available. B. Equipment Reliability—Vehicle and cargo equipment are structurally sound and properly maintained. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: There are sev- eral systems that have been pioneered by the railroads to detect mechanical problems associated with cargo transport. The AAR developed a program named Advanced Technology Safety Ini- tiative (ATSI). One of the goals of ATSI is the detection and reporting of faulty equipment. This initiative incorporates three primary detection technologies. The railroads currently have a limited number of wayside “Wheel Impact Load Detectors” (WILDs) in operation. A WILD senses wheel impacts generated by a passing railcar, for example, those caused by wheel defects such as flat spots or divots. If the impact caused by the wheel is deemed to be ex- cessive, the train will be directed to reduce its speed and stop at the nearest railcar shop to uncouple the railcar with the wheel damage. The railroads also have a small number of “Truck Per- formance Detectors” (TPDs) in operation. (NOTE: a “truck” in this context refers to the structures underneath a railcar at both ends containing the wheels, axles, bearings, springs, and brakes). TPDs work by sensing sway stress on the rail and are used to detect truck hunting. (NOTE: “truck hunting” refers to a phenomenon in which wheels of a railcar truck begin to oscillate from side to side between the rails of the track, caus- ing eventual damage to both the rail and the railcar.) The rail- roads are also testing “Trackside Acoustic Detectors” (TADs). TADs “listen” for abnormal sounds from passing trains and are designed to detect bad wheel bearings. The data from these detectors are compiled, maintained, and analyzed in the AAR Integrated Remote Railway Information Service (InteRRIS®) database. Notifications to the car owners are generated based on this analysis. There are existing FRA regulations requiring preventa- tive railcar, track, and roadbed maintenance. These rules specify how long certain equipment parts can operate with- out inspection. Regulatory maintenance information is required to be stenciled on certain railcar types. Regular inspection and maintenance of the infrastructure is required by regulation for safe train movement, and movements are restricted by railroad rules when infrastructure deficiencies are found. In addition, freight railroads have operating rules for train “consists” which isolate hazardous cargo and reduce the consequences of a train accident involving such material. Significant advancement in detecting faulty rolling stock has occurred in the last decade. Despite the advancement in technology used by Class I railroads, there are rail corridors (short lines, regional) where ATSI technologies have not been applied. Access to data is not free to the car owners and many owners depend solely upon notification from the AAR con- cerning faults detected. There is consensus that the rail- roads benefit from this technology much more than do the car owners. The car owners incur costs associated with main- tenance required before the specified regulatory due dates. Most fault detection efforts have been focused on rolling stock and the damage it does to the rails. There is not a good system that has been widely deployed for detecting broken rails or damaged track switches in non- signaled territories. Currently, track integrity and condition is maintained primarily as a result of automated track flaw detec- tion vehicles or manual maintainer inspections for un-signaled territories. In signaled territories of the railroads, the track cir- cuits and switch controllers provide vital protection against some broken rail and track switch failure conditions. The rest are found by the manual inspection method. Restrictions on Hazmat cargo placement in train consists are variable and determined by each railroad, even though the best practice could be codified as part of the General Code of Operating Rules (GCOR) or the Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee (NORAC) standard Operating Rule- books. The current content of these rulebooks only provides general guidance as to being aware of and vigilant about iden- tified hazardous cargo (48, 49). Emerging technologies that address capability gap: There are several emerging technologies designed to improve defect detection in rolling stock. Advances in machine vision systems will permit wheel profile defect detection. Thermal sensing devices are being tested to determine wheel bearing health. Recent advances in accelerometer technology sensors can dif- ferentiate between impacts and sway allowing truck hunting and bad track detection. Wireless sensor technology could also allow easier installation on railcars and data communication between rolling stocks sensors and wayside readers. There are a couple of technologies being considered for detection of rail breaks. One uses acoustic wave transmission/sensing and was tested on a short span of track in the New York City transit system in 2006. The other uses electric current flow analysis. Both techniques offer a potential additional benefit of detect- ing vehicle presence within their monitoring zones. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Preventative maintenance of rolling stock is regulated by the FRA. The AAR ATSI program is sponsored and promoted by its Class I railroad membership. ATSI detection systems are typically not deployed on short or regional rail lines because of the lack of infrastructure and costs. The AAR issued rules providing for on-site repair of conditions found by their detectors with car owners bearing the repair costs. Shippers and car owners 88

typically do not implement fault detection systems within their domain due to a lack of infrastructure and costs. Instead they rely on regulatory preventative maintenance and man- ual inspections. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The Automatic Equipment Identification/Car Location Messaging (AEI/CLM) system along with the WILD wheel detector, TPDs, and TADs must communicate their alerts back to a central database at Railinc. The cost of these new wayside sensor systems impedes their growth on Class I railroads and prohibits adoption by most short-line railroads. In addition, these systems must have infrastructure to do that communication and properly power these detectors. The costs of the infrastructure required to sup- port these sensor systems are very large. Finding a lower cost support infrastructure such as low power and wireless capable could improve adoptability. C. Operator Performance—Operator performance is being able to successfully maneuver vehicle under normal and off-normal conditions. Capability also exists to sense oper- ator performance degradation due to fatigue, acute health problem, substance abuse, and so forth, and to alert oper- ator and back office to this situation. Additional capabil- ity to control train movement in a safe manner in absence of proper operator vigilance has been deployed in some areas, and is under development for others. Technical capability rating: 7 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Operator fatigue, particularly involving the engineer and train conductor, can have dramatic consequences. Accidents have happened within the last 5 years where operator fatigue was listed as a primary root cause. Solutions to operator fatigue have remained on the NTSB Most Wanted list since 1990. Currently, operator fatigue has been addressed by a series of implemented crew scheduling practice recommendations. FRA Regulations provide manda- tory hours of service limitations on railroad workers, and are very specific and tightly enforced. These regulations have been in effect since 1907 (50). Most railroads have advanced soft- ware packages that generate crew scheduling which attempts to comply with the hours of service rules or flag any exceptions for crew management action. A limited number of high-density or high-speed railroad lines are protected from many unsafe crew errors by systems generally referred to as “Cab Signal” systems. These systems use failsafe means of conveying train speeds to the cab and dis- playing the required speed to the operator, and provide warn- ing and alarms to the train operator for unsafe conditions in real time. In some of these applications, braking is automati- cally enforced if the train operator does not respond to the warning in an appropriate manner. Cab signal systems have been in use for many years, and in combination with “dead- man” control, prevent operator inattention from causing some accidents. The majority of Class I U.S. railroads are currently develop- ing, testing, or demonstrating radio-based Positive Train Con- trol (PTC) systems in compliance with upcoming FRA regula- tions in 49 CFR Part 236, Subpart I. These systems protect against human errors in complying with signals, speed limits, switch positions, etc. by sensing train location and speed, com- paring them with the current railroad conditions and infra- structure, and automatically applying brakes as needed for safety. One of the additional capabilities of PTC systems is to monitor the crew’s timely response to restrictions, work authorities, track authorities, and signal aspects. Failure to com- ply with the rules to allow the PTC system to provide protec- tion is an indication (in near real time) that the train is not being controlled safely. Therefore, central dispatchers can observe crew behavior and take appropriate action. Gaps: The current fatigue prevention system relies on mandatory scheduling of adequate off-hour rest periods and by having human redundancy in the cab. These approaches are not totally effective, and cab signal or PTC train controls are not widely applied at this time. Several versions of PTC are being tested but there is no agreement as to which system is preferred. An accident involving a freight and passenger train in Chatsworth, California, on September 12, 2008, resulted in multiple deaths and has resulted in pressure to adopt a standard PTC system. The conductor should notice micro-sleep or macro-sleep episodes and alert the engineer. This is facilitated by current railroad rules requiring verbal confirmation of all switch posi- tions and signal aspects among the crew and with the central dispatcher by radio. In addition, the train engineer and con- ductor communicate with each other at frequent intervals. There is some thought that emerging technologies such as positive train control and remote control locomotive systems will reduce vigilance by removing the human redundancy. The counter-assertion is that a properly applied failsafe PTC or cab signal system is more likely to safely respond to unsafe con- ditions than a second person. In addition, many AMTRAK trains already operate with a single crew member in the cab. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Engine- man Vigilance Monitoring is an FRA project to explore new technology to monitor real-time locomotive engineer alertness. The same technologies applied to monitor truck driver alert- ness can be applied here. PTC can also be considered an emerging technology as var- ious systems are being offered, and standardization of PTC for inter-line operation of trains is just now under development by AAR and the individual railroads. Fully failsafe PTC systems require substantial testing to ensure safety and reliability. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) 89

Rationale for market adoptability rating: The AAR has rec- ognized and promoted research in fatigue management since 1992. The AAR “Work Rest Task Force” along with the “North American Rail Alertness Partnership” identified key principles of an effective fatigue countermeasures program. Class I rail- roads do employ work schedule policies and these counter- measures to manage operator fatigue. There are some that use the Operator Fatigue Management (OFM) tools to manage this. Many railroads have policies that allow operators to nap under controlled conditions. Some of the non-vital real-time alertness monitoring devices are still considered experimental and have not been deployed on board locomotives. The NTSB has listed PTC as one of its top 10 needed transport safety improvements for over a decade. The Class I railroads are presently investing significant resources in developing and applying PTC systems for capacity improve- ment, which will also provide the noted significant benefits for safe train control in both signaled and non-signaled (dark) territory. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The cost of PTC is estimated to be $10 billion U.S. dollars to the Class I rail- roads. Since it is now mandated by Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) 2008, some federal monies (stimulus funds) have been made available to support this implementation. How- ever, these systems are very complex and will require exten- sive verification and validation. PTC systems are not mature technology. There is a significant development effort required to make the individual PTC implementations interoperable as a standard such that locomotives can interchange on PTC lines. It will be a challenge to develop and implement an inter- operable PTC by the 2015 deadline. D. Hazmat Commodity Identification and Awareness— Ability to identify the cargo being shipped either in person or via remote access. Technical capability rating: 7 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: All Hazmat ship- ments by rail are required to be placarded and listed on the train’s construct manifest (consist). Information is also main- tained by the railroads management systems. A uniform set of hazardous material identification methods, handling, and def- initions is required to be understood and carried by every rail crewmember (51). There is an express need by emergency re- sponders to quickly retrieve this information without risking life in an attempt to read a placard or locate the engineer. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: There is a desire for devices such as a transponder broadcasting con- tent information triggered by irregular impacts or axis modi- fication. Deployment of RFID technologies and satellite-radio identification (ID) tags with GPS or GLS for cargo module identification and localization on a continuous or frequent intermittent basis has begun, with several vendor products on the market. These technologies have the ability to identify the exact contents of Hazmat cargo, the responsible party for the cargo, and even the proper means of hazard containment and hazard mitigation, accessible to the authorized personnel for the public safety forces, federal authorities, shippers, and rail- roads affected. Market adoptability rating: 9 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: All Hazmat ship- ments must be placarded and recorded on the train’s consist. Shippers and railroads are adopting radiolocation and RFID tagging for Hazmat cargo as the technology is deployed. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Not applicable— all Hazmat shipments are placarded. E. Communication—Vehicle operator and back office have two-way communication capability at all times. This may take the form of verbal communication or data commu- nication, preferably both are available. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Current tech- nologies are through a variety of radio, cellular, microwave, and satellite wireless technologies that are used for voice, text, and data transmissions. No one communication tech- nology is 100 percent capable. Satellite technologies depend on view (i.e., tunnels, subway, overpasses, and canyons cause problems). The other technologies depend on sufficient cover- age and transmission/reception range. Combination commu- nication technologies can provide nearly 100 percent capable systems but, unfortunately, application of redundant com- munication technologies is not widespread. Class I railroads are now using multiple radio systems on trains for voice (Very High Frequency or VHF, cellular) and data (VHF, Ultra High Frequency or UHF, and satellite). Many regional and short- line railroads depend solely on VHF voice technology which can fail due to available coverage and/or range. Deployment of additional radio devices is regulated by the FCC, which is faced with frequency and bandwidth allocation issues, com- plicated by international spectrum allocation rules as well. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: GSM-R is now being combined with the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) to form the basis for an Intelligent Transport System in Europe. GSM is expected to be combined with satellite and radio to provide near 100 percent capable communications. In the United States, 802.11 short range communication standards are expected to include “Wireless Access in Vehic- ular Environment” (WAVE). The concept is to exchange data between high speed vehicles and other vehicles or wayside readers. The FCC has mandated a VHF Frequency Re-farming into 12.5 kHz channels (vs. 25 kHz) in the Railroad Radio ser- 90

vices (52). This provides the opportunity for additional chan- nels to be applied for improved coverage. The AAR is sponsoring development of a high-performance Software Defined Radio, which will allow much more flexible transmission options for both voice and data for railroad pur- poses, improving overall communication success. The rail- roads are also permitted under FCC rules to add various forms of UHF and/or Microwave links for PTC data purposes. These options, and the ability of PTC to require fewer voice radio conversations with trains (e.g., sending of track authority dig- itally), will also improve communications. Cellular telephone service is now in service as supplemental communications for train crews and field personnel of the railroads. In addition, “smart” locomotive radio equipment could be used as a repeater from another locomotive to a base station radio to increase coverage. This could be incorporated in the new AAR High-Performance Radio development. Market adoptability rating: 8 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: 100 percent com- munication capability and reliability to the rail crew is impor- tant to the railroads. It improves safety (dark regions) and efficiency. Adoptability is primarily affected by lack of, and the cost of, supporting communication infrastructure. Capac- ity improvements offered by PTC systems may serve as a way to justify and implement additional infrastructure. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The RSIA 2008 requires implementation of PTC by 2015. It is expected that this implementation will upgrade communications capa- bilities. Costs of the infrastructure upgrades are the biggest obstacle. F. Tracking—Vehicle and cargo location are known at all times, and can be monitored remotely. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Current tech- nology is a mix of techniques. It includes passive reads of low-frequency RFID tags on all railcars and locomotives from wayside readers. This provides intermittent location. GPS tracking devices are implemented on many train power units (i.e., locomotives) for the primary purpose of unit health reporting, but this also provides low resolution loca- tion reporting. PTC systems allow high resolution tracking of trains and their associated cargo consists. The AAR provides a computerized shipment tracking service that originated in the 1950s that currently identifies which train, known to be traveling between two major stations, contains the Hazmat cargo on a certain railcar. All railcars are required to have Automatic Vehicle Iden- tification (AVI) or AEI tags on them but the wayside, RFID readers are geographically sparse, and are not often on low- volume tracks. GPS coverage requires a good view of at least two GPS satellites at frequent intervals. Some locomotives have tracking capability such as GPS but individual non-powered railcars do not. Those few railcars that do have GPS and radio report only periodically to conserve on-board power. The cur- rent shipment tracking services are neither highly precise as to location, nor are they in real time. In 2009, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recognized tracking as a gap and have targeted a part of the FY 2009 Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP) to fund TIH car owners to equip a portion of their cars with GPS devices. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Nation- wide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS) or Dif- ferential Global Positioning System (DGPS) provides more accuracy (∼5m resolution) compared with (∼15m) of stan- dard GPS. Higher accuracy could provide enough resolution to provide track specific location in dense rail yards and may facilitate adoption as a cost saving measure. Assisted GPS (AGPS) or enhanced GPS (EGPS) allows use of GPS in “bad view” areas by assisting GPS with Wireless Cell Site location using various techniques. New battery designs and more effi- cient solar charging units can improve availability of these tracking devices. Some PTC systems have, as part of their database for each train, the “consist” which includes information on Hazmat cars. Conceptually, these trains can be identified very precisely on the track in real time for cargo location and tracking purposes. Market adoptability rating: 3 (Low adoptability = High market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Increasing the number of wayside readers and the infrastructure required is costly. Some railroads have as much as 60 percent dark terri- tory (i.e., no signaling). The AVI wayside readers are indepen- dent of the signal system, but the communications to a central location is often through the signal system infrastructure. GPS tracking technologies on Hazmat rail tank cars are being tested by a few shippers but less than 1 percent of the Hazmat tank car fleet has been equipped. Shippers have cited a lack of logis- tic benefit as one reason. Shippers also believe that responsi- bility for safety and security of the Hazmat asset lies with the custodian of the asset. There are also liability concerns around response to alarms from sensor equipped GPS devices. AAR is considering an interchange rule to require private car owners to share tracking data with the railroads to supplement the way- side tracking system. If such an interchange rule were to occur, then the adoptability would increase to 100 percent. Current battery and charger technologies will not permit continuous radiolocation tracking on non-power tank cars due to power requirements of the devices. Continuous tracking on powered units is possible and is enabled by emerging technologies such as PTC. Emerging communication technologies such as WAVE would certainly play an important role in PTC. 91

Grant programs such as FY 2009 FRSGP could dramatically improve adoptability. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Because of the low costs associated with the current CLM technology there is not a good business case for investing in GPS technology independent of the safety and security benefits. TSA and FEMA recognized this and implemented a grant program (Freight Rail Security Grant 2009) for Hazmat car owners to equip their tank cars with GPS. This program is expected to equip approximately 20 percent of the U.S. Hazmat fleet in 2010. G. Security—Vehicle, cargo, and operator are resistant to theft, diversion, sabotage, and intentional acts. Technical capability rating: 3 (Low capability = High tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: As of June 16, 2008, PHMSA adopted interim rules that reiterate the rail carriers’ obligation to address in their security plans issues related to en-route storage and delays in transit. Moreover, it adopts a new requirement mandating that rail carriers inspect placarded Hazmat railcars for signs of tampering or suspicious items, including improvised explosive devices. The rulemaking was developed by PHMSA in consultation with the FRA (53). Existing railroad policy is to not leave loaded Hazmat railcars unattended in unmanaged yards. Most managed yards have 24-hour security presence in the yards. Some large managed yards are equipped with video surveillance. The U.S. Coast Guard has initiated a mandate requiring a new credential for transportation workers. A Transportation Workers Identifica- tion Credential (TWIC) will be required for unescorted work- ers entering secured areas. The TWIC technology involves an extensive background search and deep sensing biometric fin- gerprint reading. Marine ports have taken the lead in adopt- ing this ID system. The FAQ section of TSA’s TWIC website states “At this time, the TWIC program is focused on the maritime mode, specifically MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels.” (Note: MTSA stands for Maritime Transportation Security Act.) And while the U.S. Coast Guard would prefer that all crew members of a train entering a secured port area possess a TWIC, that has not been made an absolute require- ment (i.e., there are approved equivalent entry processes that train crews can follow). Equipment tampering technologies exist but are not read- ily used. An example is an open door or dome sensor on a tank car. Sensors must be coupled with a GPS tracking device to do near real-time alerting. The railroads do not own the Hazmat railcars they transport so the car owners would have to provide asset tampering detection solutions. The AAR is considering an interchange rule to require sharing GPS tracking data and alerts received by the private equipment owners with the rail- road of custody. One only has to look at the presence of graffiti on railcars to see evidence of the gaps in security associated with rail freight transportation. The U.S. rail system has 140,000 miles of track. It is cost prohibitive to fence or frequently patrol this entire system. The current capability is primarily a rail security policy enforcement designed to keep loaded Hazmat moving or in a secure yard. The upcoming rule for more secure Haz- mat routing is only intended to minimize the risk from attack, not to prevent it. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: One current approach taken by TSA involves periodic rail corri- dor assessments for Hazmat transport through high threat urban areas. Some high value corridors have been identified and pilot projects to enhance security using technology is cur- rently underway. These technologies involve installing virtual fence that detects moving objects and perimeter breaches. Some wayside readers were modified to use sensor technolo- gies such as gas or explosives detection. One such corridor is a 7-mile corridor through Washington, DC. New technolo- gies are being tested by the FRA and AAR at TTCI that would permit covert remote control operations of rail locomotives including an emergency stop. Cooperative arrangements between shippers and carriers to share tracking and sensor data would improve situational awareness and response. Emerging security related sensor technology includes smart impact detection, event triggered site image capture, leak detection, smart locking, and tamper detection. The AAR, CHEMTREC, and shippers are currently working on a communication standard to permit tracking and sensor data sharing. The AAR began a pilot test of this data transfer with 2 shippers in August 2008. Market adoptability rating: 4 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Much of the funding related to rail security has been applied to passenger rail (mass transit) through TSA priorities on protection of the general public. Because of the size and numbers of rail yards in the United States, the installation of video surveillance is costly. The railroads are adding their own video yard monitoring capabilities selectively. The Class I railroads have their own police and train their employees annually on security. Private rail car owners have not been able to justify the costs of imple- menting GPS sensor technologies from a logistics benefit. Many see the primary responsibility for security once consigned to the railroad as the carrier’s since they have custody of the asset. Cost sharing between the government, carriers, and the car owners for such technologies has not yet materialized. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: It is a monumen- tal task to secure 140,000 miles of track in the United States. It is difficult to determine where to apply limited resources. TSA and FEMA recognized this and implemented a grant program (Freight Rail Security Grant 2009) to help fund efforts to sup- 92

port security awareness and emergency response training for frontline Class I employees. Class II and III railroads can also apply for funds supporting vulnerability assessments and secu- rity plan development. Car owners can use funds to equip their tank cars with GPS from this program. It remains a challenge to properly secure that much territory using limited resources. H. Emergency Response—Qualified emergency response is delivered to the incident site in a timely manner wherever it may occur. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Under federal law, notification of emergencies involving releases of reportable quantities of hazardous materials must be made to the National Response Center. Local emergency response organizations are also notified. The Occupational Safety and Health Adminis- tration (OSHA) requires the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS). An ICS is a combination of person- nel, policies, procedures, and equipment working together within a common organizational structure with responsibility for management of assigned resources to effectively accom- plish stated objectives at the scene of an accident. Hazmat ship- ments are identified by placards and stenciling on the railcars. Industry services such as the ACC’s “Chemical Transporta- tion Emergency Center” (CHEMTREC) provide a 24-hour response hotline. They will provide information and assist in contacting the manufacturer, carrier, and shippers. Member companies often have trained response teams that can be deployed to the accident scene to assist local responders. To receive financial and technical assistance under FEMA’s grant programs, state governments must develop and update a 4-year exercise program for validating emergency preparedness and response. FEMA, shippers, community responders and major carriers conduct regular cooperative response exercises. At its Pueblo, Colorado, facility, TTCI provides training to responders on Hazmat accident mitigation and methods for prevention and containment of hazardous emissions. Auto- mated detection and notification of release information could speed up response but is considered experimental and not currently deployed. Costs, reliability, and false triggers hin- der deployment of such systems. Rail accident sites are often difficult to access by road thus delaying response. Smart GPS devices with sensors are being developed and tested. Such systems could detect spills or leaks and notify responders with information such as location, materials, and quantities. Together with GIS data systems, responders can quickly access information such as access routes, weather conditions, and population density and produce a more com- plete threat assessment. Sophisticated railroad dispatch sys- tems include databases of hazards, local public safety contacts, and shipper contacts related to Hazmat. Even more precise information would be available from PTC systems as they are deployed. Market adoptability rating: 9 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: The rail indus- try must implement emergency response as an essential part of operating their business. Maximizing response while min- imizing response time is a primary goal of emergency man- agement. Technology to speed emergency response must be reliable and properly filtered with no false alarms. The liabil- ity caused by responding to false alarms must be reduced or eliminated. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The rail industry and Hazmat manufacturing industry recognize the importance of effective emergency response. Automated systems that do early detection and alerting can also provide false indications which could result in liabilities to the message receiver and costs associated with responding. Such systems must be ade- quately filtered and validated before there will be significant acceptance. Emergency first responders need rapid identifi- cation and relevant information on the hazardous materials they are required to mitigate. Emergency responders, outside of industry, are community based local fire fighters and emer- gency workers. They are often first on the scene but often have the least amount of information initially. I. Vehicle Identification—Vehicles can be quickly identified by first responders as well as back office personnel. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Tank cars must display their unique identification mark. These must be stenciled in particular locations which typically include both sides and the top. The Hazmat material and hazard associated with that material is also stenciled on the side of the car. The technical rating is an 8 instead of a 9 because of the need expressed by emergency responders to identify a tank car and its contents from a distance. There is some discussion in the emergency response functional require- ment concerning this. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Not applicable. Market adoptability rating: 9 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Tank car owners must comply with these regulations. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Not applicable. J. Hazmat Route Restrictions—Routes are selected in part based on minimizing risk to people and the environment. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) 93

Rationale for technical capability rating: As of June 16, 2008, PHMSA adopted interim rules for routing of trains trans- porting the most toxic and dangerous hazardous materials in rail tank cars. Under the interim rule, rail carriers must com- plete a comprehensive safety and security risk assessment of their primary routes and any practicable alternative routes, beginning June 1, 2008. This is intended to promote improved security of trains against malicious attacks that would endan- ger larger than necessary populations. The AAR is doing work on generating routing algorithms that use the required factors and produce routes which are approved by PHMSA. Market adoptability rating: 9 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: The rail industry must implement this required route analysis as an essential part of operating its business. Because this is a requirement for all railroads by the end of 2010, the market adoptability is high. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Not applicable. Hazmat routing will be a requirement. Technology Development Priority—Rail Mode Table D-5 is a recap of the functional requirement gap rating—rail. Table D-6 is a recap of the mode importance rating. Based on Tables D-5 and D-6, Table D-7 provides the devel- opment priorities for the rail mode functional requirements. Extracted Screened Technologies—Rail Mode Table D-8 contains technologies the modal lead selected from the screened research list as being most applicable for the rail mode. Technologies considered high priority devel- opment needs are in bold type. 1.3 Marine Mode Functional Requirements—Marine Mode NOTE: The marine mode has the eight generic functional requirements. 94 High Medium HighF. Tracking High Medium Low C. Operator Performance Medium A. Package Integrity B. Equipment Reliability High G. Security Low Low D. HM Commodity ID I. Vehicle ID J. HM Route Restrictions Low E. Communication H. Emergency Response Medium Market Adoptability Need Rating Low Medium High Technical Capability Need Rating Table D-5. Functional requirement gap rating—rail. High MediumAir High Rail Barge High Medium Low Medium High Truck Pipeline Low Low Low Medium Serious Consequence Potential (Volume Per Shipment) Low Medium High Modal Activity Level (Ton-Miles) Table D-6. Mode importance rating.

95 High Medium C. Operator Performance D. HM Commodity ID E. Communication H. Emergency Response I. Vehicle ID J. HM Route Restrictions High A. Package Integrity B. Equipment Reliability High F. Tracking G. Security Medium Low Medium High Low Low Low Medium Mode Importance Rating Low Medium High Functional Requirement Gap Rating Table D-7. Functional requirement technology development priority—rail. Technology Need Description Potential Solution(s) HIGH PRIORITY Materials to Improve Equipment Crashworthiness (Package Integrity, Equipment Reliability) Derailments will occur and Hazmat containers need to survive these events. New materials and container designs are needed. Specialty and treated steels, engineered metal structures such as corrugated crumple energy absorbing designs, structural foams and composites are needed. Self sealing technologies, impact resistant coatings, protected recessed valves and fittings. Hazmat tank car design specification is regulated. HIGH PRIORITY Rail Infrastructure and Equipment Defect Detection (Equipment Reliability) Most derailments are due to either defects in rail infrastructure or rolling stock. Improved infrastructure material such as concrete or composite ties. More defect detection technologies such as GPS-based truck hunting detectors, acoustical bad bearing detectors, wild wheel detectors, automated rail defect survey equipment, and track integrity sensor systems. HIGH PRIORITY Cargo Content Identification (Cargo Identity, Tracking) Wireless identification of Hazmat contents detectable by locomotive and emergency responders. Networked RFID tag on each railcar with interrogators on locomotive and emergency responders; load contents and macro data via memory stick on tank cars; data could be networked via wireless repeaters or electronic brake wiring on cars to front and end of trains. HIGH PRIORITY Cargo Condition Sensors (Tracking, Emergency Response) Sensors to detect diminished container integrity, loss of material, temperature, hatch open/close, penetration by other than hatch opening. Pressure gauges and chemical detection sensors combined with other sensors such as Impact could alert via GPS devices of security and derailment events. Embedding image collecting could provide visual information and evidence concerning the event. Anti-Collision Systems (Operator Performance) Anti-collision systems such as Positive Train Control (available but not widely adopted) and driver assistive systems. Several versions of a positive train control system are currently available but are not widely adopted due to costs and lack of a standards technology. A technology standard is required because locomotives often move on different Class I railroads and incompatibility issues could occur. Other technologies could also help prevent collisions due to inattentiveness or sleeping such as mini-cameras to monitor driver's eye and eyelid movements; devices that record heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and brain waves; the use of risk perception algorithms to determine whether the locomotive is being operated safely. HIGH PRIORITY Standard GPS requires a good view of the sky and is not functional in tunnels and ravines. Enhanced GPS uses additional techniques to continue to acquire tracking data even under these conditions. Fusion of imaging and inertial sensors (including the use of LIDAR and Doppler) that result in GPS-level navigation precision; beacon-based navigation (including pseudolites); signals of opportunity (SoOP). Table D-8. Extracted screened technologies—rail. (continued on next page)

96 Technology Need Description Potential Solution(s) HIGH PRIORITY Improved detection of foreign devices and defects on shipping stock. High resolution camera systems triggered by AEI reader technology can auto capture images of tank cars. Analysis systems could be applied based on that tank car’s profile to identify foreign devices and potentially defects in the equipment. Such systems when applied to tank cars’ exiting facilities could supply additional documentation for Chain-of- Custody transfer. HIGH PRIORITY Tank car tracking (Tracking) Real-time visual vessel tracking, including vessel name, speed, course, etc. Intelligent video surveillance system capable of tracking Hazmat tank cars through high-threat urban area in real time using handoff from camera to camera; Networked RFID (AEI) combined with GPS and cargo monitoring; Internet-delivered, remote asset telemetry Asset Management Platform using GSM or satellite communications; GSM-based GPS device with built-in RF receiver (for sensor reception), camera, and impact detector; and the use of geofencing. Redundant communication techniques (GSM failover to satellite) could be combined to improve message delivery in dark cellular areas. HIGH PRIORITY Alert/incident notification systems (Security, Tracking) False alarms from sensor systems are barriers to adoptability. They are costly and generate liabilities. Technology is needed to provide alarm filtering such that confidence in sensor data is enhanced. Such systems will combine multiple sensors with infrastructure information to decide how to treat an alert. Systems could automatically notify the proper agencies based on this assessment. Event data received by sensor technology is compared with programmed values in data tables to identify matches indicating an actual/emerging problem. When such patterns are identified, alert messages are automatically sent via fax, email, pager, text message, and/or voice message. System also includes the ability to inventory vulnerable targets (e.g., critical infrastructure) and generate customized alerts to appropriate officials. Digital photograph (using an IR flash for conditions of darkness) can also be included in the report. HIGH PRIORITY Universal communications interface standard (Security, Tracking, Emergency Response) There is a strong desire by government, railroads, shippers and Hazmat responders to use a standard universal communication interface for communicating credible threats, tracking, and alert information to the proper agencies. Currently, there is no standard definition for such an interface. XML definitions and secure data protocols for communicating credible threat information, tracking data, sensor data and alert notifications between stake holders. A central secure data-repository for such information where business proprietary data is protected but stake holders can access needed tracking, content, and response information. HIGH PRIORITY Innovative GPS and Sensor Power for Non- powered Vehicles (Tracking) Tank cars do not have a power source available to supply GPS and sensor devices. Frequent reporting requirements mandate a reliable power source. Battery recharging, flexible batteries that never need to be recharged, electronics that can power themselves are needed. Bearing or axle generator recharging capability on rolling stock. Wireless electrical or motion-powered technology; plastic thin-film organic solar cells with flexible polymer batteries; nanogenerators harnessing power from movement of flexible wires; very fast storage for solar power or a flash charge for cell phones and laptops. HIGH PRIORITY Universal Security ID for Transportation Industry (Security) Almost every organization interviewed expressed a strong desire for a single universal security ID system. Many Hazmat shippers use DHS CFATS IDs and U.S. Coast Guard ports require TWIC IDs. The railroads require their own ID systems. There is a need for a single system. There are several advanced security ID systems available. Chemical factory workers IDs (CFATS) and transportation worker IDs (TWIC) systems are new and use biometric + PIN technologies to verify a person’s identity. Standardizing IDs for Rail, Truck, Barge, and AIR would reduce costs and allow for these ID technologies to be leveraged with other technologies such as smart locking or sealing systems. HIGH PRIORITY Advanced Cargo Locks & Seals (Security) Conveyance hatch seals today are simple mechanical cables that are easily cut by pliers or cutters. They are designed to alert the receiver that someone tampered with the cargo but do not hinder the tampering or generate an alert in real time. Improved positive locking mechanisms that can disarm and disable conveyance hatches. Smart locking mechanisms could be combined with smart card ID recognition such as TWIC and only open when a properly credentialed person attempts to access it. It could also be programmed to differentiate geofenced behaviors. Seals could be equipped with break wire technology and provide alerts via GPS concerning seal breakage when not within a shipper or customer geofence. Table D-8. (Continued).

A. Package Integrity—Package is robust such that material contents are not breached during normal transport oper- ations and typical accident conditions. Capability exists to sense/detect pressure build-up and/or material release. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Hazmat cargo carried by the marine mode is typically in bulk using spe- cialized barges, open sea tankers, or containers. While these may be breached due to collision, allision, or grounding, such events are relatively rare (although the consequences can be significant). Tankers are being converted to double hulls in an effort to reduce spill likelihood. Note, however, that an unintended consequence of double-hulled vessels can be that if flammable materials seep from the inner hull, these fumes may ignite if exposed to a spark caused by a grounding, allision, or collision that punctures the outer shell; in such instances, the entire cargo could explode and burn. Technologies to sense/ detect pressure build-up and/or material release are not in wide commercial use at this time. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Being tested today are technologies to detect and send an alarm for pressure changes of container contents, spills/leaks, and hatch status (open or closed), with readings to be sent by satellite. Coupled with these systems is the ability to send photo images of the impact area. One important concern is to provide sufficient power such that safe (i.e., spark resis- tant) and frequent readings can be made and transmitted (see discussion under “F. Tracking”). Market adoptability rating: 8 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Most of the indus- try uses the same type of packaging, although the extent to which various sensors are utilized will depend on the nature of the cargo and the availability of resources to invest in this technology. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: As technology is implemented to provide sensing/detection capability, depend- ing on installation and operating cost, it may be that only the larger, more financially secure carriers will opt to use this capability. The remainder of the industry may follow, how- ever, if required to do so by regulation or if the cost of imple- mentation is affordable. B. Equipment Reliability—Vehicle and cargo equipment are structurally sound and properly maintained. Capabil- ity exists to sense/detect problems such as engine failure or loss of steering. Vehicle is able to protect its crew from seri- ous injury under most accident circumstances. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: It appears that the industry is keeping its equipment properly maintained and that equipment and procedures are in place to protect the crew. The capability to sense/detect problems, such as engine failure and loss of steering, should be similar to other transport vehicles. There is some concern that improvements need to be made to vessel stability. A vessel’s stability is the measure of its ability to withstand high winds, waves, and other forces resulting from its operations (lifting, trawling, towing, etc.) and resist capsizing by returning to an upright position after being heeled over. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Im- proved lashing systems for marine containers; automated stability systems for ships. Market adoptability rating: 8 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Most of the indus- try uses similar equipment and maintenance practices. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: None specified. C. Operator Performance—Operator is able to successfully maneuver vehicle under normal and off-normal condi- tions. Capability also exists to sense operator performance degradation due to fatigue, acute health problem, substance abuse, etc., and alert the operator and back office to this situation. Technical capability rating: 7 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Major improve- ments have been made in navigation technology with the advent of the Automatic Identification System (AIS). AIS tech- nology and communication protocol has been adopted by the International Maritime Organization as an international stan- dard for ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, and shore-to ship com- munication of navigation information, including vessel posi- tion, speed, and course information. AIS users operating in proximity to each other automatically create a virtual network. Shore stations can join these virtual networks and receive ship- board AIS signals, perform network and frequency manage- ment, and send additional broadcast or individual informa- tional messages to AIS equipped vessels. Most major U.S. ports have AIS capability. Inland waterway AIS installations only cover the Mississippi River below Baton Rouge, although boats traveling through this area are required to have AIS capability. Also, AIS range is limited to VHF radio range. The major inland waterway carriers, representing roughly 70 percent of the industry, have AIS installed on their power boats. Many carriers use electronic navigation systems that identify chan- nels and currents, along with AIS capability, integrating these technologies to identify potential conflicts with boats, infra- structure, and other obstructions. Boat pilots are also trained on high-end simulators that represent the wheelhouse/ bridge, present a full set of controls and offer a wide range of scenarios that may be encountered. Note that dock navigation remains an issue, however, as most of these operations are still performed using hardcopy reference documents that are avail- able on computers in pdf form. 97

Systems that sense operator performance degradation as a result of fatigue, acute health problem, substance abuse, etc., and alert the operator and back office to this situation are not in commercial use at this time. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Plans call for land-based AIS to be implemented throughout the entire inland waterway system. Capability to sense/alert per- formance degradation from boats deviating off course or coming too close to another boat is possible and being tested. Another emerging technology is a system mounted on the power vessel that records radar images, VHS radio, and video images. Also, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has success- fully prototyped “Smartlock,” a system that can measure and communicate outdraft (cross-currents) that creates upstream navigation problems around locks, bridges, and other major structures; sensors submerged at these locations determine the direction and velocity of the outdraft, and the information is transmitted to the AIS for dissemination. The Corps has also been asked by waterway operators to develop a means of con- trolling drift wood that builds up around locks. Among the technologies being considered that can detect and report physical conditions and operator behavior are mini-cameras and IR lights mounted above the steering wheel to monitor driver’s eye and eyelid movements; devices that record heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and brain waves; and the use of risk perception algorithms to determine whether the ves- sel is being operated safely. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Only about 70 percent of the inland waterway industry has invested in AIS capability. Also, not all operators have integrated AIS with other navigation technologies to the full extent. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Both market adoption of existing technology (AIS, electronic navigation charts) and emerging technology will be highly dependent on deployment cost and the carrier’s ability to pay. While the major carriers have a strong interest in developing and using more advanced technologies, some of the others may not fol- low unless required to do so. D. Hazmat Commodity Identification and Awareness— Ability to identify the cargo being shipped either in person or via remote access. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Nearly all marine Hazmat shipments are in bulk and relatively easy to identify. Moreover, the shipments are placarded and the material is listed on the shipment manifest, which is stored on the bridge. Furthermore, AIS broadcasts include the vessel identification number and the type of ship and cargo. Some concern has been expressed with stacked container ships in terms of difficulties reading RFID tags on containers that are located under layers of other containers. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Under consideration/development are IR spectroscopy to analyze for potentially hazardous chemicals, with chemical signa- tures stored that can be rapidly matched; networked RFID tags on each package with interrogators on container ships (to read from deepest containers stacked on ships); and load assignment and shipping paper transcription via memory stick on conveyance, wireless transmittal, and broadband user enrollment. Market adoptability rating: 8 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: The industry is fairly uniform in how it deals with Hazmat commodity iden- tification and awareness. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Again, market adoption will come down to whether the industry can justify investment in new technology for safety, security, and eco- nomic reasons. Otherwise, wholesale adoption will only occur if required by regulation. E. Communication—Vehicle operator and back office have two-way communication capability at all times. Technical capability rating: 7 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: The advent of AIS also provides a means for boats (and back offices) to electronically exchange information on boat identification, position, course and speed. Use of satellite communication is also prevalent in the industry, as are cell phone technology, walkie-talkies, and text messaging. Communication dead spots and the fact that AIS is not operational everywhere impact complete coverage. In deep sea operations, there is often a communication problem because many foreign vessels are operated by individuals who are not fluent in the English language. This can lead to confusion in terms of how to nav- igate in U.S. waters, jeopardizing safety and security. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: Plans call for land-based AIS to be implemented throughout the entire inland waterway system. Among the technologies under development to resolve GPS “dark spots” are fusion of imag- ing and inertial sensors, including the use of LIDAR and Doppler, that result in GPS-level navigation precision; beacon- based navigation (including pseudolites: small transceivers that are used to create a local, ground-based GPS alternative); and signals of opportunity (SoOP; e.g., time beacons and radio broadcasts). To combat foreign language communication problems, it has been suggested that development of a linguis- tic tool, one that could translate typical marine navigation terminology into several foreign languages (and vice versa), 98

would provide added safety and security. In response to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Coast Guard is developing a two-way maritime data communication system based on AIS technology, referred to as the Nationwide Auto- matic Identification System (NAIS). AIS data (e.g., vessel loca- tion, course, and speed) collected by NAIS will be combined with other government intelligence and surveillance data to form a holistic, overarching view of maritime traffic within or near U.S. and territorial waters. NAIS is expected to consist of a system of AIS receivers, transmitters, transceivers, repeaters and other equipment located on shoreside installations and remote platforms, potentially including buoys, offshore plat- forms, aircraft, and spacecraft, to receive, distribute, and use information transmitted by vessels that operate AIS equipment. Message data will be transported between system components over a wide-area network (WAN) and diverse, remote site con- nectivity (e.g., leased analog circuits, microwave). Implemen- tation of the NAIS involves installing AIS equipment and related support systems on and around communications towers or other structures along 95,000 miles of coastline and inland waterways. The system is expected to be fully imple- mented and operational by 2014. Market adoptability rating: 7 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Only about 70 percent of the waterway operators have invested in AIS capability on their boats, perhaps an indication of the extent to which the industry is embracing the availability of advanced communication technologies. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Both market adoption of existing and emerging technology will depend on deployment cost and the carrier’s ability to pay. While the major carriers are likely to leverage these technologies where it can be proven to be cost-effective, the remainder of the indus- try may not follow suit unless it is a regulatory requirement. F. Tracking—Vehicle and cargo location are known at all times. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability rating) Rationale for technical capability rating: Many boats have GPS (Global Positioning System) or DGPS (Differen- tial GPS) capability while others use LORAN-C (LOng RAnge Navigation)-C to identify their location. Intermittent cover- age and lack of positional accuracy can be problematic for navigational purposes, although the lapses in readings may be less of a concern relative to other modes because of the travel speed of the boat. Barges assigned to a consist are typically tracked based on the boat that is powering it, rather than on a separate GPS transponder tagged to the barge. This cre- ates a potential problem if the association between barge and power boat is not made properly. For deep sea operations, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) enables the U.S. Coast Guard to correlate Long Range Iden- tification and Tracking (LRIT) data with data from other sources so that it can be received by flag states, port states, and coastal states to detect anomalies and heighten overall maritime domain awareness. Passenger ships, cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage or more, and mobile offshore drilling units while in transit are required to transmit LRIT information. Conditions vary in terms of the locations under which U.S. and foreign flag vessels must report. Some exemptions also apply. Transmissions are to occur with a frequency of 2 to 4 times per day to reduce the communications cost to be in line with the demand of states requiring LRIT information. The LRIT system is expected to be operational by December 31, 2008. The LRIT system consists of the ship borne transmit- ting equipment; communications service providers; application service providers; and an LRIT data center, data distribu- tion plan, and international data exchange. The Coast Guard does not envision LRIT and AIS interfacing with each other, however. Although the position, identification, and time of position information will be similar in both systems, the method of transmission is distinct. AIS is a VHF-based sys- tem that is limited to line-of-sight, but is able to transmit broader data content than LRIT. In contrast, LRIT uses satel- lite technology to identify and track ships in a larger geo- graphic area than shore-based AIS. Because AIS data is open broadcast and is easily obtainable, the Coast Guard may not need LRIT information while a ship is in port. However, the process to stop and re-start LRIT transmissions is not cost-effective unless the ship will not be transmitting for an extended period of time. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: NDGPS or DGPS provide more accuracy compared with standard GPS. AGPS or EGPS allow use of GPS in “bad view” areas by assist- ing GPS with wireless cell site location. Among the technolo- gies being proposed or under development are an intelligent video surveillance system capable of tracking Hazmat vehicles through high-threat urban areas in real time using handoff from camera to camera; networked RFID combined with GPS and cargo monitoring; the GT Freight Data Collector system, a GPS-based instrument; E-Transport River Information Ser- vices (RIS) vessel tracking and tracing telematics; satellite- based tracking out beyond 200 miles in conjunction with NAIS; Internet-delivered, remote asset telemetry Asset Man- agement Platform using GSM communications; GSM-based GPS device with built-in RF receiver (for sensor reception), camera, and impact detector; and the use of geofencing. New battery designs and more efficient solar charging units offer potential for improving tracking of individual barges. Among these are wireless electrical or motion-powered technology; plastic thin-film organic solar cells with flexible polymer bat- teries; nanogenerators harnessing power from movement of 99

flexible wires; and very fast storage for solar power or a flash charge for cell phones and laptops. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: The major water- way operators are financially stable and routinely invest in hardware and software upgrades to support operations, including tracking. On the other hand, smaller operators with limited financial resources are constrained in their ability to acquire these capabilities. LRIT is envisioned to be backward compatible with existing equipment onboard ves- sels. Consequently it is estimated that approximately 15 per- cent of U.S. flag vessels (about 70 of 450) may need some type of equipment enhancement; in such cases, the costs are expected to be nominal (i.e., under $5,000 apiece). Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: A decrease in the acquisition cost of these technologies and/or justification that the operating cost savings of improved logistics management outweigh the technology acquisition cost will help to improve overall industry adoption. G. Security—Vehicle, cargo, and operator are resistant to theft, diversion, sabotage, and other intentional acts. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: From a secu- rity standpoint, it is extremely difficult to maintain a closed marine transportation system due to the number of parties involved, the culture of port operations, international linkages, etc. However, progress is being made. By September 2008, all mariners and support personnel will be required to have a TWIC. The TWIC has biometric features including finger- prints and eye scans. Hulls are generally locked and electronic seals are sometimes used. Around docks, some companies have installed underwater sensors to detect any foreign objects that could cause potential harm to the docking vessel. Ports are using x-ray and gamma machines, as well as radiation detec- tion devices to screen cargo. However, where these systems have been implemented, only a small percentage of cargo is observed. Integrated surveillance intelligent systems (ISIS), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and remote video surveil- lance systems (RVSS) are also being used as security tools. Many boats are outfitted with a panic button which transmits an alarm to a centralized location. Also, piracy remains a problem in the open seas. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: The extent to which ISIS, UAVs, and RVSS have matured is unknown. It is possible that more advanced versions of these systems are under development, such as the use of under- water imaging technology to map hulls of ships. Another area of security technology development is in the use of advanced cargo locks and seals. Systems under consideration/ development include improved positive locking mechanisms that can disarm and disable conveyance hatches and locks using low life cycle cost plastic fiber-optic seals with RF com- munications running on a single battery with 4 of years life to support continuous monitoring. The external seals would have entry and state-of-health alarms sent to a receiver talking to “the world,” with all messages stored at a data collection point, and using a remotely monitored sealing array (RMSA) with cryptographically authenticated messages (much more resis- tant to defeat). Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: At this time, most ports and docks do not have sophisticated surveillance and detection technologies installed. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The resources required to implement advanced security technology will require either investment by the DHS and/or ports/vessels that are considered prime terrorist targets. The extent to which these resources will be made available is unknown. An addi- tional challenge will be how to screen a greater percentage of cargo without creating an excessive burden to commerce. H. Emergency Response—Qualified emergency response is delivered to an incident site in a timely manner wherever it may occur. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: When an inci- dent occurs that requires an emergency response, a single call to the National Response Center initiates the response process. Subsequent Center interactions with the carrier and the U.S. Coast Guard provide a means for identifying the accident location, cargo involved, and other pertinent information (through back office and AIS communications, respectively). Even so, response can be problematic, as access to a dock and the time to reach an incident site can be difficult. The industry has yet to leverage GIS technology to identify the nearest response assets in proximity (e.g., police, medical per- sonnel, recovery resources) to the incident site. Fortunately, crews are well trained in handling fires and other onboard incidents, with drills run once a week. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: The U.S. Coast Guard and waterway operators are working col- laboratively to develop Waterway Action Plans, identifying trigger points and actions taken by towboat captains and com- panies to mitigate risk. Technologies to support improved emergency response include systems where event data received by sensors is compared with programmed values in data tables to identify matches indicating an actual/emerging problem. When such patterns are identified, alert messages are auto- matically sent via fax, email, pager, text message, and/or voice 100

message. The system also includes the ability to inventory vulnerable targets (e.g., critical infrastructure) and generate customized alerts to appropriate officials. Digital photograph (using an IR flash for conditions of darkness) can also be included in the report. Market adoptability rating: 8 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Most of the indus- try recognizes its emergency response role and has appropriate operating practices in place. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The extent to which new technologies will be adopted to enhance existing operations will depend on whether such implementation is considered cost-effective. Technology Development Priority— Marine Mode Table D-9 is a recap of the functional requirement gap rating—marine. Table D-10 is a recap of the mode importance rating. Based on Tables D-9 and D-10, Table D-11 provides the development priorities for the marine mode functional requirements. Extracted Screened Technologies— Marine Mode Table D-12 contains technologies the modal lead selected from the screened research list as being applicable for the marine mode. Technologies considered high priority devel- opment needs are in bold type. 1.4 Air Mode Functional Requirements—Air Mode NOTE: The air mode has the eight generic functional requirements. A. Package Integrity—Package is robust such that material contents are not breached during normal transport oper- ations and typical accident conditions. Capability exists to sense/detect pressure build-up and/or material release. Technical capability rating: 7 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Aircraft are cat- egorized as Passenger, Cargo, and Combination aircraft. The probability of transporting large containers of dangerous goods is small in the total number of flights. The majority of 101 High Medium High High Medium Low C. Operator Performance Medium F. Tracking G. Security High Low Low A. Package Integrity B. Equipment Reliability D. HM Commodity ID E. Communication Low H. Emergency Response Medium Market Adoptability Need Rating Low Medium High Technical Capability Need Rating Table D-9. Functional requirement gap rating—marine. High MediumAir High Rail Barge High Medium Low Medium High Truck Pipeline Low Low Low Medium Serious Consequence Potential (Volume Per Shipment) Low Medium High Modal Activity Level (Ton-Miles) Table D-10. Mode importance rating.

air shipments involve either limited quantities or small quan- tities which are flown during the daytime, and cargo shipments that are usually flown during the evening or early morning hours. Containers for bulk shipment usually involve palletized drums or cylinders that are certified as meeting the container requirements for UN/ICAO (United Nations/International Civil Aviation Organization) standards. These standards are enforced domestically by the U.S. DOT. The primary area of concern for shipments by air involves the pressure build-up based on the use of unpressurized aircraft or unheated cargo holds on certain aircraft. When packaging is breeched, it is often associated with the ground handling and not directly related to the air portion of the move. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: When possible, pressure gauge and temperature range normal- ities may be transferred via IR and, in some cases, radio trans- mission during the loading and unloading ground operations. The possibility of in-flight communication with ground track- ing is not deemed feasible currently. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Due to the inter- national regulations for shipments made by air, the operat- ing conventions of International Air Transport Association (IATA)/ICAO will need to be canvassed to determine how enforcement and practical applications are covered. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Airlines are cur- rently not seeking additional capital outlay programs because of the market fluctuations regarding the availability of fuel. The likelihood of additional provisions for a limited business activity does not seem practical at this time. B. Equipment Reliability—Vehicle and cargo equipment are structurally sound and properly maintained. Capability exists to sense/detect problems such as engine failure or loss of steering. Vehicle is able to protect its crew from serious injury under most accident circumstances. Aircraft and cargo loading equipment are routinely inspected and, depending on the certificate of the airline, the timing and frequency of inspections may be routinely monitored. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the airline manufacturers have to commit to airworthiness directives as required by the supporting national agencies. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Air crews are required to pre- and post-flight each aircraft prior to each activ- ity for a flight period. In addition, this mode has licensed repair and maintenance personnel who must maintain licensed air- craft and power plant licenses to make certificated repair or adjustments to a certificated aircraft. There is no other trans- portation mode which requires such regimented service and maintenance programs. Air carriers must maintain complete maintenance programs to be allowed to operate aircraft for hire both domestically and in foreign commerce. Emerging technologies that address the capabilities gap: The primary technology efforts involve the conservation of fuel and the more efficient use of resources for aircraft maintenance for aircraft and power plant. Human engineer- ing will also be important as it relates to aircrew utilization and mandated rest periods. The cost of reducing air crews to no more than two uniformed personnel on the flight deck is the standard for most commercial activities based on air- craft tonnage; it is important to remember that single pilot operation is permitted on some smaller aircraft and in remote locations. Market adoptability rating: 5 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: The primary direction is the utilization of aircrews to reduce labor costs 102 High Medium A. Package Integrity B. Equipment Reliability C. Operator Performance D. HM Commodity ID E. Communication H. Emergency Response High F. Tracking G. Security High Medium Low Medium High Low Low Low Medium Mode Importance Rating Low Medium High Functional Requirement Gap Rating Table D-11. Functional requirement technology development priority—marine.

103 Technology Need Description Potential Solution(s) HIGH PRIORITY Cargo content identification Sensors to analyze the composition of different types of Hazmat cargo/substances. IR spectroscopy to analyze for potentially hazardous chemicals, with chemical signatures stored that can be rapidly matched; networked RFID tag on each package with interrogators on container ships (to read from deepest containers stacked on ships); load assignment/shipping paper transcription via memory stick on conveyance, wireless transmittal, and broadband user enrollment. HIGH PRIORITY Cargo condition sensors Sensors to detect diminished container integrity, loss of material, temperature, hatch open/close, penetration by other than door opening. Pressure gauges and/or chemical detection sensors; fiber-optic sensors and photonic sensor integrated wireless systems; container vibration patterns gathered from wireless RF sensor tags. Operator condition monitoring systems Medical monitoring devices that can detect and report physical conditions (such as drowsiness, heart attack, diabetic emergencies) and operator behavior (lane drift). Mini-cameras and IR lights mounted above the steering wheel to monitor driver's eye and eyelid movements; devices that record heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and brain waves; the use of risk perception algorithms to determine whether the vessel is being operated safely. HIGH PRIORITY Overcoming GPS “dark territory” Certain technologies that allow use of GPS by assisting it with wireless cell site location in a “bad view” area where a GPS device may have difficulty providing location information. Fusion of imaging and inertial sensors (including the use of LIDAR and Doppler) that result in GPS-level navigation precision; beacon-based navigation (including pseudolites); signals of opportunity (SoOP) HIGH PRIORITY Innovative sensor power for vehicles Battery recharging, flexible batteries that never need to be recharged, electronics that can power themselves. Wireless electrical or motion-powered technology; plastic thin-film organic solar cells with flexible polymer batteries; nanogenerators harnessing power from movement of flexible wires; very fast storage for solar power or a flash charge for cell phones and laptops. Vessel/cargo stability Systems that can detect and/or help improve conditions of stability, draft, and trim of a ship or barge. Improved lashing systems for maritime containers; automated stability systems for ships. HIGH PRIORITY Advanced cargo locks & seals Locks and seals that not only secure but also transmit cargo or trailer/container status to back office systems. Improved positive locking mechanisms that can disarm and disable conveyance hatches and locks using low life cycle cost plastic fiber-optic seals with RF communications running on a single battery with 4 years of life to support continuous monitoring; the external seals would have entry and state-of-health alarms sent to a receiver talking to “the world,” with all messages stored at a data collection point, and using a remotely monitored sealing array (RMSA) with cryptographically authenticated messages (much more resistant to defeat). HIGH PRIORITY Vessel security Improved detection of weapons, mines, and swimmers. Underwater imaging technology to map hulls of ships. Language translation Linguistic tools to improve communication with foreign vessels operated by individuals who are not fluent in the English language. None specified. HIGH PRIORITY Vessel tracking Real-time visual vessel tracking including vessel name, speed, course, etc. Intelligent video surveillance system capable of tracking Hazmat vehicle through high-threat urban area in real time using handoff from camera to camera; networked RFID combined with GPS and cargo monitoring; the GT Freight Data Collector system, a GPS-based instrument; E-Transport River Information Services (RIS) vessel tracking and tracing telematics; satellite-based tracking out beyond 200 miles in conjunction with NAIS; Internet-delivered, remote asset telemetry Asset Management Platform using GSM communications; GSM-based GPS device with built-in RF receiver (for sensor reception), camera, and impact detector; and the use of geofencing. HIGH PRIORITY Alert/incident notification systems Systems capable of automatically detecting and transmitting anomalies or incidents involving the driver, vehicle, or cargo. Event data received by sensor technology is compared with programmed values in data tables to identify matches indicating an actual/emerging problem. When such patterns are identified, alert messages are automatically sent via fax, email, pager, text message, and/or voice message. System also includes the ability to inventory vulnerable targets (e.g., critical infrastructure) and generate customized alerts to appropriate officials. Digital photograph (using an IR flash for conditions of darkness) can also be included in the report. Table D-12. Extracted screened technologies—marine mode.

and the use of contract personnel in the area of maintenance and ground operations. Contractors do not have the associ- ated labor costs of union members, and the ability to “bid or shop” fees seems to be limited to the actual license holder, not necessarily the actual individual providing the servicing capability. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The rising cost of new aircraft and the corresponding expense of fuel have had their impact on all but a few flag carriers which have significant cost alignment programs based on the national- ized airline. The greater concern is the certificated airline of foreign registry that would operate in international commerce and may be transporting dangerous goods in aircraft less well- maintained. C. Operator Performance—Operator is able to successfully maneuver vehicle under normal and off-normal conditions. Capability also exists to sense operator performance degra- dation due to fatigue, acute health problem, substance abuse, etc., and alert the operator and back office to this situation. For licensed air crews, the role of the Airline Pilots Associ- ation (APA) and the International Airline Pilots Association (IAPA) in cooperation with ICAO is to closely monitor the standards for aircrews based on the training necessary, in-flight hours, re-certification and the use of monitored simulation, and accident fault tree assessment protocols. The required age restrictions of Class 1 medicals and the retirement decreed at 60 years of age for any U.S. licensed commercial pilot helps assure a flying population of highly qualified professionals. The license and medical certification requirements for commercial pilots are only exceeded by the military system (which supplies a majority of the pilots for the commercial airlines). Technical Capability Rating: 8 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Before a pilot is permitted to operate a certificated commercial aircraft he or she must possess an airman license, have received a minimum number of hours in the type and class of aircraft, and have been tested by the chief pilot or his designee for that specific airline. In addition, his or her physical condition must be documented within the limits of an FAA certified flight surgeon. Currently, aircrews must be tested and approved every 6 months for cur- rency requirements. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: The greatest effort has been expended on the health and well being of the certificated airman which is understandable for many reasons, not the least of which is the high cost of main- taining current aircrews. As mentioned, many of the medical regimes have been tested and perfected in military applications and have then been modified or customized by the individ- ual airlines. Market adoptability rating: 7 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Although many of the practices and procedures have evolved from military activities, when implemented in the commercial aviation arena cost, and the level of sophistication have slowed adop- tion directly. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: There is one stum- bling block that hampers the widespread implementation of advancing medical and human performance management standards. The limitation is the high cost of demanding all aircraft crews to maintain level one certification; this is par- ticularly true for non-U.S. crews that may operate for foreign flag carriers either on cargo-only aircraft or charter licensed airlines. D. Hazmat Commodity Identification and Awareness— Ability to identify the cargo being shipped either in person or via remote access. Technical capability rating: 9 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Specifically for this mode there is a strong need to know the category of dangerous goods being offered or being transported. The primary descrip- tion tool is the shippers’ declaration of dangerous goods and the airway bill. Both of these documents must comply with the IATA/ICAO dangerous goods regulations. These regula- tions are then adopted and enforced by the legal entity of the individual member states with the ability of additional state requirements. Currently, the United States has the largest number of additional requirements beyond the IATA/ICAO requirements. The role of the air carrier must be described as well, in that some carriers either severely restrict the accep- tance of dangerous goods either by class or use or, in some cases, there is a complete ban of any dangerous goods ac- cepted for any transport by that airline. Emerging technology that address capability gap: In order to economically compete and to provide for a more uniform system of classification, the majority of airlines will no longer accept classification documentation by any method other than electronic delivery. In some instances, the delivery of the documentation must be completed by a certain time before the scheduled departure of the aircraft to ensure complete identification and compatibility with other commodities whether dangerous goods or not. The ul- timate acceptance criteria remain with the Pilot in Com- mand. The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) S.T.O.P. Program permits that if there is any concern for any reason, the captain of the flight may reject any ship- ment, even if the product is accurately described and sub- mitted for flight; the captain is in charge of the flight and its entire configuration. 104

Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: There is the need for Hazmat commodity identification information in the event of a Hazmat accident or unplanned release of product. The im- mediate adverse impact of a Hazmat release occurring during flight operations makes it crucial to have correct and immedi- ate information on the Hazmat commodity. Because shippers make mandated surcharges on the shipment of dangerous goods, current economics have actually reduced the number of dangerous goods shipments to those that are time-critical for their recipients. One drawback is that some may be tempted not to declare dangerous goods contained in packages. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: When a ship- per chooses to utilize air transport, there are several consid- erations for the selection of premium transportation. The assessment is primarily based on quantity limitations and time-sensitive delivery status. The use of limited quantity and small quantity exceptions may allow a shipper to continue to utilize air shipping protocols and still remain economically viable with other less expensive methods. Accurate quantity and proper descriptions are of utmost importance when con- sidering potential incident scenarios. E. Communication—The aircrew and ground operations are in constant radio and electronic communication. This would include both flight and ground operations. Technical Capability Rating: 9 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: All air crews regardless of origin or type of aircraft are required to maintain access both vocally and electronically with air traffic controllers as well as with company flight directors (although there are communication “dead spots” within some air traffic control sectors). Commercial air operations are monitored fully and, in the era of post-9/11, involve some of the most stringently prescribed conditions for transport of dangerous goods. Emerging capabilities that address capability gap: In con- sideration of full compliance, there are only the interruptions in commercial air traffic that may result during increased sun spot and solar flare activities. Market adoptability rating: 9 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Air carrier oper- ations are required to be able to maintain active and real-time communications as a necessary part of business. Commercial dangerous goods air transport companies must comply with the requirements adopted by the domestic and international regulatory bodies. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: This business practice is mandated and therefore there are not any alterna- tive business practices available. F. Tracking—Location of in-flight aircraft and receiving ground vehicles (LTL) is known. Technical capability rating: 9 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: All commer- cial aircraft are required to file a flight plan whether trans- porting dangerous goods or not. Aircraft are identified by aircraft tail sign and company call sign. In addition to these regular identification routines, aircraft are identified based on fixed or rotary wing, land or seaplane, and in certain irregu- lar occurrences as lifeflight or air ambulance. This classifica- tion does not address military cargo; although in tracking activities, civil and military aircraft can use the same airway alignment system. Emerging technologies that address capability gap: The technology that is advancing this type of air activity involves the use of combined civil and military routing and tracking overseas where the military operations area over- lay the commercial routes. There still will be redundant sys- tems when it comes to military transport in active combat arenas. Market adoptability rating: 9 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: The mandated level of compliance by individual member states keeps con- currence levels high. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Perhaps the only hindrances to full compliance are the use of uncertified car- riers in either remote operations or operations outside the country of origin. G. Security—Aircraft, cargo, and operator are resistant to theft, diversion, sabotage and other intentional acts. Technical capability rating: 9 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Aircraft, cargo operations, and support operations are mandated to be resis- tant to theft, diversion, sabotage, and other intentional acts. Current practices within the industry (post-9/11) require the identification of all persons who could come in contact with a commercial aircraft. In many cases, this secured activity is required by current FAA regulations for both ground and carrier activities. In addition, it is the responsibility of each municipal Airport Authority to employ (or contract for) uniformed personnel to verify the identification of those permitted to access an aircraft regardless of the aircraft’s type (i.e., whether a passenger, cargo, or combination trans- port vehicle). Protecting the vehicle, cargo, and operator from security- related risks requires technology solutions for each task. The area of greatest concern is the identification and background inquiries for the contractors used to load or offload aircraft 105

at the ground locations. This may also include contractors involved with fueling aircraft. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: Contractors and their proper identification are subject to increasing use of authentication technologies such as bio- metrics and smart cards. The use of RFID has been adopted in limited locations for cargo. This is commonly a transfer point where cargo may be held for a few hours before con- tinuing to its final destination. Security is higher when cargo is moving. Market adoptability rating: 9 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: The initial and continuing costs of these systems have proven to be the pri- mary deterrent to the complete adoption of these practices. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: There are lim- itations with some foreign states that permit undocumented vendor activities to apply to some flights into the United States. The use of vendors based principally on cost seems to be the potential weak link. H. Emergency Response—Qualified emergency response is delivered to incident and accident sites in as timely a man- ner as necessary. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: It is critical that first responders are fully prepared for responding to incidents or accidents involving aircraft transporting dangerous goods. It is important to recognize that inherent to aircraft opera- tions, there may be onsite and sometimes offsite locations where the ability to contain large amounts of highly volatile fuels is needed. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: There are systems in place at ground operation sites that can provide the aircraft load manifest and plan to first responders. These systems are relatively simple in practice but require other technologies such as multiple access band communi- cation and GPS technologies. Market adoptability rating: 6 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: These systems must be used in conjunction with other technologies. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Based on the ori- gin of the transport, either in-flight or at an airport location, multiple agencies would need access to cargo information. Also, in view of the already high level of safety consciousness involving both employees and response crews, additional expenditures during challenging financial conditions is more difficult. Technology Development Priority—Air Mode Table D-13 is a recap of the functional requirement gap rating—air. Table D-14 is a recap of the mode importance rating. Based on Tables D-13 and D-14, Table D-15 provides the development priorities for the air mode functional requirements. Extracted Screened Technologies—Air Mode Table D-16 contains technologies the modal lead selected from the screened research list as being applicable for the air mode. No technologies are considered high priority develop- ment needs so none are in bold type. 106 High Medium High High Medium Low A. Package Integrity B. Equipment Reliability D. HM Commodity ID H. Emergency Response Medium High Low Low C. Operator Performance E. Communication F. Tracking G. Security Low Medium Market Adoptability Need Rating Low Medium High Technical Capability Need Rating Table D-13. Functional requirement gap rating—air.

1.5 Pipeline Mode Functional Requirements—Pipeline Mode NOTE: The pipeline mode has seven generic functional requirements. It does not have the “F. Tracking” functional requirement like all other modes. A. Package Integrity and Tracking—Ensures that the material contents of the pipeline are not breached during normal and abnormal operations, and capability exists to detect pressure build-up and/or material release. Technical capability rating: 7 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Pipelines are an economical and reliable transportation mode for natural gas, oil, and refined products. Pipelines are typically made from high strength steel that has been engineered to provide good tolerance to natural and human events that could cause the product to escape. Most pipelines are buried with a protective coating used to minimize the growth of cor- rosion, along with cathodic protection methods to back up the coatings. Pipelines are actually quite robust and resilient. Their improvements offer materials issues and related opportunities to (1) minimize capital expenditures (CAPEX) and facilitate risk management and (2) minimize operating expenses (OPEX) and maximize the asset value over its life cycle. For leak detection, pipeline operators typically use a com- bination of flow verification through an accounting method, aerial, or land surveillance to find dead vegetation or other indications of a leak, and/or Computational Pipeline Moni- toring (CPM) systems to monitor for pipeline leaks. CPM is 107 High MediumAir High Rail Barge High Medium Low Medium High Truck Pipeline Low Low Low Medium Serious Consequence Potential (Volume Per Shipment) Low Medium High Modal Activity Level (Ton-Miles) Table D-14. Mode importance rating. High Medium High High Medium Low A. Package Integrity B. Equipment Reliability C. Operator Performance D. HM Commodity ID E. Communication F. Tracking G. Security H. Emergency Response Medium High Low Low Low Medium Mode Importance Rating Low Medium High Functional Requirement Gap Rating Table D-15. Functional requirement technology development priority—air.

108 Technology Need Description Potential Solution(s) Implementation of improved first responder chemical detection system technology with validated capabilities. Improved chemical sensors. Joint ventures with the Department of Homeland Security Service training mission in order to provide training to responders. Decision support. Decision support system. Establish table topic exercises on decision matrixes and fault tree diagrams. Equipment for mitigating biological agents. Protective foam (starting to appear in marketplace). Coordinate response with Health and/or Center for Disease Control. Determine locations that offer communicable disease ward training. Shipping container cargo contents identification. Not specified. Consider color coding of private containers or requiring shippers to provide external identification regimes. Emergency responders need access to contents of shipping papers electronically to determine commodity, have the ability to tie into the shipper’s data, and tap into a database to get information on chemical properties of the commodity and response advice. Electronic freight manifest. Current applications exist in the form of bar code readers for information distribution, however the inputting of the information is not standardized. Unique identifier on container. Not specified. Establish UN identification for commodity codes and require shipper to affix. Master database of information on what is in a shipment. Electronic freight manifest. Access FAA 90 carrier file and automate for recurring shipment types and origin and destination routings. Capability to get reliable information to emergency responders in remote areas. Not specified. Interlink with GPS monitors that permit satellite telephone downlink. Security identification credential (for transportation, not emergency response) that is universally accepted. Not specified. Establish standards for either eye or ear recognition. Possible funding may be available in conjunction with Homeland Security or Department of Justice. Need one universal identification card that is simple, interoperable, and is read by one standard reader. When a person leaves the system, where they had access is known so that it can be closed out. Biometrics-based universal security credential. Universal credentialing system that carriers can adopt and monitor based on TSA profiles. Behavioral monitoring. Risk perception algorithms to determine whether vehicle is being operated safely. FAA human criteria studies would establish baseline criteria. Advanced cargo seals. Use of low life cycle cost plastic fiber-optic seals with RF communications running on a single battery with 4 years of life, under continuous monitoring. External seals would have entry and state-of-health alarms sent to a receiver talking to “the world,” with all messages stored at a data collection point; Remotely monitored sealing array (RMSA) with cryptographically authenticated messages (much more resistant to defeat). Once standards are in place in multi-modal applications just ensure air requirements of temperature and pressure for mishandling incidents. Physical condition/drowsy driver monitoring. Eye movement cameras, brain waves, movements. Replicate findings on the highway mode. Innovative security sensing transportation applications. Fiber-optic sensors and photonic sensor integrated wireless systems. Establish standards in ground operations. Detecting hazardous and chemical materials. IR spectroscopy to analyze for potentially hazardous chemicals, with 25,000 chemical signatures stored that can be matched in 20 seconds. Implement standards from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and OSHA. Table D-16. Extracted screened technologies—air mode.

a computer-based monitoring tool which allows the pipeline controller to respond to an anomaly that may indicate prod- uct release. Additionally, pipeline operators use preventa- tive methods such as internal pipeline inspection, hydrotest- ing, direct assessment (an assessment methodology that may indicate active corrosion sites related to external corrosion, internal corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking [SCC]), and damage prevention programs to monitor for pipeline threats such as corrosion, SCC, and third party damage. Rationale for technical capability rating: Modern pipeline steels have good toughness to resist catastrophic failure due to corrosion growth or excavation equipment striking the pipeline. Federal regulations require that pipeline in popu- lated areas be thicker, further reducing the likelihood of release due to natural or human events. Valves to stop flow in the rare case of the release of product can be closed, often remotely from a central control room. While pipelines are not designed to withstand an intentional attack, many of the safeguards used to prevent or minimize the effect of a release are applicable. Existing leak detection techniques have trouble reliably detecting small pipeline leaks, while preventative inspection and test programs do not reliably detect all pipeline threats (microbial induced corrosion, SCC, etc.). Offshore pipelines present many additional problems related to inspection and re- pair capabilities. Additionally, the emergence of products from alternative energy technologies (ethanol and carbon dioxide) will introduce new problems for pipeline systems. Ethanol contains components that cause cracking in steels, so pipelines often have to be protected from the product. The U.S. DOT PHMSA project “Understanding how Fuel Grade Ethanol and other ethanol-rich products might be transported via pipe- lines” is addressing this issue along with industry research by the Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI). One of the leading causes of pipeline leaks is third party excavation in the pipeline right of way. One very visible exam- ple was a 1993 accident in which 330,000 gallons of diesel fuel leaked from a 36-inch pipeline and eventually into the Potomac River upstream of Washington, DC. The pipe was damaged during the installation of a parking lot over the pipeline. PHMSA has many projects in the area of detecting equipment in the right-of-way and precise location of underground pip- ing systems. One large effort has been the development of an autonomous distributed sensor system that uses low frequency sound wave detection to detect and report excavation activ- ity and its location as well as sense third party damage. These efforts can also be characterized as security issues if they are attempting to stop intentional damage, but accidental dam- age is far more prevalent. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: Higher strength steels have been developed to lower the cost of installation of new pipelines. The resistance to breach by excavation equipment has also improved. The concept of steel pipe with reinforcing fibers to limit the size of a breach is being investigated. Liquid line methods including mass balance and statistical methods and the application of Coriolis Effect mass flow meters can be used for leak detection. Verification of container integrity can be provided by airborne leak detec- tion technologies, including the PHMSA project Airborne Natural Gas Emission LIDAR (ANGEL) technology for the detection of small hazardous liquid and refined product leaks. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with low cost sensors can help ensure the integrity and security of the nation’s pipelines. Other technologies include airborne infra-red chemical sensors, mass balance leak detection, acoustic emission leak detection, fiber-optic sensing, pressure analysis leak detec- tion, real-time pipeline monitoring, long-range guided wave technologies, mechanical damage fault tree analysis, Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) system for pipe location, magnetic tracer for locating plastic pipe, and inspection technologies for unpiggable pipeline. (NOTE: “Pig” is an acronym for Pipe- line Inspection Gauge which refers to the use of the gauge to get measurements or other information from within a pipeline while product is flowing.) Also helpful will be a GPS-based sys- tem that warns (1) inspectors of excavation activity that is occurring in an area without a valid One-Call ticket (i.e., a fea- ture of pipeline operations responding to the requirement that an operator of a pipeline or utility respond within a set time to a request for marking the asset when excavation in an area is imminent) and (2) excavators and operators of the proximity of excavation equipment to underground facilities. Market adoptability rating: 7 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Current leading- edge technologies are being used in an increasing number of new pipeline construction projects. However, retrofitting pipelines with modern materials and equipment is not per- formed on a routine basis. Pipelines are engineered for decades of operation, so the adoption of new technology can happen quite slowly. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Challenges to suc- cessful implementation of the emerging technologies include garnering industry interest in moving prototype systems into commercialization in view of their cost. The cost of energy products is typically at the forefront of public debate, and increasing the cost for improved safety and security will not be easily accepted. For example, implementing real-time mon- itoring on a 1,000 mile pipeline at a current cost of tens of thousands of dollars per mile is clearly quite expensive. B. Equipment Reliability—Ensures that the pipeline equip- ment is structurally sound and properly maintained, and capability exists to detect problems. Technical capability rating: 5 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) 109

Rationale for technical capability rating: Federal regu- lations for inspection and maintenance help ensure that the pipeline is structurally sound. “One-Call” and 811 systems have been adopted to help prevent accidental damage to pipelines. The pipeline right of way is checked on a periodic basis for signs of unauthorized excavation that may have caused damage. Above ground surveys check the cathodic protection and coating systems used to prevent the initiation and growth of corrosion anomalies. Inspection tools are run inside the pipeline to assess the pipe for corrosion, dents, and other anomalies that may grow to failure, allowing the prod- uct to escape. Materials are available to repair the pipeline without disrupting delivery. Compressor and pump station reliability and availability are essential to overall pipeline delivery dependability, yet the pipeline infrastructure is aging with equipment operating well beyond its expected operating life. Old equipment can be problematic in finding parts for repairs (therefore reduc- ing system reliability and redundancy) as well as complying with the requirements for reducing environmental emissions. If redundancy is not available, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance can lead to outages in supply. The U.S. DOT Office of Pipeline Safety (DOT OPS) requires the use of excess flow valves that stop the flow of product when the flow exceeds a specified amount. Automatic shut down valves can have reliability problems, resulting in operators manually over- riding fault signals. Starting turbines using natural gas results in significant volumes of gas vented to the atmosphere. The venting of gas represents considerable loss of revenue as well as the poten- tial exposure to pending greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations. Alternative, cost effective, environmentally friendly, methods for starting gas turbines in pipeline compression service are needed. Preventative inspection and test programs do not reliably detect all pipeline threats (microbial induced corrosion, SCC, etc.). Offshore pipelines present many additional problems related to inspection and repair capabilities. Additionally, the emergence of products from alternative energy technologies (ethanol and carbon dioxide) will introduce new problems for pipeline systems. The U.S. DOT PHMSA project “Under- standing how Fuel Grade Ethanol and other ethanol-rich prod- ucts might be transported via pipelines” is addressing this issue along with industry research by the Pipeline Research Coun- cil International (PRCI). Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: Technologies include more reliable shut down valves and more efficient turbines; use of composite systems (not reinforced polymers but rather thinner steel used within a reinforcing scheme); and new or replacement materials other than steel. Market adoptability rating: 3 (Low adoptability = High market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: While some newer designs of equipment are available, they have not been widely implemented because older equipment continues to be used. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Emerging tech- nologies can be implemented on new pipelines, but convincing pipeline owners to retrofit existing pipelines can be difficult. C. Operator Performance—Operator is able to success- fully conduct job function under normal and abnormal conditions. The capability exists to sense operator perfor- mance degradation. Technical capability rating: 7 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Section 12 of the “Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforce- ment, and Safety Act of 2006” (54) provides general guidance regarding regulations that will require operators to manage the human factors risks in their control room. A partial quota- tion from Section 12 is provided: § 60137. Pipeline control room management: ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than June 1, 2008, the Secretary shall issue regulations requiring each oper- ator of a gas or hazardous liquid pipeline to develop, implement, and submit” . . . “a human factors management plan designed to reduce risks associated with human factors, including fatigue, in each control center for the pipeline.” Few pipeline incidents are typically attributed to human factors. The most frequently cited causes of oil pipeline incidents are third party damage, corrosion, and equipment-related failure (55). However, several recent investigations of severe pipeline incidents have determined that controllers did not correctly identify and respond to abnormal situations in an effective and timely manner; thereby contributing to the severity of the accident (56). Rationale for technical capability rating: Federal regula- tions exist in 49 CFR 192 and 49 CFR 195 related to operator qualifications as well as drug and alcohol programs. Pipeline operators who perform covered tasks must be qualified. “Qual- ified” means that an individual has been evaluated and can (a) perform assigned covered tasks and (b) recognize and react to abnormal operating conditions. While relatively few technologies are in use to monitor operator performance, personnel are well-trained in the alerting response technolo- gies, and there is not a large gap. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: Since pipeline operators do not operate vehicles in the deliv- ery of the commodity, devices such as brain-wave monitors to ensure alertness are not as critical. One system that may have utility is video monitoring to detect adverse behavior patterns (for example in a control center) that may indicate drowsiness or a physical emergency. Market adoptability rating: 3 (Low adoptability = High market adoptability need) 110

Rationale for market adoptability rating: Personnel mon- itoring systems exist but have not been implemented to any appreciable degree. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Pipeline opera- tions have less perceived need and are less inclined to invest in technologies that detect operator degradation. D. Hazmat Commodity Identification and Awareness— Ability to identify the cargo being transported. Technical capability rating: 7 (High capability = Low technical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Federal regu- lations exist in 49 CFR 192 and 49 CFR 195 that require pipelines to be marked to indicate danger, name of the com- modity (gas or liquid), operator name, and telephone number. Markers often do not indicate the exact product being trans- ported nor the operating pressures and temperatures. Although this minimizes security concerns, it can be problematic for emergency response efforts if this information is unknown or incomplete. The locations of all energy pipelines were required to be mapped and the data entered into a DOT database called the National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS). This data- base became available in summer 2001 and was shut down just after 9/11 for security reasons. This database is needed for Hazmat awareness, since local authorities, first responders, and the public could use the database to identify the product in the pipeline. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: The NPMS now has a viewer by county, a compromise to address security concerns. The NPMS database is growing and includes natural gas transmission lines, hazardous liq- uid trunklines, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants. Information on other types of pipelines and facilities are included in the database, such as gathering and distribution lines. Additional facilities are being added on a voluntary basis. Market adoptability rating: 5 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Technologies for providing commodity identification and awareness are becoming more widely used. Some gaps exist such as iden- tifying hazardous products that are transported in batches. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: This is more of political issue than a technology issue. Many of the tech- nologies that improve Hazmat commodity identification and awareness can negatively impact security (e.g., the belief that a placard on a railcar helps someone with malicious intent identify the most dangerous substance in the train). E. Communication—Ensure two-way communication at all times between control stations and other critical infrastructure. Technical capability rating: 6 (Medium capability = Medium technical capability need) Most pipeline systems use a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. SCADA systems are computer- based communication tools that monitor, process, transmit, and display pipeline data and provide an integrated summary of remote pipeline sensors and controls. Pipeline controllers engaged in SCADA operations monitor and control pipeline operations from a console in a pipeline control room, which is typically equipped with multiple SCADA consoles used to monitor and control separate sections of a larger pipeline system. SCADA systems may also be used directly for leak detection, can provide support for a leak detection system, or can be used independently of a leak detection system. Current technologies in use consist of a variety of radio, cellular, micro- wave, and satellite wireless technologies that are used for data transmission. Pipeline operators also utilize hand-held radios when out in the field. Rationale for technical capability rating: Authentication of users and systems using old technology may lack up-to- date cyber-security protocols, while more reliance on Inter- net and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software brings new vulnerabilities. The move from proprietary technolo- gies to more standardized and open solutions together with the increased number of connections between SCADA sys- tems and office networks and the Internet has made them more vulnerable to attacks. Consequently, the security of SCADA-based systems has come into question because they are increasingly seen because they are extremely vulnerable to cyber-terrorism attacks. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: Next generation protocols such as unified architecture take advantage of XML, web services, and other modern web tech- nologies, making SCADA IT systems more easily supportable. Surety Enhancement for Wireless Automated Control Net- works allows a secure automated control system that depends on a hybrid wired/wireless communication infrastructure and standards-based protocols. Cost-effective, high performance solutions are needed for critical infrastructure cyber security, including an energy management system (EMS)/SCADA and all related business functions. Market adoptability rating: 8 (High adoptability = Low market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: These technolo- gies are being successfully incorporated into pipeline infor- mation systems. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The prevalence of cyber attacks means that systems must constantly be up to the task of defeating them. F. Tracking—This functional requirement does not apply to the pipeline mode. 111

G. Security – Pipelines, equipment, cargo, and operators are resistant to theft, diversion, sabotage, and other inten- tional acts. Technical capability rating: 3 (Low capability = High tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: The hundreds of thousands of miles of pipelines that crisscross the United States are monitored remotely and have a significant poten- tial for undetected theft, sabotage, or other intentional acts. Theft is a problem in Mexico, South America, and Africa, but is rare in the United States. Diversion, while possible for other transportation methods, is less likely since an infrastructure would have to be established. Pipeline damage from excava- tion equipment is a constant consideration for pipeline oper- ators. This is a similar threat to sabotage, just not intentional. Worldwide, attempts to breach pipelines have been made, but most are unsuccessful because pipeline materials are designed to resist damage. However, some attempts are successful in dis- rupting delivery of energy products for extended times. Also, if damage from an unsuccessful attempt goes undetected, it could eventually cause failure. However, the consequence of sabotage can be great and this must be considered. Some pipelines are a single source of nat- ural gas for a large population area, which can be problematic when the public relies on this for heat. If a natural gas pipe- line is breached in a populated area, the results could be catastrophic if ignition occurs. If an oil or products line is breached near a waterway, the environmental impact can be substantial. Pipeline operators typically use a combination of flow ver- ification through an accounting method, aerial, or land sur- veillance to find dead vegetation or other indications of a leak, and/or CPM systems to monitor for pipeline leaks. CPM is a computer-based monitoring tool which allows the pipeline controller to respond to an anomaly that may indicate prod- uct release. Additionally, pipeline operators use preventative methods such as internal pipeline inspection, hydrotesting, direct assessment (an assessment methodology that may indi- cate active corrosion sites related to external corrosion, inter- nal corrosion, and SCC), and damage prevention programs to monitor for pipeline threats such as corrosion, SCC, and third party damage. Rationale for technical capability rating: Theft is typically performed in small quantities. Existing leak detection tech- niques have trouble reliably detecting small pipeline leaks. In- line inspection methods can detect taps on the pipeline that could indicate an attempt to steal the contents. Systems being developed to detect third party damage would typically be use- ful for detecting sabotage as well. One of the leading causes of pipeline leaks is third party excavation in the pipeline right of way. One of the most visible examples was a 1993 accident in which 330,000 gallons of diesel fuel leaked from a 36-inch pipeline into the Potomac River upstream of Washington, DC. The pipe was damaged during the installation of a parking lot over the pipeline. U.S. DOT PHMSA has many projects in the area of involving detecting equipment in the right-of- way and precise location of underground piping systems. One large effort has been development of an autonomous distributed sensor system that uses low frequency sound wave detection to detect and report excavation activity and its location as well as sense third party damage. These efforts can also be characterized as security issues if they are used to stop intentional damage, but accidental damage is far more prevalent. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: The same technologies that detect commodity release can help detect a security incident in which a pipeline is breached. Airborne leak detection technologies, including U.S. DOT PHMSA project’s Airborne Natural Gas Emission LIDAR (ANGEL) technology to the detection of small hazardous liq- uid and refined product leaks. UAVs with low cost sensors to ensure the integrity and security of the nation’s pipelines. Other technologies include Airborne LIDAR/infrared chem- ical sensors, mass balance leak detection, acoustic emission leak detection, fiber-optic sensing, pressure analysis leak detec- tion, real-time pipeline monitoring, inspection technologies for unpiggable pipeline, long-range guided wave technologies, mechanical damage fault tree analysis, GPR system for pipe location, and magnetic tracer for locating plastic pipe. Also, a GPS-based system that warns (1) inspectors of exca- vation activity that is occurring in an area without a valid One- Call ticket (i.e., a feature of pipeline operations responding to the requirement that an operator of a pipeline or utility respond within a set time to a request for marking the asset when excavation in an area is imminent) and (2) excavators and operators of the proximity of excavation equipment to underground facilities. Market adoptability rating: 4 (Medium capability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Current leading- edge technologies are being used in an increasing number of locations. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: Challenges to successful implementation of the emerging technologies will be cost and garnering industry interest in moving prototype systems into commercialization. For example, implementing real-time monitoring on a 1,000 mile pipeline currently costs tens of thousands of dollars per mile. H. Emergency Response—Qualified emergency response, including repair and remediation, is delivered to an inci- dent site in a timely manner. Technical capability rating: 8 (High capability = Low tech- nical capability need) Rationale for technical capability rating: Federal regulations exist for requiring the development of emergency response 112

113 High Medium C. Operator Performance High B. Equipment Reliability High Medium Low D. HM Commodity ID H. Emergency Response Medium HighG. Security Low Low A. Package Integrity Low E. Communication Medium Market Adoptability Need Rating Low Medium High Technical Capability Need Rating Table D-17. Functional requirement gap rating—pipeline. High MediumAir High Rail Barge High Medium Low Medium High Truck Pipeline Low Low Low Medium Serious Consequence Potential (Volume Per Shipment) Low Medium High Modal Activity Level (Ton-Miles) Table D-18. Mode importance rating. plans. For natural gas pipelines, operators are required to have Emergency Plans (including training of personnel) under 192.615. For liquid pipelines, operators are required to have Emergency Plans under 195.403(e) and Emergency Response Training under 195.404. Both require operators to follow the guidance in American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice (API RP) 1162, First Edition, December 2003. Tech- nologies that alert operators to problems are in use. Emerging technologies that address the capability gap: A number of repair methods are being developed. One is con- tinuing development of composite wrap sleeves. New appli- cations and different types of composites are being developed and they have also been used for other applications such as external sleeve crack arrestors on pipelines. After a relatively slow start and an extended industry/regulatory acceptance period, composite wraps are becoming more standard in the pipeline industry. Market adoptability rating: 4 (Medium adoptability = Medium market adoptability need) Rationale for market adoptability rating: Current sys- tems provide emergency response capabilities for Hazmat leak detection and response. New remediation and repair tech- nologies such as composite wraps are being embraced but not rapidly. Challenges/obstacles to market adoption: The relative scarcity of major leaks of dangerous substances from pipelines is perhaps the biggest obstacle to this technology area. Technology Development Priority— Pipeline Mode Table D-17 is a recap of the functional requirement gap rating—pipeline. Table D-18 is a recap of the mode importance rating. Based on Tables D-17 and D-18, Table D-19 provides the development priorities for the pipeline mode functional requirements. Extracted Screened Technologies— Pipeline Mode Table D-20 contains technologies the modal lead selected from the screened research list as being applicable for the pipe- line mode.

High Medium A. Package Integrity D. HM Commodity ID E. Communication H. Emergency Response High C. Operator Performance High B. Equipment Reliability G. Security Medium Low Medium High Low Low Low Medium Mode Importance Rating Low Medium High Functional Requirement Gap Rating Table D-19. Functional requirement technology development priority—pipeline. Technology Need Description Potential Solution(s) Small volume leak detection. Ability to pinpoint leaks. Liquid line methods including mass balance and statistical methods and the application of Coriolis Effect mass flow meters. Pipeline repair improvements. Improved ability to repair damaged pipeline. Composite patch materials. Leak stoppage via a chemical reaction produced by the commodity itself. The marriage of nanotechnology and microencapsulation to produce a leak control scheme inexpensive enough to include with the product (regardless of transport mode). The commodity does not adversely react in end-use but activates when a leak exposes it to shear-stress flowing through a crack coupled with a trigger reaction driven by oxygen. Airborne leak detection. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR). Materials for pipelines to compensate for the current lack of quantity and quality of steel. New pipeline materials. Composite materials, thinner steel used within a reinforcing scheme. Improved simulator training. Advanced simulators. Simulator training applications are not limited to abnormal operating condition training. In many process control industries, the opportunity of presenting infrequent (or even never-before-encountered) conditions through simulation tend to result in a focus on abnormal operating condition training. Provide a means of both facilitating and tracking communications between schedulers and controllers. Computer-based communication tools. Automated communications forms that require the entry of key delivery parameters (e.g., origin, destination, product volume, flow rate, scheduled start, scheduled stop, and operational considerations). Computerized procedures or documented heuristics that aid users in decision-making. Decision support tools. If implemented and used appropriately, decision support tools can aid decision-making by walking users through the relevant set of decision questions and often pulling the relevant decision parameters directly from the SCADA system. Such aids may reduce decision-making time. Reduce the number of manual calculations needed. Systems to automate calculations required. Manual calculations, manual record-keeping, or extensive data entry can be time consuming and error prone. This Some workers experience fatigue for reasons not associated with the work environment. Sleep disorder screening technologies. A variety of technology approaches have been researched. Several U.S. transportation operators who have identified worker alertness as an operational risk have instituted confidential sleep disorder screening as part of their broader fatigue management programs. Existing pipeline leak detection techniques have trouble reliably detecting small pipeline leaks. Mass balance leak detection. Commercial systems undergoing continuous improvement. Competition from competing technologies drives development. Existing pipeline leak detection techniques have trouble reliably detecting small pipeline leaks. Acoustic emission leak detection. Some DOT sponsored work, but commercial systems available and being developed privately. Existing pipeline leak detection techniques have trouble reliably detecting small pipeline leaks. Fiber-optic sensing. Fiber-optic/photonic or wireless sensors for fixed point monitoring of infrastructure health and environment problems. Some DOT sponsored work, but commercial systems available and being developed privately. Table D-20. Extracted screened technologies—pipeline mode. (continued on next page)

Technology Need Description Potential Solution(s) Start-up inefficiencies. More efficient turbines. Starting turbines using natural gas results in significant volumes of gas vented to the atmosphere. Pipeline Damage Prevention—Onshore. DTRS56-02-T-0005, "Digital Mapping of Buried Pipelines with a Dual Array System.” There are many commercial methods to map underground utilities. None are perfect, so development continues. This is more a problem for distribution pipelines. Transportation pipelines are marked and are typically easier to find since they are steel. Pipeline Damage Prevention—Onshore. DTRS56-02-T-0006, "Pipeline Damage Prevention Through the Use of Locatable Magnetic Plastic Pipe and a Universal Locator" There are many commercial methods to map underground utilities. Passive systems use magnetometers to detect the ferromagnetic steel, active systems impress an AC current on the pipe (conductivity needed); this gives a better estimate of depth. Plastic pipes are especially difficult since they are not conductive or ferromagnetic. Pipeline Damage Prevention—Onshore. DTRS56-04-T-0006, "Effectiveness of Prevention Methods for Excavation Damage." Process development, not new technology. Pipeline Damage Prevention— Onshore/Alaska. DTRS56-04-T-0007, "Infrasonic Frequency Seismic Sensor System for Preventing Third Party Damage to Gas Pipelines." PIGPEN low freq sound wave (infrasonic) detection to sense third party damage, DTRS56-04-T-00078, DTRS57- 05-C-10110, DTPH56-08-T-000019 and DTRS57-04-C- 10002. Pipeline Damage Prevention—Onshore. DTPH56-06-T-000005, "Differential Impedance Obstacle Detection Sensor (DIOD)— Phase 2." Directional drilling equipment can bore directly into pipelines. The sensors developed on this project are intended to detect pipelines and guide equipment in alternate directions. Pipeline Damage Prevention— Onshore/Alaska. DTRS57-05-C-10110, "Infrasonic Frequency Seismic Sensor System for Pipeline Integrity Management." PIGPEN low freq sound wave (infrasonic) detection to sense third party damage, DTRS56-04-T-00078, DTRS57- 05-C-10110, DTPH56-08-T-000019 and DTRS57-04-C- 10002. Pipeline Damage Prevention—Onshore. DTPH56-07-P-000046, "Determine the Requirements for Existing Pipeline, Tank and Terminal Systems to Transport Ethanol without Cracking." Ethanol contains components that cause cracking in steel. Pipelines often have to be protected from the product. This project is developing guidelines for safe transportation of ethanol including use of coatings and inhibitors. Pipeline Assessment and Leak Detection— Onshore/Offshore/Alaska. DTRS56-04-T-0012, "Hazardous Liquids Airborne Lidar Observation Study (HALOS)." DTRS56-04-T-0012, DTPH56-05-T-0004, and DTPH56-08- T-000019 are similar projects with similar objectives. The product (Hazmat Liquids, Natural Gas) and sensor type vary. Pipeline Assessment and Leak Detection— Onshore/Alaska. DTPH56-05-T-0004, "Use of Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) for Pipeline Surveillance to Improve Safety and Lower Cost." DTRS56-04-T-0012, DTPH56-05-T-0004, and DTPH56-08- T-000019 are similar projects with similar objectives. The product (Hazmat Liquids, Natural Gas) and sensor type vary. Pipeline Assessment and Leak Detection— Onshore. DTPH56-08-T-000017, "GPS- Based Excavation Encroachment Notification." Damage prevention by continuously monitoring the position of excavating equipment. Pipeline Assessment and Leak Detection— Onshore. DTPH56-08-T-000019, "Advanced Development of Proactive Infrasonic Gas Pipeline Evaluation Network." PIGPEN low freq sound wave (infrasonic) detection to sense third party damage, DTRS56-04-T-00078, DTRS57-05-C- 10110, DTPH56-08-T-000019 and DTRS57-04-C-10002. Low cost monitoring of pipelines for third party intrusion, theft, and sabotage. Similar technologies for detection of third party damage. Implementing real-time monitoring on a 1,000 mile pipeline currently costs tens of thousands of dollars per mile. Existing pipeline leak detection techniques have trouble reliably detecting small pipeline leaks. Pressure analysis leak detection. Commercial systems undergoing continuous improvement. Competition from competing technologies drives development. Offshore pipelines presenting many additional problems related to inspection and repair capabilities. Improved inspection pigs. Some DOT-sponsored work, but commercial systems available and being developed privately. Products from alternative energy technologies (ethanol and carbon dioxide) will introduce new problems for pipeline systems. Development of new inhibitors. Protect the pipeline. Preventing third party excavation in the pipeline right-of-way. Acoustic, fiber-optic, seismic, etc. Implementing real-time monitoring on a 1,000 mile pipeline currently costs tens of thousands of dollars per mile. Table D-20. (Continued).

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Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security Get This Book
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TRB’s Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) Report 4: Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security explores near-term (less than 5 years) and longer-term (5–10 years) technologies that are candidates for enhancing the safety and security of hazardous materials transportation for use by shippers, carriers, emergency responders, or government regulatory and enforcement agencies.

The report examines emerging generic technologies that hold promise of being introduced during these near- and longer-term spans. It also highlights potential impediments (e.g., technical, economic, legal, and institutional) to, and opportunities for, their development, deployment, and maintenance.

The research focused on all modes used to transport hazardous materials (trucking, rail, marine, air, and pipeline) and resulted in the identification of nine highly promising emerging technologies.

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