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· In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the power over the use of tribal funds or tribal lands (3). This Act
Supreme Court decided that states do not have authority on not only stopped further reduction of the tribal land base but
tribal lands and tribes did not lose their sovereign powers by also permitted federal funds to be spent for the first time for
becoming subject to the federal government. Only Congress on-reservation tribal projects, including irrigation works, roads,
has plenary (or overriding) power over tribal affairs. The homes, and community schools (4).
Supreme Court has consistently upheld that Congress may Also during this period, the federal government's trust
exercise plenary power over Native American tribes (3). responsibility was clarified in the Seminole Nation v. U.S, 316
U.S. 286, 62 S. Ct. 1049 (1942) Supreme Court case. Treaty pro-
visions from the 1840s stated that interests from a trust fund
2.2.3 Allotment and Assimilation
would be paid directly to individuals. The federal government
(1887-1934)
paid the tribal treasurer instead. The Court found that the fed-
In this period, tribal sovereignty was limited and land eral government's trust relationship with tribes had a fiduciary
ownership altered by promoting assimilation of tribes into responsibility as well (4). This fiduciary responsibility was re-
American society through the federal government's policy of affirmed in the U.S. v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, Supreme Court
subdividing and selling tribal lands. The General Allotment Act (1980 and 1984) case when the Court determined that the
of 1887 (also known as the Dawes Act) limited tribal sovereignty federal government had the responsibility to manage tribal
and broke up communal tribal lands into smaller pieces that resources and land for the benefit of tribes (4).
were given to individual landowners, including non-Native
Americans. The resulting checkerboard pattern of land owner-
2.2.5 Termination Period (1945-1968)
ship, occupancy of reservation lands by non-Native Americans,
and non-tribal authority over those lands led to overlapping In 1953, Congress adopted House Concurrent Resolution
and conflicting policies. These checkerboard tribal lands still No. 108 which reversed federal tribal self-determination poli-
have lingering negative impacts on the development and imple- cies and, as a result, ended the trust relationship between
mentation of current transportation projects (3). federal and tribal governments (4). More than 109 tribal gov-
Two noteworthy Supreme Court cases occurred during this ernments were terminated resulting in the federal government
time. In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), the Supreme no longer recognizing them as sovereign nations (5). Upon ter-
Court upheld that tribal sovereignty was not limited by the con- mination, tribes lost their powers of self-government, were
straints imposed in the U.S. Constitution. Tribes have internal ineligible for government services, and were subject to taxation
sovereignty and are free to govern their internal relations (4). on their land. Unilaterally, tribal members became subject to
In Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CA8 1905), the Supreme state criminal and civil laws (4).
Court upheld Tribes' permit tax on nonmembers for the priv- This termination policy also resulted in the passage of Pub-
ilege of conducting business within Tribes' borders. The Court lic Law 83-280 (1953) by Congress, which generally extended
characterized as `inherent' the Tribe's "authority . . . to pre- state jurisdiction on tribal reservations by mandating the dele-
scribe the terms upon which noncitizens may transact business gation of substantial civil and criminal jurisdiction over reser-
within its borders" (21). vations in certain states (4). Public Law 280 gave six states
mandatory and substantial criminal and civil jurisdiction over
tribes: Alaska (except for Metlakatla Reservation), California,
2.2.4 Reorganization Period (1934-1945)
Minnesota (except for Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, and
The Reorganization Period reversed the federal allotment Oregon (except for Warm Springs Reservation). Ten other
and assimilation policies. This was initiated by the findings of states also opted to accept some degree of Public Law 280 juris-
the Merriam Report (1928) which documented the failure of diction: Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada,
the allotment policies. The resulting Indian Reorganization North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington.
Act (IRA) was passed in 1934. It prohibited future allotments Where Public Law 83-280 applies, tribes and states both
of tribal lands and enabled tribes to assert powers of self- share jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters (5). This left
government. For the first time, the IRA recognized tribal tribes with a greatly diminished role and was contrary to the
governments as viable political entities. It also established Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Supreme
mechanisms for tribal business enterprises and provided for Court case, which stated that "laws of the state can have no
the adoption of tribal constitutions. These tribal constitutions force of law on tribal land" (4).
had to be ratified by the Secretary of the Interior. The IRA also A significant factor in the return to self-determination and
provided that tribal, rather than federal, authority gave tribal respect of sovereignty was the Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
courts legitimacy (4, 5). However, under the IRA, the Bureau (1959) Supreme Court case (4). The Court decided that tribal
of Indian Affairs, rather than tribes, had final decision-making courts rather than state courts had jurisdiction in a lawsuit aris-
