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12 Guidebook for Conducting Local Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Studies planning by informing about the potential conditions, complexity, and evolution of hazmat transportation incidents that may occur through scenarios development. Conducting an HMCFS can help planners raise awareness about hazmat transport in a com- munity, provide information for pre-incident operational response training, or assess needs for emergency response equipment or hazmat incident response teams. Some of these activities also are eligible for grant funding under federal programs. An HMCFS can provide a key component of needs justification for associated funding requests, although the HMCFS should not be con- ducted as a reason to justify new equipment. In addition, formal designation of hazmat transport routes requires analysis of risks, for which an HMCFS is an important part. 1.1.2 HMCFS Funding PHMSA oversees a grants program that provides funding for local hazmat planning and train- ing. The Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) Grants Program uses funds from hazmat transportation carrier registration fees under federal hazardous material transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.). Funds are administered in each state by the state emergency response commissions (SERCs), and by individual TERCs. LEPCs can apply for HMEP grant funding through their respective SERCs (eligibility also applies to TERCs). More information about the program is available from the HMEP grants manager at (202) 366­0001, on the HMEP Web site at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/grants, or by e-mail at hmep.grants@dot.gov. Other grant funds may be available from local, state, or federal agencies, and an HMCFS may be funded fully by a local government or other entity without any additional grant funds. 1.2 Hazmat Transportation Overview Transportation of hazardous materials, by one mode or another, is present in nearly every community. According to the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)/U.S. Census Bureau's 2007 Commodity Flow Survey (3), referred to as the CFS, 2.2 billion tons, corresponding to 323 bil- lion ton-miles of hazardous materials, are shipped in the United States annually. Roadways (trucks) transport the majority--roughly 1.2 billion tons (about 54 percent of total tonnage) and 104 billion ton-miles (about 32 percent of total ton-miles) shipped. Railways are associated with 6 percent, waterways with 7 percent, and pipelines with 28 percent of total hazmat shipment ton- nage. Although 2007 statistics for hazmat transport by air were not published in the 2007 CFS, it comprised 0.02 percent of total hazmat shipment tonnage in 2002. The majority of shipment tonnage represents a subset of the nine hazardous materials classes. Flammable-Combustible Liquids (Class 3) represent 78 percent of the total tons, over 56 percent of the total ton-miles, and almost 81 percent of the total value. Gases (Class 2) represent over 11 percent of the tons, 17 percent of the ton-miles, and 9 percent of the value. The remaining seven hazmat classes total around 11 percent of total tons, 27 percent of total ton-miles, and 10 per- cent of total shipment value. The U.S.DOT sets requirements for hazmat transportation in hazardous materials regulations (HMR) under 49 CFR. Under 49 CFR, Part 173 (4), hazardous materials are grouped into nine major classes, several of which are further subclassified into divisions, as shown in Table 1-1. The HMR requires that hazmat shipments be designated by United Nations/North American (UN/NA) placards or labels when shipment quantities meet certain threshold criteria. Each class/division is characterized by a distinct graphic and numbering scheme. The UN/NA placards and labels and shipping manifests are important warning indicators by which first responders can identify initial isolation and response procedures when an incident involving hazmat trans- portation occurs. Examples of UN/NA placards from the 2008 Emergency Response Guidebook (5),

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Introduction 13 The HMCFS and National Emergency Management Frameworks HMCFS information can be used under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) framework, the Incident Command System (ICS), and the National Response Framework (NRF). "NIMS provides a consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident" (2, p 4-2). It builds on the ICS to provide first responders and authorities with the same foun- dation for emergency incident management. The HMCFS informs the NIMS and ICS frameworks at multiple levels, including the three that follow. 1. Command and management · The HMCFS can be used to help identify key risk and response areas that are impacted by ICS operations. · The HMCFS can be used to help identify response needs, personnel, equipment, and other resources that are affected by multiagency coordination systems (such as mutual aid agreements), regional hazmat teams, etc. · The HMCFS can be used to help identify information that may need to be communicated to the public during emergency situations in a timely, accurate, and accessible manner. 2. Preparedness · HMCFS information can be used to help identify training needs, response sce- narios for exercises, technical certification needs for hazmat responders, and equipment needs. 3. Resource management · The HMCFS can be used to help identify specific needs for resource inventory, mobilization, tracking, and recovery for hazmat incidents. The NRF builds on NIMS and "guides governments at all levels, the private sector and NGOs, and individual citizens toward a shared and effective response" (2, p 4-6) to incidents. Under the NRF, state, territorial, tribal, and local jurisdictions are responsible for developing all-hazards emergency operations plans, including identifying specific technological hazards that may be present in a community. This, in turn, affects required leadership and responsibility roles for different threats as well as evacuation strategies for potentially impacted populations. Jurisdictions may need to determine the level of multi-agency integration likely to be required for hazmat incident response, develop public information systems, identify and characterize resources, and provide training. An HMCFS also can be used to inform about resources, support, and assistance needed to augment local response at state and federal levels. or ERG, are shown in Appendix A. Hazardous materials also must be identified in papers that doc- ument specific information about the shipment. These documents are called shipping manifests. Shipping document (manifest) information and an illustration of placard numbering from the 2008 ERG are shown in Appendix B. The vast majority of hazardous materials shipments move safely and securely along the nation's transportation system. However, the threat of a hazmat transportation incident remains significant, with at least two incidents per hour on average, or more than 50 per day, nationally. Incidents

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14 Guidebook for Conducting Local Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Studies Table 1-1. The hazardous materials classification system. Class/Division Number Name of Class or Division None Forbidden materials None Forbidden explosives 1 Explosives 1.1 Explosives (with a mass explosion hazard) 1.2 Explosives (with a projection hazard) 1.3 Explosives (with predominantly a fire hazard) 1.4 Explosives (with no significant blast hazard) 1.5 Very insensitive explosives; blasting agents 1.6 Extremely insensitive detonating substances 2 Gases 2.1 Flammable gas 2.2 Non-flammable compressed gas 2.3 Poisonous Gas 3 Flammable and combustible liquids 4 Flammable solids 4.1 Flammable solid 4.2 Spontaneously combustible material 4.3 Dangerous-when-wet material 5 Oxidizers 5.1 Oxidizer 5.2 Organic peroxide 6 Poisons 6.1 Poisonous materials 6.2 Infectious substance (etiologic agent) 7 Radioactive materials 8 Corrosive materials 9 Miscellaneous hazardous materials None Other regulated material: ORM-D* *Note: ORM-D stands for other regulated materials--domestic. can occur in almost any jurisdiction at almost any time. Human behavior and technological fail- ure cause many system failures or casualties. Some well-publicized events in the last decade include the following: · In January 2004, a gasoline tanker truck left the I-895 roadway on the I-95 overpass in Elkridge, MD, went over the bridge rail, and into the northbound I-95 lanes. The tanker exploded and four vehicles on I-95 were driven into the resulting fire, killing the drivers of three vehicles. NTSB concluded that the likely cause was failure of the tanker truck driver to maintain control of his vehicle (6). · In January 2005, a Norfolk Southern train collided with another train parked on a siding at Avondale Mills, Inc. in Greenville, SC, after a train crew failed to realign a track switch. A chlo- rine tank railcar ruptured in the collision, releasing an extensive vapor cloud. The accident caused 9 deaths, 75 hospital admissions, and evacuation of 5,400 people (7). The total cost of the incident was estimated at $126 million by FRA (8). · In November 2007, a 12-inch-diameter liquid propane pipeline ruptured near Carmichael, MS. The gas cloud resulting from the breach enveloped nearby homes and ignited, killing two and injuring seven people. Property damages alone were estimated over $3 million. The NTSB determined the cause of the incident was due to pipeline weld failures (9). · In July 2008, a barge tow on the Mississippi River (which was improperly piloted) turned into the path of an oil tanker. The collision split the barge in two, resulting in spillage of nearly 300,000 gallons of fuel oil, closing the river for nearly 100 miles from New Orleans to Louisiana