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179 APPENDIX G Past Tunnel Fires Description G-1 TUNNEL FIRES IN THE US line truck, must retreat to west portal to find operating emergency phone (5 minutes minimum on operator's estimate). Console WALLACE operator places first unambiguous call to Oakland Fire Depart- ment 7 minutes minimum after collision, as much as 10 minutes Location: Wallace Tunnel, I-10, Mobile, Alabama after original stoppage in left lane of tunnel. Alarm sounds at fire Date: late 1970s station 55 seconds after initiation of call. Type: Medium Response: First pieces of fire equipment reach west portal Conditions at Ignition: 2 a.m. in very light traffic. Engine fire 3 minutes 45 seconds after alarm (10 minutes, 45 seconds from broken fuel line in camper truck. Electric fuel pump fed minimum after collision). First pieces of fire equipment reach fire after engine turned off. Owner abandoned vehicle. east portal 7 minutes after alarm. Fire equipment from Orinda Fire Department reaches east portal 12 minutes after console Detection/Alarm/Notification: Operator noted fire on TV operator's call. Oakland responds with seven engines (28 men), monitors, activated traffic-control red lights, and summoned fire two chief's cars (four men), and three other units (eight men). department. Exhaust fans, which may have activated automatically during early stages of fire in response to high levels of CO sensed in tunnel, Response: Fire equipment arrived within expected period. soon automatically shut down without having affected events or Very light traffic effectively stopped at portal. Ventilation sys- conditions in the tunnel. tem left inactive per fire department instructions. Tunnel filled with smoke; fire department unable to reach site of fire. Mother and grown son following bus in pickup witness colli- sion between bus and gasoline truck, come to stop, notice small Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: None fire, back up but abandon pickup for fear of rear end collision. Mother calls on emergency phone (1 minute after collision) until phone malfunctions; returns to pickup less than 50 ft (15.2 m) Survival/Damage: Vehicle completely consumed; minor from unmarked cross-adit to next tube. Son walks east in tunnel to damage to tunnel; no injuries. warn motorists; approximately two minutes later enveloped by smoke; gropes way out last 200 ft (60.9 m) to portal. Truck driver Source of Information: Study interview and passenger remain with beer truck less than 150 ft (45.7 m) from unmarked cross-adit. Man in second pickup backs up when warned by son until enveloped by smoke near sedan with elderly CALDECOTT couple, abandons vehicle and gropes remaining 80 ft (24.4 m) to portal. All other vehicles clear tunnel backing out, either through Location: Caldecott Tunnel, US-24, Oakland, California impatience or prompted by sight of approaching smoke wall. Date: 7 April 1982 Tunnel fills completely with smoke in excess of 300F (148.9C) Type: Major hazardous material within 3 minutes of collision eastward from burning gasoline truck to portal. Conditions at Ignition: Probably inebriated westbound driver lost control of compact auto just past midnight in light traffic. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Natural draft eastward Multiple glancing collisions with curbs and wall; stopped in left- through tunnel blows all combustion products in that direction; hand lane just into straightaway from right-hand curve proba- firemen approach to within 75 ft (22.9 m) of fire, make no attempt bly to inspect damage or affect minor repairs. At least two to suppress fire at that time. Fans left off through concern for possibly three or more cars pass on right during next few min- maintaining natural draft. Firemen unable to operate the valves utes. Slightly speeding empty bus unaware of obstacle tries that became corroded, in order to direct water-gasoline mixture in to pass full gasoline truck/trailer combination, as truck passes tunnel drainage away from nearby lake; concentrate on explosion stopped auto, multiple collisions occur. Trailer tank ruptures; and pollution hazard at lake while waiting for fire to burn down. spilled gasoline ignites. Bus driver ejected by collision forces; Extinguishment efforts started at 1:29 a.m. (75 minutes after ini- bus continues, exits portal approximately 36 seconds after impact. tial collision), tunnel water pressure falls too low to support hose Truck driver brings rig to stop, exits west portal on foot. As many streams. Firemen near tanker observe water leaking from dam- as twenty cars enter east portal. aged hose connections. Residual gasoline fire extinguished using foam and dry powder. Fire under control at 2:54 a.m. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Tunnel crew note noise and vibration from tunnel, see bus exit portal and come to rest Survival/Damage: Seven fatalities (auto driver, bus driver, against bridge pier (40 seconds after tunnel accident). Operators mother, beer truck occupants, elderly couple), two hospitalized dispatched to investigate, two go to east portal; one inspects for smoke inhalation (son and pickup driver). Six vehicles totally bus then drives east up westbound tube (1 minute, 40 seconds). destroyed in tunnel, one in collision with bridge pier. Tunnel Console operator receives call from tunnel reporting "bunch suffered extensive superficial damage to walls, ceiling, and road- of accidents"; connection lost before more information is way. Most tunnel support systems destroyed or severely dam- exchanged (1 minute, 10 seconds). Console operator notes mul- aged, including lighting, emergency phones, signs, alarms, tiple simultaneous phone calls from tunnel seconds before entire wiring, commercial broadcast antenna, and firefighting water sup- system fails. Operator driving east up tunnel finds burning gaso- ply. Repair costs estimated in excess of three million dollars.

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180 Source of Information: Oakland Fire Department report, alarms, wiring, commercial broadcast antenna, and fire fighting information transmitted with R. E. Graham (Chief, Maintenance water supply. Branch South, Caltrans) letter of 21 May 1982 to National Transportation Safety Board, and California Highway Patrol Acci- This front to rear collision of bus, car, and fuel tanker inci- dent Report. dent was created by limited sight conditions within the tunnel. The limited sight distance in the Caldecott Tunnels was due to narrow 2 ft (0.61 m) wide shoulders and a 2,400 ft (731.5 m) Description of Facility radius curve in the alignment. The stopping sight distance cal- Length: 3,370 ft (1027.2 m) culated from these conditions is only 415 ft (126.5 m) at a safe Cross Section: 3 bores stopping speed of 50 mph (80.5 km/h). The safe stopping speed 2 unidirectional lanes each bore, middle bore is reversible. is the speed at which a vehicle would safely stop within the AADT: 304,000 (October 1, 2001) available sight distance. Description of Incident BALTIMORE HARBOR At 12:14 a.m. on April 7, 1982, a westbound driver lost con- trol of his vehicle just past midnight in light traffic. He was prob- Location: Baltimore Harbor Freeway, Baltimore, Maryland ably inebriated. After multiple glancing collisions with curbs Date: 23 March 1978 and the wall, He stopped the vehicle in the left-hand lane in the Type: Major hazardous material straightaway after a right-hand curve to inspect damage or attempt repair. A slightly speeding empty bus tried to pass a full gasoline truck/trailer combination at the same time the truck was passing Conditions at Ignition: Soft drink delivery truck rams fuel oil the stopped vehicle. Multiple collisions occurred. The truck/trailer tanker from behind in heavy traffic one-quarter mile (0.4 km) after tank ruptured and the spilled gasoline ignited. The bus driver was exiting east portal of Baltimore Harbor Tunnel. Fuel spilled from ejected by the force of the collision and the bus continued through soft drink truck ignites and spreads to tanker. Third truck carrying the tunnel, exiting the west portal about 36 seconds after impact. creosoted railroad ties also ignited. The truck driver stooped the truck/trailer and exited the west por- tal on foot. Up to 20 vehicles entered the east portal. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Unknown; tunnel personnel not involved. Tunnel crew saw the bus exit the tunnel and sent operators to investigate. One operator inspected the bus and drove east into Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fire department put the tunnel. The console operator received a call from the tunnel out fire in unspecified short period. reporting a bunch of accidents, but the connection was lost. The console operator received multiple simultaneous phone calls Survival/Damage: Unknown, none to tunnel. Traffic con- from the tunnel seconds before the entire system failed. The gested around Baltimore metropolitan area throughout after- operator driving east into the tunnel found the burning gasoline noon and evening. truck and had to retreat to the west portal to find an operating emergency phone. The Oakland Fire Department was called a Source of Information: Study interview. minimum of 7 minutes after the collision. Exhaust fans which may have activated automatically during HOLLAND the early stages of the fire in response to high level of CO, auto- matically shut down without having affected condition in the Location: Holland Tunnel, New York City, New York tunnel. A natural eastward draft through the tunnel blew all the Date: 13 May 1949 combustion products in that direction. Ventilation fans were left Type: Major hazardous material. off in an attempt to maintain the natural draft. The tunnel filled completely with smoke within 3 minutes of the collision. Conditions at Ignition: Fully enclosed trailer carrying eighty 55-gallon (208.2 L) drums of carbon disulfide enters New Jersey Firefighters approached to within 75 ft (22.9 m) of the fire, but portal of tunnel, in violation of Port Authority regulations and made no attempt to suppress it at that time. Firefighters were allegedly non-placarded in violation of ICC regulations, in very unable to operate corroded valves to direct the water-gasoline heavy, slow traffic approximately 8:30 a.m. Drum breaks free and mixture in the tunnel drainage system away from a nearby lake. ignites upon striking roadway approximately 2,900 ft into tunnel. Firefighters concentrated on the explosion and pollution hazard Truck rolls to stop in left lane. Four trucks catch fire or are aban- at the lake while waiting for the fire to burn down. doned adjacent to trailer in right lane. Five additional trucks stopped 350 ft (106.7 m) to the rear grouped tightly in right lane At 1:29 a.m., efforts to extinguish the fire started. Water pres- also ignite. Approximately 125 automobiles, buses, and trucks fill sure in the tunnel fell too low to support hose streams. Firefight- both lanes back to New Jersey portal. ers near the tanker observed water leaking from damaged hose connections. The residual gasoline fire was extinguished using Detection/Alarm/Notification: Patrolling officer 100 ft foam and dry powder. The fire was under control by 2:54 a.m. (30.5 m) from mishap transmits trouble signal to control room at 8:48 a.m.; assists drivers escaping scene through cross-adit There were 7 fatalities and 6 vehicles were totally destroyed in to north tube. First fire alarm transmitted by patrolling officers the tunnel. At least 3 fatalities were within 150 ft (45.7 m) of further east at 8:56 a.m., who then run to assist. Tunnel person- unmarked cross-connections to the adjoining tunnel. The tunnel nel in tunnel west of fire promptly evacuate occupants on foot to suffered extensive superficial damage to walls, ceiling, and road- New Jersey; start backing vehicles out of tunnel. Jersey City Fire way. Most tunnel support systems were destroyed or severely Department receives telephone notice at 9:05 a.m. New York damaged. These included: lighting, emergency phones, signs, Fire Department receive fire alarm at 9:12 a.m.

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181 Response: Three-man emergency crew drive west through Conditions at Ignition: Private auto abandoned and set afire eastbound tube on wrecker and jeep upon receiving 8:56 a.m. fire in deserted, early morning tunnel. alarm; commence fighting fire with 12 in. (30.5 cm) hose and spray nozzle. Assist two tunnel patrolmen overcome by smoke. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Fire eventually discovered by Knock down fires in two trucks of eastern group; tow one to New unspecified means. Fire department summoned by unspecified York portal. New York rescue company and battalion chief drive means. west through westbound tube; cross to scene at adit and relieve tunnel emergency crew. Some firemen in distress recover by breathing at the curb-level fresh air ports. Response: Local fire department responded with unspecified resources. Second alarm transmitted at 9:30 a.m. activates four engine companies, two ladder truck companies, and a water tower. Fire- Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fire extinguished men not involved in firefighting search through burning trucks, without incident. help three trapped people to safety. Additional NYC pumpers augment capacity of tunnel fire main; activate five 22 in. (55.9 cm) Survival/Damage: Vehicle destroyed. No damage to tunnel. hoses and a foam generator. New Jersey engine company, truck No injuries. company, rescue company, and battalion chief transmit second alarm upon initial inspection at New Jersey portal. Oxygen masks Source of Information: Study interview. ordered. Firemen establish hose lines through half mile (0.8 km) of BLUE MOUNTAIN abandoned vehicles; extinguish fires in second group of trucks. Tunnel ventilation accelerated to full capacity at fire site at approx- Location: Blue Mountain Tunnel, Pennsylvania Turnpike, imately 9:45 a.m.; firemen discover they can work without masks. Franklin County, Pennsylvania Two exhaust fans disabled by heat at 1000F (537.8C); third fan Date: 19651966 kept in service by water spray. Ceiling at fire collapses; fire boats Type: Medium monitor Hudson River above for signs of tube failure. Conditions at Ignition: Truck carrying fish oil (not consid- Remaining non-burning vehicles removed by 10:15 a.m.; ered hazardous material at the time) caught fire in tunnel. JCFD drives two pumpers east to fire site, joining forces with NYFD. Fire controlled by approximately 1:00 p.m.; overhauling operations continue until 12:52 a.m. the next morning. Residual Detection/Alarm/Notification: Unknown. carbon disulfide and turpentine reflash at 6:50 p.m. during cleanup; extinguished with 5-gal. (18.9 L) foam extinguishers; Response: Fire department responded to unspecified degree. area then covered with heavy foam. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fire extinguished with- Total equipment involved: one tow truck, several jeeps, seven out incident; combustion products left tunnel without mechan- chief units, five rescue companies, seven police emergency squads, ical assistance. 14 engine companies, six truck companies, one lighting truck, one water tower, one smoke ejector, one foam truck, 40 additional Survival/Damage: Unspecified damage to truck. Minor if any firemen, at least 13 ambulances at the scene, and four Consoli- damage to tunnel. No injuries specified. dated Edison emergency trucks with inhalators (total of 29 fire- fighting units, 20 medical units, seven supervisory units, at least three port authority vehicles, and four commercial vehicles with Source of Information: Study interview. special apparatus on board. Unknown total number of personnel in excess of 250). CHESAPEAKE BAY Survival/Damage: Ten trucks and cargoes completely destroyed, 13 others damaged. 600 ft (182.9 m) of tunnel wall Location: Chesapeake Bay Bridge/Tunnel, Norfolk, Virginia and ceiling demolished; walls spalled in places to cast iron tube Date: 3 April 1974 plates. 650 tons (589,670 kg) of debris removed from tunnel. Type: Medium Tube reopened to traffic 56 h after fire started. All cable and wire connections through tube disrupted at fire. Total damage esti- Conditions at Ignition: Six-wheel closed refrigeration truck mated at $1 million dollars (in 1949 dollars). Sixty-six injuries, blows left rear tire and careens out of control down grade in 27 requiring hospitalization; no fatalities. south tunnel, contacts curb and overturns, blocking both lanes. Full, 50-gal. (189.3 L), fiberglass fuel tank explodes in flames Source of Information: The Holland Tunnel Chemical Fire upon overturn. report by the National Board of Fire Underwriters. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Mid-tunnel booth patrolman One recalls trapped firefighters breathing from the curb-level hears blowout, observes overturn and explosion, reports "acci- fresh air inlets in Holland Tunnel fire. dent with fire" to control booth at 12:18 p.m. Response: Booth patrolman moves to scene; assists driver and SQUIRREL HILL directs him to safety; halts oncoming traffic. Tunnel emergency trucks dispatched from two shoreward portal islands at 12:19 p.m. Location: Squirrel Hill Tunnel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Three other tunnel units in transit on bridge also converge. Chief Date: Unknown of Police arrives at 12:21 p.m., finds Virginia State Trooper unit Type: Medium already giving aid to injured driver and crew of north emergency

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182 truck already fighting fire with hose and foam. Additional alarm the fire appeared to have been extinguished. However, approx- placed to Chesapeake Beach Fire Department, who responded imately 15 minutes later the fire flared up again. This produced with one engine, one rescue unit, and one ambulance. Flush truck thick black smoke. Thereafter the fire grew to a length of more than and maintenance wrecker also summoned. 1100 m (3,609 ft). Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fuel fire brought under Although there was a message at the portal of the tunnel that control within six or seven minutes; secondary fires extinguished there had been an accident, vehicles continued to drive into the soon after. Some dense smoke hung in area during fire, but breath- tunnel. A tailback of 231 vehicles formed in front of the source ing apparatus not required. Exhaust fans operated throughout fire. of the fire. Internal telephone system required since fire destroyed overhead antenna. Driver conveyed to hospital by 12:50 p.m. The Nihonzaka Tunnel is monitored from two control centers (Shizuoka and Kawasaki). The fire was first noticed by the Survival/Damage: Truck essentially destroyed; cargo un- Kawasaki control room. Mistakenly, from here the fire service damaged. Tunnel ceiling tiles, hand rail, and antenna wire dam- responsible for the Shizuoka district was alarmed initially, aged by impact or fire, value unspecified. Tunnel reopened to although it was further away. A unit of the fire service which was traffic at 4:50 p.m. One injury, driver hospitalized in shock with much closer was only informed 40 minutes after the fire broke out. burns on arms and legs. The people inside the tunnel initially tried to extinguish it Source of Information: Memoranda of booth patrolman and themselves by rolling out the hoses attached to the hydrants in Chief of Police sergeant of 5 April 74 concerning Economy the emergency areas. However they were not able to activate the Stores, Inc., truck accident/fire. extinguishing water supply, as they were not aware that in addi- tion to the throwing of a lever--which is normally sufficient-- One of the parameters for risk analysis is the cost of life, it was also necessary to press a button. Personnel located in the which varies in different countries. In 2009, the federal govern- Shizuoka control centre failed in their attempts to reach the scene ment (78) calculated the value of one life in the U.S. to be worth of the accident, but were able to assist 42 vehicles in escaping $5.8 million when deciding the benefits of railroad construction from the tunnel. to ensure increased workers' safety. A person that dies without newly mandated safety rules is referred to as a "statistical life" At around 8:30 p.m. 208 people had managed to escape from by government analysts, who compare costs and benefits of new the tunnel on foot (approximately 15 minutes after the fire had bro- programs. The value of each of those lives range from $1 mil- ken out again). The firemen reaching the scene of the fire could not lion to $10 million. initially achieve a great deal, as their respiratory equipment only allowed each of them to work for 30 minutes. The Federal Railroad Administration estimated each life to be worth $5.8 million when analyzing new safety rules to pre- The supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel (approximately vent construction workers from being hit by trains that are being 170 m3 or 45,000 gal.) had been used up approximately 11/2 hours built or repaired. The new rules are in response to the seven U.S. after the fire started without it being possible to put the fire out. workers who have been killed under those circumstances since 1997 (78). When the fire-fighting water ceased to flow, combustible gases and vapors drifted from the source of the fire to two groups of vehicles in the tunnel, setting them alight. G-2 TUNNEL FIRES DESCRIPTION-- OUTSIDE THE U.S. The extinguishing work could only be resumed after a "shuttle service" to surface waters had been set up using 7 sets of fire- Nihonzaka Tunnel, Japan (1979) fighting appliances. It was only possible to bring the fire under control 2 days after it had broken out. The fire, which initially The Nihonzaka Tunnel is located half way between the started on July 11, 1979, was finally extinguished on July 18 (i.e., cities of Tokyo and Nagoya. The tunnel consists of two approxi- approximately one week after the rear-end collision). mately 2 km (1.24 mi) long tubes, which are operated in each direction. There were no restrictions on hazardous materials During the fire the semi-transverse ventilation of the tunnel traveling through the tunnel until the fire occurred. worked in the suction mode at full power. However this was not sufficient to extract enough smoke and hot burning gases for the The fire was started on July 11, 1979, by a rear-end collision fire service units, who were equipped only with limited respira- involving 4 trucks and 2 cars. The accident caused tanks on the tory protection, to effectively fight the fire. vehicles to become leaky so that fuel (gasoline and diesel) leaked out. This fuel ignited and thereby triggered a conflagration affect- Of the 230 vehicles in the tunnel, 173 were destroyed by the ing 173 vehicles in total. fire; 7 people died in the fire, while a further 2 were injured. Among the burnt-out vehicles there were two road tankers The tunnel lining and the additional 4.5 mm (0.177 in.) thick carrying neoprene and accompanying solvent. The load on reinforcement of the tunnel walls were damaged for a length another truck involved in the accident consisted of 10 drums of of approximately 1100 m (3,609 ft). The greatest damage ether. These also became leaky as a result of the accident. The occurred in an area of approximately 500 m (1,640 ft) on either ether which leaked out immediately began to burn intensely. side of the fire source. The road surface melted in places up to Other materials which burnt were artificial resin and plastics. a depth of 2 to 3 cm (0.79 to 1.18 in.) on average, with the max- imum depth being approximately 7 cm (2.76 in.). Electric The deluge sprinklers located in the tunnel were set off auto- cables and pipes lay in a cable duct in the road surface concrete matically by fire alarm systems. After approximately 10 minutes continued to function normally.

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183 During the repair work the concrete of the tunnel lining was to work effectively in tunnel. Total equipment and personnel removed up to a depth of approximately 3 cm (1.18 in.). Then involved: 34 engines, 2 portable fire pumps, 30 (10 ton) tank wire grating was placed in position and steel fiber concrete trucks, three ambulances, 654 personnel. injected using the dry injection method. The application thick- ness depended on the damage to the tunnel, being approxi- Survival/Damage: Of 231 vehicles including 66 trucks in tun- mately 5 to 10 cm (1.97 to 3.94 in.) on average. nel during course of incident, 58 are undamaged, 173 destroyed. Ceiling, walls, and tunnel systems almost completely destroyed After the repair work to the roadway had been completed on for central 1145 m (3,756.6 ft). Seven fatalities, six in collision August 7, work began on repairing the tunnel equipment. This and one of injuries suffered in collision; two other unspecified work lasted approximately 1 month, including among other things: injuries. "Police and sufferers will take matter into court," ends summary report. 1) Renewal of the surveillance and fire alarm systems 2) Reconstruction of the ventilation system Source of Information: Tokyo Fire Department letter to 3) Renewal and supplementation of the fire extinguishing Hamburg, West Germany, Fire Department of 30 August 79; equipment Summary of Automobile Fire in Nihonzaka Tunnel, of unknown 4) Installation of a guided escape system (including loud- source but written in English by a Japanese; and National speakers) Bureau of Standards Memorandum for the Files by D. Gross of 26 September 79 concerning visit to test facilities in Japan. Summary: NIHONZAKA 1) The fire was caused by a rear-end collision. Location: Nihonzaka Tunnel Shizuoka Prefecture, near Yaizu 2) The deluge sprinklers located in the tunnel were set off City, Japan (100 miles or 161 km southwest of Tokyo) cor- automatically by fire alarm systems. After approximately rect Japanese pronunciation: Nee-hon-za-ka, without stress. 10 minutes the fire appeared to have been extinguished. "Nihon" is the Japanese name for their post-WWII nation. However, approximately 15 minutes later the fire flared Date: 11 July 79 (Wednesday) up again. This produced thick black smoke. Thereafter the Type: Major hazardous material fire grew to a length of more than 1100 m. 3) The fire department alarm was incorrect (wrong fire Conditions at Ignition: Four large trucks and two autos department, too late). involved in collision three-quarters through westbound tube; 4) Those people in the tunnel could not use the fire extin- spilled fuel ignited at 6:39 p.m. 231 vehicles are in tunnel guishers as the instructions were not clear. behind fire or enter tunnel unheeding or in contravention to 5) The efforts of the fire department to extinguish the fire emergency warnings at east portal. were considerably hampered by the inadequate respira- tory protection devices. 6) The suction power of the semi-cross ventilation system in Detection/Alarm/Notification: Operators notice smoke the tunnel was not sufficient to extract the smoke and hot in tube on TV monitors, display `OFF LIMITS' sign at east burning gases. portal, reverse ventilation system, and notify Shizuoka Fire 7) The hot burning gases caused the fire to jump between Department, behind fire, at 6:42 p.m. Yaizu City Fire Depart- groups of vehicles. ment, in front of fire and much closer to tunnel, summoned at 8) In the fire 7 people died, the tunnel was damaged over a 7:18 p.m. Automatic spray heads interlocked with fire detector length of approximately 1,100 m (3,609 ft) and 173 vehi- activate at accident site. cles were destroyed. Response: Motorists at scene deploy hoses from hydrant boxes, but cannot activate water since valves require the push- MOORFLEET ing of an operating button in addition to traditional turning of handle. Shizuoka equipment at east portal at 6:48 p.m. unable Location: Moorfleet Tunnel, Hamburg, West Germany to reach accident site, assist 42 vehicles to escape tunnel. Date: 31 August, 1969 Automatic spray system reportedly suppresses fire at initial Type: Major hazardous material site at 6:50 p.m., but fire reignites at 7:20 p.m. 208 occupants of vehicles trapped in tunnel escape on foot out east portal by 8:30 p.m. Three Yaizu City engine companies arrive and aug- Conditions at Ignition: Driver of truck trailer combination ment fire main at FD connections at west portal. carrying 14 tons of polyethylene stopped in cut-and-cover tun- nel at 1:10 a.m. probably to inspect malfunction by tunnel illu- mination. Discovered burning tire on trailer, uncoupled and Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Initial efforts consume drove tractor out of tunnel. entire 40,800 gallon (155,000 L or 40,947 gal.) water supply by 8:05 p.m. (1 hour, 26 minutes after automatic spray heads acti- Detection/Alarm/Notification: Unknown vate) without extinguishing fire. Unburned combustible vapors from accident site spread fire to two other groups of vehicles in tunnel when water supply is exhausted. Suppression resumed Response: Unknown with water relayed from unspecified natural sources. Fire under control Friday afternoon but continued burning until 10:00 a.m. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fire was extinguished 18 July, nearly a week after initial incident. Semi-transverse using foam; water used to cool wreckage. Other details unspecified. ventilation system, with reversible supply fans only, operated in exhaust mode (maximum exhaust capacity one-half rated supply Survival/Damage: Uncaptioned pictures reveal damage to capacity) throughout emergency but was unable to clear heat and ceiling and walls similar to Caldecott and Holland Tunnel fires; smoke enough to allow breathing-apparatus-equipped firemen no other details available

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184 Seljestad Road Tunnel (Norway) AADT 14,100 Description of Facility Trucks: 26% Length: 1,268 m (4,160 ft) Cross Section: Two 11 ft (3.35 m) lanes, undivided, bi- The tunnel near Salzburg, Austria, has a full transverse ventila- directional tion system split into four sections. The two outer sections supply AADT: 1,350 vpd and exhaust air through the tunnel portals. The inner sections sup- Trucks: 20% ply and exhaust air through a ventilation shaft in the middle of the tunnel. Fresh air can be supplied at a rate of about 190 m3/s per The tunnel has normal lighting. There are four SOS stations, kilometer (390 CFM per lane foot). Exhaust air is removed at a rate one at each end and two at 500 m (1,640 ft) intervals inside. Six of about 115 m3/s per kilometer (235 CFM per lane foot). Exhaust hand-held fire extinguishers are located every 250 m (820 ft). openings are located in the ceiling every 6 m. The tunnel has an Eight jet ventilators automatically run in the direction of the draft automatic fire detection system. at any given time. The fans are started by signals from CO and NO2 detectors. Flashing red warning signals are located at both ends of the tunnel. High-voltage and communications cables were in a concrete conduit along an enclosed ditch and Description of Incident a fiber optic communication cable was mounted on the ceil- At 4:47 a.m. on May 29, 1999 a fire resulted when a semi-truck ing. The tunnel is monitored and remotely operated from the laden with cows collided with four cars and a paint truck in front. Hordaland Road Traffic Centre in Bergen. The semi-truck driver had failed to stop either through sleep depri- vation, driver error, or excessive speed. Description of Incident The semi-truck smashed the cars behind the paint truck so At 8:52 p.m. on July 14, 2000, an accident occurred when two thoroughly that the first personnel on the scene believed it to be truck-trailers met about 300 m (980 ft) inside the tunnel. Because only one car. Two of the four cars between the trucks had been of narrow roadway, the two truck-trailers slowed to pass at low pushed under the paint truck, while the two other cars were crushed speed. Behind one truck-trailer, five following passenger cars into the tunnel wall. The trucks ended up nose to tail. Gasoline also slowed. A truck-tractor approaching these passenger cars from the damaged vehicles is presumed to have ignited, starting from behind was unable to slow down sufficiently resulting in the fire which led to explosions of the spray paint cans in the paint a rear end collision involving all five cars. One of the vehicles truck. The flames spread to a total of 16 trucks and 24 passen- immediately caught fire which spread to the other vehicles. A ger cars were burned. Eight people died instantly during this colli- motorcycle and an additional passenger car were ultimately sion while two escaped from one of the cars that had been crushed involved in the accident. Both truck-trailers escaped the accident into the wall. Four people died in the subsequent fire. Two people and exited the tunnel. had not left their car. The paint truck driver after having escaped, went back into the tunnel to retrieve some paperwork. He joined Shortly after the fire started, a ceiling mounted communications the two people who had stayed in their car and all three perished. cable burned, cutting off telecommunications in Roldal. Because Another truck driver suffocated while fleeing the accident scene. of the cable failure, it was not possible to notify the Roldal fire Three of his colleagues escaped by cramming themselves into an department. This also cut communication and control with the emergency call booth that was sealed tight enough to prevent the Road Traffic Centre for emergency telephones and technical smoke from entering. equipment inside the tunnel. The fans functioned automatically and technical functions could be controlled from a board installed Events leading up to the collision included a traffic backup outside the tunnel. caused by an earlier serious accident north of the tunnel at 2:08 a.m. This produced a higher than normal volume of traffic. Due to the cable failure, the flashing red signals at the tunnel Night repair work being carried out in the Tauern Tunnel about portals could not be activated shortly after the start of the fire. All 800 m (2,625 ft) from the northern portal reduced tunnel traffic to traffic on the Roldal side of the tunnel was stopped after smoke one lane. Alternating one-directional use was controlled with was observed coming out of the tunnel. In addition, a bus was traffic signals. The Salzburg bound traffic was stopped during turned around and placed across the roadway to prevent additional one of these stop and go sequences at the time of the collision. traffic from entering the tunnel from the Roldal side. According to the Odda fire department, when arriving at the scene no manual control of technical installations was required because the draft At 4:50 a.m., the fire alarm system in the control room at was moving in the appropriate direction and because all traffic by St. Michael was triggered. The manager on duty at the control that time had stopped. A total of eight vehicles were involved in room switched to four cameras near the crash site, but nothing an accident resulting in one of the vehicles catching fire. The fire could be seen. Alarm status of the fire alarm system then switched spread rapidly to six other cares quickly filling the tunnel with the traffic lights at both tunnel entrances to red. Many people smoke from the collision site all the way out to the east entrance. ignored the red traffic lights and entered the tunnel. Video cameras The accident was reported to the emergency services in Odda at at the north portal showed thick smoke coming up the tunnel at 8:55 p.m. and the first unit arrived at the scene at 9:20 p.m. Occu- high speed. As smoke quickly started to pour out of the north end pants of the burning cars were able to get out of the tunnel on their of the tunnel, drivers were still entering from the south and dis- own or with assistance from others. After the fire was extin- regarding the red traffic lights. The tunnel manager immediately guished a tunnel search with smoke evacuation crew located four contacted police and firefighters. From video feeds from the tunnel persons alive in the proximity of an abandoned passenger car. control room showed police that traffic had come to a stop and peo- There were no fatalities in the accident. ple were fleeing the tunnel by foot. The accident location forced fleeing motorists to run either 800 m (2,625 ft) toward the northern portal or 3.4 miles (5.5 km) toward the south portal At 4:53 a.m., Tauern Tunnel the first hand held fire extinguishers located in the call booth niches Description of Facility were used. At 4:56 a.m., the ventilation system automatically Length: 6,400 m (21,000 ft) switched over to fire mode. The north end exhaust ventilation Cross Section: Two-lane, undivided, bidirectional extracted smoke at a rate of 230 m3/s (487,370 CFM) upward into

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185 the exhaust air ducts. This caused a stratification of the smoke, so tunnel were extremely difficult due to uncontrolled backlayer- the smoke stayed at the ceiling for the first 10 to 15 minutes. This ing of smoke in the tunnel. The smoke traveled down the tunnel allowed about 80 people to escape. corridor against the direction of the ventilation system. The first firefighters arrived at the south entrance 27 minutes after the start of the accident fire. They drove slowly toward the St. Gotthard Tunnel accident even though the visibility was zero. A number of explo- Description of Facility sions then occurred which produced much more smoke and fire. Length: 10 miles (16.3 km) The heat became so extreme that the firemen had to retreat to Cross Section: Two-lane, undivided, bidirectional travel the nearest emergency phone niche. Some of the phones in these lanes with separate service tunnel booths stopped operating. The smoke from these explosions started ADT: 18,000 heading to the north portal in spite of the exhaust ventilation. This tunnel is located in the Trico region of the Swiss Alps The tunnel electrical engineer arrived at the control room dur- between the cities of Goeshenen and Alrolo. The tunnel has a ing this time and took manual control of the ventilation system. parallel service/safety tunnel with connecting passageways every The commander of the firefighters gave the order to switch to max- 250 m (820 ft) and an extensive network of smoke detectors. The imum extraction in the fire portion of the tunnel while the other service/safety tunnel is wide enough for people on foot, but not three ventilation sections received maximum fresh air. The third for service vehicles. Four firefighters are located at each entrance section ventilation system helped force the smoke out through the 24 hours a day. The ventilation system consists of fans and shafts north portal. that can replace the air in the tunnel every 15 minutes. This allowed firefighters to rescue three people trapped in an emergency niche for slightly more than an hour and to put out the Description of Incident fires in 15 to 17 burning vehicles. The firefighters could not pen- At 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 2001, two trucks collided head-on etrate any further northward due to the intense heat and smoke. about a mile (1.6 km) from the south entrance during a period of The third section ventilation system was changed from supply to heavy traffic. The load of tires in one of the trucks burst into exhaust mode to help reduce some of the smoke exiting from the flames. The driver of this truck escaped by climbing out of the win- north portal. dow. The burning tires emitted noxious fumes and made the fire difficult to extinguish. Temperatures were reported to be 1,200C (2,192F). The ventilation shafts helped expel the smoke and At 6:00 a.m., more than 300 firefighters had been assembled warning barriers were put up to prevent cars from entering the tun- at the tunnel entrances; 170 at the north entrance and 138 at the nel after the blaze started. The blaze burned for more than 48 hours. south entrance. They had at their disposal an assortment of equipment which included 2 infrared cameras, 23 light systems, a mobile generator, and 12 giant fans. This permitted the start of Many drivers were able to back out of the tunnel or escape the fire fighting from the north portal. by foot through the service tunnels. All told there were 23 vehicles at the site of the collision, but only 11 people died. Some of the people who died in this accident had actually made it At about 10:00 a.m. engineers believed that the tunnel was to safety, but had returned to their cars to retrieve items. Others had being weakened structurally by the fire. Before the northern died because they had stayed in their cars while using their cell firefighters could begin fighting their way through the inferno phones. with 5 foam/water hoses, the engineers had to inspect and provide props to prevent the tunnel from collapsing. The heat inside the tunnel reached 2000F (1093.3C) at the impact and 1800F After the fire started, barriers automatically stopped more traf- (982.2C) in a 700 m (2,300 ft) long stretch. The heat was so fic from entering the tunnel and ventilators switched to emergency settings. Rescue workers arrived within minutes of the first alert. intense that the inside walls crumbled. The outside walls sur- Firefighters worked their way to within 200 m (650 ft) of the acci- vived quite well. dent and then had to use the service/safety tunnel to access the fire. A 100 m (330 ft) portion of the tunnel collapsed. The likely reason At 3:00 p.m., firefighters started putting out the fire with a for the collapse was the spalling of the concrete due to conversion mobile foam thrower and by 9:00 p.m. the fire was finally extin- of moisture to steam. The concrete spalling exposed the structural guished. All told the casualty count came to 12 dead, 49 injured steel reinforcing thus making it ductile. This combination led to the and 50 cattle destroyed. On January 10, 2000, another truck fire collapse. The tunnel was reopened on December 21, 2001. broke out in the Tauern Tunnel. Many of the same mistakes were made, but this time all managed to escape as firefighters The St. Gotthard Tunnel was originally designed for horse- put out the fire. driven carriages. The horses would get frightened when they saw the open end of the tunnels, so the tunnels were designed to curve. Traffic conditions due to construction at the time of the inci- This configuration reduces the stopping sight distance in modern dent created a unique tunnel operating state that could not be roadways. A significant number of fatalities were created by anticipated under normal operations. It is important to note that motorists returning to their cars to retrieve items. Clear instruc- motorists continued to enter the tunnel even after traffic signals tions and signage could encourage safe evacuation patterns for indicated no entry. Special care is to be given to VMS design tunnel occupants. and accompanying changeable warning beacons to make traffic control more effective. Mont Blanc Tunnel The ventilation was capable of keeping the smoke layer at the Description of Facility ceiling for 15 minutes. Subsequently, the fire energy over- Length: 11,600 m (38,000 ft) whelmed the ventilation system and began pushing smoke along Cross Section: Two-lane, undivided, bidirectional the length of the tunnel. After the fire was established, fire fight- AADT: 5,500 ing operations of both people and equipment movement into the Trucks: 40%

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186 The Mont Blanc tunnel was built jointly by the French and The French side activated the 2000 or 4000 m (6,561.7 to Italians in 1965 and is operated by both nations. Each nation 13,123.4 ft) reversible duct nearest to the fire to exhaust air. maintains one half of the tunnel although a larger portion of the The Italian side left the reversible duct positioned to supply air roadway is on the French side. and set it at maximum capacity. At 11:15 a.m., the Italian oper- ators tried to switch to exhaust with an automatic system Shelter rooms are located every 600 m (2,000 ft). These rooms geared to concentrate the exhaust flows near the site of the fire are separated from the road tunnel, supplied with fresh air, and and later at 12:30 and 12:45 they tried manually to do this same designed for 2-hour fire resistance. Each fresh-air duct supplies air task. Neither the automatic or manual change over to the exhaust at a rate of about 75 m3/second to one-eighth of the tunnel length mode was successful. The smoke never exhausted. The French (16.5 CFM per lane foot). Exhaust air is removed at a rate of about and the Italians did not have a centralized management system 300 m3/second per kilometer (95 CFM per lane foot). Fresh-air to indicate the total power usage per fan, but they do know the openings are located near the bottom of the walls at approximately total power usage by all fans. 10 m (30 ft) intervals. One square-meter (10.5 ft2) exhaust open- ings are located near the ceiling at about 300 m (980 ft) intervals. It took 53 hours to extinguish the fire. The fire cost the lives of 39 people, including 29 inside vehicles and 9 found outside. Thirty-four vehicles, including 20 trucks were burned. The fire Description of Incident damaged over 900 m (2,952.8 ft) of the tunnel structure and a At 10:53 a.m. on March 24, 1999, a refrigerated truck caught considerable amount of tunnel equipment. The tunnel reopened fire for unknown reasons. The truck was traveling in the France March 9, 2002. Italy direction. The toll collector noticed nothing unusual, but truck drivers from the opposite direction used their headlights This fire incident was probably initiated by equipment to warn the driver that something was wrong. He could see temperatures on board a freight truck. Overheating would be smoke coming from underneath his truck when he looked in due to mountain pass driving conditions contributing to ignition his rear-view mirrors. He slowly stopped the truck at Rest Area and combustion. 21 located 6,700 m (21,981.6 ft) from the entry toll plaza. He could not get to his fire extinguisher in the cab of the truck, because the fire had started to engulf the cab. He fled on foot Main lessons learnt from the Mt. Blanc toward the Italian portal. and Tauern Tunnel fires of 1999 The Mont Blanc and the Tauern tunnels are both bidirection- The smoke was observed on the monitor screens at the time the nal and transverse ventilated. As the fire in the Tauern tunnel truck stopped, but the obscuration monitors on the French side involved a heavy goods vehicle transporting lacquer tins, and and the heated gas monitors on the Italian side both failed to trig- because there were more people present in the Tauern tunnel, ger an alarm while the truck was moving. The French monitors this fire was potentially more serious than the Mont Blanc fire. belatedly indicated higher than normal temperatures. The heat release rate of both fires reached quickly high values. Italian authorities were notified of the fire at 10:54 a.m. by a However, the outcome in terms of loss of life for the Mont phone call from a person at Rest Area 22. It was confirmed when Blanc fire was far more serious than for the Tauern fire. Several they received an alarm from a fire pull box at 10:57 a.m. and the differences between these two fires may have contributed to the removal of a fire extinguisher at 10:58 a.m. at Rest Area 21. At outcome in each case. From a human behavior view, the Tauern 10:55 a.m., all traffic signals in the FrenchItaly direction tunnel fire occurred shortly after the Mont Blanc catastrophe, turned red. The Italian entrance was closed at 10:56 a.m. and so the people involved were well aware of the possible severe consequences that could result from a tunnel fire and so The spread of the fire was not affected by the contents of the fled the fire almost immediately. In addition, in the case of the truck which contained margarine and flour and was not classi- Tauern fire, the fire was located "near" one of the tunnel portals fied as hazardous cargo. However, the refrigerated trailer was adding evacuation. In the Mont Blanc Tunnel fire, the fire occurred fitted with a thermal insulation foam that was highly flamma- almost in the middle of the tunnel compounding the difficulties ble. The cause of the fire is suspected to be overheating of the with both smoke extraction and evacuation. Furthermore, the engines and turbos due to the long and difficult uphill drive. two separate control centers within the Mont Blanc tunnel made The wind at the start of the fire was coming from the Italian managing the fire difficult. side, but the wind shifted before other emergency vehicles could reach the fire. Due to the extremely rapid spread of the Other aspects that contributed to the differences in these two fire, emergency vehicles could not get to the site of the collision situations are given by the fact that the ventilation system of the in time to control the fire as had been done with prior accidents Tauern Tunnel had a higher performance than the one in the Mont in this tunnel. Blanc Tunnel, and the firefighters in the Tauern Tunnel were bet- ter equipped than those in the Mont Blanc Tunnel (see Table 61). The video monitors indicated that the smoke spread from ceil- ing to floor and did not stratify to allow people to escape by stay- ing low to the road. Thirty-four people died in their vehicles Pfnder Tunnel, Austria (1995) without fleeing through the tunnel or finding refuge in the fresh air On April 10, 1995, there was a traffic accident in the tunnel as supply openings. This indicated that they were not aware of the a result of which three vehicles burnt out. The fire was located dangerous situation that existed. Contributing to this was the fact approximately 4.3 km (2.67 mi) from the northern portal and that they could not see the problem ahead of them due to large 2.4 km (1.5 mi) from the southern portal. The accident was caused trucks blocking their view. When the smoke did reach them, they by the microsleep of a car driver traveling in a southerly direction. apparently stayed in their cars because the cars provided a sense of He crossed over to the oncoming traffic lane and crashed into an security. The ventilation supply and exhaust ducts attempted to articulated vehicle laden with bread. This truck began to skid, control the smoke. When the alarm went off most of the supply then crossed over to the wrong side of the road, slid along the ducts started delivering air at full levels. tunnel wall for approximately 130 m (426 ft) and then finally

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187 TABLE G1 EVENT, CONSEQUENCES, LESSONS LEARNED Event Consequences Lessons Learned The fire grew -- Difficult to reach the fire - HGV serious fires can happen rapidly, even if the because of smoke and heat even with "non dangerous" goods trucks load was not Tunnel users could not - Redefine the notion of considered as extinguish the fire with "dangerous goods" for road dangerous goods extinguisher tunnels Fast and precise ++ Optimization of the Need of fire detection systems fire location detection ventilation operation able to locate the fire rapidly Fire detection -- Fire location unknown Need of fire detection systems system out of work able to locate the fire rapidly First alarm given by + Fast alarm Fire detection systems are to opacimeters include smoke detection in addition to temperature detection Two people died in a -- 2 victims Pressurized shelters must be pressurized shelter related to an evacuation route that because of heat is not the tunnel itself First firemen -- Could not reach the fire Need to inform the firemen on arrived from the extended smoke plug in the smokiest tunnel tunnel side Misunderstanding -- Arrived at the tunnel late Need to train the firemen about the fire site Firemen entered -- Firemen were trapped in - Need to train the firemen the tunnel with the tunnel. One died, and - Cooperation needed between inappropriate the evacuation of the others the tunnel operators and the equipment needed several hours firemen to inform them of the situation inside the tunnel Some users rapidly ++ Fewer victims Need to inform the users on the decided to evacuate behavior expected from them Some users remained -- Victims died asphyxiated in Need to inform the users on the in their vehicles the smoke behavior expected from them Three users took - Perhaps they thought that Emergency call niches have to be refuge they were in a safe area identified by the tunnel users as in an emergency while it was not the case non-safe areas. There must be no call niche Needed to be rescued by confusion possible between firemen emergency call niches and pressurized shelters or evacuation routes. Car drivers entered -- More victims Need to inform the users on the the tunnel in spite behavior expected from them of the red signal and siren Two separated -- Lack of coordination Only one control centre operating control centers between the tunnel the tunnel operators of the two centers complicated emergency ventilation operation Fresh air supply at -- Accelerated the smoke - Reduce fresh air supply if the full capacity (from velocity toward the portals longitudinal velocity is not the bottom) Longer smoke plug controlled . - Ventilation procedures have to be checked periodically in the light of available recommendations

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188 TABLE G1 (continued) Event Consequences Lessons learned Fresh air supply ++ Permitted smoke Fresh air supply must be reduced from the ceiling stratification in the in the fire zone to favor the stopped after the minutes following the fire smoke stratification fire alarm Ventilation - No smoke extraction in Need to train the tunnel operators procedures were the fire zone to react to emergency situations not followed Blowing from the ceiling (blowing instead of contributed to the smoke extraction) destratification A vehicle queue -- A high number of people - Fire safety distance must be build up at the in the dangerous zone followed when vehicles have to backside of the fire The fire transmitted to stop in a tunnel. Need of others vehicles information for the users. - Barriers are to be installed in long tunnels to avoid the accumulation of vehicles in dangerous zones The tunnel was ++ Limited the number of - Tunnel users have to be closed to the traffic people present in the tunnel educated rapidly (3 min after - Use physical barrier instead of the fire beginning) traffic lights to close the tunnel Operators could not - - Count the entering and exiting know how many vehicles people were present in the tunnel at and after the fire beginning Ranking of event from very good (++) to very bad (- -). crashed into an oncoming minibus carrying three people. The From the scene of the accident the tunnel was completely minibus caught fire immediately and then set the articulated truck filled with smoke in a northerly direction for approximately 270 m and a following car on fire. (885 ft) and in a southerly direction for approximately 800 m (2,625 ft). In spite of the excessive amount of smoke and the In the tunnel control room the computer-controlled fire pro- detonations which could be heard in the tunnel, four firemen gram started immediately. Furthermore, the alarm was passed on attempted to reach the scene of the fire with a special fire to the local municipal police force and the rescue services in the engine equipped for tunnel use. This was intended to prevent town of Bregenz. From here, the fire department responsible for any injured people who might be lying on the ground from the southern portal was alarmed at 8:45 a.m. and at 8:47 a.m. the being driven over in the dark by an emergency vehicle. The fire service responsible for the northern portal. At 8:48 a.m. driver of the fire engine was only able to find his way in the control of operations at the southern portal was taken over by the tunnel by skirting the edge of the pavement with his tires in fire department at the tunnel control centre. order not to lose his bearings. As the visibility was zero because of the dense smoke, the While the alarms were being given, an explosive flare-up was firemen could not find the central line of the road even when they observed on the monitors in the tunnel control centre. The scene bent down or crawled along the ground. A fireman walking in front of the accident was filled with smoke within seconds so that it of the fire engine collided with a parked truck in the smoke because was no longer possible to follow the course of the fire on the he was not able to see the obstacle in good time. Moreover, owing screens in the control centre. to the very poor visibility it was extremely difficult to drive the fire engine between the trucks and cars standing in the traffic jam The volunteer fire service of the town of Bregenz entered the in the tunnel. tunnel at around 8:57 a.m. from both portals without having any exact information on the location of fire. Some minutes later four In order to be able to finally begin extinguishing the fire, it people fleeing in the direction of the southern cavern of the tunnel was initially necessary in the smoke-filled tunnel for the fire- were rescued (the car driver causing the accident, the driver of the men to identify by feeling around since they could not obtain articulated truck involved in the accident and two truck drivers visible information. They were able to feel a fire extinguish- who had driven into the danger area from the southern side). ing bay from where they could open a water valve located in These people and the rescue teams were caught up in the smoke front of a hydrant. The extinguishing work was also greatly which was drifting in a southerly direction. hindered by the heat at the scene of the fire. Nevertheless, the

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189 fire was under control approximately 1 hour after the fire depart- on the tunnel ceiling, was damaged over a length of approxi- ments had been alarmed. mately 360 m (1,181 ft). In order that the tunnel could be put back into temporary operation, the false ceiling was initially Coordination of the fire-fighting measures was also greatly supported with thick wooden poles and planks. In addition, a hindered by the fact that the two-way radio system in the tunnel narrow-meshed steel net was fixed in place on the ceiling in stopped working. The three occupants of the minibus were the damaged part of the tunnel. After approximately 2 days it was burned to death in their vehicle. All other people (at the time possible to open the tunnel again for traffic. The final repair work of the accident there were approximately 60 people in vehicles was carried out in May 1995. in the tunnel) were able to escape from the tunnel unharmed. The articulated truck, a car, and a minibus were destroyed by SUMMARY the fire. The tunnel ceiling at the scene of the fire showed spalling and cracks. Even the supporting consoles of the false ceiling on 1. Overtired drivers are a considerable danger to other road the internal vault were weakened by the heat of the fire. This users. structural damage stretched over a length of approximately 24 m 2. The extinguishing work was hindered by smoke, heat, (78.7 ft). Additionally, the tunnel was completely blackened by and the fact that the two-way radio connections did not soot over a length of 35 m (114.8 ft) north of the scene of the acci- work. dent, and 70 m (229.7 ft) in a southerly direction. 3. Dense smoke spread out over several hundred meters across the entire cross section of the tunnel. The operating equipment, such as the tunnel lighting, the aer- 4. Due to the dense smoke it was not possible to follow the ial cables for the tunnel radio, and the supply lines in a cable duct course of the fire on the video monitoring system.