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Design Fires in Road Tunnels (2011)

Chapter: Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G - Past Tunnel Fires Description." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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179 G-1 TUNNEL FIRES IN THE US WALLACE Location: Wallace Tunnel, I-10, Mobile, Alabama Date: late 1970s Type: Medium Conditions at Ignition: 2 a.m. in very light traffic. Engine fire from broken fuel line in camper truck. Electric fuel pump fed fire after engine turned off. Owner abandoned vehicle. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Operator noted fire on TV monitors, activated traffic-control red lights, and summoned fire department. Response: Fire equipment arrived within expected period. Very light traffic effectively stopped at portal. Ventilation sys- tem left inactive per fire department instructions. Tunnel filled with smoke; fire department unable to reach site of fire. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: None Survival/Damage: Vehicle completely consumed; minor damage to tunnel; no injuries. Source of Information: Study interview CALDECOTT Location: Caldecott Tunnel, US-24, Oakland, California Date: 7 April 1982 Type: Major hazardous material Conditions at Ignition: Probably inebriated westbound driver lost control of compact auto just past midnight in light traffic. Multiple glancing collisions with curbs and wall; stopped in left- hand lane just into straightaway from right-hand curve proba- bly to inspect damage or affect minor repairs. At least two possibly three or more cars pass on right during next few min- utes. Slightly speeding empty bus unaware of obstacle tries to pass full gasoline truck/trailer combination, as truck passes stopped auto, multiple collisions occur. Trailer tank ruptures; spilled gasoline ignites. Bus driver ejected by collision forces; bus continues, exits portal approximately 36 seconds after impact. Truck driver brings rig to stop, exits west portal on foot. As many as twenty cars enter east portal. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Tunnel crew note noise and vibration from tunnel, see bus exit portal and come to rest against bridge pier (40 seconds after tunnel accident). Operators dispatched to investigate, two go to east portal; one inspects bus then drives east up westbound tube (1 minute, 40 seconds). Console operator receives call from tunnel reporting “bunch of accidents”; connection lost before more information is exchanged (1 minute, 10 seconds). Console operator notes mul- tiple simultaneous phone calls from tunnel seconds before entire system fails. Operator driving east up tunnel finds burning gaso- APPENDIX G Past Tunnel Fires Description line truck, must retreat to west portal to find operating emergency phone (5 minutes minimum on operator’s estimate). Console operator places first unambiguous call to Oakland Fire Depart- ment 7 minutes minimum after collision, as much as 10 minutes after original stoppage in left lane of tunnel. Alarm sounds at fire station 55 seconds after initiation of call. Response: First pieces of fire equipment reach west portal 3 minutes 45 seconds after alarm (10 minutes, 45 seconds minimum after collision). First pieces of fire equipment reach east portal 7 minutes after alarm. Fire equipment from Orinda Fire Department reaches east portal 12 minutes after console operator’s call. Oakland responds with seven engines (28 men), two chief’s cars (four men), and three other units (eight men). Exhaust fans, which may have activated automatically during early stages of fire in response to high levels of CO sensed in tunnel, soon automatically shut down without having affected events or conditions in the tunnel. Mother and grown son following bus in pickup witness colli- sion between bus and gasoline truck, come to stop, notice small fire, back up but abandon pickup for fear of rear end collision. Mother calls on emergency phone (1 minute after collision) until phone malfunctions; returns to pickup less than 50 ft (15.2 m) from unmarked cross-adit to next tube. Son walks east in tunnel to warn motorists; approximately two minutes later enveloped by smoke; gropes way out last 200 ft (60.9 m) to portal. Truck driver and passenger remain with beer truck less than 150 ft (45.7 m) from unmarked cross-adit. Man in second pickup backs up when warned by son until enveloped by smoke near sedan with elderly couple, abandons vehicle and gropes remaining 80 ft (24.4 m) to portal. All other vehicles clear tunnel backing out, either through impatience or prompted by sight of approaching smoke wall. Tunnel fills completely with smoke in excess of 300°F (148.9°C) within 3 minutes of collision eastward from burning gasoline truck to portal. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Natural draft eastward through tunnel blows all combustion products in that direction; firemen approach to within 75 ft (22.9 m) of fire, make no attempt to suppress fire at that time. Fans left off through concern for maintaining natural draft. Firemen unable to operate the valves that became corroded, in order to direct water-gasoline mixture in tunnel drainage away from nearby lake; concentrate on explosion and pollution hazard at lake while waiting for fire to burn down. Extinguishment efforts started at 1:29 a.m. (75 minutes after ini- tial collision), tunnel water pressure falls too low to support hose streams. Firemen near tanker observe water leaking from dam- aged hose connections. Residual gasoline fire extinguished using foam and dry powder. Fire under control at 2:54 a.m. Survival/Damage: Seven fatalities (auto driver, bus driver, mother, beer truck occupants, elderly couple), two hospitalized for smoke inhalation (son and pickup driver). Six vehicles totally destroyed in tunnel, one in collision with bridge pier. Tunnel suffered extensive superficial damage to walls, ceiling, and road- way. Most tunnel support systems destroyed or severely dam- aged, including lighting, emergency phones, signs, alarms, wiring, commercial broadcast antenna, and firefighting water sup- ply. Repair costs estimated in excess of three million dollars.

180 Source of Information: Oakland Fire Department report, information transmitted with R. E. Graham (Chief, Maintenance Branch South, Caltrans) letter of 21 May 1982 to National Transportation Safety Board, and California Highway Patrol Acci- dent Report. Description of Facility • Length: 3,370 ft (1027.2 m) • Cross Section: 3 bores 2 unidirectional lanes each bore, middle bore is reversible. • AADT: 304,000 (October 1, 2001) Description of Incident At 12:14 a.m. on April 7, 1982, a westbound driver lost con- trol of his vehicle just past midnight in light traffic. He was prob- ably inebriated. After multiple glancing collisions with curbs and the wall, He stopped the vehicle in the left-hand lane in the straightaway after a right-hand curve to inspect damage or attempt repair. A slightly speeding empty bus tried to pass a full gasoline truck/trailer combination at the same time the truck was passing the stopped vehicle. Multiple collisions occurred. The truck/trailer tank ruptured and the spilled gasoline ignited. The bus driver was ejected by the force of the collision and the bus continued through the tunnel, exiting the west portal about 36 seconds after impact. The truck driver stooped the truck/trailer and exited the west por- tal on foot. Up to 20 vehicles entered the east portal. Tunnel crew saw the bus exit the tunnel and sent operators to investigate. One operator inspected the bus and drove east into the tunnel. The console operator received a call from the tunnel reporting a bunch of accidents, but the connection was lost. The console operator received multiple simultaneous phone calls from the tunnel seconds before the entire system failed. The operator driving east into the tunnel found the burning gasoline truck and had to retreat to the west portal to find an operating emergency phone. The Oakland Fire Department was called a minimum of 7 minutes after the collision. Exhaust fans which may have activated automatically during the early stages of the fire in response to high level of CO, auto- matically shut down without having affected condition in the tunnel. A natural eastward draft through the tunnel blew all the combustion products in that direction. Ventilation fans were left off in an attempt to maintain the natural draft. The tunnel filled completely with smoke within 3 minutes of the collision. Firefighters approached to within 75 ft (22.9 m) of the fire, but made no attempt to suppress it at that time. Firefighters were unable to operate corroded valves to direct the water-gasoline mixture in the tunnel drainage system away from a nearby lake. Firefighters concentrated on the explosion and pollution hazard at the lake while waiting for the fire to burn down. At 1:29 a.m., efforts to extinguish the fire started. Water pres- sure in the tunnel fell too low to support hose streams. Firefight- ers near the tanker observed water leaking from damaged hose connections. The residual gasoline fire was extinguished using foam and dry powder. The fire was under control by 2:54 a.m. There were 7 fatalities and 6 vehicles were totally destroyed in the tunnel. At least 3 fatalities were within 150 ft (45.7 m) of unmarked cross-connections to the adjoining tunnel. The tunnel suffered extensive superficial damage to walls, ceiling, and road- way. Most tunnel support systems were destroyed or severely damaged. These included: lighting, emergency phones, signs, alarms, wiring, commercial broadcast antenna, and fire fighting water supply. This front to rear collision of bus, car, and fuel tanker inci- dent was created by limited sight conditions within the tunnel. The limited sight distance in the Caldecott Tunnels was due to narrow 2 ft (0.61 m) wide shoulders and a 2,400 ft (731.5 m) radius curve in the alignment. The stopping sight distance cal- culated from these conditions is only 415 ft (126.5 m) at a safe stopping speed of 50 mph (80.5 km/h). The safe stopping speed is the speed at which a vehicle would safely stop within the available sight distance. BALTIMORE HARBOR Location: Baltimore Harbor Freeway, Baltimore, Maryland Date: 23 March 1978 Type: Major hazardous material Conditions at Ignition: Soft drink delivery truck rams fuel oil tanker from behind in heavy traffic one-quarter mile (0.4 km) after exiting east portal of Baltimore Harbor Tunnel. Fuel spilled from soft drink truck ignites and spreads to tanker. Third truck carrying creosoted railroad ties also ignited. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Unknown; tunnel personnel not involved. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fire department put out fire in unspecified short period. Survival/Damage: Unknown, none to tunnel. Traffic con- gested around Baltimore metropolitan area throughout after- noon and evening. Source of Information: Study interview. HOLLAND Location: Holland Tunnel, New York City, New York Date: 13 May 1949 Type: Major hazardous material. Conditions at Ignition: Fully enclosed trailer carrying eighty 55-gallon (208.2 L) drums of carbon disulfide enters New Jersey portal of tunnel, in violation of Port Authority regulations and allegedly non-placarded in violation of ICC regulations, in very heavy, slow traffic approximately 8:30 a.m. Drum breaks free and ignites upon striking roadway approximately 2,900 ft into tunnel. Truck rolls to stop in left lane. Four trucks catch fire or are aban- doned adjacent to trailer in right lane. Five additional trucks stopped 350 ft (106.7 m) to the rear grouped tightly in right lane also ignite. Approximately 125 automobiles, buses, and trucks fill both lanes back to New Jersey portal. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Patrolling officer 100 ft (30.5 m) from mishap transmits trouble signal to control room at 8:48 a.m.; assists drivers escaping scene through cross-adit to north tube. First fire alarm transmitted by patrolling officers further east at 8:56 a.m., who then run to assist. Tunnel person- nel in tunnel west of fire promptly evacuate occupants on foot to New Jersey; start backing vehicles out of tunnel. Jersey City Fire Department receives telephone notice at 9:05 a.m. New York Fire Department receive fire alarm at 9:12 a.m.

181 Response: Three-man emergency crew drive west through eastbound tube on wrecker and jeep upon receiving 8:56 a.m. fire alarm; commence fighting fire with 12 in. (30.5 cm) hose and spray nozzle. Assist two tunnel patrolmen overcome by smoke. Knock down fires in two trucks of eastern group; tow one to New York portal. New York rescue company and battalion chief drive west through westbound tube; cross to scene at adit and relieve tunnel emergency crew. Some firemen in distress recover by breathing at the curb-level fresh air ports. Second alarm transmitted at 9:30 a.m. activates four engine companies, two ladder truck companies, and a water tower. Fire- men not involved in firefighting search through burning trucks, help three trapped people to safety. Additional NYC pumpers augment capacity of tunnel fire main; activate five 22 in. (55.9 cm) hoses and a foam generator. New Jersey engine company, truck company, rescue company, and battalion chief transmit second alarm upon initial inspection at New Jersey portal. Oxygen masks ordered. Firemen establish hose lines through half mile (0.8 km) of abandoned vehicles; extinguish fires in second group of trucks. Tunnel ventilation accelerated to full capacity at fire site at approx- imately 9:45 a.m.; firemen discover they can work without masks. Two exhaust fans disabled by heat at 1000°F (537.8°C); third fan kept in service by water spray. Ceiling at fire collapses; fire boats monitor Hudson River above for signs of tube failure. Remaining non-burning vehicles removed by 10:15 a.m.; JCFD drives two pumpers east to fire site, joining forces with NYFD. Fire controlled by approximately 1:00 p.m.; overhauling operations continue until 12:52 a.m. the next morning. Residual carbon disulfide and turpentine reflash at 6:50 p.m. during cleanup; extinguished with 5-gal. (18.9 L) foam extinguishers; area then covered with heavy foam. Total equipment involved: one tow truck, several jeeps, seven chief units, five rescue companies, seven police emergency squads, 14 engine companies, six truck companies, one lighting truck, one water tower, one smoke ejector, one foam truck, 40 additional firemen, at least 13 ambulances at the scene, and four Consoli- dated Edison emergency trucks with inhalators (total of 29 fire- fighting units, 20 medical units, seven supervisory units, at least three port authority vehicles, and four commercial vehicles with special apparatus on board. Unknown total number of personnel in excess of 250). Survival/Damage: Ten trucks and cargoes completely destroyed, 13 others damaged. 600 ft (182.9 m) of tunnel wall and ceiling demolished; walls spalled in places to cast iron tube plates. 650 tons (589,670 kg) of debris removed from tunnel. Tube reopened to traffic 56 h after fire started. All cable and wire connections through tube disrupted at fire. Total damage esti- mated at $1 million dollars (in 1949 dollars). Sixty-six injuries, 27 requiring hospitalization; no fatalities. Source of Information: The Holland Tunnel Chemical Fire report by the National Board of Fire Underwriters. One recalls trapped firefighters breathing from the curb-level fresh air inlets in Holland Tunnel fire. SQUIRREL HILL Location: Squirrel Hill Tunnel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Date: Unknown Type: Medium Conditions at Ignition: Private auto abandoned and set afire in deserted, early morning tunnel. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Fire eventually discovered by unspecified means. Fire department summoned by unspecified means. Response: Local fire department responded with unspecified resources. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fire extinguished without incident. Survival/Damage: Vehicle destroyed. No damage to tunnel. No injuries. Source of Information: Study interview. BLUE MOUNTAIN Location: Blue Mountain Tunnel, Pennsylvania Turnpike, Franklin County, Pennsylvania Date: 1965–1966 Type: Medium Conditions at Ignition: Truck carrying fish oil (not consid- ered hazardous material at the time) caught fire in tunnel. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Unknown. Response: Fire department responded to unspecified degree. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fire extinguished with- out incident; combustion products left tunnel without mechan- ical assistance. Survival/Damage: Unspecified damage to truck. Minor if any damage to tunnel. No injuries specified. Source of Information: Study interview. CHESAPEAKE BAY Location: Chesapeake Bay Bridge/Tunnel, Norfolk, Virginia Date: 3 April 1974 Type: Medium Conditions at Ignition: Six-wheel closed refrigeration truck blows left rear tire and careens out of control down grade in south tunnel, contacts curb and overturns, blocking both lanes. Full, 50-gal. (189.3 L), fiberglass fuel tank explodes in flames upon overturn. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Mid-tunnel booth patrolman hears blowout, observes overturn and explosion, reports “acci- dent with fire” to control booth at 12:18 p.m. Response: Booth patrolman moves to scene; assists driver and directs him to safety; halts oncoming traffic. Tunnel emergency trucks dispatched from two shoreward portal islands at 12:19 p.m. Three other tunnel units in transit on bridge also converge. Chief of Police arrives at 12:21 p.m., finds Virginia State Trooper unit already giving aid to injured driver and crew of north emergency

182 truck already fighting fire with hose and foam. Additional alarm placed to Chesapeake Beach Fire Department, who responded with one engine, one rescue unit, and one ambulance. Flush truck and maintenance wrecker also summoned. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fuel fire brought under control within six or seven minutes; secondary fires extinguished soon after. Some dense smoke hung in area during fire, but breath- ing apparatus not required. Exhaust fans operated throughout fire. Internal telephone system required since fire destroyed overhead antenna. Driver conveyed to hospital by 12:50 p.m. Survival/Damage: Truck essentially destroyed; cargo un- damaged. Tunnel ceiling tiles, hand rail, and antenna wire dam- aged by impact or fire, value unspecified. Tunnel reopened to traffic at 4:50 p.m. One injury, driver hospitalized in shock with burns on arms and legs. Source of Information: Memoranda of booth patrolman and Chief of Police sergeant of 5 April 74 concerning Economy Stores, Inc., truck accident/fire. One of the parameters for risk analysis is the cost of life, which varies in different countries. In 2009, the federal govern- ment (78) calculated the value of one life in the U.S. to be worth $5.8 million when deciding the benefits of railroad construction to ensure increased workers’ safety. A person that dies without newly mandated safety rules is referred to as a “statistical life” by government analysts, who compare costs and benefits of new programs. The value of each of those lives range from $1 mil- lion to $10 million. The Federal Railroad Administration estimated each life to be worth $5.8 million when analyzing new safety rules to pre- vent construction workers from being hit by trains that are being built or repaired. The new rules are in response to the seven U.S. workers who have been killed under those circumstances since 1997 (78). G-2 TUNNEL FIRES DESCRIPTION— OUTSIDE THE U.S. Nihonzaka Tunnel, Japan (1979) The Nihonzaka Tunnel is located half way between the cities of Tokyo and Nagoya. The tunnel consists of two approxi- mately 2 km (1.24 mi) long tubes, which are operated in each direction. There were no restrictions on hazardous materials traveling through the tunnel until the fire occurred. The fire was started on July 11, 1979, by a rear-end collision involving 4 trucks and 2 cars. The accident caused tanks on the vehicles to become leaky so that fuel (gasoline and diesel) leaked out. This fuel ignited and thereby triggered a conflagration affect- ing 173 vehicles in total. Among the burnt-out vehicles there were two road tankers carrying neoprene and accompanying solvent. The load on another truck involved in the accident consisted of 10 drums of ether. These also became leaky as a result of the accident. The ether which leaked out immediately began to burn intensely. Other materials which burnt were artificial resin and plastics. The deluge sprinklers located in the tunnel were set off auto- matically by fire alarm systems. After approximately 10 minutes the fire appeared to have been extinguished. However, approx- imately 15 minutes later the fire flared up again. This produced thick black smoke. Thereafter the fire grew to a length of more than 1100 m (3,609 ft). Although there was a message at the portal of the tunnel that there had been an accident, vehicles continued to drive into the tunnel. A tailback of 231 vehicles formed in front of the source of the fire. The Nihonzaka Tunnel is monitored from two control centers (Shizuoka and Kawasaki). The fire was first noticed by the Kawasaki control room. Mistakenly, from here the fire service responsible for the Shizuoka district was alarmed initially, although it was further away. A unit of the fire service which was much closer was only informed 40 minutes after the fire broke out. The people inside the tunnel initially tried to extinguish it themselves by rolling out the hoses attached to the hydrants in the emergency areas. However they were not able to activate the extinguishing water supply, as they were not aware that in addi- tion to the throwing of a lever—which is normally sufficient— it was also necessary to press a button. Personnel located in the Shizuoka control centre failed in their attempts to reach the scene of the accident, but were able to assist 42 vehicles in escaping from the tunnel. At around 8:30 p.m. 208 people had managed to escape from the tunnel on foot (approximately 15 minutes after the fire had bro- ken out again). The firemen reaching the scene of the fire could not initially achieve a great deal, as their respiratory equipment only allowed each of them to work for 30 minutes. The supply of fire-fighting water in the tunnel (approximately 170 m3 or 45,000 gal.) had been used up approximately 11⁄2 hours after the fire started without it being possible to put the fire out. When the fire-fighting water ceased to flow, combustible gases and vapors drifted from the source of the fire to two groups of vehicles in the tunnel, setting them alight. The extinguishing work could only be resumed after a “shuttle service” to surface waters had been set up using 7 sets of fire- fighting appliances. It was only possible to bring the fire under control 2 days after it had broken out. The fire, which initially started on July 11, 1979, was finally extinguished on July 18 (i.e., approximately one week after the rear-end collision). During the fire the semi-transverse ventilation of the tunnel worked in the suction mode at full power. However this was not sufficient to extract enough smoke and hot burning gases for the fire service units, who were equipped only with limited respira- tory protection, to effectively fight the fire. Of the 230 vehicles in the tunnel, 173 were destroyed by the fire; 7 people died in the fire, while a further 2 were injured. The tunnel lining and the additional 4.5 mm (0.177 in.) thick reinforcement of the tunnel walls were damaged for a length of approximately 1100 m (3,609 ft). The greatest damage occurred in an area of approximately 500 m (1,640 ft) on either side of the fire source. The road surface melted in places up to a depth of 2 to 3 cm (0.79 to 1.18 in.) on average, with the max- imum depth being approximately 7 cm (2.76 in.). Electric cables and pipes lay in a cable duct in the road surface concrete continued to function normally.

183 During the repair work the concrete of the tunnel lining was removed up to a depth of approximately 3 cm (1.18 in.). Then wire grating was placed in position and steel fiber concrete injected using the dry injection method. The application thick- ness depended on the damage to the tunnel, being approxi- mately 5 to 10 cm (1.97 to 3.94 in.) on average. After the repair work to the roadway had been completed on August 7, work began on repairing the tunnel equipment. This work lasted approximately 1 month, including among other things: 1) Renewal of the surveillance and fire alarm systems 2) Reconstruction of the ventilation system 3) Renewal and supplementation of the fire extinguishing equipment 4) Installation of a guided escape system (including loud- speakers) NIHONZAKA Location: Nihonzaka Tunnel Shizuoka Prefecture, near Yaizu City, Japan (100 miles or 161 km southwest of Tokyo) cor- rect Japanese pronunciation: Nee-hon-za-ka, without stress. “Nihon” is the Japanese name for their post-WWII nation. Date: 11 July 79 (Wednesday) Type: Major hazardous material Conditions at Ignition: Four large trucks and two autos involved in collision three-quarters through westbound tube; spilled fuel ignited at 6:39 p.m. 231 vehicles are in tunnel behind fire or enter tunnel unheeding or in contravention to emergency warnings at east portal. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Operators notice smoke in tube on TV monitors, display ‘OFF LIMITS’ sign at east portal, reverse ventilation system, and notify Shizuoka Fire Department, behind fire, at 6:42 p.m. Yaizu City Fire Depart- ment, in front of fire and much closer to tunnel, summoned at 7:18 p.m. Automatic spray heads interlocked with fire detector activate at accident site. Response: Motorists at scene deploy hoses from hydrant boxes, but cannot activate water since valves require the push- ing of an operating button in addition to traditional turning of handle. Shizuoka equipment at east portal at 6:48 p.m. unable to reach accident site, assist 42 vehicles to escape tunnel. Automatic spray system reportedly suppresses fire at initial site at 6:50 p.m., but fire reignites at 7:20 p.m. 208 occupants of vehicles trapped in tunnel escape on foot out east portal by 8:30 p.m. Three Yaizu City engine companies arrive and aug- ment fire main at FD connections at west portal. Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Initial efforts consume entire 40,800 gallon (155,000 L or 40,947 gal.) water supply by 8:05 p.m. (1 hour, 26 minutes after automatic spray heads acti- vate) without extinguishing fire. Unburned combustible vapors from accident site spread fire to two other groups of vehicles in tunnel when water supply is exhausted. Suppression resumed with water relayed from unspecified natural sources. Fire under control Friday afternoon but continued burning until 10:00 a.m. 18 July, nearly a week after initial incident. Semi-transverse ventilation system, with reversible supply fans only, operated in exhaust mode (maximum exhaust capacity one-half rated supply capacity) throughout emergency but was unable to clear heat and smoke enough to allow breathing-apparatus-equipped firemen to work effectively in tunnel. Total equipment and personnel involved: 34 engines, 2 portable fire pumps, 30 (10 ton) tank trucks, three ambulances, 654 personnel. Survival/Damage: Of 231 vehicles including 66 trucks in tun- nel during course of incident, 58 are undamaged, 173 destroyed. Ceiling, walls, and tunnel systems almost completely destroyed for central 1145 m (3,756.6 ft). Seven fatalities, six in collision and one of injuries suffered in collision; two other unspecified injuries. “Police and sufferers will take matter into court,” ends summary report. Source of Information: Tokyo Fire Department letter to Hamburg, West Germany, Fire Department of 30 August 79; Summary of Automobile Fire in Nihonzaka Tunnel, of unknown source but written in English by a Japanese; and National Bureau of Standards Memorandum for the Files by D. Gross of 26 September 79 concerning visit to test facilities in Japan. Summary: 1) The fire was caused by a rear-end collision. 2) The deluge sprinklers located in the tunnel were set off automatically by fire alarm systems. After approximately 10 minutes the fire appeared to have been extinguished. However, approximately 15 minutes later the fire flared up again. This produced thick black smoke. Thereafter the fire grew to a length of more than 1100 m. 3) The fire department alarm was incorrect (wrong fire department, too late). 4) Those people in the tunnel could not use the fire extin- guishers as the instructions were not clear. 5) The efforts of the fire department to extinguish the fire were considerably hampered by the inadequate respira- tory protection devices. 6) The suction power of the semi-cross ventilation system in the tunnel was not sufficient to extract the smoke and hot burning gases. 7) The hot burning gases caused the fire to jump between groups of vehicles. 8) In the fire 7 people died, the tunnel was damaged over a length of approximately 1,100 m (3,609 ft) and 173 vehi- cles were destroyed. MOORFLEET Location: Moorfleet Tunnel, Hamburg, West Germany Date: 31 August, 1969 Type: Major hazardous material Conditions at Ignition: Driver of truck trailer combination carrying 14 tons of polyethylene stopped in cut-and-cover tun- nel at 1:10 a.m. probably to inspect malfunction by tunnel illu- mination. Discovered burning tire on trailer, uncoupled and drove tractor out of tunnel. Detection/Alarm/Notification: Unknown Response: Unknown Control/Extinguishment/Suppression: Fire was extinguished using foam; water used to cool wreckage. Other details unspecified. Survival/Damage: Uncaptioned pictures reveal damage to ceiling and walls similar to Caldecott and Holland Tunnel fires; no other details available

184 Seljestad Road Tunnel (Norway) Description of Facility • Length: 1,268 m (4,160 ft) • Cross Section: Two 11 ft (3.35 m) lanes, undivided, bi- directional • AADT: 1,350 vpd • Trucks: 20% The tunnel has normal lighting. There are four SOS stations, one at each end and two at 500 m (1,640 ft) intervals inside. Six hand-held fire extinguishers are located every 250 m (820 ft). Eight jet ventilators automatically run in the direction of the draft at any given time. The fans are started by signals from CO and NO2 detectors. Flashing red warning signals are located at both ends of the tunnel. High-voltage and communications cables were in a concrete conduit along an enclosed ditch and a fiber optic communication cable was mounted on the ceil- ing. The tunnel is monitored and remotely operated from the Hordaland Road Traffic Centre in Bergen. Description of Incident At 8:52 p.m. on July 14, 2000, an accident occurred when two truck-trailers met about 300 m (980 ft) inside the tunnel. Because of narrow roadway, the two truck-trailers slowed to pass at low speed. Behind one truck-trailer, five following passenger cars also slowed. A truck-tractor approaching these passenger cars from behind was unable to slow down sufficiently resulting in a rear end collision involving all five cars. One of the vehicles immediately caught fire which spread to the other vehicles. A motorcycle and an additional passenger car were ultimately involved in the accident. Both truck-trailers escaped the accident and exited the tunnel. Shortly after the fire started, a ceiling mounted communications cable burned, cutting off telecommunications in Roldal. Because of the cable failure, it was not possible to notify the Roldal fire department. This also cut communication and control with the Road Traffic Centre for emergency telephones and technical equipment inside the tunnel. The fans functioned automatically and technical functions could be controlled from a board installed outside the tunnel. Due to the cable failure, the flashing red signals at the tunnel portals could not be activated shortly after the start of the fire. All traffic on the Roldal side of the tunnel was stopped after smoke was observed coming out of the tunnel. In addition, a bus was turned around and placed across the roadway to prevent additional traffic from entering the tunnel from the Roldal side. According to the Odda fire department, when arriving at the scene no manual control of technical installations was required because the draft was moving in the appropriate direction and because all traffic by that time had stopped. A total of eight vehicles were involved in an accident resulting in one of the vehicles catching fire. The fire spread rapidly to six other cares quickly filling the tunnel with smoke from the collision site all the way out to the east entrance. The accident was reported to the emergency services in Odda at 8:55 p.m. and the first unit arrived at the scene at 9:20 p.m. Occu- pants of the burning cars were able to get out of the tunnel on their own or with assistance from others. After the fire was extin- guished a tunnel search with smoke evacuation crew located four persons alive in the proximity of an abandoned passenger car. There were no fatalities in the accident. Tauern Tunnel Description of Facility • Length: 6,400 m (21,000 ft) • Cross Section: Two-lane, undivided, bidirectional • AADT 14,100 • Trucks: 26% The tunnel near Salzburg, Austria, has a full transverse ventila- tion system split into four sections. The two outer sections supply and exhaust air through the tunnel portals. The inner sections sup- ply and exhaust air through a ventilation shaft in the middle of the tunnel. Fresh air can be supplied at a rate of about 190 m3/s per kilometer (390 CFM per lane foot). Exhaust air is removed at a rate of about 115 m3/s per kilometer (235 CFM per lane foot). Exhaust openings are located in the ceiling every 6 m. The tunnel has an automatic fire detection system. Description of Incident At 4:47 a.m. on May 29, 1999 a fire resulted when a semi-truck laden with cows collided with four cars and a paint truck in front. The semi-truck driver had failed to stop either through sleep depri- vation, driver error, or excessive speed. The semi-truck smashed the cars behind the paint truck so thoroughly that the first personnel on the scene believed it to be only one car. Two of the four cars between the trucks had been pushed under the paint truck, while the two other cars were crushed into the tunnel wall. The trucks ended up nose to tail. Gasoline from the damaged vehicles is presumed to have ignited, starting the fire which led to explosions of the spray paint cans in the paint truck. The flames spread to a total of 16 trucks and 24 passen- ger cars were burned. Eight people died instantly during this colli- sion while two escaped from one of the cars that had been crushed into the wall. Four people died in the subsequent fire. Two people had not left their car. The paint truck driver after having escaped, went back into the tunnel to retrieve some paperwork. He joined the two people who had stayed in their car and all three perished. Another truck driver suffocated while fleeing the accident scene. Three of his colleagues escaped by cramming themselves into an emergency call booth that was sealed tight enough to prevent the smoke from entering. Events leading up to the collision included a traffic backup caused by an earlier serious accident north of the tunnel at 2:08 a.m. This produced a higher than normal volume of traffic. Night repair work being carried out in the Tauern Tunnel about 800 m (2,625 ft) from the northern portal reduced tunnel traffic to one lane. Alternating one-directional use was controlled with traffic signals. The Salzburg bound traffic was stopped during one of these stop and go sequences at the time of the collision. At 4:50 a.m., the fire alarm system in the control room at St. Michael was triggered. The manager on duty at the control room switched to four cameras near the crash site, but nothing could be seen. Alarm status of the fire alarm system then switched the traffic lights at both tunnel entrances to red. Many people ignored the red traffic lights and entered the tunnel. Video cameras at the north portal showed thick smoke coming up the tunnel at high speed. As smoke quickly started to pour out of the north end of the tunnel, drivers were still entering from the south and dis- regarding the red traffic lights. The tunnel manager immediately contacted police and firefighters. From video feeds from the tunnel control room showed police that traffic had come to a stop and peo- ple were fleeing the tunnel by foot. The accident location forced fleeing motorists to run either 800 m (2,625 ft) toward the northern portal or 3.4 miles (5.5 km) toward the south portal At 4:53 a.m., the first hand held fire extinguishers located in the call booth niches were used. At 4:56 a.m., the ventilation system automatically switched over to fire mode. The north end exhaust ventilation extracted smoke at a rate of 230 m3/s (487,370 CFM) upward into

185 the exhaust air ducts. This caused a stratification of the smoke, so the smoke stayed at the ceiling for the first 10 to 15 minutes. This allowed about 80 people to escape. The first firefighters arrived at the south entrance 27 minutes after the start of the accident fire. They drove slowly toward the accident even though the visibility was zero. A number of explo- sions then occurred which produced much more smoke and fire. The heat became so extreme that the firemen had to retreat to the nearest emergency phone niche. Some of the phones in these booths stopped operating. The smoke from these explosions started heading to the north portal in spite of the exhaust ventilation. The tunnel electrical engineer arrived at the control room dur- ing this time and took manual control of the ventilation system. The commander of the firefighters gave the order to switch to max- imum extraction in the fire portion of the tunnel while the other three ventilation sections received maximum fresh air. The third section ventilation system helped force the smoke out through the north portal. This allowed firefighters to rescue three people trapped in an emergency niche for slightly more than an hour and to put out the fires in 15 to 17 burning vehicles. The firefighters could not pen- etrate any further northward due to the intense heat and smoke. The third section ventilation system was changed from supply to exhaust mode to help reduce some of the smoke exiting from the north portal. At 6:00 a.m., more than 300 firefighters had been assembled at the tunnel entrances; 170 at the north entrance and 138 at the south entrance. They had at their disposal an assortment of equipment which included 2 infrared cameras, 23 light systems, a mobile generator, and 12 giant fans. This permitted the start of the fire fighting from the north portal. At about 10:00 a.m. engineers believed that the tunnel was being weakened structurally by the fire. Before the northern firefighters could begin fighting their way through the inferno with 5 foam/water hoses, the engineers had to inspect and provide props to prevent the tunnel from collapsing. The heat inside the tunnel reached 2000°F (1093.3°C) at the impact and 1800°F (982.2°C) in a 700 m (2,300 ft) long stretch. The heat was so intense that the inside walls crumbled. The outside walls sur- vived quite well. At 3:00 p.m., firefighters started putting out the fire with a mobile foam thrower and by 9:00 p.m. the fire was finally extin- guished. All told the casualty count came to 12 dead, 49 injured and 50 cattle destroyed. On January 10, 2000, another truck fire broke out in the Tauern Tunnel. Many of the same mistakes were made, but this time all managed to escape as firefighters put out the fire. Traffic conditions due to construction at the time of the inci- dent created a unique tunnel operating state that could not be anticipated under normal operations. It is important to note that motorists continued to enter the tunnel even after traffic signals indicated no entry. Special care is to be given to VMS design and accompanying changeable warning beacons to make traffic control more effective. The ventilation was capable of keeping the smoke layer at the ceiling for 15 minutes. Subsequently, the fire energy over- whelmed the ventilation system and began pushing smoke along the length of the tunnel. After the fire was established, fire fight- ing operations of both people and equipment movement into the tunnel were extremely difficult due to uncontrolled backlayer- ing of smoke in the tunnel. The smoke traveled down the tunnel corridor against the direction of the ventilation system. St. Gotthard Tunnel Description of Facility • Length: 10 miles (16.3 km) • Cross Section: Two-lane, undivided, bidirectional travel lanes with separate service tunnel • ADT: 18,000 This tunnel is located in the Trico region of the Swiss Alps between the cities of Goeshenen and Alrolo. The tunnel has a parallel service/safety tunnel with connecting passageways every 250 m (820 ft) and an extensive network of smoke detectors. The service/safety tunnel is wide enough for people on foot, but not for service vehicles. Four firefighters are located at each entrance 24 hours a day. The ventilation system consists of fans and shafts that can replace the air in the tunnel every 15 minutes. Description of Incident At 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 2001, two trucks collided head-on about a mile (1.6 km) from the south entrance during a period of heavy traffic. The load of tires in one of the trucks burst into flames. The driver of this truck escaped by climbing out of the win- dow. The burning tires emitted noxious fumes and made the fire difficult to extinguish. Temperatures were reported to be 1,200°C (2,192°F). The ventilation shafts helped expel the smoke and warning barriers were put up to prevent cars from entering the tun- nel after the blaze started. The blaze burned for more than 48 hours. Many drivers were able to back out of the tunnel or escape by foot through the service tunnels. All told there were 23 vehicles at the site of the collision, but only 11 people died. Some of the people who died in this accident had actually made it to safety, but had returned to their cars to retrieve items. Others had died because they had stayed in their cars while using their cell phones. After the fire started, barriers automatically stopped more traf- fic from entering the tunnel and ventilators switched to emergency settings. Rescue workers arrived within minutes of the first alert. Firefighters worked their way to within 200 m (650 ft) of the acci- dent and then had to use the service/safety tunnel to access the fire. A 100 m (330 ft) portion of the tunnel collapsed. The likely reason for the collapse was the spalling of the concrete due to conversion of moisture to steam. The concrete spalling exposed the structural steel reinforcing thus making it ductile. This combination led to the collapse. The tunnel was reopened on December 21, 2001. The St. Gotthard Tunnel was originally designed for horse- driven carriages. The horses would get frightened when they saw the open end of the tunnels, so the tunnels were designed to curve. This configuration reduces the stopping sight distance in modern roadways. A significant number of fatalities were created by motorists returning to their cars to retrieve items. Clear instruc- tions and signage could encourage safe evacuation patterns for tunnel occupants. Mont Blanc Tunnel Description of Facility • Length: 11,600 m (38,000 ft) • Cross Section: Two-lane, undivided, bidirectional • AADT: 5,500 • Trucks: 40%

186 The Mont Blanc tunnel was built jointly by the French and Italians in 1965 and is operated by both nations. Each nation maintains one half of the tunnel although a larger portion of the roadway is on the French side. Shelter rooms are located every 600 m (2,000 ft). These rooms are separated from the road tunnel, supplied with fresh air, and designed for 2-hour fire resistance. Each fresh-air duct supplies air at a rate of about 75 m3/second to one-eighth of the tunnel length (16.5 CFM per lane foot). Exhaust air is removed at a rate of about 300 m3/second per kilometer (95 CFM per lane foot). Fresh-air openings are located near the bottom of the walls at approximately 10 m (30 ft) intervals. One square-meter (10.5 ft2) exhaust open- ings are located near the ceiling at about 300 m (980 ft) intervals. Description of Incident At 10:53 a.m. on March 24, 1999, a refrigerated truck caught fire for unknown reasons. The truck was traveling in the France– Italy direction. The toll collector noticed nothing unusual, but truck drivers from the opposite direction used their headlights to warn the driver that something was wrong. He could see smoke coming from underneath his truck when he looked in his rear-view mirrors. He slowly stopped the truck at Rest Area 21 located 6,700 m (21,981.6 ft) from the entry toll plaza. He could not get to his fire extinguisher in the cab of the truck, because the fire had started to engulf the cab. He fled on foot toward the Italian portal. The smoke was observed on the monitor screens at the time the truck stopped, but the obscuration monitors on the French side and the heated gas monitors on the Italian side both failed to trig- ger an alarm while the truck was moving. The French monitors belatedly indicated higher than normal temperatures. Italian authorities were notified of the fire at 10:54 a.m. by a phone call from a person at Rest Area 22. It was confirmed when they received an alarm from a fire pull box at 10:57 a.m. and the removal of a fire extinguisher at 10:58 a.m. at Rest Area 21. At 10:55 a.m., all traffic signals in the French–Italy direction turned red. The Italian entrance was closed at 10:56 a.m. The spread of the fire was not affected by the contents of the truck which contained margarine and flour and was not classi- fied as hazardous cargo. However, the refrigerated trailer was fitted with a thermal insulation foam that was highly flamma- ble. The cause of the fire is suspected to be overheating of the engines and turbos due to the long and difficult uphill drive. The wind at the start of the fire was coming from the Italian side, but the wind shifted before other emergency vehicles could reach the fire. Due to the extremely rapid spread of the fire, emergency vehicles could not get to the site of the collision in time to control the fire as had been done with prior accidents in this tunnel. The video monitors indicated that the smoke spread from ceil- ing to floor and did not stratify to allow people to escape by stay- ing low to the road. Thirty-four people died in their vehicles without fleeing through the tunnel or finding refuge in the fresh air supply openings. This indicated that they were not aware of the dangerous situation that existed. Contributing to this was the fact that they could not see the problem ahead of them due to large trucks blocking their view. When the smoke did reach them, they apparently stayed in their cars because the cars provided a sense of security. The ventilation supply and exhaust ducts attempted to control the smoke. When the alarm went off most of the supply ducts started delivering air at full levels. The French side activated the 2000 or 4000 m (6,561.7 to 13,123.4 ft) reversible duct nearest to the fire to exhaust air. The Italian side left the reversible duct positioned to supply air and set it at maximum capacity. At 11:15 a.m., the Italian oper- ators tried to switch to exhaust with an automatic system geared to concentrate the exhaust flows near the site of the fire and later at 12:30 and 12:45 they tried manually to do this same task. Neither the automatic or manual change over to the exhaust mode was successful. The smoke never exhausted. The French and the Italians did not have a centralized management system to indicate the total power usage per fan, but they do know the total power usage by all fans. It took 53 hours to extinguish the fire. The fire cost the lives of 39 people, including 29 inside vehicles and 9 found outside. Thirty-four vehicles, including 20 trucks were burned. The fire damaged over 900 m (2,952.8 ft) of the tunnel structure and a considerable amount of tunnel equipment. The tunnel reopened March 9, 2002. This fire incident was probably initiated by equipment temperatures on board a freight truck. Overheating would be due to mountain pass driving conditions contributing to ignition and combustion. Main lessons learnt from the Mt. Blanc and Tauern Tunnel fires of 1999 The Mont Blanc and the Tauern tunnels are both bidirection- nal and transverse ventilated. As the fire in the Tauern tunnel involved a heavy goods vehicle transporting lacquer tins, and because there were more people present in the Tauern tunnel, this fire was potentially more serious than the Mont Blanc fire. The heat release rate of both fires reached quickly high values. However, the outcome in terms of loss of life for the Mont Blanc fire was far more serious than for the Tauern fire. Several differences between these two fires may have contributed to the outcome in each case. From a human behavior view, the Tauern tunnel fire occurred shortly after the Mont Blanc catastrophe, and so the people involved were well aware of the possible severe consequences that could result from a tunnel fire and so fled the fire almost immediately. In addition, in the case of the Tauern fire, the fire was located “near” one of the tunnel portals adding evacuation. In the Mont Blanc Tunnel fire, the fire occurred almost in the middle of the tunnel compounding the difficulties with both smoke extraction and evacuation. Furthermore, the two separate control centers within the Mont Blanc tunnel made managing the fire difficult. Other aspects that contributed to the differences in these two situations are given by the fact that the ventilation system of the Tauern Tunnel had a higher performance than the one in the Mont Blanc Tunnel, and the firefighters in the Tauern Tunnel were bet- ter equipped than those in the Mont Blanc Tunnel (see Table 61). Pfänder Tunnel, Austria (1995) On April 10, 1995, there was a traffic accident in the tunnel as a result of which three vehicles burnt out. The fire was located approximately 4.3 km (2.67 mi) from the northern portal and 2.4 km (1.5 mi) from the southern portal. The accident was caused by the microsleep of a car driver traveling in a southerly direction. He crossed over to the oncoming traffic lane and crashed into an articulated vehicle laden with bread. This truck began to skid, then crossed over to the wrong side of the road, slid along the tunnel wall for approximately 130 m (426 ft) and then finally

187 Event Consequences Lessons Learned The fire grew rapidly, even if the truckís load was not considered as dangerous goods - - • Difficult to reach the fire because of smoke and heat • Tunnel users could not extinguish the fire with extinguisher - HGV serious fires can happen even with “non dangerous” goods - Redefine the notion of “dangerous goods” for road tunnels Fast and precise fire location detection ++ Optimization of the ventilation operation Need of fire detection systems able to locate the fire rapidly Fire detection system out of work - - Fire location unknown Need of fire detection systems able to locate the fire rapidly First alarm given by opacimeters + Fast alarm Fire detection systems are to include smoke detection in addition to temperature detection Two people died in a pressurized shelter because of heat - - 2 victims Pressurized shelters must be related to an evacuation route that is not the tunnel itself First firemen arrived from the smokiest tunnel side - - Could not reach the fire Need to inform the firemen on extended smoke plug in the tunnel Misunderstanding about the fire site - - Arrived at the tunnel late Need to train the firemen Firemen entered the tunnel with inappropriate equipment - - Firemen were trapped in the tunnel. One died, and the evacuation of the others needed several hours - Need to train the firemen - Cooperation needed between the tunnel operators and the firemen to inform them of the situation inside the tunnel Some users rapidly decided to evacuate ++ Fewer victims Need to inform the users on the behavior expected from them Some users remained in their vehicles - - Victims died asphyxiated in the smoke Need to inform the users on the behavior expected from them Three users took refuge in an emergency call niche - • Perhaps they thought that they were in a safe area while it was not the case • Needed to be rescued by firemen Emergency call niches have to be identified by the tunnel users as non-safe areas. There must be no confusion possible between emergency call niches and pressurized shelters or evacuation routes. Car drivers entered the tunnel in spite of the red signal and siren - - • More victims Need to inform the users on the behavior expected from them Two separated control centers - - • Lack of coordination between the tunnel operators of the two centers complicated emergency ventilation operation Only one control centre operating the tunnel Fresh air supply at full capacity (from the bottom) . - - • Accelerated the smoke velocity toward the portals • Longer smoke plug - Reduce fresh air supply if the longitudinal velocity is not controlled - Ventilation procedures have to be checked periodically in the light of available recommendations TABLE G1 EVENT, CONSEQUENCES, LESSONS LEARNED

188 crashed into an oncoming minibus carrying three people. The minibus caught fire immediately and then set the articulated truck and a following car on fire. In the tunnel control room the computer-controlled fire pro- gram started immediately. Furthermore, the alarm was passed on to the local municipal police force and the rescue services in the town of Bregenz. From here, the fire department responsible for the southern portal was alarmed at 8:45 a.m. and at 8:47 a.m. the fire service responsible for the northern portal. At 8:48 a.m. control of operations at the southern portal was taken over by the fire department at the tunnel control centre. While the alarms were being given, an explosive flare-up was observed on the monitors in the tunnel control centre. The scene of the accident was filled with smoke within seconds so that it was no longer possible to follow the course of the fire on the screens in the control centre. The volunteer fire service of the town of Bregenz entered the tunnel at around 8:57 a.m. from both portals without having any exact information on the location of fire. Some minutes later four people fleeing in the direction of the southern cavern of the tunnel were rescued (the car driver causing the accident, the driver of the articulated truck involved in the accident and two truck drivers who had driven into the danger area from the southern side). These people and the rescue teams were caught up in the smoke which was drifting in a southerly direction. From the scene of the accident the tunnel was completely filled with smoke in a northerly direction for approximately 270 m (885 ft) and in a southerly direction for approximately 800 m (2,625 ft). In spite of the excessive amount of smoke and the detonations which could be heard in the tunnel, four firemen attempted to reach the scene of the fire with a special fire engine equipped for tunnel use. This was intended to prevent any injured people who might be lying on the ground from being driven over in the dark by an emergency vehicle. The driver of the fire engine was only able to find his way in the tunnel by skirting the edge of the pavement with his tires in order not to lose his bearings. As the visibility was zero because of the dense smoke, the firemen could not find the central line of the road even when they bent down or crawled along the ground. A fireman walking in front of the fire engine collided with a parked truck in the smoke because he was not able to see the obstacle in good time. Moreover, owing to the very poor visibility it was extremely difficult to drive the fire engine between the trucks and cars standing in the traffic jam in the tunnel. In order to be able to finally begin extinguishing the fire, it was initially necessary in the smoke-filled tunnel for the fire- men to identify by feeling around since they could not obtain visible information. They were able to feel a fire extinguish- ing bay from where they could open a water valve located in front of a hydrant. The extinguishing work was also greatly hindered by the heat at the scene of the fire. Nevertheless, the Fresh air supply from the ceiling stopped after the fire alarm ++ Permitted smoke stratification in the minutes following the fire Fresh air supply must be reduced in the fire zone to favor the smoke stratification Ventilation procedures were not followed (blowing instead of extraction) - • No smoke extraction in the fire zone • Blowing from the ceiling contributed to the smoke destratification Need to train the tunnel operators to react to emergency situations A vehicle queue build up at the backside of the fire - - • A high number of people in the dangerous zone • The fire transmitted to others vehicles - Fire safety distance must be followed when vehicles have to stop in a tunnel. Need of information for the users. - Barriers are to be installed in long tunnels to avoid the accumulation of vehicles in dangerous zones The tunnel was closed to the traffic rapidly (3 min after the fire beginning) ++ • Limited the number of people present in the tunnel - Tunnel users have to be educated - Use physical barrier instead of traffic lights to close the tunnel Operators could not know how many people were present in the tunnel at and after the fire beginning gnitixednagniretneehttnuoC-- vehicles Ranking of event from very good (++) to very bad (- -). Event Consequences Lessons learned TABLE G1 (continued)

189 fire was under control approximately 1 hour after the fire depart- ments had been alarmed. Coordination of the fire-fighting measures was also greatly hindered by the fact that the two-way radio system in the tunnel stopped working. The three occupants of the minibus were burned to death in their vehicle. All other people (at the time of the accident there were approximately 60 people in vehicles in the tunnel) were able to escape from the tunnel unharmed. The articulated truck, a car, and a minibus were destroyed by the fire. The tunnel ceiling at the scene of the fire showed spalling and cracks. Even the supporting consoles of the false ceiling on the internal vault were weakened by the heat of the fire. This structural damage stretched over a length of approximately 24 m (78.7 ft). Additionally, the tunnel was completely blackened by soot over a length of 35 m (114.8 ft) north of the scene of the acci- dent, and 70 m (229.7 ft) in a southerly direction. The operating equipment, such as the tunnel lighting, the aer- ial cables for the tunnel radio, and the supply lines in a cable duct on the tunnel ceiling, was damaged over a length of approxi- mately 360 m (1,181 ft). In order that the tunnel could be put back into temporary operation, the false ceiling was initially supported with thick wooden poles and planks. In addition, a narrow-meshed steel net was fixed in place on the ceiling in the damaged part of the tunnel. After approximately 2 days it was possible to open the tunnel again for traffic. The final repair work was carried out in May 1995. SUMMARY 1. Overtired drivers are a considerable danger to other road users. 2. The extinguishing work was hindered by smoke, heat, and the fact that the two-way radio connections did not work. 3. Dense smoke spread out over several hundred meters across the entire cross section of the tunnel. 4. Due to the dense smoke it was not possible to follow the course of the fire on the video monitoring system.

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TRB’s National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Synthesis 415: Design Fires in Road Tunnels information on the state of the practice of design fires in road tunnels, focusing on tunnel fire dynamics and the means of fire management for design guidance.

Note: On September 20, 2011, the following errata was released related to NCHRP Synthesis 415. The electronic version of the publicaiton was changed to reflect the corrections.

On pages 106 and 107, an incorrect reference was cited. In the final paragraph on page 106, the last sentence should read: One study came to the conclusion that, although some minimum water application rates would achieve a certain objective, a marginally higher rate would not necessarily improve the situation (79). The figure caption for Figure 35 at the bottom of page 107 should read: FIGURE 35 NFPA 13, NFPA 15, and other International Water Application Rates (79).

The added reference is as follows:

79. Harris, K., “Water Application Rates for Fixed Fire Fighting Systems in Road Tunnels,” Proceedings from the Fourth International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, A. Lönnermark and H. Ingason, Eds., Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Mar. 17–19, 2010.

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