National Academies Press: OpenBook

Design Fires in Road Tunnels (2011)

Chapter: Chapter Four - Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels Literature Review

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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
×
Page 22
Page 23
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
×
Page 23
Page 24
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
×
Page 24
Page 25
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels Literature Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14562.
×
Page 25

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

21 Fires occur in tunnels far less frequently than in buildings. However, because of the unique nature of a tunnel fire, they are more difficult to suppress and extinguish, and usually get more attention. In theory, the frequency of tunnel fires is related to vari- ables such as tunnel length, traffic density, speed control, and slope of the road. Each variable has to be accounted for when comparing different tunnels. • Urban tunnels tend to have a higher fire rate than other tunnels; • In many tunnels no fire has occurred; and • An event frequency span of about one fire per month to one fire per year per tunnel applies only to tunnels that are either very long, have a significant amount of traffic, or both. A large majority of tunnels report far fewer fires. Table 3 lists many major tunnel fires, most of which resulted in injuries, loss of life, and structural damage. Although the possibility of a significant fire incident in road tunnels is low, it can still happen. This table compiled information from numerous literature sources and provides a year of fire event, tunnel location, tunnel length, duration of fire when information was available, and fire consequences in terms of deaths or injuries and damages to the structure and other property. Some major fire events are also described in web- only Appendix G. It was reported that the probability of significant fires from HGVs is greater than from passenger cars. When HGVs are involved in fires, there is a higher risk of the fire developing into a much larger, more serious fire. The duration of recorded serious fires in road tunnels range from 20 min to 4 days. Most of the serious fires are in the range of 2 to 3 h. However, four fires in road tunnels were particularly serious. • Nihonzaka, Japan, collision, duration 4 days (1979). • Mont Blanc, France/Italy, self-ignition of an HGV, duration 53 h (1999) (see Figure 3). • Tauern, Austria, collision, duration 15 h (1999). • Gotthard, Switzerland, collision, duration 20 h (2001). From an analysis of the catastrophic tunnel fire events the following conclusions were derived: • Fires developed much more quickly than expected. • Fire temperatures of in excess of 1000°C (1832°F) have been achieved. • Smoke volumes were higher than expected from an early stage of the fire growth. • Fire spread between vehicles occurred over a much greater distance than previously expected (e.g., more than 200 m or 656 ft in the Mont Blanc Tunnel). • During fires road tunnel users behaved unexpectedly, such as: – Did not realize the danger to which they were exposed. – Failed to use the safety infrastructure provided for self-rescue. – Incorrectly believed that they were safer in their cars than if they used the self-rescue safety systems. – Chose to stay in their vehicles during the early stages of a fire because they did not want to leave their property. – Realized too late the danger they had placed them- selves in, by which time it was too late to execute self-rescue. CAUSE OF VEHICULAR FIRES IN ROAD TUNNELS Collisions and other vehicle accidents are not the most frequent cause of tunnel fires, although most large fires are caused by accidents. The original cause of collisions and other traffic accidents is often driver in-attention. NTSB analysis, in conjunction with that from international studies, of the cause of bus fires show that the primary causes of such fires are: • Engine fires, which account for approximately two-thirds of bus fires. Engine fires can be the result of damaged fuel lines, oil lines, or an overheated heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system. • Electrical short circuits followed by a cable fire (the most frequent cause for light-weight vehicle fires). Electrical fire or cable insulation was the item first ignited in 29% of U.S. bus fires. • Of the bus and school bus fires, 27% began with flam- mable or combustible liquids or gases, piping, or filters. • Underseat heaters catching fire. • Braking systems that can overheat (according to French statistics in 60% to 70% of fire events involving trucks). • Collisions. • Other defects leading to the self-ignition of a vehicle. CHAPTER FOUR SIGNIFICANT FIRE INCIDENTS IN ROAD TUNNELS—LITERATURE REVIEW

22 Year Tunnel Country Tunnel Length, m (ft) Fire Duration Damage People Vehicles Structure 1949 Holland United States 2550 (8,365) 4 h 66 injured 10 trucks, 13 cars Serious 1965 Blue Mountain United States 1300 (4,265) — — 1 truck — 1967 Suzaka Japan 244 (800) 11 h 2 injured 12 trucks — 1968 Moorfleet Germany 243 (800) 1 h — 1 truck Serious 1970 Wallace United States 1000 (3,280) — — — Slight 1974 Mont Blanc France/ Italy 11 600 (38,000) 15 min 1 injured — — 1974 Chesapeake Bay Bridge United States 2440 (8,000) 4 h 1 injured 1 truck — 1976 Crossing BP France 430 (1,410) 1 h 12 injured 1 truck Serious 1978 Velsen Netherlands 770 (2,530) 1 h 20 min 5 dead 5 injured 4 trucks, 2 cars Serious 1979 Nihonzaka Japan 2045 (6,700) 159 h 7 dead 2 injured 127 trucks, 46 cars Serious 1980 Kajiwara Japan 740 (2,427) 1.5 h 1 dead 2 trucks Serious 1982 Caldecott United States 1028 (3,372) 2 h 40 min 7 dead 2 injured 3 trucks, 1 bus, 4 cars Serious 1982 Lafontaine Canada 1390 (4,565) 1 dead 1 truck Limited 1983 Pecorila Galleria Italy 662 (2,170) — 9 dead 22 injured 10 cars Limited 1986 L’Arme France 1105 (3,625) — 3 dead 5 injured 1 truck, 4 cars Limited 1987 Gumefens Switzerland 343 (1,125) 2 h 2 dead 2 trucks, 1 van Slight 1989 Brenner Austria 412 (1,350) 2 dead 5 injured 1990 Røldal Norway 4656 (15,270) 50 min 1 injured — Limited 1990 Mont Blanc France/ Italy 11 600 (38,000) — 2 injured 1 truck Limited 1993 Serra Ripoli Italy 442 (1,450) 2 h 30 min 4 dead 4 injured 5 trucks 11 cars Limited 1993 Hovden Norway 1290 (4,230) 1 h 5 injured 1 motor cycle, 2 cars Limited 1994 Huguenot South Africa 3914 (12,840) 1 h 1 dead 28 injured 1 bus Serious 1995 Pfander Austria 6719 (22,040) 1 h 3 dead 4 injured 1 truck, 1 van, 1 car Serious 1996 Isola delle Femmine Italy 148 (485) — 5 dead 20 injured 1 tanker, 1 bus, 18 cars Serious 1999 Mont Blanc France/ Italy 11 600 (38,000) 2.2 days 39 dead 23 trucks, 10 cars, 1 motorcycle, 2 fire engines Serious (closed for 3 years) 1999 Tauern Austria 6401 (21,000) 15 h 12 dead 49 injured 14 trucks, 26 cars Serious (closed for 3 months) 2000 Seljestad Norway 1272 (4,173) 45 min 6 injured 1 truck, 4 cars, 1 MC — TABLE 3 LIST OF ROAD TUNNEL FIRES (continued on next page)

2001 Prapontin Italy 4409 (14,463) — 19 injured 1 truck Serious 2001 Gleinalm Austria 8320 (27,293) — 5 dead 4 injured — — 2001 Ville Marie Tunnel Canada 8400 (27,560) 2001 Guldborg- sund Denmark 460 (1,509) — 5 dead 6 injured 2001 St. Gottard Switzerland 16 900 (55,450) Over 2 days 11 dead 2 trucks, 23 vehicles Serious 2002 Tauern Austria 6401 (21,000) — 1 dead — — 2002 A86 France 618 (2,028) 6 hr 2 dead 1 car, 1 motorcycle — 2002 Ted Williams United States 2600 (8,530) 1 bus — 2002 Homer New Zealand — 3 injured 1 bus — 2003 Locica Slovenia 800 (2,625) 1 truck, 1 car — 2003 Fløyfjell Norway 3100 (10,171) ~10 min 1 dead 1 car Limited 2003 Golovec Slovenia 700 (2,297) — — 1 bus 2003 Baregg Switzerland 1390 (4,560) — 2 dead 21 injured 4 trucks, 3 fire engines Serious 2004 Baregg Switzerland 1080 (3,543) — 1 dead , 1 Injured 1 truck, 1 car Serious 2004 Dullin France 1500 (4,921) — — 1 bus 2004 Kinkem- pois Belgium 600 (1,969) — — 1 truck Slight 2004 Frejus France/ Italy 12 900 (42,323) — — 1 truck — Year Tunnel Country Tunnel Length, m (ft) Fire Duration Damage People Vehicles Structure 2005 Frejus France/ Italy 12 900 (42,323) 6 h Diesel leakage in HGV loaded with tires 2 dead; 21 treated for smoke inhalation 4 HGV, 3 fire fighting vehicles 1. load: Tires 2. load cheese 3. load: scrap 4. load: glue Serious damage, tunnel closed 2006 Viamala Switzerland 760 (2,493) 9 dead 6 injured 1 bus, 2 cars 2006 Crap-Teig Switzerland 2171 (7,122) 1 HGV with wooden pallets Limited structural, electrical damage 2007 Burnley Australia 2900 (9,514) 3 dead 4 HGVs, 7 cars Slight 2007 Caldecott United States, Canada 1028 (3,372) 1 car 2007 Santa Clarita I-5 [25] United States, Canada 165 (544) 3 dead 23 injured 33 tractor/ semi-trailer; 1 car 2007 San Martino Italy >45 min 2 dead; 10 injured 1 HGV 2009 Eiksund Norway 7700 (25,262) 5 dead 1 HGV, 1 car 2009 Gubrist Switzerland 4 injured 2 cars 2010 Trojane Slovenia 885 (2,900) 5 injured 1 HGV 2010 Wuxi Lihu China 24 dead, 19 injured 1 shuttle bus Collected from numerous sources: ASHRAE Handbook (22). TABLE 3 (continued) 23

Other causes that were mentioned but occur far less frequently included technical defects (self-ignition) in tunnel equipment and maintenance work in tunnels. FREQUENCIES OF TUNNEL FIRES In a French study representing 400 million kilometers (approx- imately 250 million miles) run by trucks underground, HGV fires in 26 tunnels were analyzed and roughly classified accord- ing to their importance to tunnel environment (Table 4) (21). The heat release for fires classified as causing some damage to the tunnel is estimated to be below 20 MW (68 MBtu/hr); serious fires are considered with heat release of more than 20 MW (68 MBtu/hr). Therefore, major fires are rare events, even in relation to the entire number of truck fires in tunnels (see Figure 4). German and Swiss data showed that only about 1 of 100 to 500 breakdowns is accompanied by a fire, with fire involved in about 1 of 10 to 20 accidents. Note that this information is currently being revisited by PIARC to reflect the latest fire events. The risk of a vehicle fire tends to increase in situations of intensified motor heating (steep uphill lanes of tunnels, tun- nels after a long uphill slope) and intensified brake heating 24 (long downward slopes). Also, for a short period of time during the opening of a new tunnel, there can be a tendency for more fire events as was observed in the Elb Tunnel in Germany. As the drivers become more familiar with a tunnel environment, the fire rate will stabilize at a lower level. CONSEQUENCES OF TUNNEL FIRES Fires generally produce heat, smoke, and toxic products, which can cause damage and loss of life. Heat is the cause of damage to structure and installations, whereas it is rarely the original cause of death. The threat to humans is primarily the loss of vis- ibility owing to smoke (which impedes evacuation), then toxi- city. A secondary risk is that fires potentially represent a hazard to the environment caused by the toxicity of the smoke and sub- stances in the drainage. The main consequences of fires are: 1. Fatalities and injuries to: • Tunnel users, • Operating personnel, and • Rescue forces. Heat, smoke, gases, lack of oxygen, and loss of visibility lead to intoxication, suffocation, burns, and even death. FIGURE 3 Mont Blanc Tunnel after fire. Classification of Fire Cases of Fire for 108 veh x km (approx. 108 veh x miles) Passenger Cars Fires of any importance 1–2 (1.6–3.2) Trucks Without Dangerous Goods Fires of any importance 8 (12.9) Fires with some damage to the tunnel 1 (1.6) )84.0ot61.0(3.0ot1.0noitamitsEserifsuoiresyreV Trucks Transporting Dangerous Goods Fires of any importance Estimation 2 (3.2) Fires with involvement of the dangerous goods Estimation 0.3 (0.48) Source: PIARC (21). TABLE 4 ESTIMATION OF FIRE RATES IN FRENCH TUNNELS FIGURE 4 Burnley Tunnel (Australia) after fire.

25 2. Economic losses related to vehicles and goods, and the cost of repair of damage/reconstruction: • Destroying tunnel equipment (e.g., lighting, ventila- tion, and telecommunication); • Damage to the tunnel construction: the main effects are spalling of concrete, overheating of concrete rein- forcement, collapse of false ceilings, and ventilation ducts; and • Severe damage or loss of burning vehicles and their goods. 3. Traffic disturbance resulting from closure or reduced service level of the tunnel after a fire (e.g., re-routing resulting in extra transport time, direct economic losses, and possibly increased risk to the users). 4. Potential environmental damage from the fire. In some cases, tunnel rehabilitation after fires can take weeks or months. During this time, traffic congestion on the roads in the vicinity of the closed tunnel is an almost inevitable result, especially in densely populated areas. In two French tunnels in Lyon (Tunnel Fourviere and Tunnel La Croix Rousse) about 40% of the fires were extin- guished by a fire extinguisher (six cases). In about 60% of the events (eight cases) the help of a fire department was needed. Most fatalities in road tunnels appear to arise from ordinary traffic accidents. Norwegian data indicated that approximately two-thirds of deaths resulted from common traffic accidents and about one-third from fire-related incidents. In addition, it stated that “dangerous goods” incidents are likely to involve fire, which may be assumed to be about one-third of fire- related incidents (see Table 5). Fire statistics indicate that highway tunnels are safer than open roads. As far as can be determined, there have been only three major tunnel fires in the United States. Small automobile fires are frequent and occur as often as weekly in congested urban tunnels. To date, such fires have been extinguished without difficulty. SUMMARY Although major fires in tunnels (with a HRR of more than 20 MW resulting in injuries, loss of life, and structural damage) are very rare events, because of the unique nature of a tunnel fire, they are difficult to suppress and extinguish and usually receive more attention. Fire statistics indicate that highway tunnels are safer than open roads. When HGVs are involved in fires, there is a higher risk of the fire developing into a much larger, serious fire. The duration of recorded serious fires in road tunnels ranged from 20 min to 4 days. Most of the serious fires last from 2 to 3 h. Analysis of the catastrophic tunnel fire events provided the following conclusions: • Fires develop much more quickly than expected. • Fire temperatures in excess of 1000°C (1832°F) are achieved. • Smoke volumes are higher than expected from an early stage of the fire growth. • Fire spread between vehicles occurs over a much greater distance than had been expected previously. • The road tunnel users behaved unexpectedly, such as: – Did not realize the danger to which they were exposed. – Failed to use the safety infrastructure provided for self-rescue. – Wrongfully believed that they were safer in their cars than if they used the self-rescue safety systems. – Chose to stay in their vehicles during the early stages of a fire since they did not want to leave their property. – Realized too late the danger they had placed them- selves in, by which time it was too late to execute self-rescue. Collisions and other vehicle accidents are not the most frequent cause of fires, although most large fires are caused by accidents. • Engine fires cause approximately two-thirds of bus fires. They can be the result of damaged fuel lines, oil lines, or overheated HVAC systems. • Electrical short-circuits, followed by a cable fire (the most frequent cause for light vehicle fires). Electrical fire or cable insulation was the item first ignited in 29% of the U.S. bus fires. • Twenty-seven percent of the bus and school bus fires began with the flammable or combustible liquids or gases, piping, or filters. Type of Incident Potential Loss of Life per Billion Person-Kilometers (person-miles) Percentage Common Traffic Accidents 0.74 (1.19) 67 Fire, Light Vehicle 0.08 (0.13) 7 Fire, Heavy Vehicle 0.24 (0.39) 21 Fire in Tunnel Installations 0.01 (0.02) 1 ìDan gerous Goods” Incidents 0.04 (0.06) 4 001)77.1(1.1latoT Source: Assessment of the Safety of Tunnels Study (23). TABLE 5 LIFE LOSS IN ROAD TUNNEL INCIDENTS IN OSLO

• Underseat heaters catching fire. • Braking systems; these can overheat. • Collisions. • Technical defects (self-ignition) of tunnel equipment. • Maintenance work in tunnels. The risk of a vehicle fire tends to increase in situations of intensified motor heating (steep uphill lanes of tunnels, tun- nels after a long uphill slope) and intensified brake heating (long downward slopes). The main consequences of fires are: 1. Fatalities and injuries to • Tunnel users, • Operating personnel, and • Rescue forces. 26 2. Economic losses related to vehicles and goods and cost of repair of damage/reconstruction: • Destroying tunnel equipment (e.g., lighting, ventila- tion, and telecommunications); • Damage to the tunnel construction: primary effects are spalling of concrete, overheating of concrete reinforcement, and collapse of false ceilings and ventilation ducts; and • Severe damage or loss of the burning vehicles and their goods. 3. Traffic disturbance owing to closure or reduced service level of the tunnel after fire. 4. Potential environmental damage resulting from the fire. In some cases, tunnel rehabilitation after fires can take weeks or months.

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TRB’s National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Synthesis 415: Design Fires in Road Tunnels information on the state of the practice of design fires in road tunnels, focusing on tunnel fire dynamics and the means of fire management for design guidance.

Note: On September 20, 2011, the following errata was released related to NCHRP Synthesis 415. The electronic version of the publicaiton was changed to reflect the corrections.

On pages 106 and 107, an incorrect reference was cited. In the final paragraph on page 106, the last sentence should read: One study came to the conclusion that, although some minimum water application rates would achieve a certain objective, a marginally higher rate would not necessarily improve the situation (79). The figure caption for Figure 35 at the bottom of page 107 should read: FIGURE 35 NFPA 13, NFPA 15, and other International Water Application Rates (79).

The added reference is as follows:

79. Harris, K., “Water Application Rates for Fixed Fire Fighting Systems in Road Tunnels,” Proceedings from the Fourth International Symposium on Tunnel Safety and Security, A. Lönnermark and H. Ingason, Eds., Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Mar. 17–19, 2010.

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