National Academies Press: OpenBook

Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies (2011)

Chapter: CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems

« Previous: CHAPTER ONE Introduction
Page 12
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 12
Page 13
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 13
Page 14
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 14
Page 15
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 15
Page 16
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 16
Page 17
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 17
Page 18
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 18
Page 19
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 19
Page 20
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 20
Page 21
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 21
Page 22
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 22
Page 23
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 23
Page 24
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 24
Page 25
Suggested Citation:"CHAPTER TWO Development of Electronic Video Surveillance in Transit Systems." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14564.
×
Page 25

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

10 CHAPTER TWO DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRONIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN TRANSIT SYSTEMS The impact of the September 11, 2001, attacks using airplanes as weapons of destruction has had an incalculable impact on discussions of transportation security. It is reflected in virtually all post-9/11 literature; it is almost impossible to find any discussion of surface transit security measures that focuses on nonterrorist-related safety or security concerns. This focus has intensified since the subsequent terrorist activities involving transit systems in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, in London, England, on July 7, 2005 (where surveillance technology played a role in post-event investi- gation), in Mumbai (Bombay), India, on July 11, 2006, and in Moscow, Russia, on March 29, 2010, while this study was under way. In addition, the May 1, 2010, attempted bombing in New York City’s Times Square, where the transit system was not the primary focus of the attack but would have been seriously affected by it, led New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg to renew his call for an expanded surveillance network. At the same time, images of someone who turned out not to be a suspect but were widely circulated led to debate among secu- rity professionals about the value of video as a preventive or a post-incident (forensic) investigatory tool. The debate was tempered when, within weeks of the Moscow bombing and the failed Times Square bombing, India suffered yet another terrorist attack on its rail system. In this incident, on May 28, 2010, a Mumbai-bound passen- ger train collided with a freight train after someone sabo- taged tracks in the state of West Bengal, resulting in more than 70 deaths and more than 100 injuries only 1 week after the same suspects were believed to have blown up a bus car- rying civilians and police officers. Although a Maoist group was blamed for the crash, within days the Communist Party of India said that it was not involved. India has not provided information on who else might have been responsible and has continued to view the Maoists as the most likely perpe- trators (“India: Maoists Deny…” 2010). Thus, while the current synthesis focuses on the uses of video surveillance for broader purposes than terrorism concerns, the literature review is skewed in that direction owing to the single-issue focus of many of the recent studies. But vulnerability measures taken to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring also have applicability to general crime pre- vention and to patron and employee safety. In the Transpor- tation Research Record, Aaron Eder observed that “good security systems can increase the difficulty of terrorist oper- ations, increase the likelihood of terrorists being detected, minimize injuries and loss of life, decrease panic, and calm riders during times of panic.” This is equally true for less dramatic events on transit systems (Eder 2001, p. 94). A chronology of terrorist events against transit systems compiled by the Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies Institute (MTI) listed close to 4,000 events between January 1972 and August 2004 (Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems 2005). Other studies, which are often based on similar or overlapping databases, have reported similar numbers. One study estimated that rail-related attacks, none in the United States, averaged 30 per year between 1998 and 2003 (Peterman 2005). More recently, in a commentary fol- lowing the Moscow bombings, former TSA administrator Kip Hawley and his co-authors counted 11 ground transpor- tation incidents versus 53 attacks on airline and airports dur- ing the same time period (Hawley et al. 2010). Regardless of the actual numbers of incidents and how these compare with those on other transportation modes, terrorist activity on rail systems around the world has influ- enced the utilization of electronic video surveillance tech- nology well beyond its original use primarily as a passenger traffic control and risk management tool. HISTORY OF ELECTRONIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN TRANSIT Despite this exhaustive focus on antiterrorism electronic video surveillance, its uses have always been far broader. The earliest uses of video surveillance were associated with passenger traffic control and managing risk related to over- crowding, nonpayment, fire, and accidents and injuries. Sub- sequently, surveillance came to be viewed as part of crime prevention strategies, especially as these began to concen- trate on the intertwined roles of deterring crime while also enhancing patron perception of safety. Initially, video moni- toring was employed primarily to assist in fare compliance. Cameras were placed in entry areas to allow for observation

11 lection system and secondarily to deter and apprehend fare evaders. Only the Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH) rail line connecting New York and New Jersey (operated by the PANY&NJ) was at the time using surveillance solely as part of its crime prevention strategies (Policing Urban Mass Transit Systems 1979, p. 38). In addition, Philadelphia experimented with surveillance in 1978 in conjunction with patrols in the transit system by plainclothes officers assigned to cut down on the growing graffiti problem (Hackney 1978). The situation changed considerably over two decades. Guidelines for the Effective Use of Uniformed Transit Police and Security Personnel, a 1997 TCRP report by Interactive Elements Inc. on transit policing and security deployment tactics, found that a dozen rail agencies employed video sur- veillance in stations, parking lots, bus terminals, rail stations, elevators, and onboard vehicles:BART, the Greater Cleve- land Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA), the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA), Maryland’s Transit Administration (MTA-MD), Miami’s Metro-Dade Transit (MetroRail), the Metropolitan Atlanta Regional Transportation Authority (MARTA), the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), New York City Transit (NYCT), NJT, Denver’s Regional Transportation District (RTD), the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority (SEPTA), and the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). The technology was used primarily to docu- ment incidents in progress, to facilitate officer response by having staff responsible for monitoring the video dispatch officers to these incidents, and to assist in post-event investi- gation and prosecution of offenders by providing a record of criminal activity and a positive identification of the person(s) responsible for the act (pp. 156–157). This synthesis found that transit agencies still use video surveillance primarily for these purposes. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT Although video surveillance technology is today most fre- quently discussed in the context of terrorism, a review of the history of the uses of surveillance systems in transit agencies points to its primary use as a risk management tool against fare evasion and as a defense against fraudulent claims, par- ticularly for individuals alleging injury during accidents. Its use as a tool in crime prevention and detection, to allay patron fears that transit systems were unsafe, was secondary. Two recent TCRP studies pointed to the continuing importance of risk management issues in the installation of video surveillance systems. The current synthesis rein- forced the continuation of this role. Although use of video surveillance anywhere on a transit agency’s property assists in risk mitigation, its use in nonpublic areas such as yards and employee areas are traditional uses that continue to be among the most common. Of the 43 responding agencies, 26 of ticket vending machines (TVMs) and, particularly in the London Underground (LU), to assist station personnel in monitoring areas of dangerous crowding on platforms and escalators. As with so many innovations in law enforcement, the ini- tial uses of surveillance cameras are difficult to pinpoint. Some observers trace their use to covert surveillance by individual agents or private investigators taking photos of suspects engaged in various incriminating behaviors. With- out going so far as to link the use of surveillance in the tran- sit environment to such covert activities, its use was reported as early as the 1970s. Policing Urban Mass Transit Systems, one of the first federal reports that dealt specifically with policing mass transit, observed in 1979 that several properties had or were planning to install video surveillance equipment to moni- tor station activities. Seen in the broader context of using technology to assist police, the move was compared to silent alarms and two-way radios as adjuncts to or replacements for patrol operations. Just as today, the “constant surveil- lance capabilities” were seen as having “the potential to deter offenders, aid police in detecting crimes and apprehending criminals, and provide patrons with a sense of security.” But the researchers also noted that even where installed, sur- veillance systems were not “well integrated into police day- to-day operations,” in large part because the cameras were monitored by transit operations personnel (1979, p. 15). The findings of this synthesis confirm that many surveil- lance systems continue to be monitored by transit opera- tions personnel but this was not perceived as a problem by respondents. Of the 40 agencies that responded to the question concerning who monitors their video systems, the largest number (22) reported the task was performed by a combination of police/security and rail operations person- nel, 8 by rail operations personnel, and 10 by police/security personnel. None of the agencies saw this as hampering law enforcement activities; the combined roles of police/secu- rity and rail operations personnel seemed to be a successful application of system integration that maximized the ben- efits of video surveillance monitoring. It permitted observa- tion of and response to operating hazards at the same time as preventing vandalism or criminal activity, all of which may affect rail operations. The 1979 report documented that law enforcement was rarely the primary goal of the surveillance systems. For instance, San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) was described as having installed its video cameras primar- ily to monitor elevators for the disabled community and only incidentally for security. Port Authority Transit (PATCO) used its video in conjunction with a public address system and a direct-line emergency telephone system primarily to assist patrons having problems with the automatic fare col-

12 reported use of video surveillance in storage and other yards and 20 in employee/administrative areas. In a 2000 TRCP synthesis, Identifying and Reducing Fraudulent Third Party Tort Claims Against Public Transit Agencies: A Synthesis of Transit Practices, M. Patricia Maier provided a number of examples of how transit agencies were using surveillance video images to take action against fraudu- lent claims (2000, pp. 29–31). Fraudulent claims can mean many things, including, commonly, verification of insurance claims resulting from accidents or injuries (real or alleged) from patrons, employees, or trespassers. Because the issue of fraudulent claims by employees is more controversial than the other categories and because such surveillance is more likely to be covert rather than overt, the existing literature tends to focus on discussions of external rather than on internal fraud. External fraudulent claims may occur through a variety of events. For instance, people who were at an incident may claim to be injured when they were not, and people who were not at an incident may also claim to have been injured. In some cases, these so-called “ghost riders” have been observed on video actually rushing to enter a disabled vehi- cle, more often a bus than a railcar, so that they may claim an injury resulting from the accident. SEPTA conducted a study in 1988 that showed that between two and three times as many people were filing lawsuits as had been injured in accidents, including those who were not even onboard the vehicles. Maier (2000) described a SEPTA subway accident in 1990 that killed four people and attracted claims from almost 300 people who alleged to have been injured, a figure that was far in excess of the number of passengers onboard at the time. Because video surveillance onboard vehicles has been until recently more likely to be installed on buses than rail- cars, similar bus-related findings are quite common. Again from SEPTA, Maier cited an instance when lawsuits were received following a bus/car accident even though the bus had carried no passengers at the time of the incident. Simi- larly, a sting operation that created a staged accident in New Jersey resulted in video of 17 bystanders scrambling onto a bus that had been hit by a car; all later claimed to have been injured. Bus companies in urban areas of the state reported that buses involved in accidents were often surrounded by “runners” working for doctors and lawyers who would get on the bus to distribute leaflets with the names and phone numbers of their employers, encouraging passengers to claim neck or back injuries so that they could file claims against the carriers. Another TCRP study, Electronic Surveillance Technol- ogy on Transit Vehicles, reported that almost half of respond- ing agencies used surveillance recordings to disprove claims made against their systems. Once again, SEPTA provided a number of examples. The Philadelphia-based agency reported that during its implementation of onboard surveil- lance in the mid-1990s as part of a larger program aimed at targeting fraud, claims dropped more than 30%. Although the report did not specify whether the cameras were used only on buses, only on railcars, or on some combination of the two, it noted that based on the entire program, SEPTA estimated its claims-related savings at more than $2 mil- lion annually (Maier and Malone 2001, pp. 19–20). Also involving SEPTA, Maier and Malone (2001, p. 25) reported on a 1995 case in which a plaintiff who sued for injuries allegedly sustained during a sudden stop added a claim of emotional distress after learning that SEPTA had relied on video surveillance to monitor the plaintiff’s actions. The court sustained SEPTA’s defense that the surveillance was not intrusive and violated no rights claimed by the plaintiff. In addition to saving lives, there has been considerable discussion along these lines as to the benefit of video surveil- lance at rail crossings to help to mitigate liability after cross- ing accidents, particularly in conjunction with tests to ensure that flashing lights and gates were operable. A recent acci- dent involving an Amtrak train and a car carrying five young people (the 19-year-old driver and four others between the ages of 14 and 21, all of whom were killed in the accident) illustrates this. Within 24 hours of the crash, police released a copy of a video image that showed the vehicle skirting the railroad gate despite the gates and flashing lights operating. The train, Amtrak 353, going from Detroit to Chicago and carrying about 150 people, was traveling within speed limits when it broadsided the vehicle on tracks owned by Norfolk Southern (Runk 2009). Grants available from the FHWA’s Highway-Rail Cross- ing Program are intended, in part, to address these safety- related issues, but responses to the synthesis questionnaire showed that none of the responding agencies had received funds from this source. The wording of the funding question made it impossible to determine whether funds had been applied for and not approved or whether this is an untapped resource for passenger rail agencies. The importance of surveillance as a risk and fare compli- ance tool persists. In 2005, a report prepared for Sound Tran- sit (Seattle, Washington) in conjunction with its Regional Transit Long-Range Plan recommended video surveillance for monitoring TVMs and general fare collection protection and did not mention it in any other capacity (Sound Transit Long-Range Plan Update 2005, p. 20). Video cameras are often placed in locations where it is possible to monitor fare collection points. As surveillance technology has become more common, it may also prove its value to transit in detect- ing vendor fraud. This occurred recently when a school sys- tem discovered, based on its video system covering areas outside its main buildings, that a company being paid for snow removal billed for more trucks than were sent to the site (Stelter March 2, 2010).

13 EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF RISK In recent years, defining risk has often revolved around discussions of the readiness to avoid and the capability to respond to terrorist acts. But the same factors that make public transit vulnerable to terrorism also make transit agencies vulnerable to other types of crimes and to claims of injury or loss of property. For example, unlike airports, transit systems do not have either single or closely watched points of egress and access. Transit vehicles travel in pre- dictable paths at predictable times along ROWs that are generally unguarded and easily accessible to the public. Brian Jenkins, who has written extensively on transit ter- rorism, has observed that for those individuals who are intent on killing in quantity and willing to kill arbitrarily, transit provides the perfect target in part because it pro- vides anonymity and an easy getaway (Jenkins 2001). The same conditions exist for other, nonterrorist crimes and also for traditional risk management concerns such as claims of loss of property and injury by employees, patrons, or trespassers. In recent years rail agencies have recognized the inter- twining needs of crime prevention—whether related to terrorism or any criminal event—and safety. Safety and security concerns are enumerated, analyzed, and ranked using similar methodologies. Each analysis is similar to a traditional risk assessment and is required as a condition of receiving funds from DHS or approval under FTA’s New Starts programs. These assessments, whether called threat and vulnerability assessments, hazard analyses, or risk reg- istry reviews, are intended to establish that an agency is aware of and has provided satisfactory provisions for the detection, deterrence, and response to safety hazards and security vulnerabilities. Thus, the recognition of a role for electronic video sur- veillance in both risk management and crime prevention did not occur in a vacuum; it was part of a developing litera- ture in the 1970s on theories of crime prevention and also reflected growing concerns by transit managers that patrons perceived transit systems as unsafe. Current discussions on video surveillance as a potential terrorist detection tool and its use in post-event investigation are a continuation of its crime prevention applications. These new uses have been made possible by technology that permits more accurate identification of persons and objects than the earliest sys- tems were capable of providing. Influence of Crime Prevention Theories The expansion of video surveillance from a risk manage- ment to a law enforcement tool was also influenced by the emerging theories of crime prevention through environmen- tal design (CPTED) and situational crime prevention (SCP). These theories altered the way transit agencies addressed security as transit managers recognized that the public’s per- ception of security influenced their travel decisions. CPTED grew out of the concept of “defensible space” for- mulated in the late 1960s by the architect and urban planner Oscar Newman. Newman recognized that the design of the physical environment could create opportunities for people to come together and in doing so remove the opportunity for criminals to act without the fear of being observed. In this view, design features enhance or inhibit the possibility of crime occurring in a specific place by producing either positive or negative behaviors by those who enter the prem- ises. At the same time, places that are designed in ways that seem to inhibit crime (clean, well-lit, and offer few hiding places for the ill-intentioned) also foster feelings of security. Patrons sense that those responsible for the site are in con- trol even if they do not actually observe uniformed transit employees present. The theory was expanded in the late 1970s by what have come to be known as SCP theories. The first of these, com- monly referred to as opportunity theory, states that offenders will commit crimes wherever two factors converge: suit- able targets and an absence of protection. Added to this, the rational choice perspective stated that, with the exception of rare crimes of passion, offenders make rational choices that involve weighing the pros and cons of committing particular crimes in particular areas (Cohen and Felson 1979; Cornish and Clarke 1986). A nonviolent adaptation of these theories is the “ghost riders,” who calculated that they could allege phony injuries because no one was on the buses or railcars to report their fraud. The disabled bus or railcar was a suit- able target on which to commit fraud because there were no guardians to note their fraudulent behavior. SCP can be viewed as an action plan for combating crime or fraud. Broadly speaking, its premise is that the physi- cal environment can be managed to control both the fear of crime and the likelihood of its actual occurrence. Whereas CPTED focuses on physical design elements to minimize vulnerabilities, SCP includes cleanliness, type and amount of staffing, and more general target-hardening techniques. A plan in barrier-free systems to resolve a problem of patrons ignoring TVMs and failing to pay their fares illus- trates how the theories overlap and also the role that video surveillance continues to play in detecting fare evasion. A solely CPTED-based solution to payment fraud would involve moving the payment area to a location more easily visible to general users or to agency security personnel, but this may not be possible in an older system. An SCP-based solution would add environmental deterrents to any built-in environmental controls, such as the possibility of external surveillance (general video monitoring) and plainclothes officers to observe, arrest, and prosecute violators. In this example, video monitoring alone may not correct the prob-

14 lem, but in all likelihood, particularly with appropriate sig- nage, it will encourage some nonpayees to pay rather than risk being caught on video. If combined with the ability of the person monitoring the video to speak directly to the nonpayees or to direct an officer to the scene, this system is likely to deter all but the most persistent nonpayees. CPTED is particularly valuable in the initial design of a transit system because it makes use of natural surveillance and access control, and territorial reinforcement to assist agency personnel in fostering an environment that mini- mizes the opportunity for crime. In effect, it uses physical arrangements to produce socially-acceptable behavior that will reduce actual crime and also the fear of crime. But because perfect CPTED solutions are rarely available, even in new construction, SCP-based solutions, particularly elec- tronic video surveillance, have become the most common backup plans. New Transit Systems Incorporate Design Improvements The idea of designing new transit systems based on CPTED features while also incorporating surveillance technology was pioneered with the construction of WMATA, which began operation in 1976. Much studied by transit profession- als and academic researchers, WMATA was described as “crime free” and labeled “one of the safest subway systems in the world” based on its architectural design, which used crime prevention principles, vigilant maintenance policies, and stringent enforcement of rules (LaVigne 1996, p. 163). Recognizing that the architects and planners had the luxury of starting from scratch rather than having to accommodate existing technology and design, much was made of the system’s high ceilings and uniform 600-ft-long platforms. In addition to their length, the platforms were straight and relatively pillar-free, with few indentations or places for those with ill intentions to hide. This also con- tributed to a feeling of spaciousness and standing room free of having to crowd in on other patrons, all elements viewed by crime prevention specialists as adding to passenger com- fort and feelings of security. Although deep below street level (the system has some of the steepest escalators of all U.S. transit systems), platforms were well lit and immaculately maintained. In addition to a uniformed attendant on each mezzanine, every station was designed with a minimum of eight surveillance cameras in operation, placed at the ends of each platform and on ceilings at entrances and exits. Elevators were also equipped with surveillance cameras. Relying on the police theory of the dual message of omnipresence, namely that a visible police officer sends a message to the ill-intentioned that there is a high probability of being caught in a criminal act and to the well-intentioned that the law enforcement presence provides security by deterring the ill-intentioned, WMATA’s first police chief, Angus MacLean, said the cameras were pur- posely left visible to riders and to alert potential criminals that they were being monitored. He admitted, though, that the cameras served mostly a psychological purpose because they were viewed only at the station manager’s kiosk, which was often unattended (LaVigne 1996, p. 174). Probably unknown to patrons, was that the video screens were not monitored by police officers, but by civilian atten- dants who used two-way portable radios to contact police more quickly than in most of the older transit systems. This deployment has not changed; today, most surveillance moni- tors are viewed by some combination of civilian rail opera- tions personnel and by police/security officers. As indicated previously, this system integration allows the video network to maintain safe and efficient rail operations while also observing possible vandalism or criminal behavior. Regardless of who was watching, WMATA received con- siderable publicity for instances when patrons were warned by someone monitoring the surveillance system not to stand too close to the platform edge or to pick up trash they had dropped somewhere other than into the receptacles provided. WMATA was not the only agency that used it video sur- veillance for basic order maintenance. In an article discuss- ing the expanded use of surveillance, The New York Times reported on an incident at the Hoboken, New Jersey, PATH station where a couple was startled to hear a voice from the police command center at about 2 a.m. reminding the male to put out his cigarette and asking him and his female com- panion to take their feet off the bench (Halbfinger 1998). Though these examples might seem amusing or even petty, it is unlikely that patrons getting such messages will consider participating in serious vandalism or crimi- nal behavior. Unstated also is that it is likely to discourage employees from shirking assigned duties or undertaking other inappropriate behavior as long as cameras are known to be in use. As with WMATA, MARTA, established in 1972, also was designed as a wholly new entity and also included elec- tronic surveillance technology from its inception. In addition to constant surveillance in the stations, MARTA included other designed-in risk mitigation and crime prevention tech- nological advances such as passenger intercoms, emergency phones, and anti-passback fare gates. The emergency phone system was more extensive than most rail systems and relied on a variety of color-coded phones; white phones were des- ignated for passenger assistance, blue phones were linked to zone centers where personnel monitored video cameras, and red phones were designed as fire phones (Guidelines for Effective Use… 1997, p. 40). As new systems were developed that included electronic video surveillance, its use underwent a dramatic change

15 throughout the transit industry. By the 1990s, surveillance had become a fairly regular feature in stations, employee facilities, and parking lots. Its installation on railcars and along ROWs was and continues to be far more limited. In addition to WMATA and MARTA, other urban transit systems made use of video surveillance in passenger stations as early as the late 1970s and early 1980s; today almost all do. One early adopter, Chicago’s Metra, monitored several stations with a system that was originally intended to protect TVMs, again illustrating the overlap of fraud detection with crime prevention. Metra officials found the cameras acted as a significant crime deterrent, which led to retrofitting them with wide-angle lenses to include larger sections of the stations. Both the St. Louis Bi-State Development Agency (MetroLink) and Cleveland’s GCRTA reported successful applications of video monitoring at key rail stations. The GCRTA also used video to monitor revenue facilities. The Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (NFTA, Buffalo, New York) used surveillance to view more than 90 of its locations. Although at this time, most of the in-vehicle moni- toring took place in buses rather than on railcars, the NFTA reported some success with cameras to deter incidents on some light rail vehicles (LRVs) (Gilbert 1995, p. 22). THE LONDON UNDERGROUND’S INFLUENCE ON TRANSIT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS To most North American transit managers, the transit sys- tem most closely associated with the introduction of video surveillance is the London Underground (LU) in the United Kingdom. One of the first systems to employ video surveil- lance, the LU’s vast network of cameras attracted worldwide attention in the aftermath of the attacks on July 7, 2005, when suicide bombers who claimed an association with al Qaeda set off three bombs in LU trains and on one London bus, killing 52 people and wounding more than 700. Two weeks later, on July 21, terrorists planted an additional three bombs on the LU and on another London bus, but this time the devices failed to detonate. By the time of the second attempt, authorities had already identified the first set of bombers based in part on a closed- circuit television (CCTV) image of the four men at the Luton train station, about 50 miles north of London, at about 7:20 a.m. on the day of the attacks. The black-and-white photo showed all four men carrying backpacks; additional evi- dence indicated they had traveled together to the King’s Cross Station. The wide publicity given to the video image of the four men by the London Metropolitan Police, in what the Canadian Broadcasting Company on Aug. 11, 2005, called “the largest crime scene in British history,” (“London police investigation timeline,” 2005) has influenced at least part of the current push to increase the use of video in U.S. tran- sit systems. Yet this instance also reinforced that video may serve more appropriately as a post-crime investigative tool than as a crime deterrence or prevention mechanism. The role of video for either prevention or post-crime investiga- tion may be less relevant for terrorism than for traditional crime, particularly where suicide bombers are unconcerned with the consequences of their actions and may actually hope for recognition as a way to further their cause. At the time of the July 7 bombings, the approximately 275 LU stations were observed by more than 6,000 cam- eras; that number was expected to double by 2010. By the end of 2005, the British Transport Police, which is respon- sible for rail policing in England, Scotland, and Wales, comprised about 650 officers and was expected to hire about 100 additional officers in 2006. These figures are difficult to substantiate, but both the numbers of cameras and of police officers have grown. The original purpose of the LU’s video system was to assist station personnel monitoring crowd control. It was introduced on the Victoria Line in 1968 and spread with the introduction of one-person train crews. There was at that time relatively little interest in and little thought given to observing individuals within the crowd (Butcher 1990). By the 1980s, crime on the LU had become a political issue just as it had in large cities in the United States and Canada. Added to the concerns were fears of Irish Republican Army bombings, which eventually included the deaths of three people on the rail system, one at Victoria Station in 1991 and two on the Docklands Light Railway in 1996. Despite this prevailing fear of terrorism, the primary pur- pose of the LU surveillance video network was to continue its original purpose, namely to alert staff to dangerous build- ups of passengers at escalators and other strategic points, not to catch criminals. Any thoughts of catching criminals were limited to the view that if station staff observed a crime, they would call police or use the public address system to inter- vene by vocally drawing attention to the crime. Fennell Report on the King’s Cross Station Fire The vast expansion of surveillance equipment in the LU came not because of fears of terrorist attack or of crime, but as a direct result of a massive fire at King’s Cross Station in November 1987, the same station that was the scene of the July 7 bombing. The fire started in one of the station’s four escalators and spread throughout the ticket hall and the station within minutes at the end of the evening rush hour, resulting in 31 fatalities, including 1 employee. Because of the chaotic conditions and the lack of an emergency evacu- ation plan, the number of injuries was never tallied. The fire spread rapidly owing to the draft created by the train move- ments, the steep incline of the escalators, and the station itself, including its design and the existence of old paint on the walls that burned quickly.

16 The post-incident investigation report, commonly referred to as the Fennell Report after its chair, Desmond Fennell, led to changes in fire standards. The report also highlighted the absence of interoperable communica- tions, firefighters’ lack of knowledge of the station, the station’s general lack of cleanliness and its low mainte- nance standards, and the lack of emergency access/egress policies. All these are today considered standard features of emergency management plans (Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure 2006, pp. 39–42). Finally, the report noted that transit systems had introduced video sur- veillance that in addition to proving effective in reducing crime, allowed better control of stations primarily to deal with the specific dangers presented by crowding and fires (Butcher 1990). Video surveillance cameras in the LU continue to serve the dual functions of operations management and crime pre- vention. One system is used primarily for its original pur- pose of managing and operating patron flow and ensuring, for instance, that doors clear the platforms. The second sys- tem, which includes recording capabilities, is used primarily for law enforcement purposes, with images fed to a central location under police control (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2006, p. 737). The use of video surveillance throughout the United King- dom, not only on transit but also in parking lots, town cen- ters (downtowns or shopping districts), and entertainment areas, particularly where there are taverns that attract young patrons, has received considerably more attention than in the United States. In the face of a number of academic studies that drew few definitive conclusions, in 2007 the London Evening Standard compared surveillance cameras in different parts of London, including the transit system, and claimed that police were “no more likely to catch offenders in areas with hun- dreds of cameras than in those with hardly any.” This was despite expenditures of more than £200 million (about $294 million in 2010) (Davenport 2007). In the face of recent criticism of the widespread reli- ance on surveillance throughout the country, in May 2010 the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition govern- ment announced that curbs would be placed on the “tens of thousands of closed-circuit television cameras in public areas” owing to their “little impact on crime rates over the years.” The new deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, noted that it was “outrageous that decent, law-abiding citizens get treated as if they have got something to hide” (Burns May 20, 2010, p. A6). But within slightly more than a fort- night of the announcement, police claimed to have solved a major crime after viewing images from security cameras outside the home of a suspect who was charged with hav- ing killed a woman who was visible on the camera, one of a number of women he is believed to have slain (Burns May 28, 2010, p. A4). USE OF SURVEILLANCE BY TRANSIT SYSTEMS WORLDWIDE Despite the focus on recent acts of terrorism against rail net- works, rail-directed terrorism has a long international his- tory. Among the attacks on the Italian rail network was one outside Bologna in 1974 that killed 12 people and injured 48; another in 1980 at the Bologna station that killed 40 people and injured almost 300; and one in 1986, also in the Bologna area that killed 12 people and injured almost 200. In 1986, Chile saw 78 explosive-related incidents on its rail system. Two subway bombings occurred in Paris in 1995, includ- ing one in July on a commuter rail train entering the under- ground Saint-Michel station during rush hour that killed 7 people and injured 80 when the explosion led to a fireball that measured over 3,000˚C at its epicenter. A second Paris bombing occurred only 3 months later at the Orsay Museum station. Attributed to the Armed Islamic Group, it resulted in no deaths but more than two dozen injuries. In May 2010, this event received renewed publicity when French police arrested 14 men they suspected of plotting the escape from prison of one of the bombers. In Argentina, in 2008, com- muters set fire to a train that had delayed their morning commute in what officials believed was sabotage by leftist political activists. A similar incident involving commuters had occurred at the main railway station a year earlier. Bus bombings have been frequent throughout Israel, including in its two major cities of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, where suicide bombers often targeted bus stations and shelters in addition to the vehicles themselves, particularly after it became more difficult for them to enter the buses unobserved. Nerve Gas Becomes a New Terrorist Tactic The Kasumigaseki subway station in Tokyo, Japan, was the scene of a nerve gas attack carried out by the Aum Shin- rikyo religious sect when members of the group released five canisters of diluted sarin, an extremely toxic chemical, disguised in lunch boxes and soft drinks on five separate subway trains during the morning rush hour. Although only 12 people died, between 5,000 and 6,000 were exposed to the sarin gas. This is an example of the vulnerability of tran- sit systems even when they are not the primary target, as the cult members released the gas on these particular trains not with the aim of killing transit passengers, but of causing deaths in police headquarters and other government build- ings in the area immediately above the stations. Unlike many countries in Europe where transit security is a national issue, but like the United States and Canada where planning tends to be localized, the Japanese government provides guidance to transit operators on security issues that are recommendations rather than regulations. In response to the attack, both the Tokyo Metro and the Toei Subway added patrols by both their own staffs and private security officers and installed more than 2,000 video surveillance cameras.

17 In 1985, when Hong Kong extended its 6-year-old Mass Transit Railway (MTR) by opening the 12-station Hong Kong Island Line, surveillance played a major role in its protection plans even though the new line was a change from single- level stations to some as many as seven levels deep. Here, too, researchers have been reluctant to attribute the low crime rate on the railway solely to the cameras. The transit system is policed by a unit of the Royal Hong Kong Police Depart- ment. Response times to incidents observed on the monitors have been described as “an almost miraculous 60 seconds— maximum—on a station, or two and a half minutes if the officer has to come by train from another station” (The Police Journal 1985, pp. 265–266). As with WMATA and MARTA, the MTR incorporates many features of CPTED; stations are well-lit and built without blind spots or niches, and there are no public toilets, luggage lockers, or food stalls. This assists those who monitor the video cameras by minimizing the rea- sons anyone might be observed doing anything but waiting for a train or exiting a train (see Figure 1). Concerned about graffiti, public order, and more serious crimes on its transit system in the mid-1990s, the Dutch Min- istry of Transport added surveillance cameras to its buses but relied on enhanced human security on its rail lines. Rail officials tried to address the unemployment problem and the need for extra security by recruiting unemployed men as watchmen. Although they lacked police authority and did not carry weapons or handcuffs, the men patrolled stations to act as deterrents to miscreants. Surveillance observations on the buses found that most problems involved aggressive youths who frightened regular patrons, resulting in most of the youths being referred to their schools for handling (Smeets and Jacobs 1996, pp. 32–33). The Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District (Tri-Met) in Portland, Oregon, introduced a similar citizen-based pro- gram decades ago. A Rider Advocate group, consisting of a supervisor and ten people recruited from a nonprofit neigh- borhood coalition, randomly rode buses that had a high rate of gang-related incidents; they were paid and identified with Tri-Met through their jackets and patches. The program, which currently operates in partnership with Victory Out- reach Community Services, was initially expanded as part of the AmeriCorps program to include college-age community residents who received stipends and tuition benefits in return for their participation. All advocates are selected and work in accordance with Tri-Met’s guidelines. France also has a lengthy history of terrorist activity. Between 1970 and 1995, terrorists carried out more than 20 attacks on French surface transportation systems (Fink 2003, p. 1822). The Paris Transport Authority (Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens or RAPT), the agency that oversees Métro, bus, and tramway service in and around Paris, tended in the 1980s to view its communications and surveillance networks as parts of its station management and fire preven- Similar to U.S. crime prevention strategies, signs were also posted in stations and on railcars, and announcements were added reminding passengers to report suspicious persons and objects. In addition, trash cans were removed from all public areas, as is true in many U.S. transit systems today. The King’s Cross fire and the Tokyo sarin attack high- light the importance of train control, which today is often video-assisted. In King’s Cross, the fire was fueled by drafts caused by the failure to halt train movements. In Tokyo, the sarin was carried from station to station by moving trains and doors continuing to open as the trains moved through the stations. FIGURE 1 This is an example of a reminder to passengers. Deutsche Bahn posts signs on its buses and railcars reminding patrons of its 24-hour hotline for reporting vandalism; many portions of the system are also under video surveillance. Photo courtesy of Dorothy M. Schulz. Learning from One Another A transit system following ideas and plans established by others is common. Just as the Tokyo Metro turned to tactics used by a number of U.S. systems, in mid-May 2010, Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, announced that the sen- sor and camera system it began planning for in the wake of the Tokyo attacks would be operational within 2 weeks. The city’s public transport company announced that in addition to surveillance cameras, the system would include sensors that can detect leakages and send information to the opera- tions center and to police and would automatically activate instructions to passengers to assist in evacuations (“Prague deploys sensors…” 2010). This, too, follows actions taken in the United States, where a number of systems have installed sensors to fulfill a variety of roles. Whether for passenger or risk management, crime pre- vention, or terrorism concerns, many countries have turned to video surveillance in their transit systems. In New South Wales, Australia, CityRail introduced cameras in the 1980s; by 1991, cameras blanketed about 25 of its highest-risk sta- tions, including more than 50 cameras at Redfern and almost that many at North Sydney. The installation of the cameras was highly publicized. Rail staff believed that the cameras had reduced assaults in the stations as well as graffiti activ- ity, but researchers found this difficult to confirm because the installation of the cameras was accompanied by an increase in security officers (Easteal and Wilson 1991, pp. 19–20).

18 described the surveillance system as serving a number of pur- poses, including control of patron traffic patterns, passenger safety, management of emergencies and crises, and remote observation of unprotected areas. The central control room included real-time monitoring of the surveillance images by civilian personnel, who were able to make announcements to patrons with a public address system. They were also able to remotely configure the system’s functions to focus on particu- lar areas or images. In addition to monitoring patron areas, cameras were also installed to view yards and storage areas. Watching Now or Watching Later Throughout this synthesis, viewing in real time is defined as someone watching the monitors with the capability of making public address announcements, dispatching agency police or emergency personnel to the location, or contacting local emergency responders. Response could be to crimes in progress, patron calls for assistance, safety-related matters, or rail operations activities that require immediate response. Not all cameras are viewed in real time; those that are not are used for retroactive or forensic investigation by police officers. In these instances, the images are used to assist in investigation of events that have already occurred but that the transit agency or other authorities have determined require follow-up activity. Examples could be crimes, safety hazards, accidents, or derailments. A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released in 2006 on passenger rail security found that five countries that were not identified had centralized the process for performing research and developing passenger rail secu- rity technologies as well as for maintaining a clearinghouse on technology and best practices. The report noted that U.S. rail agencies interviewed for the study expressed an interest in a more active centralized research and development authority (Hecker 2006, p. 15). Recently, alluding to this greater level of centralization, Amtrak Vice President and Chief of Police John O’Connor told members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation that Amtrak had become the first American rail police department to become an associate member of RAILPOL, a European organization of rail and transit security agencies that were cooperating to share intelligence, coordinate activities, and improve counter- terror capabilities (O’Connor 2010, p. 4). Estimating the Number of Cameras Although video surveillance has proliferated as a law enforcement tool in the United States, its use is far more common throughout Europe and Asia. A review of rail security measures in 2007 found that almost all European Union countries that had not previously installed surveil- lance equipment on their rail systems had done so in the aftermath of terrorist activities, including, for instance, the installation of 1,500 security cameras to guard the Belgian tion programs rather than as crime or terrorist prevention tools. The system’s fire prevention tactics in 1989 included station telephones linked to RAPT headquarters and the fire brigade, with surveillance cameras allowing staff to monitor public areas as well as the system’s electrical and mechanical plant (Simony and Loesche 1989). More recently, Camille Fink (2003) described RAPT as having enhanced security that now includes physical barriers, alarm systems, and a surveillance network that relies on software to allow opera- tors to bring up a particular image from any one of more than 4,000 cameras. In a study of Météor (Métro Est-Ouest Rapide), a line developed to provide service to Paris’ northern and southern suburbs, Marina L. Myhre and Fabien Rosso (1996) com- pared it to WMATA as it, too, was planned to allay pas- sengers’ fears of crime and disorder by designing in CPTED elements. In contrast to most of the existing stations on the 13 Paris Métro lines, where stations had multiple entrance/ exits and long, winding corridors, and lacked surveillance cameras, Météor was designed to include two surveillance cameras at platform ends and onboard cameras linked to a systemwide control center. In addition to surveillance cam- eras, Météor relies on a number of other security features similar to U.S. systems. As with WMATA, uniformed and plainclothes attendants are present in the stations and are equipped with two-way radios to communicate with police and, as MARTA, a variety of intercoms, call buttons, and emergency alarms enable the command center to com- municate with operators and passengers through the pub- lic address system (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2006, p. 732). These features can be found on MARTA and on a number of newer U.S. light rail systems but are more difficult to install and maintain on older systems, where either the technical capacity is lacking or where vandalism results in high mal- function rates. Spain has also witnessed considerable terrorist activity, primarily at the hands of the Basque independence orga- nization, ETA, which was initially suspected of having caused the March 11, 2004, attack on Renfe, the national rail system, before it was determined to have been carried out by al Qaeda operatives. Although municipal police pro- tect Metro Madrid, Renfe has its own police force; the two share responsibility for both crime prevention and response to crimes. Since the attacks, stations have been retrofitted with anti-intrusion and detection systems, and additional surveillance cameras and private security officers are now employed to monitor patron and employee areas (Loukaitou- Sideris et al. 2006, p. 740). In 1998, responding primarily to patron reports of feelings of insecurity and to damage to equipment caused by vandalism, the Italian railway system developed a command and control system to centrally manage railway operations that included a surveillance system. Nino Ronetti and Carlo Dambra (2000)

19 rail service and the installation of 1,200 security cameras to guard Swedish subway and commuter rail stations (Howarth 2007). One vendor put the number of cameras at 2.75 million in China, 4.2 million in the United Kingdom, and 30 million in the United States and estimated that the global market was worth $13 billion in 2009 and could be worth $41 bil- lion by 2014 (Ben-Zvi 2009). But vendor estimates might be taken with a grain of salt, particularly because periodic reports indicate that even in countries where law enforce- ment is more centralized than in the United States, the actual number of surveillance cameras is difficult to calculate. USE OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE BY CANADIAN TRANSIT SYSTEMS Rarely have transit studies played as pivotal a role in theories of crime than in those pertaining to fear of crime. One of the earliest and most important of such studies was conducted by the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) in 1976. Responding to the concerns of the Metro Action Committee on Public Violence Against Women and Children (METRAC) and the Metro Toronto Police Force, the TTC undertook a safety audit, which documented that despite a low crime rate, the subway system was perceived as unsafe by many women. The study, Moving Forward: Making Transit Safer for Women (1989), for the first time formally recognized the much higher levels of fear expressed by women patrons of public transit. The study stemmed from a safety audit that established that women feared sexual assault on the Toronto transit system despite its low crime rate. Women, who had not previously been asked such questions, admitted that their fears caused them to limit their use of transit altogether or during nighttime hours. To address these fears, features were added to the transit system that are today taken for granted, including installing passenger assistance alarms in transit vehicles, installing emergency telephones on plat- forms, closing off dead-end passageways, creating visibly marked off-hours waiting areas, and creating large and eas- ily understood signage. In responding to Moving Forward, the TTC turned to video surveillance as a crime prevention and fear alleviation tool. This tactic has become common throughout Canada, where passenger rail systems rely heavily on video surveil- lance. Many of these agencies provide considerable detail about their safety and security strategies on their websites, including more open discussion of the presence of surveil- lance than is found on U.S. transit agency websites. Just as in the United States, residents of major Canadian cities and their suburbs depend on rail transit for travel to and from their central business districts. According to the Canadian Urban Transport Association, in 2007 public tran- sit employed 45,000 people and had a 1.7 billion total rid- ership (Issue Paper 23, June 2007). The same report noted the prevalence of video surveillance technology both inside stations and onboard vehicles and also noted that in response to citizens’ desire for greater levels of protection, a number of transit systems, including Greater Vancouver, Toronto, and Ottawa, have increased the legal powers of their security personnel, including broadening powers of arrest and autho- rizing officers to enforce the Criminal Code as well as laws relating to trespassing, liquor licensing, and controlled sub- stances violations (Issue Paper 23, June 2007). The policing configurations of Canadian transit agencies are not unlike the United States in that officers range from those who have full police authority to those who are basically security officers. In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Canadian federal government assumed a larger role in transit security both financially and through regulations that require agencies to conduct risk assessments, outline mitigation strategies, and develop systemwide security plans. For instance, the Transit- Secure Program set aside $80 million CAD (Canadian dol- lars) to support security measures by urban transit (bus) and passenger rail operators. The first round of funding, which was announced at the end of 2006, included up to CAD$37 million to help transit systems in Canada’s six major met- ropolitan areas (Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Toronto, Ottawa-Gatineau, and Montreal) conduct risk assessments; develop security plans; create employee training and public awareness programs; and upgrade security equipment such as surveillance equipment, access control technology, and light- ing. The second round of Transit-Secure funding, announced in 2007, included up to CAD$2 million to support risk assess- ments and comprehensive security planning by smaller com- munities that rely on bus rather than rail service. Transport Canada, Public Safety Canada, and local stake- holders have sponsored a number of emergency prepared- ness activities, particularly in the interjurisdictional areas that include Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal. These activi- ties, which include tabletop, command post, and full-scale live exercises and drills, are sponsored to help government officials, transit system personnel, first responders, and law enforcement agencies prepare for their emergency roles. Toronto Transit Commission The TTC, the largest transit system in Canada, carried 445 million passengers on 2,500 vehicles in 2006. Based on a review of antiterrorism security weaknesses that identified a number of potential mitigation measures in 2006, TTC was awarded CAD$1.5 million in Transit-Secure funding to sup- port a terrorism-specific risk and vulnerability assessment, enhance property security and access controls, and install a surface vehicle broadcast messaging system. Future ini- tiatives could include enhanced visual monitoring technol- ogy for subway stations and high-risk surface vehicle routes (Issue Paper 23, June 2007).

20 in French or in English, provide the same level of detail on safety and security arrangements as those of the other Cana- dian transit agencies. Because the Metro’s rubber-tire subway cars are among the oldest currently in use, dating back to the mid-1960s, and are not air-conditioned, it is likely that no video surveillance system exists on the cars, which also do not permit passen- gers to move between cars once onboard. Even the newer cars date from 1976, before rail vehicle manufacturers delivered equipment with pre-installed surveillance systems. Requests for proposals for bids in 2008, though, specified that vehicles include larger windows, additional lighting, high-definition televisions, a new public address system, and surveillance cameras. More recently, in October 2010, the STM signed a contract for 468 rail vehicles meeting its specifications (“STM contract signing…” Oct. 22, 2010). In late 2007, Metro announced that it would use CAD$3.6 million of the CAD$5.7 million that the Montreal region had obtained from the Transit-Secure program to add 240 video cameras to the 1,200 already in place. An additional CAD$75,000 would be used to improve the reliability of video surveillance equipment at Montreal’s downtown Cen- tral Station. Cameras would be located in areas identified in a study based specifically on terrorism-related security issues (“Cash to Secure…” 2007). Alberta Transit Systems The province of Alberta is home to two of Canada’s pas- senger rail systems, the Calgary Transit Authority and the Edmonton Transit System. Both provide considerable detail on their websites about their service and their safety and security policies and advise readers that the collection of recorded camera images is authorized under Section 33c of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. Edmonton’s light rail system is a 21 km (about 13 miles), 15-station system operating 74 LRVs that carry more than 74,000 passengers on an average day. Average speed is 70 km per hour (kp/h) [about 44 miles per hour (mph)], and headways are 5 minutes during peak hours. All stations and major transit centers feature surveillance cameras that are linked into an emergency telephone network that is acti- vated as soon as the help phone is engaged and also allows an officer in the control room to speak with the patron over the phone. Safety and Security Division personnel are also able to monitor incidents through a computer-aided dis- patch system in patrol vehicles. This system allows officers to receive information from control center staff viewing the surveillance monitors. Transit officers are designated as special constables, which authorizes them to enforce transit laws and to carry batons and pepper spray. Funds for ongoing enhancements to lighting, to improve CPTED design features in and around stations, and to improve the In addition, in October 2007, the TTC announced plans to install nearly 12,000 surveillance cameras on its entire fleet of buses, streetcars, and on all new subway cars and also at all rail and bus stations. The system was planned for real- time viewing as well as having the capability to download video to a central archive for investigations of past crimes. Streetcars were expected to be outfitted with between four and six cameras each and plans called for the nearly 250 new subway cars to each have one camera. No decision had been made on whether the existing 800 subway cars would be retrofitted (Edwards 2007). The new cars, manufactured by Bombardier Transportation, also include a two-way inter- com system for drivers and passengers to communicate, and the cars can be delivered with integrated communications for passengers for alerts such as which doors will open and which stations are being approached. Ottawa O-Train Ottawa’s LRT service is Canada’s newest and smallest rail transit system. Opened in 2001, the O-Train travels for about 5 miles, carrying about 10,000 passengers daily. Unlike many LRT systems, its alignment is entirely isolated from road traffic but the lightly-used Ottawa Central provides infrequent freight traffic on pre-existing Canadian Pacific Railway track after the O-Train’s operating hours. Operated by OC Transpo under its official name of Capital Railway, the system is considered light rail in part because of extension plans into downtown Ottawa and in part because its railcars are smaller and lighter than most in North Amer- ica and do not meet Association of American Railroads’ standards for crash-worthiness for mainline train cars. The railcars use one operator and no additional crew. The three diesel-powered Talent railcars, built by Bombardier as part of a larger order for Deutsche Bahn’s regional network, run on 15-minute headways. Five stations are monitored by sur- veillance cameras and their images are observed by com- munications officers. These officers also answer emergency calls and dispatch the Transit Special Constables, who are supported by members of the Ottawa Police Service for problems they are not authorized or trained to handle. Montreal Metro Montreal is served by two transit agencies. The Montreal Metro is a 71-km (about 44 miles) subway system operated by the Société de transport de Montréal (STM) that currently comprises 67 stations on four separate lines. The Agence métropolitaine de transport operates the 214-km (about 133 miles) rail agency that provides service on five commuter rail lines in addition to operating a bus network. The Metro is Canada’s longest subway system and the busiest in terms of daily passengers (987,000 on an average weekday in 2008, when more than 290 million riders used the system). Neither the subway’s nor the commuter rail line’s websites, whether

21 went toward the most recent upgrading of the system, which also included funds for enhanced lighting and helped to pay for retrofitting that was in progress when the funds were dis- tributed. With the system introduced in 2008, cameras are able to transmit three video feeds per station—the inbound and outbound platforms and the lobby. The project is labor intensive; 6 employees administer it, including managing who may access the system, and 18 employees were trained in system maintenance. Just as it has consistently upgraded its surveillance cam- era network, TransLink has seen a need to upgrade its human security network. Although SkyTrain initially was patrolled by Transit Special Constables, in December 2005 TransLink created the South Coast BC Transportation Authority Police Service to allow officers to pursue a suspect outside the tran- sit agency’s property and to coordinate their activities more fully with local police. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY The TTC/METRAC study was in the forefront of research that determined that the public’s perception of whether tran- sit facilities are safe can affect decisions that will impact ridership. This is particularly true in parts of the country where the decision to use public transportation or to drive is a discretionary one. Many riders of the nation’s largest transit systems may have few other commuting options as a result of traffic congestion and the inadequate parking facili- ties in the central business districts, but in other parts of the country the decision to use the transit system is based on a number of factors. Research has shown that safety and secu- rity play a large role in the decision, particularly for women. Today, the TTC/METRAC finding that women are more fearful of crime than men is commonly accepted by researchers and police executives. Related findings by Mar- garet T. Gordon and Stephanie Riger (1989) were explained by criminological theories discussed by Dorothy M. Schulz and Susan Gilbert (1996) at the FHWA’s second national conference on women’s travel issues and more recently by Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Amanda Bornstein, Camille Fink, Linda Samuels, and Shanin Gerami (2009). These theories of crime and fear have influenced decisions by transit systems on a number of security measures, including enhanced use of video surveillance systems. Opportunity theory, advanced in the late 1970s by Lawrence E. Cohen and Marvin Felson (1979), stated that offenders will commit crimes where there are suitable tar- gets and an absence of protection. This theory played a large role in the expansion of CPTED as a way to use the physi- cal facility itself to create a more protected environment. Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke (1986) extended existing surveillance system were provided by the Transit- Secure Program. All Calgary Transit (locally referred to as CTrain) sta- tions and platforms are under 24-hour surveillance by more than 350-cameras located throughout the system. Stations and platforms are also equipped with emergency telephones (called HELP phones in Calgary). Video monitors are viewed by staff members who have the ability to contact the system’s uniformed peace officers. In 2008, following a mur- der of a woman who was stalked aboard a train and followed home, Calgary Transit doubled its staff of peace officers to 65. Although the officers do not have full police powers, they are authorized to enforce a number of municipal bylaws (Stelter 2009). Similar to a number of states in the United States, the major difference between peace officers and police officers is that peace officers cannot conduct inves- tigations but may take actions for a limited number of situ- ations that occur in their presence; they also receive fewer hours of training. Also in 2008, with funds provided through the Transit-Secure Program, Calgary installed a dozen pan- tilt-zoom cameras at selected locations to provide improved surveillance capabilities. A parking fee was also instituted to generate funds dedicated to enhancing the safety, security, and cleanliness of the transit system. British Columbia TransLink The Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority (Trans- Link) is a complex transit system that has come to rely heavily on video surveillance, particularly since the Win- ter Olympics in 2010. Because the system spreads out from the city itself, TransLink covers the largest geographic area of any North American transit system. It comprises more than 1,000 square miles (1,800 square kilometers), travels through 17 municipalities, and in 2007 served more than 165 million passengers. SkyTrain, a subsidiary of SkyLink, is a fully automated, 49.5 km (about 31 miles) light rail system with 33 stations that links downtown Vancouver with a num- ber of its larger residential suburbs. Built in 1986 to serve the World’s Fair held in Vancouver, it is the longest automated light rail system in the world. Like a number of the newer light rail systems, SkyTrain included a surveillance system when it began revenue operations. When the system was expanded in 2000, the IT network was upgraded to expand beyond the 850 analog cameras that recorded around the clock, with feeds sent from each station to a central control center where images were recorded and stored. Similar to the synthesis case study involving Metro Tran- sit in Minneapolis, Minnesota (see chapter five), experiences in British Columbia reinforce that even a modern surveil- lance system requires frequent upgrading. By 2005, the net- work was not considered large enough to handle the amount of video that was being generated (Anderson 2008). Almost CAD$10 million of Transit-Secure funds distributed in 2006

22 as reflecting the crime and disorder in the neighborhood (Loukaitus-Sideris et al. 2009). These groups are often the most transit dependent because they lack access to a pri- vate vehicle. Preventing “Broken Windows” These findings on fear of transit crime support a more general theory of crime prevention that applies not only to women but to all potential transit patrons. This so-called bro- ken windows theory, popularized by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982), posits that a broken window that is not repaired sends a message that a facility is uncared for and thereby presents a target for disorderly or criminal behavior. In this theory, any sign of neglect, such as graffiti or scratchiti, or even an overflowing trash bin, has the same effect. In addition, Wilson and Kelling theorized that disorder creates fear in those who live nearby or must use those facili- ties and that the areas eventually attract sex-traders, drug addicts, and noisy youths who make the facility even less desirable to others. When those who are unable to shun the facility make use of it, they, too, begin to contribute to its disorder; they believe there is little chance their behavior will be penalized because there appears to be no respon- sible authority over the location. This is part of the reason to make public address announcements reminding patrons of the consequences of even modest misconduct. It sends a message to all in hearing distance that the location is being monitored and that someone is in charge and is responsible. Even with announcements, a facility may have reached such a state of neglect that it may require not only CPTED rede- sign but also uniformed patrol presence until it is restored to an orderly condition. Once order is re-established, vis- ible video surveillance with appropriate signage indicating its presence and public address announcements reinforcing this signage can help assuring patrons that a certain level of safety, security, and orderliness has been established and will be maintained. Transit agencies’ efforts to redesign stations to allay these fears and, particularly since September 11, 2001, to add video surveillance systems to public areas have addressed some but not all of these fears. Studies in Not- tingham, England, and Ann Arbor, Michigan, found that patrons felt only moderately safer with the knowledge that cameras were watching. In England, focus groups com- posed of women stated that they did not feel more secure knowing that “someone, somewhere is supposed to be watching them” (Trench et al. 1992), and the Michigan study found that although surveillance cameras were the most noticed of the security improvements implemented, they did not have a significant impact on passengers’ feel- ings of safety (Wallace et al. 1999). Yet because so many of the studies in the United Kingdom and the United States the theory by introducing the concept of “rational choice,” which stated that offenders are rational, self-serving indi- viduals who will weigh the benefits and risks of commit- ting a crime in a particular place at a particular time. The benefits of a particular location are the presence of a victim and the ability to commit a criminal act and escape unseen. The risks include being observed or being unable to escape. Many patrons view transit as providing a number of the ben- efits criminals consider. Specifically, the patrons view them- selves as available victims and they view the transit system itself as providing hiding places. Because they may not see a police presence, they estimate the possibility of the cap- ture of their victimizer as low. Unfortunately, criminals may see the same cost-benefit analysis and act accordingly. But electronic video surveillance systems change the equation. They increase the risk of being observed; an offender might be observed and actually caught before fleeing, or his or her image may be caught to use for retroactive investigation and subsequent arrest. Women and the Fear of Victimization Women’s higher fears of victimization are based on their generally facing higher levels of stranger violence (Young 1992), and according to Richard B. Felson (1996) their fears are generally correct. Because they are often smaller than their aggressor might be, they are more likely to be the targets of random violence in public spaces. Women interviewed by Loukaitus-Sideris and colleagues as part of an MTI study on easing women’s fears of transportation environments (2009) found that women believed that as a group they had distinct safety/security needs and that despite improvements in tran- sit security, they were often fearful of transit settings. Echo- ing the earlier TTC/METRAC findings, these fears often led women to adjust their behavior and travel patterns and/or avoid certain travel modes and settings at certain times. For transit agencies, this translates into lost revenue. But despite this finding, the MTI researchers also found that only a small number of U.S. transit agencies had programs that targeted the safety and security needs of women riders. Although most systems agreed that women had distinct safety and security needs, only a third of those surveyed believed that agencies should put specific programs into place to address these needs. Jerome A. Needle and Renée M. Cobb in a TCRP study entitled Improving Transit Security (1997) found that fear and anxiety about personal security were impor- tant detractors from using public transit for all potential patrons, not only women. Although gender has emerged as the most significant factor related to fear of crime and victimization in transit environments, other studies, not all conducted in the United States, have found that fears are also more pronounced among the elderly, certain ethnic groups, and low-income people, who typically live in high- crime neighborhoods and may see their local transit station

23 are based on small samples or individual locations, the true effect video surveillance has on patron perception of security is difficult to determine. Despite this unanswered question, electronic video surveillance has come to pre- dominate in crime and terrorist prevention efforts around the world.

Next: CHAPTER THREE How Transit Agencies use Video Surveillance »
Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies Get This Book
×
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

TRB’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Synthesis 90: Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies explores the current use of electronic video surveillance technology solely by passenger rail agencies onboard railcars, along rights-of-way, and more.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!