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31 their headquarters buildings were monitored by video sur- surveillance at the entrance to its yard in this category and veillance but a small number indicated that all agency loca- another included pedestrian crossings near a bridge. This tions, including satellite offices, were monitored. Customer small system, in operation since 2004, also reported that it service areas and public lobbies; TVMs; and warehouses, relied on surveillance only along its ROW and that no other storerooms, loading docks, and commissaries were among portions of the transit system were monitored by video cam- the locations listed as under video monitoring. One agency eras. Phoenix's Valley Metro (another case study agency) did noted that its incline plane control station and the souvenir not state in its questionnaire response that it employs any gift shop were monitored. ROW surveillance, but protection of its Town Lake Bridge in Tempe, Arizona, is a major element of its surveillance network (see chapter five). RIGHT-OF-WAY SURVEILLANCE Although passenger rail systems do not generally con- Use of video surveillance technology along the ROW was duct surveillance of the ROW, a number of bus systems uncommon. Of the 43 responding agencies, only 14 indi- have employed it to assist in injury claims adjudication or, cated that they used surveillance along the ROW. Of these, less frequently, to monitor for suspicious activities. In these 12 indicated its use primarily near stations. Only two agen- instances, cameras were installed not only inside buses to cut cies reported the use of surveillance at grade crossings and down on crime and vandalism, but also outside the vehicles two indicated its use at interchanges with other railroads to monitor activity along the bus route and to alert operators (Table 6). to suspicious activities. For instance, HARTline, in Tampa, Florida, began using surveillance along its bus transitway in the 1990s to alert supervisors to suspicious activities. Bro- TABLE 6 ward County, Florida, did the same, hoping to cut down on LOCATION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY VIDEO SURVEILLANCE crime and vandalism but also on accident and injury claims Installation Location No. that drivers could not verify owing to their inability to moni- Near Stations, Station Platforms, 12 tor all areas of the bus from the front seat (Gilbert 1995). or Shelters At Grade Crossings 2 Intercity Transit in Olympia, Washington, which main- tains 22 separate bus routes, installed cameras on its approx- At Interchanges with Other Rail 2 Systems imately 100 buses and vans to better managing public safety and to mitigate liability. A 35% increase in riders over a In High Disorder/Crime Areas 3 5-year period, combined with a number of assaults in down- Other 7 town Olympia, led to the decision to integrate the cameras into the existing global positioning system (GPS) and alarm The number of uses exceeded the number of agencies systems to "increase security initiatives, deter vandalism because some agencies that employed ROW surveillance and theft, mitigate accident and liability claims, and enhance used it in multiple locations. Illustrative of the importance of operations." According to transit management, although local decision-making, it is difficult to generalize about the none of the assaults were on bus operators, stabbings near agencies that employed ROW surveillance or about the sub- the transit system led to customer fears of crime, a concern categories listing where they used it. For instance, the two that it was believed would be addressed by the added sur- systems that reported using surveillance at grade crossings veillance ("More Traffic..." 2007). This is an example of a included an old, established West Coast multimodal system transit agency's awareness of the whole journey concept. By and a light rail system that recently added a small number of responding to events that occurred off its premises but in trolleys to augment its primarily bus transit system. Simi- its immediate area of operation, Intercity recognized that larly, the two systems that indicated use of surveillance at patron fear could discourage ridership. interchange locations were the same trolley system that had installed cameras at grade crossings and a long-established Deterring Trespassers with Video Cameras and Sensors Midwestern commuter rail line. Three agencies indicated the presence of surveillance equipment in areas they defined The increase in the number of cities using cameras to pho- as high disorder or crime areas. tograph and send summonses to red-light and right-turn- on-red violators has the potential to expand into a way to Seven agencies, including one case study agency (Min- provide ROW surveillance or, more likely, to photograph and nesota's Metro Transit), had installed surveillance in areas fine railroad crossing gate violators. Although none of the listed as "other"; in most of these instances, "other" was transit agencies specifically mentioned using surveillance defined as critical areas such as subways, bridges, and tun- this way, a number have turned to photo enforcement cam- nels. Of these agencies, all but Metro Transit were commuter eras to minimize deaths and injuries and to mitigate liability or heavy rail systems, although one smaller system included at rail crossings.

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32 LACMTA installed photo-enforcement cameras along other public documents. Relying on these sources, among the Blue Line in 2007; violators were fined a minimum of the transit systems that have installed motion detectors and $271 for the first offense (Abdollah 2007). In early 2009, the sensors are MTA (New York and Connecticut), MTA-MD, city of El Mirage, Arizona, expanded its traffic cameras to LACMTA, Amtrak, WMATA, NJT, SEPTA, and MBTA. a Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad crossing, Most but not all of these agencies purchased all or part of contracting for a system called Redflexrail, which detects their sensor systems with the help of DHS grants. However, when vehicles drive around railroad crossing gates and not all published sources are reliable; as recently as 2009, also records the bell sounds and whistles of approaching at least one video surveillance blog stated that BART had trains. As with most red-light camera operations, the costs announced in 2007 that it would be expanding its existing of installation, operation, and maintenance is borne by the surveillance system to include cameras along the tracks, but contractor and the city pays the company a portion of the responses by BART to this synthesis' questionnaire did not fines that are collected. Although the idea was not BNSF's, confirm this information. the freight railroad has been in talks with other contractors about implementing camera-based crossing enforcement. Right-of-Way Trespassing A BNSF spokesman noted that the railway supported video enforcement because it could "influence driver behavior at Deterring trespassers from the ROW is an area in which rail crossings and increase driver safety" (Leung 2009). crime prevention and risk mitigation strategies and concerns overlap. Trespassers may be innocent of any ill intentions A similar plan was instituted in Sydney, Australia, in toward the transit system, but they may cause damage to 2006, when mobile cameras, fences, and warnings signs property or injury to themselves. They may also be malevo- were erected along a number of rail corridors in a campaign lent. Reviewing the British response to IRA terrorism as part intended to deter people from walking over the tracks. The of a larger study, Protecting Public Surface Transportation initiative was instituted after CityRail reported more than Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research 2,300 instances of trespassing in 20052006, resulting in 23 on Best Security Practices, undertaken for MTI, Brian Jen- deaths and 11 serious injuries. The remote-controlled cam- kins and Larry N. Gersten found that as stations were better eras, called Spycams, which cost about $250,000 each, can protected, usually through use of video technology, attack- be used in poor light and at night and are portable enough to ers moved their attacks to switch boxes and areas away from be moved to trespassing "hot spots" by railway employees stations (p. 20). (Silmalis 2006). A number of U.S. rail agencies use similar mobile cameras mounted on lifts with adjustable heights to Because these crimes often occur in remote locations, provide temporary coverage in outdoor parking lots where a they are difficult to solve, as with the derailing of Amtrak's series of crimes have been reported. The cameras are then Sunset Limited in Hyder, Arizona, on October 9, 1995, about moved to new areas as problems and activity shifts from 59 miles southwest of Phoenix, Arizona, on an isolated por- facility to facility. tion of Southern Pacific Railway's ROW. The train carried 248 passengers and a crew of 20; the derailment caused 65 A number of the case study agencies (see chapter five) injuries and the death of one employee. Property damage was are using or are planning to use photo enforcement in com- estimated at close to $3,000,000. The crime had been com- bination with sensors to deter both vehicles and pedestrians mitted by the removal of spikes from the rails, the removal trespassing on their alignments. Metro Transit uses cameras of nuts and bolts from the rail joints, and the disabling of the equipped with analytics to monitor portals into tunnels and signal system, in addition to other acts of vandalism. Despite at Minneapolis' Lindbergh Airport to supplement its intru- evidence found at the scene indicating an intentional derail- sion detection system. Houston's METRO is in the process of ment, the crime has never been solved (Terrorism in Surface expanding its surveillance network to add cameras along its Transportation 1996). alignment that would monitor nontransit vehicles that make illegal turns into its alignment. PAAC has relied on chemi- Such incidents are not unique to the United States. In the cal/radiation-detection sensors in a number of its downtown 2007 RAND Corporation study Securing America's Passen- subway stations since 20062007. And Valley Metro relies ger-Rail Systems, Jeremy M. Wilson and colleagues broke on a combination of intrusion detection and surveillance down terrorist attacks on rail systems worldwide from 1998 cameras to protect the Tempe Town Lake Bridge. through 2006. Their database contained 24,000 attacks, of which 455 were against solely rail targets (2% of the total). Many transit systems are reluctant to discuss their use They also noted that recent attacks were more numerous and of sensors, particularly because many of the installations were a source for concern owing to the number of causalities are seen as terrorist-related early warning systems for and significant damage to the rail system that they caused. detection of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and Further refining their database to 886 incidents, they found explosive materials. Despite this, some information can be that of incidents where a weapon was involved, the percent- gleaned from media accounts, vendor announcements, and age that occurred inside railcars, in stations, and on the

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33 tracks was virtually identical (26, 25, and 25, respectively). system and installation of chemical detection sensors along Of the incidents that occurred on the tracks, they consid- 5 miles of track. The combination of agencies involved in ered 79% to have been caused by bombings, 16% through the project includes police staff from Amtrak and CSX. Data sabotage (defined as damage without use of a weapon, such will be available to the Washington DC Metropolitan Police, as removal of rails or damaging equipment), 2% by armed the U.S. Capital Police, the National Park Service Police, and attack, and 2% by arson. Although it is impossible to con- other agencies to be authorized by DHS. firm this claim, video surveillance along the ROW might have prevented or in some way mitigated the effects of some In an earlier system upgrade that was also supported by of these track-related incidents. funds from DHS, the Delaware River Port Authority used its $3.8 million grant to upgrade surveillance at 14 rail stations Current DHS projects that involve passenger rail agen- and tunnels between rail stations adjacent to its 14-mile- cies are intended to provide ROW protection by extending long ROW. As part of the overall project, which included the reach of electronic video surveillance from patron and installation of more than 250 cameras and almost 100 emer- employee areas to the tracks. In addition to those mentioned gency telephones, cameras were to be installed above and as already having received DHS funding, system upgrades below the Ben Franklin Bridge, a seven-lane highway with currently under way generally call for a network based on tracks on either side that connects Philadelphia to southern surveillance and remote sensing equipment. One current New Jersey. The under-the-bridge cameras were intended to plan involves monitoring tunnels and tracks leading into monitor passing boats and mitigate the risk of a water-borne and out of Washington, D.C., as part of the National Capital terrorist attack (Stelter Sept. 2008). Region Rail Pilot Program and the Amtrak Security Pilot Program. The Rail Pilot Program, authorized in 2006 by the In a separate project, in 2006 the UPRR began to introduce National Capital Planning Commission, provided $10 mil- wireless surveillance video and sensors to its 7,000 locomo- lion for a pilot project to create a virtual boundary through tives with the aim of permitting centralized monitoring and an 8-mile section of ROW through the DC Rail Corridor, recording of a train's path, maintaining a record of brake use, which includes Union Station, L'Enfant Plaza, the Virginia and recording the use of horns and bells. The system is differ- Avenue and First Avenue tunnels, and the Long and Anacos- ent from Metrolink's use of surveillance inside locomotives. tia bridges. The UPRR plan is not meant to track the activities of engi- neers, but to permit locomotive operators to access video dur- According to the DHS notice posted in the Federal Reg- ing security-related events (Marcoux 2006, p. 14). ister in November 2007: "The virtual boundary (fence) shall consist of video camera technology integrated with intel- A number of areas involving ROW surveillance have so ligent vision interpretation software that will enable the far received limited attention, including the use of surveil- system to detect moving objects, detect intruders crossing lance onboard vehicles to monitor the ROW from inside virtual boundaries, identify personnel loitering in the area, the vehicles or from remote locations. As with the use of and identify unauthorized suspicious objects left behind or cameras and sensors for traffic or trespasser control, these objects removed along the rail line" ("Sophisticated Surveil- areas await further study. As technology improves and lance..." 2007, p. 44). information about these pilot projects receives wider pub- licity at rail industry gatherings and in industry publica- The system is based on real-time monitoring not only tions, it can be anticipated that there will be a greater focus of video images, but of data and alarm information at three in these areas, particularly if antiterrorism funds continue police communications centers; CSX Corp. will maintain to be available from DHS or if transit agencies develop one at its Jacksonville, Florida, headquarters and Amtrak methods for partnering with local authorities, particularly will maintain two, both accessible in Philadelphia and New in controlling unauthorized access to light rail alignments York City. Also part of the program is an explosive detection by road vehicles.