Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies (2011)

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24 CHAPTER THREE HOW TRANSIT AGENCIES USE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE INTRODUCTION The number of passenger rail transit systems has increased considerably within the past decade as new systems, particu- larly light rail operations, have initiated service in a number of cities. Today, passenger rail covers a wide range of agen- cies, from those operating fewer than a dozen streetcars dur- ing the morning and evening rush hours to those running hundreds of trains for 20 or more hours a day. In addition to the number of vehicles and distances traveled, the systems differ in their operating environments and in their organiza- tional and jurisdictional arrangements. To undertake a comprehensive study, it is important to survey as many agencies as possible that operate a passen- ger rail system so that all systems, regardless of size and complexity, may use the experiences of others to help them make decisions that fit their needs and pocketbooks. In an ideal world, everyone can learn from everyone else, but a new southwestern light rail system would learn fewer les- sons from a northeastern heavy or commuter rail system than from another light rail system regardless of location. To reach the largest possible number of transit agencies, a one-page letter from TRB and a four-page survey instru- ment were emailed to 58 agencies (a copy is provided as appendix A). Information was received from 43 agencies (listed in appendix B). In addition to reflecting a high rate of return for the survey questionnaire (73%), the agencies were located in all parts of the United States. They reflected all modes of passenger transit service (heavy, commuter, and light rail) and included old and new transit systems, includ- ing those that do not anticipate entering revenue service for at least another year or two. The findings may, therefore, be considered to embody both agency practices and those of the nation’s passenger rail systems. Several large transit systems were sent a single question- naire, even though they are multimodal agencies that operate two or more transit modes. Although each agency was asked to identify itself and to include the name and title of the per- son who completed the questionnaire, each was promised anonymity unless it granted permission to be named; hence statistical information does not identify the agencies. Even with this promise, one agency refused to participate based on its belief that the information was too sensitive to make available, and a large, multimodal agency on the East Coast, declined to participate owing to ongoing litigation involving its surveillance system provider. The questionnaire responses were tabulated by the study’s authors and reviewed with transit specialists. Any discrepancies or apparent misunderstandings were resolved through telephone calls or emails to the agency representa- tive who completed the survey. Each of the agencies that responded used electronic video surveillance in some way. Agencies that did not employ surveillance could complete the questionnaire; none did. The agencies that declined to cooperate also use video surveillance. Yet, because not all agencies responded, the study cannot state without ques- tion that all transit agencies use some form of video sur- veillance. Although there seems to be overwhelming use of it, how extensive the use might be continues to be open to question. The period of initial introduction of video surveillance capabilities stretched from the 1970s to within the past few years. This also reflects the differing ages of the transit agen- cies themselves. A number of newer systems have included video surveillance in their operations since the introduction of revenue service. The agencies that replied each used video surveillance for a variety of functions. Agencies were pro- vided ten common areas where video surveillance is most often employed; all correctly understood this to mean loca- tions on which cameras were focused. Regardless of when it was installed, agencies use sur- veillance for many purposes and in many areas. The larg- est number of agencies (40) employed electronic video surveillance in stations, and on station platforms and shel- ters, followed by passenger areas onboard railcars (33). Table 1 indicates where agencies are using video surveil- lance cameras. Note that as with all synthesis tables, not all agen- cies answered all questions; for this reason, actual num- bers rather than percentages are provided. Because not all responders interpreted all questions identically, there are a small number of discrepancies in some totals. Owing to the number of respondents, none of these inconsistencies were considered to have skewed the data and therefore were retained as submitted.

25 TABLE 1 WHERE ELECTRONIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IS USED Where No. Onboard Vehicles In passenger areas In operator/cab area 33 11 Stations, Station Platforms, Shelters 40 Elevators Only 10 Parking Facilities 28 Along the ROW 11 In Storage/Other Yards 26 In Employee/Administrative Areas 20 Other 8 STATIONS, STATION PLATFORMS, AND SHELTERS As indicated, the largest locations for electronic video sur- veillance were stations, station platforms, and shelters. Forty agencies said they used cameras to observe these areas. Ten agencies reported that they employed surveillance only in elevators, but this information contradicted their other replies. Considering the totality of responses, it appears that no agencies employ surveillance only in elevators and that cameras in elevators are part of the overall placement of cameras elsewhere in stations, station platforms, and shel- ters or parking facilities. Although the most common use of video technology is to observe stations, station platforms, and shelters (which may or may not include elevators), the percentages of such pas- senger areas covered by surveillance differed greatly. Using categories of under 25%, 25% to 50%, 51% to 75%, and 76% or more, the findings indicated that the newer the transit agency, the more likely that all stations, station platforms, and shelters were observed by video cameras as part of over- all crime prevention efforts (Table 2). Each of the 40 agen- cies reported the percentage of its stations, station platforms, and shelters that were covered by its video surveillance sys- tems. Because a number of systems were multimodal, the percentages are not broken down by mode, but newer rail systems (which are often all or primarily light rail systems) tended to fall in the highest category. TABLE 2 PERCENTAGE OF STATIONS, STATION PLATFORMS, AND SHELTERS MONITORED BY VIDEO SURVEILLANCE Category No. Less than 25% 8 26–50% 4 51–75% 8 76–100% 20 Among older, heavy rail systems, both WMATA and MARTA have had surveillance capabilities at all their sta- tions since their inception. However, surveillance systems are not static and need to be upgraded over time. In 2009, for instance, WMATA announced that it would upgrade its cam- eras on buses, in ventilation shafts, at station entrances, and near the ends of platforms by using funding that included a DHS grant of almost $28 million. Of the total amount, about $7 million was set aside to add surveillance inside railcars, in part because the agency viewed the improvements pri- marily for crowd control even though most of the money came from security grants (Harwood 2009). An older system that added cameras well after its initial operations was Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA, known locally as the T).According to TCRP’s Tran- sit Security Update, MBTA, a multimodal system, installed cameras in all subway stations in conjunction with its instal- lation of automatic fare collection equipment (Nakanishi 2009). Although the T began to install cameras around 2000, in 2002 it began to upgrade to a fiber-optic network funded in part by $23 million from DHS. The higher resolution pro- vided by the new cameras resulted in positive media attention when a man accused of robbing a passenger at gunpoint at the busy Back Bay station was identified based on a description that included a tattoo that matched a surveillance image of the man entering the station at about the time of the robbery (Daniel and Smalley 2007). Currently, more than 500 cam- eras have been installed in T stations and in trains; they are monitored in real time at a number of locations by both police department and rail operations personnel. At least some of the cameras will rely on analytic software (“smart” video) to identify suspicious behaviors and/or objects. MBTA notifies patrons that cameras are in use. In Portland, Oregon, Tri-Met video cameras moni- tor shelters and stations in the Portland Mall area, known locally as the transit mall. The installation, part of a 2-year improvement plan in conjunction with the MAX Green Line, added to a network of cameras that covers most stations and all parking garages and elevators. Another light rail system that had earlier benefited from area-wide improvements, San Diego’s Trolley, operated by the Metropolitan Transit Sys- tem, was able expand its surveillance network at its C Street Station through a public/private partnership that included the C Street Task Force providing time and material valued at more than $100,000 toward the installation and operation of eight cameras (“Security Cameras…” 2006). The Maryland Transit Administration, as part of its over- all security and emergency preparedness planning, is adding cameras at those Metro subway stations and platforms that were not included in earlier installations and also in a number of light rail and commuter rail stations. Similar expansion of video surveillance can be observed around the nation; com- monly, such announcements are made by the transit agency,

26 light rail system. In this case, the officials found the officers’ actions over-zealous; in the other situation, although the security guards did what their job description required their actions were seen as too placid. In Seattle, video showed a 15-year-old girl being beaten by other teenagers in front of three security officers in the Downtown Transit Tunnel. After considerable public outcry, King County Metro announced it would reexamine its policy forbidding its unarmed security guards from physically intervening in criminal or suspicious behavior (Westerman 2010; Stelter Feb. 22, 2010). One of the most controversial video-based cases did not involve surveillance cameras directly but occurred when a shooting by a BART police officer was photographed by a number of patrons on their cell phones. In that case, in the early morning hours of January 1, 2009, the officer fatally shot a patron on the Fruitville station platform in Oakland, California, following a fight that involved a number of men on the train and spilled out onto the platform. The officer was charged with second-degree murder; as the trial began in June 2010, a number of legal experts predicted that its outcome would provide insight not only into the jury’s attitudes toward police brutality, but also into the latest legal thinking on the issues of video evidence (Wood 2010). On July 8, the officer was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser charge than the one originally brought against him. In November he was sentenced to 2 years in prison, a verdict that angered the community and resulted in protests in Oakland. The possibility of this type of surveillance of police behavior has been a concern to police for a number of years. In a review of the pros and cons of surveillance, Ray Surette (2007, p. 155) cited a British study in which nearly one- fourth of police officers queried saw as a major disadvantage of surveillance cameras that they were often the ones under surveillance. The police believed that many low-visibility arrests that previously went unnoticed would now receive supervisory attention and could provide an independent review of their activities that would challenge their version of events internally and possibly in court proceedings. Although this study referred specifically to police, the use of video surveillance to observe employee behavior is not new and has played a role in managing internal fraud and misconduct of employees for many years. Video sur- veillance systems provide protections for employees, par- ticularly those working in remote locations at night or on weekends, but their installation is often met with resistance because employees suspect that anything observed on the video is as likely to be used to criticize their activities as to protect them from harm. Whatever the possible downsides of video surveillance may be perceived to be, responses from agencies as to plans for its use indicate a strong belief in its positive attributes. As Table 3 shows, the vast majority of agencies who answered the funding agency, or in some cases the vendor selected to install the surveillance network. Local media coverage of the expansion of surveillance often includes information about particular crimes or situ- ations where the cameras played a role in apprehension of suspects or in resolution of problems surrounding disorderly behavior, often by teenagers using public transportation to or from school. The Boston case where the forensic evidence provided by the camera resulted in an arrest is typical. These cases are examples of how the installation of sur- veillance technology serves a number of overlapping goals. Although DHS funding is primarily based on terrorist- related concerns, once cameras are installed they are likely to assist in fare collection efforts as well as in crime preven- tion and detection. This is particularly so if they produce images that are sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for post-incident investigation and subsequent prosecution. This type of overlapping function extends beyond transit. In Pitts- burgh, Pennsylvania, for instance, a $2.4 million DHS grant in 2008 that was aimed at protecting the city’s waterways, ports, and rivers resulted in Mayor Luke Ravenstahl submit- ting a federal grant application for funding to install more than 220 cameras to cover nearly all of the city’s neighbor- hoods (Wilkinson 2010). (See the chapter five case study for a discussion of Pittsburgh’s surveillance plans.) Video of patrons’ actions may help to mitigate a transit agency’s liability by showing the patrons as partially respon- sible for the event that led to their injury or loss claim. For example, in 2009 in Melbourne, Australia, a 6-month-old boy escaped with only scratches after his baby carriage rolled onto the tracks and was struck by a train that dragged the child about 100 ft before coming to a stop. The mother, who was could be seen screaming on the video, had also been seen on the video letting go of the pram just before it rolled onto the tracks (Sweeney 2009). In yet another fall onto rail tracks that received widespread coverage less than a month later, an intoxicated woman was seen falling onto the tracks on Boston’s T. Although Boston’s video cameras are not linked to an automatic train control system, the woman was not hit because the train driver saw passengers on the platform frantically waving their arms and was able to stop her train in front of the woman, who later admitted to hos- pital authorities that she had been drinking (“Train Stops Short . . .” 2009). Video cameras at stations have also captured behavior that has brought bad publicity and most likely added liabil- ity to transit agencies and local authorities. Two incidents in 2010 illustrate these unintended consequences. In Portland, Oregon, two city police officers were suspended after their police chief and commissioner indicated they were “trou- bled” by the officers’ handling of a situation that began on the street but was videoed when it moved onto the MAX

27 In general, onboard surveillance appears to have become far more common since a 2001 TRCP synthesis. Yet direct comparisons are difficult because of the dissimilarity in the population surveyed. In that study, Electronic Surveil- lance Technology on Transit Vehicles, Maier and Malone (2001) queried 32 agencies. Although 14 of the 30 largest U.S. transit agencies participated, only 16 were rail agencies (6 operated heavy rail and 11 provided light rail service). In addition to those that reported having onboard surveil- lance, some agencies were planning to install it; others were in test mode and the systems were not yet operational. Of the agencies that responded that they had surveillance onboard vehicles, 11 of 23 indicated that less than 25% of their rail- cars were equipped with this technology and only 3 reported that between 76% and 100% of vehicles had cameras. At that time, both BART and the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) indicated that all new vehicles would be equipped with sur- veillance systems but they did not specify whether these would include cameras in operator areas/cabs. In replying to the current synthesis questionnaire, BART was less definitive as to whether all vehicles would be so equipped while CTA continued to indicate that it anticipated installing surveillance in passenger and operator/cab areas of all new vehicles. The length of time between the two stud- ies may account for the change in BART’s response but also indicates that multi-year implementation plans may change as budgets change or as new priorities develop. Overall, the number of agencies committed to equipping all new railcars with surveillance technology had increased substantially since the earlier study (Table 5). Although vehi- cle manufacturers are now able to routinely accommodate orders for onboard surveillance, fewer agencies reported that their plans called for surveillance on new vehicles than those reporting the same for station design plans. TABLE 5 WILL ALL NEW VEHICLES INCLUDE SURVEILLANCE VIDEO ONBOARD? Surveillance Onboard? No. Yes, Plans Call for Surveillance: In passenger areas only Passenger areas and operator/ cab areas 29 13 14 No, Plans Do Not Call for Surveillance 10 Onboard surveillance systems have a longer history on buses than on railcars; many of the systems that pioneered their use on railcars were multimodal agencies that expanded surveillance to railcars after successful applications on buses. For instance, the Bi-State Development Agency in St. Louis, Missouri, had installed surveillance systems on both buses and its LRVs primarily to curb disruptive behav- ior by juveniles. Because Bi-State’s MetroLink security staff this question intend to include plans for video surveillance in all new station designs. TABLE 3 DO ALL NEW STATION DESIGNS INCLUDE PLANS FOR VIDEO SURVEILLANCE? Video Surveillance? No. Yes 35 No 3 ONBOARD RAILCARS The second most frequent area where surveillance is employed is onboard railcars, an issue that was addressed by three survey questions. Respondents who indicated they used surveillance onboard vehicles were asked to specify whether this was in passenger areas, in the operator/cab area, or in both. They were also asked to indicate what per- centage of their vehicles had surveillance devices. Of the 33 agencies that reported having onboard surveil- lance of passenger areas, 11 indicated it was also employed in operator/cab areas. There are considerable differences among modes in the availability of onboard surveillance. Only two agencies with heavy rail vehicles indicated that more than 76% of their railcars had video surveillance; an additional agency reported that new cars would include cameras. Six agencies with commuter railcars indicated that more than 76% of their railcars were equipped with video surveillance, while 16 light rail systems indicated that more than 76% of their LRVs had surveillance cameras (Table 4). TABLE 4 AGENCIES REPORTING MORE THAN 76% OF RAILCARS ARE MONITORED BY VIDEO SURVEILLANCE Type No. Heavy Rail 2 Commuter Rail 6 Light Rail 16 It is difficult to account for the vast difference among modes without further study, but some conjecture is pos- sible. Heavy and commuter rail, with a few exceptions, are generally older systems located in larger cities. Older sys- tems are more likely to have railcars that were purchased before onboard surveillance was readily available prein- stalled by vehicle manufacturers. The costs of retrofitting these vehicles could be too high and may not be cost-effec- tive depending on whether there are plans to purchase new vehicles. It is more likely that newer agencies, which most often are light rail systems, obtained LRVs with preinstalled surveillance capabilities.

28 did not regularly ride the light rail system, the agency pro- vided images obtained from the video cameras of problem activities to school officials so that individuals responsible for causing problems could be identified and disciplined through the school system. NFTA in Buffalo, New York, also relied on surveillance to curtail unruly student behavior on its buses but not on its railcars. NFTA indicated for this synthesis that surveillance was employed in onboard passen- ger areas and that new vehicles would be similarly equipped, although there were no plans for operator/cab surveillance. Maier and Malone (2001, pp. 14–17) found that in Phila- delphia, SEPTA also recorded the interior of buses for after- incident reviews of its video images but did not do so in its railcars. SEPTA’s dual interests were in curtailing the behav- ior of unruly teens and also reducing fraudulent claims. To achieve these goals, the introduction of surveillance was widely publicized through the local media, resulting in what SEPTA considered a significant reduction in claims of approximately $15 million per year compared with 1991 data. Another multimodal system with cameras on buses but not railcars was CTA, which hoped to curtail bus crime, graffiti, and scratchiti, and planned to use the video for post- incident review. Neither system was considering similar experiments for its railcars. Tri-Met, another bus/rail agency, decided to install video on its railcars based on the success of its pilot program on its buses. Tri-Met had piloted the use of cameras on three buses in 1987; by the early 1990s about 40 buses had been equipped and at the time of Maier and Malone’s study the agency had budgeted $1.2 million for a surveillance systems on 72 of its LRVs, hoping to rely on the video not only for deterrence and for post-incident investigation, but also to provide evi- dence in civil (tort) cases involving passenger injury claims. By 2010, Tri-Met noted on its website that all MAX/WES trains, most train stations, and all parking garages and eleva- tors were equipped with surveillance. As indicated in Table 5, only a small number of agencies employed video surveillance in operator/cab areas. An even smaller number anticipated that all new railcars would have this preinstalled. Whether this will change cannot be antici- pated, but the federal government has shown interest in this issue following the crash of a Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) commuter train in Chatsworth, California, in 2008. Twenty-eight people were killed in that incident, including the engineer, who, later investigation determined, was composing a text message when he ran a red signal and collided with a freight train. In early 2010, the NTSB recommended that cameras be required in all locomotives as a management tool to ensure that operators are not sending text messages, talking on cell phones, sleeping, admitting unauthorized persons into the cab area, or violating other FRA safety regulations. Metro- link installed two cameras that observe cab activities; the cameras remain despite a lawsuit filed by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen to have them removed. If upheld, this safety regulation would exceed those in air- craft, where cockpits are not under constant surveillance for safety rule violations but are equipped with voice recorders used to investigate accidents. Because Metrolink, a com- muter rail agency, is regulated by the FRA rather than the FTA, it is unclear whether the regulations could ultimately apply to FTA-regulated agencies. Pending resolution of the litigation, in May 2010, Metro- link barred one engineer from operating trains and another was under investigation for having allegedly tampered with the surveillance cameras. The allegations involve attempts at blocking the cameras’ view. Indicating how easily expen- sive, sophisticated equipment can be outwitted, the charges in one case involved clipping a paper to a visor to block the camera and in the other case involved turning the camera and putting a visor in front of it to block its view. The union contended that the actions were taken because sun visors that were moved to accommodate the cameras make it more difficult for engineers to see clearly when there is a glare. Metrolink has countered this claim by noting that it has issued engineers sunglasses and that visors are still avail- able (“Metrolink Says…” 2010). The United Transportation Union (UTU) gave the matter prominent coverage on its website, noting, somewhat ironically, that the actions that led to action against the engineers had been captured by the cameras that are the focus of the dispute. The union does not accept the agency’s viewpoint that there is “no expecta- tion of privacy in a locomotive cab” (“Metrolink Engineers Probed…” 2010). How the courts resolve this dispute will have an impact on the use of video images in internal disci- plinary matters and will be likely to influence a number of administrative issues discussed in chapter four. PARKING FACILITIES Surveillance is common at parking facilities; 28 agencies indicated they employed cameras in these locations. Installa- tion of video surveillance in parking facilities, whether open lots or multistory structures, provides assurance to patrons that they and their vehicles are safe while in the facility. Rail lines that rely on riders who park in the morning and leave their vehicles until they return at the end of the work day must be particularly careful to assure patrons that their vehicles are safe from theft and vandalism. Because vehicles parked in one spot all day are typically targets for theft or vandalism, parking facility security also has wide-ranging implications for risk management as patrons are likely to report these vio- lations to the transit or local police and to their insurance car- riers to claim reimbursement for loss or damages.

29 Parking lot crime can also result in damage to an agency’s image. Such crimes are likely to gain considerable media attention, particularly on commuter blogs. BART became an example of this when the EastBay Express article “Lots of Trouble” reported on a series of parking lot crimes in summer 2007. In one case, three teenagers attacked a man and fled with his cell phone and laptop; in another, six men attacked another man, hurling him to the ground and demanding money (Atlas 2008). Protecting the “Whole Journey” Although in these cases both the victims were men, the fears surrounding what has come to be termed “the whole journey” have been associated with the fears expressed by women. The whole journey concept goes beyond the stations, platforms, shelters, and railcars themselves to include public bus shel- ters, parking lots, and even the walk or ride to or from home to the transit station. In their study, How to Ease Women’s Fears of Transportation Environments, Loukaitou-Sideris, and col- leagues (2009, p. 50) found that security measures in the more enclosed and easily controllable parts of the transportation system (defined as the buses, trains, and station platforms) and the relative neglect of the more open and public parts (bus stops and parking lots) did not serve women’s needs. This is because women were more typically fearful at desolate bus stops or walking through parking lots devoid of human activ- ity than they were once on their buses or trains. Although conceding that transit agencies lacked the resources to assign police officers throughout the system, the researchers pointed out that the installation of cameras, while less popular with patrons than uniformed officers, was less expensive and was a more likely response to such fear. According to Norman D. Bates, president of a risk manage- ment consulting firm, women’s fears are not unfounded. He has estimated that as many as 40% of rapes and assaults take place in parking lots (Atlas 2008). In addition to the risk this presents it has profound implications for transit rid- ership; those who are overly fearful of having to retrieve their vehicles from parking facilities are unlikely to consider using mass transit. Camera Placements Outdoor parking facilities in areas without extreme climate changes may be fairly easy to protect, but indoor multistory lots require more planning than merely placing cameras any- where on any floor. Denver’s RTD, for instance, places its cameras so that the areas under observation include elevator waiting areas and emergency telephone locations, among oth- ers (Figures 2 and 3). FIGURE 2 Cameras are often placed adjacent to stations near malls, tourist attractions, or college campuses. This camera placement at the light rail station near Denver’s Metropolitan College campus is designed to blend into campus design elements. Photo courtesy of Dorothy M. Schulz. FIGURE 3 Denver’s RTD places cameras near handicapped access ramps. Photo courtesy of Dorothy M. Schulz. Houston METRO is one of a large number of agencies that monitor park-and-ride facilities to prevent a variety of crimes, including vehicle thefts and thefts from vehicles. Cameras also can be used to observe that patrons are not annoyed by panhandlers or do not become the victims of more serious crimes. Staff members who are monitoring the cameras are often able to communicate with drivers in the parking facilities and to control a number of lots’ electronic gates through their central operations center (Nakanishi 2009, p. 23) Lighting and the color of ceilings and walls can also influ- ence camera placement. Another decision point is whether the cameras are primarily for patron and vehicle safety or whether they are placed to observe payment booths to minimize the possibility of people parking without paying. Focusing a camera on the entry/exit booth may also allow the transit agency to observe whether booth attendants are properly charging patrons and recording the fees. Camera placement may also be influenced by whether the booth attendants need to be protected so that they do not become crime victims.

30 Parking facilities were among the first facilities where transit systems relied on video cameras to assure patrons of their own safety and the safety of their vehicles. Reflecting the recognition that patron fears relating to parking facili- ties had a major impact on ridership, three of the field tests undertaken by Interactive Elements Inc. for a TCRB study of transit police/security deployments, Guidelines for the Effective Use of Uniformed Transit Police and Security Per- sonnel, pertained to parking lots. In those tests, MARTA implemented bicycle patrol by its police officers to enhance visibility at a large heavy rail station and bus transfer point that had been the scene of thefts of and from autos. Employ- ing a different strategy, Metrolink worked with the Cla- remont, California, Police Department to assign a local, nonsworn uniformed officer in a marked patrol car to a post in the parking lot. In both tests, crime dropped. The LIRR field test for the same study was an early example of the use of surveillance technology in conjunc- tion with covert policing tactics. Based on patron surveys in the early 1990s, the LIRR had learned that customers were concerned about parking lot security and auto-related thefts. This led to a number of its police officers being assigned to these outdoor lots, which resulted in an increase in arrests for either theft of the autos themselves or thefts from the vehicles. By 1993, in response to legislative hearings that stemmed from the December 7, 1993, shooting on an LIRR train that resulted in six deaths, parking lot security became an issue. The importance of parking lot security to patrons was evident; even thought the shooting occurred on the train and parking or parking lots were not involved, Given the opportunity to comment on their safety and security con- cerns LIRR patrons chose to focus on something far more mundane than the shooting. From the hearings, then-LIRR Police Chief John J. O’Connor found that the stereotypical “Dashing Dan” was now also “Dashing Dianna”—40% of the primarily business commuter ridership on the LIRR was female, and, in an echo of what the TTC/METRAC study had found, women had higher fear levels than men. The auto crime officers, who worked in street-clothes in conjunction with local police, were arrest-oriented and were able to bring the theft statistics down more than 50% between 1993 and 1995 (Interactive Elements Inc. 1997). Members of the unit attributed their success to the availability of unmarked cars that allowed them to remain surreptitiously in the parking lots but also to having a member of the team monitor surveillance cameras within the lot so that the plainclothes officers in the lot could be quickly dispatched to arrest the thieves in the act of steal- ing parked vehicles (Schulz and Gilbert 1995, p. 27). Adding surveillance to parking facilities addresses patron fears and may result in lowered crime rates, but it also has important implications for risk management. Because of the extensive literature on parking lot crime and the importance of design and oversight of parking facilities, those who are victimized in these areas are likely to file claims or lawsuits against the agency responsible for the facility. Based on the doctrine of “foreseeability”—that it could be anticipated that something would occur in a particular location if left unattended or unprotected—such lawsuits generally allege negligence based on such factors as an insufficient number of police/security officers, a lack of patrols, or an absence of such common security measures as emergency telephones, adequate lighting and signage, and electronic video surveil- lance. Surveillance policies may be further questioned as to whether the cameras are monitored in real time, which may present issues if patrons believe that help is on the way when that is not so (Jones 2006). STORAGE YARDS, OTHER YARDS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS Surveillance technology was heavily employed in areas in which equipment is stored or in administrative areas. In both situations, more than half the respondents (26 for stor- age and other yards and 28 in employee and administrative areas) indicated they relied on surveillance systems to safe- guard these areas and, in some cases, to monitor employee activities. Onboard surveillance in operator/cab areas remains controversial, but use of video cameras in other employee administrative areas has become commonplace. A number of reasons can be posited for this. Cameras in employee areas require no technological features different from those required in other industries. But cameras in yards and other outdoor facilities may require greater planning and the need to include special features to protect the cameras themselves from damage or vandalism. Placement of cameras in yards and other employee-related areas can also be seen as provid- ing not only oversight of employee actions but also protec- tion for employees. Employees, particularly those working in remote locations, can be victims of crime. Just as cameras may be seen as enhancing risk mitigation and management oversight, they may also be seen as crime prevention mecha- nisms for protecting employees and their property. A number of transit agencies have used video surveillance in employee areas for decades, including Buffalo’s NFTA and Cleveland’s RTA, which in addition to monitoring key revenue facilities as early as the mid-1990s maintained a surveillance vehicle for covert operations (Gilbert 1995). Although a wide variety of locations were listed among the types of employee facilities where video was installed, a number of generalizations are possible. Surveillance tended to be employed most frequently in equipment yards and wherever personnel had access to large amounts of cash. The other most-frequently-listed location was the operations control center. Fewer than half the agencies indicated that

31 surveillance at the entrance to its yard in this category and another included pedestrian crossings near a bridge. This small system, in operation since 2004, also reported that it relied on surveillance only along its ROW and that no other portions of the transit system were monitored by video cam- eras. Phoenix’s Valley Metro (another case study agency) did not state in its questionnaire response that it employs any ROW surveillance, but protection of its Town Lake Bridge in Tempe, Arizona, is a major element of its surveillance network (see chapter five). Although passenger rail systems do not generally con- duct surveillance of the ROW, a number of bus systems have employed it to assist in injury claims adjudication or, less frequently, to monitor for suspicious activities. In these instances, cameras were installed not only inside buses to cut down on crime and vandalism, but also outside the vehicles to monitor activity along the bus route and to alert operators to suspicious activities. For instance, HARTline, in Tampa, Florida, began using surveillance along its bus transitway in the 1990s to alert supervisors to suspicious activities. Bro- ward County, Florida, did the same, hoping to cut down on crime and vandalism but also on accident and injury claims that drivers could not verify owing to their inability to moni- tor all areas of the bus from the front seat (Gilbert 1995). Intercity Transit in Olympia, Washington, which main- tains 22 separate bus routes, installed cameras on its approx- imately 100 buses and vans to better managing public safety and to mitigate liability. A 35% increase in riders over a 5-year period, combined with a number of assaults in down- town Olympia, led to the decision to integrate the cameras into the existing global positioning system (GPS) and alarm systems to “increase security initiatives, deter vandalism and theft, mitigate accident and liability claims, and enhance operations.” According to transit management, although none of the assaults were on bus operators, stabbings near the transit system led to customer fears of crime, a concern that it was believed would be addressed by the added sur- veillance (“More Traffic…” 2007). This is an example of a transit agency’s awareness of the whole journey concept. By responding to events that occurred off its premises but in its immediate area of operation, Intercity recognized that patron fear could discourage ridership. Deterring Trespassers with Video Cameras and Sensors The increase in the number of cities using cameras to pho- tograph and send summonses to red-light and right-turn- on-red violators has the potential to expand into a way to provide ROW surveillance or, more likely, to photograph and fine railroad crossing gate violators. Although none of the transit agencies specifically mentioned using surveillance this way, a number have turned to photo enforcement cam- eras to minimize deaths and injuries and to mitigate liability at rail crossings. their headquarters buildings were monitored by video sur- veillance but a small number indicated that all agency loca- tions, including satellite offices, were monitored. Customer service areas and public lobbies; TVMs; and warehouses, storerooms, loading docks, and commissaries were among the locations listed as under video monitoring. One agency noted that its incline plane control station and the souvenir gift shop were monitored. RIGHT-OF-WAY SURVEILLANCE Use of video surveillance technology along the ROW was uncommon. Of the 43 responding agencies, only 14 indi- cated that they used surveillance along the ROW. Of these, 12 indicated its use primarily near stations. Only two agen- cies reported the use of surveillance at grade crossings and two indicated its use at interchanges with other railroads (Table 6). TABLE 6 LOCATION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY VIDEO SURVEILLANCE Installation Location No. Near Stations, Station Platforms, or Shelters 12 At Grade Crossings 2 At Interchanges with Other Rail Systems 2 In High Disorder/Crime Areas 3 Other 7 The number of uses exceeded the number of agencies because some agencies that employed ROW surveillance used it in multiple locations. Illustrative of the importance of local decision-making, it is difficult to generalize about the agencies that employed ROW surveillance or about the sub- categories listing where they used it. For instance, the two systems that reported using surveillance at grade crossings included an old, established West Coast multimodal system and a light rail system that recently added a small number of trolleys to augment its primarily bus transit system. Simi- larly, the two systems that indicated use of surveillance at interchange locations were the same trolley system that had installed cameras at grade crossings and a long-established Midwestern commuter rail line. Three agencies indicated the presence of surveillance equipment in areas they defined as high disorder or crime areas. Seven agencies, including one case study agency (Min- nesota’s Metro Transit), had installed surveillance in areas listed as “other”; in most of these instances, “other” was defined as critical areas such as subways, bridges, and tun- nels. Of these agencies, all but Metro Transit were commuter or heavy rail systems, although one smaller system included

32 other public documents. Relying on these sources, among the transit systems that have installed motion detectors and sensors are MTA (New York and Connecticut), MTA-MD, LACMTA, Amtrak, WMATA, NJT, SEPTA, and MBTA. Most but not all of these agencies purchased all or part of their sensor systems with the help of DHS grants. However, not all published sources are reliable; as recently as 2009, at least one video surveillance blog stated that BART had announced in 2007 that it would be expanding its existing surveillance system to include cameras along the tracks, but responses by BART to this synthesis’ questionnaire did not confirm this information. Right-of-Way Trespassing Deterring trespassers from the ROW is an area in which crime prevention and risk mitigation strategies and concerns overlap. Trespassers may be innocent of any ill intentions toward the transit system, but they may cause damage to property or injury to themselves. They may also be malevo- lent. Reviewing the British response to IRA terrorism as part of a larger study, Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices, undertaken for MTI, Brian Jen- kins and Larry N. Gersten found that as stations were better protected, usually through use of video technology, attack- ers moved their attacks to switch boxes and areas away from stations (p. 20). Because these crimes often occur in remote locations, they are difficult to solve, as with the derailing of Amtrak’s Sunset Limited in Hyder, Arizona, on October 9, 1995, about 59 miles southwest of Phoenix, Arizona, on an isolated por- tion of Southern Pacific Railway’s ROW. The train carried 248 passengers and a crew of 20; the derailment caused 65 injuries and the death of one employee. Property damage was estimated at close to $3,000,000. The crime had been com- mitted by the removal of spikes from the rails, the removal of nuts and bolts from the rail joints, and the disabling of the signal system, in addition to other acts of vandalism. Despite evidence found at the scene indicating an intentional derail- ment, the crime has never been solved (Terrorism in Surface Transportation 1996). Such incidents are not unique to the United States. In the 2007 RAND Corporation study Securing America’s Passen- ger-Rail Systems, Jeremy M. Wilson and colleagues broke down terrorist attacks on rail systems worldwide from 1998 through 2006. Their database contained 24,000 attacks, of which 455 were against solely rail targets (2% of the total). They also noted that recent attacks were more numerous and were a source for concern owing to the number of causalities and significant damage to the rail system that they caused. Further refining their database to 886 incidents, they found that of incidents where a weapon was involved, the percent- age that occurred inside railcars, in stations, and on the LACMTA installed photo-enforcement cameras along the Blue Line in 2007; violators were fined a minimum of $271 for the first offense (Abdollah 2007). In early 2009, the city of El Mirage, Arizona, expanded its traffic cameras to a Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad crossing, contracting for a system called Redflexrail, which detects when vehicles drive around railroad crossing gates and also records the bell sounds and whistles of approaching trains. As with most red-light camera operations, the costs of installation, operation, and maintenance is borne by the contractor and the city pays the company a portion of the fines that are collected. Although the idea was not BNSF’s, the freight railroad has been in talks with other contractors about implementing camera-based crossing enforcement. A BNSF spokesman noted that the railway supported video enforcement because it could “influence driver behavior at rail crossings and increase driver safety” (Leung 2009). A similar plan was instituted in Sydney, Australia, in 2006, when mobile cameras, fences, and warnings signs were erected along a number of rail corridors in a campaign intended to deter people from walking over the tracks. The initiative was instituted after CityRail reported more than 2,300 instances of trespassing in 2005–2006, resulting in 23 deaths and 11 serious injuries. The remote-controlled cam- eras, called Spycams, which cost about $250,000 each, can be used in poor light and at night and are portable enough to be moved to trespassing “hot spots” by railway employees (Silmalis 2006). A number of U.S. rail agencies use similar mobile cameras mounted on lifts with adjustable heights to provide temporary coverage in outdoor parking lots where a series of crimes have been reported. The cameras are then moved to new areas as problems and activity shifts from facility to facility. A number of the case study agencies (see chapter five) are using or are planning to use photo enforcement in com- bination with sensors to deter both vehicles and pedestrians trespassing on their alignments. Metro Transit uses cameras equipped with analytics to monitor portals into tunnels and at Minneapolis’ Lindbergh Airport to supplement its intru- sion detection system. Houston’s METRO is in the process of expanding its surveillance network to add cameras along its alignment that would monitor nontransit vehicles that make illegal turns into its alignment. PAAC has relied on chemi- cal/radiation-detection sensors in a number of its downtown subway stations since 2006–2007. And Valley Metro relies on a combination of intrusion detection and surveillance cameras to protect the Tempe Town Lake Bridge. Many transit systems are reluctant to discuss their use of sensors, particularly because many of the installations are seen as terrorist-related early warning systems for detection of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials. Despite this, some information can be gleaned from media accounts, vendor announcements, and

33 system and installation of chemical detection sensors along 5 miles of track. The combination of agencies involved in the project includes police staff from Amtrak and CSX. Data will be available to the Washington DC Metropolitan Police, the U.S. Capital Police, the National Park Service Police, and other agencies to be authorized by DHS. In an earlier system upgrade that was also supported by funds from DHS, the Delaware River Port Authority used its $3.8 million grant to upgrade surveillance at 14 rail stations and tunnels between rail stations adjacent to its 14-mile- long ROW. As part of the overall project, which included installation of more than 250 cameras and almost 100 emer- gency telephones, cameras were to be installed above and below the Ben Franklin Bridge, a seven-lane highway with tracks on either side that connects Philadelphia to southern New Jersey. The under-the-bridge cameras were intended to monitor passing boats and mitigate the risk of a water-borne terrorist attack (Stelter Sept. 2008). In a separate project, in 2006 the UPRR began to introduce wireless surveillance video and sensors to its 7,000 locomo- tives with the aim of permitting centralized monitoring and recording of a train’s path, maintaining a record of brake use, and recording the use of horns and bells. The system is differ- ent from Metrolink’s use of surveillance inside locomotives. The UPRR plan is not meant to track the activities of engi- neers, but to permit locomotive operators to access video dur- ing security-related events (Marcoux 2006, p. 14). A number of areas involving ROW surveillance have so far received limited attention, including the use of surveil- lance onboard vehicles to monitor the ROW from inside the vehicles or from remote locations. As with the use of cameras and sensors for traffic or trespasser control, these areas await further study. As technology improves and information about these pilot projects receives wider pub- licity at rail industry gatherings and in industry publica- tions, it can be anticipated that there will be a greater focus in these areas, particularly if antiterrorism funds continue to be available from DHS or if transit agencies develop methods for partnering with local authorities, particularly in controlling unauthorized access to light rail alignments by road vehicles. tracks was virtually identical (26, 25, and 25, respectively). Of the incidents that occurred on the tracks, they consid- ered 79% to have been caused by bombings, 16% through sabotage (defined as damage without use of a weapon, such as removal of rails or damaging equipment), 2% by armed attack, and 2% by arson. Although it is impossible to con- firm this claim, video surveillance along the ROW might have prevented or in some way mitigated the effects of some of these track-related incidents. Current DHS projects that involve passenger rail agen- cies are intended to provide ROW protection by extending the reach of electronic video surveillance from patron and employee areas to the tracks. In addition to those mentioned as already having received DHS funding, system upgrades currently under way generally call for a network based on surveillance and remote sensing equipment. One current plan involves monitoring tunnels and tracks leading into and out of Washington, D.C., as part of the National Capital Region Rail Pilot Program and the Amtrak Security Pilot Program. The Rail Pilot Program, authorized in 2006 by the National Capital Planning Commission, provided $10 mil- lion for a pilot project to create a virtual boundary through an 8-mile section of ROW through the DC Rail Corridor, which includes Union Station, L’Enfant Plaza, the Virginia Avenue and First Avenue tunnels, and the Long and Anacos- tia bridges. According to the DHS notice posted in the Federal Reg- ister in November 2007: “The virtual boundary (fence) shall consist of video camera technology integrated with intel- ligent vision interpretation software that will enable the system to detect moving objects, detect intruders crossing virtual boundaries, identify personnel loitering in the area, and identify unauthorized suspicious objects left behind or objects removed along the rail line” (“Sophisticated Surveil- lance…” 2007, p. 44). The system is based on real-time monitoring not only of video images, but of data and alarm information at three police communications centers; CSX Corp. will maintain one at its Jacksonville, Florida, headquarters and Amtrak will maintain two, both accessible in Philadelphia and New York City. Also part of the program is an explosive detection