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7 This synthesis is not a review of policing configurations more interested in bringing publicity to their cause, which within the transit industry. Yet information assembled on may make the transit system itself the more attractive target. decision-making on where to install or how to make use For instance, causing trains to run late by mass trespassing of electronic video surveillance equipment and technology on the light rail tracks or creating a noisy disturbance in often was influenced by how an agency set up its police or front of or in a station will more likely suit the purposes security department, even though decisions on surveillance of a community action group than would destroying a sta- technology and its uses are rarely made by only one tran- tion or derailing a train. These groups are unlikely to want sit agency department. Generally a committee that involves to cause numerous deaths or to put the transit system out police/security, safety, risk management, rail operations, of operation for days or weeks or longer. However, interna- information technology (IT), and grant-writing specialists tional and domestic terrorist groups share the need to enter ensures that many internal stakeholders are invested in the onto the system to evaluate where they want to place any final decision. Internal staff may also be augmented by con- deadly devices or to cause their nonlethal commotions. The sultants, especially for the initial installation of an electronic role of electronic video surveillance in these instances is to video surveillance system or when it is part of an extension alert those protecting the system of suspicious persons or to the existing transit system. activities, whether terrorists or nonterrorist potential crimi- nals (whose behavior is more likely to involve planning a Anticipating that different agencies might put their video robbery, theft, or act of vandalism). surveillance systems to different uses, the study located and queried 58 U.S. heavy, commuter, and light rail passenger Stations are not the only areas of vulnerability for a tran- transit agencies. Some agencies had been in existence for sit system. Employee areas, equipment yards and storage many decades, some were relatively new, and some had not areas, electrical or traction power substations or junction yet entered revenue service. Many of the agencies are mul- boxes, the overhead contact system, and the ROW itself are timodal; the synthesis questionnaire focused on only the targets for thieves, vandals, or terrorists. In such incidents, rail modes under the systems' control. Some of the newer particularly if terrorism is not suspected, vulnerability to agencies have had video surveillance in their stations, park- safety hazards play as important a role in decision-making ing lots, and onboard vehicles since their inception, whereas as do security issues. older agencies are faced with the challenge of retrofitting stations that were not designed with video in mind. Forty- In addition to concerns over stationary facilities, transit three agencies completed the questionnaires, a response rate agencies need to prevent injury and criminal activity on their of about 73%. Five agencies offered their programs as case moving targets: the railcars. Agencies have also begun to studies to document different aspects of the roles that video consider what role electronic video surveillance might play surveillance can play in an overall security or risk manage- in addressing the vulnerability of ROWs, where the diffi- ment program. Because of the high response rate reflect- culty of locating perpetrators of violence was illustrated by ing such a wide range of agencies, the synthesis provides the as-yet-unsolved derailment of Amtrak's Sunset Limited a unique perspective. Its focus is not solely on homeland in Hyder, Arizona, on October 9, 1995. security concerns or on large, urban agencies with their own police departments. Nor is it solely on crime control; the role of video surveillance in risk management and in monitor- PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES ing employee work sites is also considered, because terror- ist threats cannot be separated from other concerns facing This synthesis investigates the implementation and use of transit agencies. In the area of crime control, any concerns electronic video surveillance by passenger rail transit agen- an agency may have over being a terrorist target will overlap cies to protect patrons, employees, railcars, and infrastruc- with concerns about criminal acts. ture. It describes the current state of practice, including what is being surveilled; whether systems are monitored regularly In addition, terrorism concerns are not the same for all and, if so, by whom; whether the images have been used agencies. Not all facilities are equally attractive to terror- in criminal or civil prosecutions; and whether the surveil- ist groups. The attractiveness of a particular target may be lance systems have resulted in fewer claims of injury or loss. based on a facility's financial value or its symbolic value, Funding sources are also explored. The objectives can be and may include the effect its disruption or destruction will summarized as follows: have on the local economy, or on creating fear and disrup- tion at the local, regional, national, or even international To provide a brief history of the use of electronic video level. International terrorists, for instance, are likely to want surveillance technology by transit systems in the to cause multiple deaths and injuries, and therefore are most United States and internationally. likely to strike where patrons will be the victims and where To describe the current use of surveillance technology maximum press coverage will be obtained. Domestic terror- by passenger rail transit agencies, including heavy rail, ists and activist groups are generally less eager to kill and commuter rail, light rail, and monorail and funicu-