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7Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transporta- tion security has been a major focus for policymakers, the transportation industry, and the general public. Because the U.S. air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed to promote commerce through accessibility and efficiency, they are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack.(1) Every day, an estimated 6 million workers, including longshoremen, mechan- ics, aviation and railroad employees, and truck drivers, access secure areas of the nationâs estimated 4,000 transportation facilities while performing their jobs. Some of these workers, such as truck drivers, regularly access secure areas at multiple transportation facilities.(2) Of particular security concern are those workers who are involved in the transportation of hazardous materials. According to TRB Special Report 283: Cooperative Research for Hazardous Materials Transportation: Defining the Need, Con- verging on Solutions,(3) the U.S.DOT has estimated that about 817,000 shipments consisting of 5.4 million tons of haz- ardous materials are made daily in the United States, which would total nearly 300 million shipments and 2 billion tons of hazardous cargo per year. The safekeeping of hazardous materials in transit is paramount to the safety and security of people everywhere. Vetting the personnel working with and around hazardous materials through a credentialing process is essential for a successful transportation security manage- ment program. However, the U.S. credentialing process, as established by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terror- ism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), the Maritime Trans- portation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), and the Safe Port Act of 2006, lacks a coordinated vision and fails to recognize the multimodal and intermodal nature of the transportation sector.(4) This disjointed vision has created a fragmented security credential system that requires various security cre- dentials throughout the transportation logistics chain. Admi- ral James M. Loy, formerly of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Department of Homeland Secu- rity (DHS), commented that there are instances when truck drivers may have as many as 23 identification (ID) cards at any given time while involved in the transportation of haz- ardous materials.(4) For example, a truck driver hauling hazardous materials would be required to hold a Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME), present a Security Identifica- tion Display Area (SIDA) badge before entering an airport, display a Common Access Card (CAC) while accessing a Department of Defense facility, show a Free and Secure Trade (FAST) credential for priority border crossings, and present a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) when entering a maritime port. Each of these credentials involves similar background checks but requires workers to submit separate applications and duplicative fees. In response to the current situation, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has placed this issue on its Top 10 list of burdensome federal regulations. The SBA has asked TSA to revise its reg- ulations to waive the background check for an HME applicant who holds a valid TWIC. According to SBA, this require- ment for redundant background checks costs the individual applicants nearly $100 and costs the trucking industry up to $30 million annually.(5) This scenario is not unique for truck drivers but is experienced by many other workers involved in the transport of hazardous materials. Each credential has costsâboth monetarily and in required time to acquireâthat result in duplicative costs and additional time required of both the credentialing agency and the person requesting cre- dentialing. These costs provide a strong incentive to consolidate the transportation security credentialing system and investi- gate the feasibility of what, from a userâs perspective, would be a single, uniform credential for HazMat transportation security. The research objective of this project is to perform a detailed evaluation of the HazMat transportation worker credentialing C H A P T E R 1 Background
system to identify duplicative elements and redundant costs throughout the process. The key outcome of the project will be determining the feasibility of consolidating many, or all, of the existing local, state, and federal credentials necessary under current regulations and policies, into one credential for all transportation modes that is cost-effective and maintains an equal or greater level of security and safety. This consoli- dated credential will establish a workerâs identity, eligibility to access secure areas, and eligibility to obtain or hold trans- portation-related licenses, credentials, and other government certifications required of persons who transport hazardous materials by all modes in the United States. 8
