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7 CHAPTER 1 Background Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transporta- ral James M. Loy, formerly of the Transportation Security tion security has been a major focus for policymakers, the Administration (TSA) and Department of Homeland Secu- transportation industry, and the general public. Because the rity (DHS), commented that there are instances when truck U.S. air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed drivers may have as many as 23 identification (ID) cards at to promote commerce through accessibility and efficiency, any given time while involved in the transportation of haz- they are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack.(1) Every day, an ardous materials.(4) For example, a truck driver hauling estimated 6 million workers, including longshoremen, mechan- hazardous materials would be required to hold a Hazardous ics, aviation and railroad employees, and truck drivers, access Materials Endorsement (HME), present a Security Identifica- secure areas of the nation's estimated 4,000 transportation tion Display Area (SIDA) badge before entering an airport, facilities while performing their jobs. Some of these workers, display a Common Access Card (CAC) while accessing a such as truck drivers, regularly access secure areas at multiple Department of Defense facility, show a Free and Secure Trade transportation facilities.(2) (FAST) credential for priority border crossings, and present Of particular security concern are those workers who are a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) involved in the transportation of hazardous materials. when entering a maritime port. Each of these credentials According to TRB Special Report 283: Cooperative Research for involves similar background checks but requires workers to Hazardous Materials Transportation: Defining the Need, Con- submit separate applications and duplicative fees. In response verging on Solutions,(3) the U.S.DOT has estimated that about to the current situation, the Small Business Administration 817,000 shipments consisting of 5.4 million tons of haz- (SBA) has placed this issue on its Top 10 list of burdensome ardous materials are made daily in the United States, which federal regulations. The SBA has asked TSA to revise its reg- would total nearly 300 million shipments and 2 billion tons ulations to waive the background check for an HME applicant of hazardous cargo per year. The safekeeping of hazardous who holds a valid TWIC. According to SBA, this require- materials in transit is paramount to the safety and security of ment for redundant background checks costs the individual people everywhere. Vetting the personnel working with and applicants nearly $100 and costs the trucking industry up to around hazardous materials through a credentialing process $30 million annually.(5) This scenario is not unique for truck is essential for a successful transportation security manage- drivers but is experienced by many other workers involved in ment program. the transport of hazardous materials. Each credential has However, the U.S. credentialing process, as established costs--both monetarily and in required time to acquire--that by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing result in duplicative costs and additional time required of Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terror- both the credentialing agency and the person requesting cre- ism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), the Maritime Trans- dentialing. These costs provide a strong incentive to consolidate portation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), and the Safe Port Act the transportation security credentialing system and investi- of 2006, lacks a coordinated vision and fails to recognize the gate the feasibility of what, from a user's perspective, would multimodal and intermodal nature of the transportation be a single, uniform credential for HazMat transportation sector.(4) This disjointed vision has created a fragmented security. security credential system that requires various security cre- The research objective of this project is to perform a detailed dentials throughout the transportation logistics chain. Admi- evaluation of the HazMat transportation worker credentialing
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8 system to identify duplicative elements and redundant costs an equal or greater level of security and safety. This consoli- throughout the process. The key outcome of the project will dated credential will establish a worker's identity, eligibility be determining the feasibility of consolidating many, or all, of to access secure areas, and eligibility to obtain or hold trans- the existing local, state, and federal credentials necessary portation-related licenses, credentials, and other government under current regulations and policies, into one credential for certifications required of persons who transport hazardous all transportation modes that is cost-effective and maintains materials by all modes in the United States.