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OCR for page 31
Classifying Noncompliance 31
overnight split assignment. Due to fatigue, an engineer failed to stop at the stop marker before
entering a station.
Factor 3. Inadequate Information and Resources
A supervisor may also fail to provide the operational information that an employee needs
to perform the job (e.g., fail to provide job brief). A supervisor may also fail to provide adequate
staffing, thereby stretching the resources of the operational staff. A maintenance supervisor had
an inadequate number of personnel assigned to perform the periodic preventive maintenance
inspection for a light rail fleet. Trying to adhere to the maintenance schedule and prevent delay
in operations, the inspection personnel skipped steps in the inspection checklist. One of the light
rail cars had a loose bolt which caused a derailment.
Factor 4. Failure to Correct a Known Problem
Failing to correct a known problem is a supervisor inaction that may contribute to noncompli-
ance. This occurs when a supervisor does not identify and address at-risk employees with remedial
or corrective action. An example of this occurred when a bus driver was reported by peers to take
risks while operating the bus (e.g., speeding, closing doors before looking to see if a passenger was
still in the doorway). While aware of these behaviors, the supervisor did not coach the employee on
the risks of these behaviors. The driver was subsequently involved in an intersection accident caused
by the driver's failure to properly judge the speed of oncoming vehicles. In a different incident, many
operators reported that a signal was difficult to see in bright sunlight but management did not take
action to correct the problem until an accident occurred.
Factor 5. Supervisor Rule Noncompliance
Supervisors may themselves commit errors and violations associated with noncompliance that
contribute to their subordinates' lack of compliance. This may include authorizing employees to
break the rules and failing to enforce rules or regulations. An incident occurred when a supervisor
authorized an employee to break the rules. A bus supervisor emphasized schedule adherence as
the most important goal, even at the expense of maintaining a safe operating speed. The bus driver
was later involved in an accident where speeding by the bus operator was cited as the probable
cause. In another incident, a track maintenance supervisor failed to ensure that the rail was prop-
erly secured prior to authorizing a train to travel through the work area. The train passed over the
loose rail and derailed.
Table 4 lists the factors associated with Level III of the taxonomy.
Level IV: Organizational and Regulatory Factors
The decisions and policies of upper management and regulatory agencies directly influence
public transit supervisor practices. As such, they can directly contribute to incidents or accidents
stemming from rules noncompliance. Contributing to these factors are economic challenges that
wax and wane over time.
During times of economic prosperity, public transit agencies may be able to satisfactorily bal-
ance the requirements associated with safe operating practices with the performance goals of the
agency (e.g., customer satisfaction and on-time performance). Historically, when economic con-
straints come into play, commitment to safety often takes a back seat to performance goals. This
has a trickle-down effect to first-line supervisors as well as front-line employees. During times
of economic hardship, cutbacks in staffing, training, incentives, and maintenance often lead to
OCR for page 32
32 Improving Safety-Related Rules Compliance in the Public Transportation Industry
Table 4. Supervisory factors (Level III).
Category Examples
Inadequate oversight Failed to provide guidance
Failed to provide training opportunities
Poor leadership
Lack of oversight
Failed to monitor employee qualifications
Failed to track performance
Provided inadequate opportunity for
Inadequate work schedule
employee rest
Inadequate information/resources Failed to properly brief employee
Failed to give the employee necessary
information
Provided inadequate staffing
Failure to correct known problem Did not call out at-risk employee
Did not report unsafe tendencies
Did not initiate remedial or corrective action
Supervisor rule noncompliance Authorized employee to break the rules
Failed to enforce rules or regulations
Allowed unqualified employees to perform
job
an overworked, less motivated, and less qualified staff operating suboptimal equipment. This
scenario, when combined with an organization that values performance goals over safety, may
lead supervisors and their employees to break safety-related rules, resulting in an accident.
The factors in this category include those of resource and acquisition management, organiza-
tional climate, an organization's operations, and regulatory influences.
Factor 1. Resource and Acquisition Management
This factor includes the acquisition and management of public transit employees, equipment, and
facilities. Resource management may involve human resources, monetary or budget resources, and
equipment and facility resources including maintenance. With respect to the latter two contrib-
utors, budget restrictions may prevent a public transit agency from replacing old equipment that
require extra maintenance and repairs. As a result, there is more opportunity during the main-
tenance process for errors that may lead to equipment failure.
Factor 2. Organizational Climate
Organizational climate can generally be regarded as the working atmosphere within an organiza-
tion. Safety climate is the collective values of management, supervisory staff, and employees as
they relate to work safety at a given point in time. Alignment of an organization's formal safety
policies, procedures, and rules with the informal values, beliefs, and attitudes of an organization's
management and staff is a predictor of a positive safety climate. However, when upper level man-
agement claims to embrace an organization's safety policies (i.e., talk the talk) only to overlook
those same policies behind the scenes (i.e., failing to walk the walk), erosion of the organization's
safety climate occurs.
Organizational structure in a public transit agency may contribute to climate erosion when the
agency's safety management personnel are not represented at every level of the organization. An
agency's safety policies as well as their safety culture may also contribute to noncompliance. In
organizations entrenched in a culture of blame, there is often no attempt to identify risks before an
incident occurs. Instead of being proactive and preventive, the managers in this type of environ-
ment are reactive, looking to blame an employee when there is noncompliance or an accident.
