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17 the increase in noise.168 It is not clear in such a situa- In the Biddle case, the Fakes had been given notice tion that an airport disclosure statement, even one re- of airport noise prior to the Fakes' purchase. Similar to corded in the land records, would bar a claim for a later the opinion in Schooner Harbor Ventures, the Indiana taking. Supreme Court in Biddle pointed out that the trial Nevertheless, the Biddle case appears to be the only court granted summary judgment against the Fakes on precedent holding that an airport disclosure statement, the basis "that their seller accepted payment for dam- which is recorded as part of a buyer's deed, may serve age to value done by airport noise, and provided the to bar a later action for compensation for airport noise, requisite formal notice of this fact to the Fakes as buy- particularly when the prior owners received compensa- ers."174 Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he Fakes tion for airport noise. However, it is unclear whether are owners who purchased at a reduced price, with the a seller who provides a buyer with a required air- knowledge that the bargain rate existed because of air- port disclosure statement must have received compen- port noise."175 The Fakes, therefore, had been compen- sation for noise in connection with the disclosure sated already in the form of a reduced price for the statement, or whether the disclosure statement, property. Thus, there was no interference with any in- standing alone, is sufficient to bar a buyer's later in- vestment-backed expectation that the purchasers' land verse claim against the airport for a taking caused by would not be subject to disturbance caused by the air- noise. port.176 If a buyer in an inverse condemnation case has There is other authority holding that a transferee's received an airport disclosure statement, the evidence knowledge of a taking or potential taking may have an also may reveal that the buyer purchased the prop- effect later on the landowner's "right to challenge un- erty at a reduced price because of airport noise. reasonable limitations on the use and value of land."169 Although not involving an airport, the deci- B. The Effect of an Airport Disclosure Act on sion in Schooner Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. United Compensation for Noise Damages States170 demonstrates that a property owner's knowl- Even if an airport disclosure statement or the re- edge of matters affecting the valuation of property, cording of one as part of the deed does not preclude a such as a regulation restricting or affecting develop- later claim for noise damages, a disclosure statement ment of the property, may impair an owner's claim that could affect the amount of compensation awarded for there has been a taking. In Schooner Harbor, the noise damages. plaintiff brought an inverse condemnation action, First, an airport disclosure law is not a restriction on alleging that land use restrictions imposed by Section the use or development of property. Even assuming 7 of the Endangered Species Act had resulted in a tak- that an airport disclosure act were to be construed ing of his property.171 The trial court dismissed the as such a restriction, it has been held that if a con- plaintiff's claims, in part because the plaintiff was demning authority takes property that is burdened by found to have constructive knowledge of land-use re- a restriction in the title or by a restriction created by strictions that affected the land's development at the a statute or ordinance, then compensation "is limited time the plaintiff acquired the land. In reversing and to the value of the property with the restricted use."177 remanding, the Federal Circuit required that the trial Moreover, as stated, a buyer may have purchased prop- court analyze the plaintiff's case based on the Penn erty subject to airport noise at a reduced price, or Central factors, such as "the economic impact on the there may have been a prior taking by adverse posses- plaintiff of the regulations, the impact on Schooner sion. Harbor's reasonable, investment-backed expectations, and the nature of the government action...."172 How- 174 Biddle, 860 N.E.2d at 582. ever, the court also stated that "Schooner Harbor's 175 knowledge of the regulation...is a factor that may be Id. 176 considered, depending on the circumstances."173 Id. 177 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12C.02, at 12C-57 (cit- ing, e.g., S. Cal. Fisherman's Ass'n v. United States, 174 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1949); John C. McDonald, Note, Eminent Domain: 168 Id. at 259, 654 F.2d at 100. Valuation Where Property Use Restricted by Deed, 21 OHIO ST. 169 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627, 121 S. Ct. L.J. 123 (1960)). See United States v. 480.00 Acres of Land, 557 2448, 2463, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592, 613 (2001). F.3d 1297, 13011302 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming a district 170 court judgment that used the following instruction: "If, at the 569 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 171 time of the taking, the property was subject to zoning restric- 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). tions, license regulations, or other land use restrictions those 172 Schooner Harbor, 569 F.3d at 1366. factors must be considered in evaluating the property...."); 173 Id. On remand, the Court of Claims held that the takings Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Certain Temporary Easements claim was not ripe for adjudication, because the plaintiff no Above the R.R. Right of Way, 357 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2004) (Al- longer owned the property and, therefore, had no present right though Amtrak contended that because of use restrictions in a to develop it or "ability to seek an incidental take permit" from deed to the property part of the property had no permissible the United States Department of the Interior, Fish and Wild- use until much later, Amtrak's own appraisal of the parcel did life Service. Schooner Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. United States, not reduce the value of the parcel because of the restrictive 92 Fed. Cl. 373, 384 (2010). covenant contained in the 1990 deed.).