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Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault (2011)

Chapter: Chapter Two - Literature Summary

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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Two - Literature Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14609.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Two - Literature Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14609.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Two - Literature Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14609.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Two - Literature Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14609.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Two - Literature Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14609.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Two - Literature Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14609.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter Two - Literature Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2011. Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14609.
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Significant investments in transit security have been made and new transit security initiatives implemented since Sep- tember 11, 2001. Although some of these initiatives have focused solely on counterterrorism, many are all-hazards in approach and are effective in mitigating operator assaults as well. Therefore, transit security literature items that cover both counterterrorism and general crime are summarized. Workplace violence literature is included because passenger assault of operators is a subset of workplace violence and strategies developed to address workplace violence can assist in addressing violence against operators. In addition to rele- vant transit security and workplace violence literature, liter- ature on operator training and selection, self-defense, video surveillance, and international studies and practices have been summarized as well. TRANSIT SECURITY Transit security investments and preparedness strategies are now being determined based on an all-hazards approach. Because bus operators are considered to be the first line of defense against violent incidents on buses, including terror- ism, security of buses and bus operators is of prime impor- tance to the DHS, the TSA, and the FTA. Reports released by these agencies have bearing on the protection of bus opera- tors to a greater or lesser extent. A TCRP synthesis report released in 2009, Transit Security Update, includes security measures, technologies, and policing methods applicable to the protection of bus operators. These transit security docu- ments are reviewed in this subchapter. Chandler, K. L., P. J. Sutherland, and H. Saporta, An Intro- duction to All-Hazards Preparedness for Transit Agencies, Federal Transit Administration, Washington, D.C., 2010. All-hazards preparedness for transit agencies is a risk priori- tization and management process to allocate resources effec- tively to reduce safety, security, and emergency management risks continually and to prevent, protect, control, and miti- gate incidents and adverse events. This document defines and describes all-hazards preparedness and provides a high-level process and illustrative examples for applying an all-hazards preparedness process that is consistent with the national guidance on all-hazards preparedness presented in the National Preparedness Guidelines. The report is based on two FTA publications—Hazard Analysis Guidelines for Transit Proj- ects (2000), the Public Transportation System Security and 12 Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide (2003)—and the National Incident Management System issued by DHS (2008). Nakanishi, Y., TCRP Synthesis 80: Transit Security Update, Transportation Research Board of the National Acade- mies, Washington, D.C., 2009. TCRP Synthesis 80: Transit Security Update, by Dr. Yuko Nakanishi, describes security practices and policing methods implemented by transit agencies in the United States. It focuses on new post–September 11, 2001, initiatives and measures that address both terrorism and crime. The author states that violent crimes occurring within transit systems evoke strong emotions in the public, along with intense media coverage, and have a significant impact on passenger perception of security. Chapter five of TCRP Synthesis 80 focuses on conflict mitigation, which is espe- cially pertinent to preventing operator assaults. Bus security measures including policing methods, video surveillance and issues related to image quality and storage requirements, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), communications, school outreach efforts, and bus operator training are discussed in the report. The lit- erature summary in Appendix B includes coverage of rele- vant FTA and TSA reports, TCRP and NCHRP reports, and literature on CompStat, CPTED, and interoperable commu- nications. The literature summary included the following relevant information: • TSA, Mass Transit Annex to Transportation Systems Sector Security Plan [Online]. Available: http://www. tsa.gov/. This document presents a coordinated security- enhancement strategy for public transportation and passenger rail systems. TSA’s system-based risk man- agement methodology and transit security fundamentals are discussed. • FTA Safety and Security website, http://transit-safety. volpe.dot.gov/Security. The website contains informa- tion about FTA’s security initiatives, Transit Watch program, guidelines and best practices, training tools, and other strategic and research products of interest to transit agencies. • FTA, Transit Agency Security and Emergency Manage- ment Protective Measures, 2006. Six security categories CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE SUMMARY

13 addressed in the report are information and intelligence; security and emergency management; regional coordi- nation; information technology and communications sys- tems; employee and public communications. • Kelling, G. and C. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Re- storing Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities, Simon and Schuster, New York, N.Y., 1997. Kelling and Coles expressed the importance of targeting minor inci- dents and maintaining order to prevent more serious ones from arising. • McDonald, P. P., Managing Police Operations: Imple- menting the NYPD Crime Control Model Using Comp- Stat, Wadsworth Publishing, New York, N.Y., 2001. A description of CompStat and how it was implemented and operated within NYPD to prevent and address crime problems was provided. • Banerjee, R., “The ABCs of TCO (Total Cost of Owner- ship): The True Costs of IP Video Surveillance,” Video Technology and Applications, Feb. 2008. A breakdown of the Total Costs of Ownership for video surveillance technology is provided, and video recorder types and storage issues are also addressed. • TRB, TCRP Web Document 18: Developing Useful Transit-Related Crime and Incident Data, April 2000. Primary data sources of crime statistics are described. Issues of crime under-reporting and crime definitions are addressed. • Allan, D. and J. Volinski, Cops, Cameras, and Enclo- sures: A Synthesis of Effectiveness of Methods to Provide Enhanced Security for Bus Operators, Report No. 392- 12, National Center for Transit Research, CUTR, May 31, 2001. This study’s overall survey results revealed that the violence prevention operator training was ranked highest in cost-effectiveness, followed by in-house se- curity and plainclothes security. In terms of onboard se- curity, in-house security and plainclothes security were considered to be the most effective. In terms of cost, con- tracted personnel were considered to be more expensive than in-house personnel. In terms of technology, video surveillance was considered to be the most effective, although the panic button connected with the headsign was considered the most cost-effective. At the time of the report, Miami–Dade Transit and San Francisco MUNI had started to implement partial enclosures on their bus fleets. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE Workplace violence literature and training materials gener- ally recommend the training of workers who deal with the public in recognizing and diffusing potentially violent situa- tions, as well as the establishment of a workplace violence policy and reporting process. According to the American Society of Industrial Security, the top strategy for preventing workplace violence was employee training, and the second place strategy was zero-tolerance policies. According to the Society for Human Resources Management, verbal threats were the most common form of workplace violence. The lit- erature emphasizes the importance of reporting all incidents and threats and of a supportive and responsive employer in all aspects of workplace violence, including prevention, employee support, proper reporting, and handling. In addition, the lit- erature emphasizes the importance of employee support after violence has occurred. Survey of Workplace Violence Prevention, 2005, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 2006. The Survey of Workplace Violence Prevention was con- ducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Dis- ease Control and Prevention. The topics covered included incidence of workplace violence, types of security, and pro- grams and policies. Interested observations included the fol- lowing: Half of the largest establishments (employing 1,000 or more workers) reported an incident in the past year, whereas only 5% of all establishments had a violent incident, and, not surprisingly, service-providing industries had much higher percentages of customer, criminal, and domestic vio- lence than goods-producing industries. State governments, followed by local governments, had higher percentages of all types of workplace violence incidents. The authors concluded that the higher incidences for state and local governments were the result of their work environment—working in direct contact with the public, having mobile workplace or deliver- ing goods or services, working in high-crime areas, working in small numbers, working in community-based settings, and working with unstable or volatile persons. In terms of effects of the violence, 36% of establishments had employees that were negatively affected, with more than 20% experiencing impacts on fear levels and morale. Workplace Violence: Issues in Response, FBI Academy, U.S. Department of Justice, Quantico, Va., Feb. 2001. The FBI Workplace Violence report was based on the pro- ceedings of the Workplace Violence Intervention Research Workshop. It notes the importance of workplace culture in encouraging employees to report incidents and in training employees to identify threats. The report highlights the neg- ative impact of emotional distress caused by workplace vio- lence, whether physical or verbal, and the importance of pro- viding counseling and support immediately after a violent event has occurred. Workplace violence prevention mea- sures are grouped into environmental methods, organiza- tional and administrative practices, programs and policies, and behavioral or interpersonal issues. The importance of inci- dent management strategies, including addressing employee reactions and concerns, provision of professional support, proper communication, and improving preventive measures are mentioned. Also included in the Workplace Violence report are case studies on threatening behavior, threat to kill, fright- ening behavior, disruptive behavior, intimidation, and threat assessment, as well as recommendations on what employees

could do in each scenario. Sample response protocols and workplace violence policy statements are also provided. BUS OPERATOR TRAINING AND SELECTION Bus operator training prepares the bus operator for a range of stressful situations, including fare issues, rules violations, and irrational or combative passengers, and assists the oper- ator in remaining calm and prudent during the situation. Bus operator selection is important because an operator skilled at and experienced in customer relations and in handling stress- ful situations may be less likely to be the victim of an assault. Also, recruiting the wrong candidate is costly to the agency— if he or she stays and performs badly, lives may be endan- gered. APTA’s recommended practice documents are useful for transit agencies in training operators and their supervisors. American Public Transit Association, Recommended Practice for Transit Bus Operator Training, APTA BTS-BO-RP- 001-07, Washington, D.C., updated June 2009. The recommended practice states that bus operator training programs contain the following topics: regulatory, agency- specific requirements, customer service, technical, and safety and security. The topics that pertain to this synthesis include safety and security, customer service, and technical training. In the safety and security section, recommended training top- ics include assault prevention, stress management, defensive driving and road rage, security awareness and emergency pro- cedures, security emergencies including assaults and threats, weapons, and incident investigation and documentation pro- cedures. Customer service training includes understanding the role of the professional transit operator, understanding the customer (different levels of abilities, socioeconomic sta- tus, age, cultural issues, and diversity), communications, dif- ficult situations and emotional or personal “hot buttons” and triggers, and customers with disabilities. Technical training includes understanding bus features, including safety and secu- rity technologies, and driving in adverse conditions. Note that APTA has also issued a Recommended Practice for Transit Supervisor Training, APTA BTS-BO-RP-002-07. Thompson, G. J. and J. Jenkins, Verbal Judo: The Gentle Art of Persuasion, Quill, New York, N.Y., 2004. Thompson and Jenkins describe verbal judo as the use of communications skills to mitigate conflict situations and defuse them before they become violent. Training in verbal judo is provided to many law enforcement personnel and has been adapted and incorporated into bus operator training content provided by some transit agencies. Although judo is a mar- tial art, it does not promote violence or aggression but, instead, focuses on empathy, harmony, and respect. Similarly, verbal judo training emphasizes dignity, professionalism, and respect in communicating with the public and teaches participants how to speak without escalating conflict, how to be efficient in speech—saying it right the first time—and how to deal 14 with individuals who may be mentally impaired or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The authors stress the importance of listening, empathizing with others, looking for a win/win solution, and seeing the situation from another’s perspective. The five tools in voluntary compliance are explained. Verbal judo techniques may be similar to some verbal de-escalation and conflict mitigation strategies being taught to new and existing bus operators. FTA’s Safety and Security website, http://transit-safety.fta. dot.gov/. Relevant security and safety information and courses deliv- ered through the National Transit Institute (NTI), Trans- portation Safety Institute (TSI), The Johns Hopkins Univer- sity, and the Volpe Center are found on the FTA’s Safety and Security website. Violence in the Transit Workplace Preven- tion, Response and Recovery is a 4-h NTI course. It provides transit employees, supervisors, and labor representatives with information on how to prevent, respond to, and recover from violence in the workplace. The course is provided free of charge to relevant employees of the transportation industry. Prevention methods covered in the course include system and personal security measures; recognizing and reporting the warning signs of potentially violent behavior; and using effective interpersonal skills in dealing with different, diffi- cult, and dangerous people. Response strategies focus on self-preservation and the importance of accurate reporting. The recovery portion addresses the stress associated with violence and what employees can do to mitigate it. TSI’s Transit Bus System Safety course helps agencies create a Transit Bus System Safety plan and addresses pas- senger incidents, vehicle collisions, and selection and train- ing of bus operators. Other training courses provide customer relations skills, including understanding of diverse popula- tions. Note that there are other relevant courses that focus on training transit managers. TCRP Project A-36, Command- Level Decision-Making for Transit Emergency Managers, is expected to provide interactive training for transit managers in incident response and emergencies. Although there are significant differences between passenger assaults against bus operators and terrorism, training courses focused on ter- rorism awareness can be useful for conveying the importance of awareness and spotting suspicious behaviors. Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction (TARR) is an NTI course that provides employees with training on how to recognize behaviors associated with terrorist activity. Warn- ing Signs, a video produced by the NTI with FTA support, reinforces system security concepts, including what to look for and what to do when confronted with suspicious activi- ties, objects, and behavior. System Security Awareness for Transit Employees is a 3- to 4-h NTI course for frontline transit employees and a 5- to 6-h course for instructors. Although the course primarily addresses suspicious incidents and identification of terrorist activity, elements of the course

15 are also useful for responding to and reporting violence against operators. The NTI site is accessible at www.ntionline.com and the Transportation Safety Institute site, at www.tsi. dot.gov. American Public Transit Association, Recommended Prac- tice: Recruiting and Retaining Bus Operations Employees, APTA BTS-BO-RP-003-09, Washington, D.C., Dec. 2009. The document aims to assist transit agencies recruit and retain bus operators. It describes the Bus Operator Selection Survey, a process software with a preemployment screening survey and a structured interview process. It also mentions other testing or screening methods, such as Wonderlic Testing, which measures cognitive ability and general intelligence; Manpower, Personnel Selection Inventory; and TotalView Assessment. The candidate selection steps are listed (appli- cation, drug testing, reference check, DMV record check, job stability, driving experience, age, criminal background check, interviews). START Training, a video-based training package for new and existing operators, is also described. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE As noted in TCRP Synthesis 80, video surveillance is widely used by transit agencies and is “an excellent, scalable secu- rity solution and addresses multiple security needs” (2). At the same time, issues such as image quality and storage require- ments need to be considered for agencies to obtain the full benefit of video systems (2). Transit agencies have been con- verting their legacy analog systems to digital systems and are exploring wireless solutions. Advanced systems enable wire- less uploads of video to central servers at depots or control cen- ters. The most advanced systems have real-time video, allow- ing police or dispatch to view what is happening inside of a bus. American Public Transit Association, Technical Recom- mended Practice for the Selection of Cameras, Digital Recording Systems, and Digital High-Speed Networks and Train-lines for Use in Transit-Related CCTV Systems, APTA IT-RP-001-08 V3, Washington D.C., 2008. APTA’s Recommended Practice document for closed circuit television (CCTV) systems assists agencies planning to install or upgrade their CCTV systems. APTA’s Technical Working Group issued a Technical Recommended Practice in 2007 and amended it in 2008 for the selection of cameras, digital recording systems, and high-speed digital train-lines for new installations of CCTV systems in transit applications, includ- ing buses (onboard and external) and depots. The document provides recommendations on camera specifications and sys- tem design, analog and digital recording systems, transmis- sion, and system testing methodology. Recommendation on real-time video wireless transmission is also provided. American Public Transit Association, Draft Recommended Practice for Video Content Analytics (VCA) Recommended Practice for Transit Applications, VCA Recommended Practice Working document, Washington, D.C., Mar. 2010. Video Content Analytics (VCA) technology, also known as Automated Video Surveillance or Intelligent Video, can pro- vide continuous analysis of CCTV images that automatically alerts dispatch when a specific alarm event is detected. APTA has produced a draft Recommended Practice docu- ment for the implementation of VCA technology. Events that may be detected include individuals in distress, objects being thrown inside the bus, objects being thrown at the bus or operator, and fighting. Currently, VCA is not being utilized for bus operator protection applications. In using this tech- nology, agencies need to consider probability of detection, false alarm rate, false negatives for events that occur but are not detected, and factors such as weather and lighting that can affect detection ranges and performance. Casciari, D., “Bus CCTV Could Predict Assaults,” BBC News, Sept. 24, 2009. A Queens University Belfast research team from the Centre for Secure Information Technologies is working on a CCTV system that can predict crime, including operator assaults, before it happens. Once the system identifies a potential crime, images would be sent to a command center and a controller/ dispatcher would intervene if necessary by communicating directly with the potential assailant. The system would analyze data on the bus’s location, time of day, and historic crime rate as well as information obtained by the CCTVs on individuals boarding the bus. SELF-DEFENSE Nonlethal self-defense tools include pepper spray or gel, Taser, kubotan, and physical self-defense without tools. Oleo- resin capsicum (OC), commonly known as pepper spray or pepper gel, is obtained from dried chili peppers ground into a fine powder. An emulsifier is added so that it can be used as an irritant to control violent people. The Taser fires electrified darts to immobilize an individual by causing neuromuscular incapacitation. A kubotan is a small stick that can be used as a self-defense tool. The principal areas for attacks in self- defense include bony, fleshy, and nerve targets. Currently, Houston METRO is the only transit agency that issues a self-defense tool and associated training to its bus opera- tors. Although there have been post-use studies on OC in subduing individuals by law enforcement personnel, there have not been many controlled scientific studies on the safety and effectiveness of OC because they are difficult to do. An evaluation of less-than-lethal weapons that may be suitable for use by bus operators was performed by Officer Trevino of Houston METRO and is summarized here. Also summa- rized later is a National Institute of Justice report describing the results of two studies, one on injuries occurring in three North Carolina police jurisdictions and the other on the deaths of 63 individuals who had died in police custody.

Officer Trevino, Houston METRO, Police Study on Less- than-Lethal Options for Bus Operators. A Houston METRO police study on less-than-lethal options for bus operators was performed prior to the agency issuing self-defense tools to its operators. The following options were evaluated: Taser, self-defense training, pepper spray and gel, and the kubotan. The study also obtained input from several large transit agencies and TSA Air Marshals to assess their experiences with self-defense tools for operators. The Air Marshals indicated that flight attendants had the option of undergoing a 2-day self-defense training. According to the study, no transit agency had issued self-defense tools to their operators—Houston METRO would be the first U.S. agency to do so. The following summarize the outcome of the evaluation: Taser—Advantages of Taser include the ability of the user to keep a safe distance (about 15 ft) from the assailant, along with contact stun capability. In addition, the Taser may be used anywhere on the body. The Taser has been more than 95% effective in stopping attackers in actual law enforcement encounters, even if the attacker was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. To ensure responsible use, the new owner must complete a back- ground check. Although independent medical reports have attested to its safety, negative publicity about police Taser use may make it hard to justify to the public its provision to bus operators. Compared with other self- defense options, errant discharges of this tool may be more likely to strike bus patrons if not used properly. Although training would address this issue to a certain extent, use in a stressful situation would be much harder than in training. The cost of this unit is higher than the other options, at about $499 per unit. The higher unit cost, along with the required training and mainte- nance, make this option the most expensive of the ones presented, and the least recommended less-than-lethal option. Pepper spray and gel—Several products were investigated in this category of OC products. Two were selected for further examination; for the purpose of this synthesis, they will be called pepper gel 1 and pepper gel 2. Mini- mal cross-contamination and ease of cleanup were a few of the factors that made these two pepper gel products more appropriate than others. Advantages of both pep- per gel 1 and 2 were their far-reaching spray distance; their small size, which makes them light and portable, and their safety in a tubular environment—because they have the least amount of airborne contaminants, the possibility of cross-contamination is minimized. Should cross-contamination occur, the water-based product may easily be decontaminated with water. The author noted that negative press can be managed with good outreach to the public and passengers on the benefits of these products. Pepper gel 1 had the highest concentration of OC, at 1.42%, and its retail cost per unit was $19.95, making it more affordable than other options. Pepper gel 2 had a slightly increased risk of cross-contamination 16 and a higher retail cost. at $41.99. The costs may be reduced through volume purchases. The report noted pepper gel 1 as the most appropriate less-than-lethal self-defense option for METRO bus operators based on cost per unit and effectiveness. The study noted that the product was ideal for a tubular environment and would provide security for operators as they wait for police assistance during assaults and other incidents. Self-defense training—Advantages of self-defense training were its short training time, low cost, and the absence of a weapon visible to the public. Another advantage was its ease of development; self-defense classes and courses already exist and are being used for transit and airline personnel. Disadvantages included exposure of opera- tors to more physical harm as a result of the hands-on nature of this defense technique. The training also does not make the operator completely proficient in tech- niques; in addition, it must be practiced regularly or the ability to use the techniques in stressful situations might be lost. Kubotan—Kubotan is one of the few martial arts weapons that is legal and unregulated. It can be used for painful blows to soft tissue areas or disabling blows to an oppo- nent’s vital points, or for hooking, trapping, and pain- compliance techniques to immobilize an adversary. The kubotan has not received negative publicity and is not as controversial as other impact weapons. It is lowest in terms of unit cost, at $5 per unit. Also, training may be developed from a DVD available for purchase. The pri- mary disadvantages are that, if the user is not trained properly, the kubotan may cause major damage to bones or cartilage and, because its use requires physical prox- imity and contact with the assailant, it poses a risk of injury to the operator. As with self-defense training, techniques must be practiced regularly or the ability to use it during emergency situations might be lost. Based on a variety of factors, including the advantages and disadvantages listed in this section, Houston METRO decided to issue pepper gel 1 to its bus operators. Additional information about pepper gel is provided in chapter five. National Institute of Justice, The Effectiveness and Safety of Pepper Spray, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Depart- ment of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2003. The National Institute of Justice report focused on two stud- ies it had funded on the effectiveness and safety of pepper spray use by law enforcement. One study examined injuries in three North Carolina police jurisdictions, and the other explored the in-custody deaths of 63 suspects on whom pep- per spray had been used. The first study revealed that the number of injuries to both officers and suspects had gone down after the introduction of pepper spray. The second study concluded that of the 63 individuals who had been in police custody when they died, in only two of them was pep- per spray contributory to their deaths. Both of the individuals were asthmatics. The other deaths were caused by the indi-

17 viduals’ drug use, disease, or positional asphyxia. It was noted that the arresting officers reported that pepper spray was only effective in 20% of these 63 cases. Toxicological information revealed that 62% of the 63 individuals had some drugs in their body. Studies that were done with individuals not on drugs demonstrated that pepper spray was effective. A 1999 study of 690 incidents concluded that pepper spray was effec- tive in 85% of them. The percentage dropped to 13% when individuals displayed behavior consistent with drug use. The document also includes the results from a third study at the University of California, San Diego that had tested the effects of pepper spray on healthy subjects by comparing their reac- tions with a placebo group. This study found that pepper spray did not compromise respiratory function even when used in conjunction with a sitting or handcuffed position. Evaluating the pepper spray risks under real-world condi- tions is difficult because every situation is unique, the number of in-custody deaths is very low, and it is impossible to repli- cate certain scenarios safely for testing purposes. Therefore, the National Institute of Justice report states that it “cannot prove that pepper spray will never be a contributing factor in the death of a subject resisting arrest.” (The implications of the researcher’s conclusions are that pepper spray or the gel form of the same substance would be effective for bus opera- tors trying to stop an assault, but may not be that effective on persons who are on drugs, and that the possibility of injury or death cannot be ruled out.) Broadstock, M., “What Is the Safety of ‘Pepper Spray’ Use by Law Enforcement or Mental Health Service Staff?” New Zealand Health Technology Assessment Tech Brief Series, 1(2), Sep. 2002. Broadstock examined studies published up to May 2002 on the topic of pepper spray use by law enforcement or mental health service staff and had samples of at least 20 participants with medium- and long-term adverse health effects. Broad- stock discovered that of the seven studies that fit her criteria, only three had been published in scientific and medical jour- nals and four were unpublished. Zollman et al. (2000) found corneal sensitivity and corneal erosions partially recovered after 1 h. All were single-dose exposures at a distance of 1.5 m, and none required medical treatment. Broadstock notes that in actual cases the doses are often higher and are administered at closer distances. Two large studies were done by Brown et al. (2000) and Watson et al. (1996). All of the subjects in the two studies required medical attention, with 7% to 9% of these subjects having significant adverse events, such as corneal abrasions and pulmonary toxicity. Broadstock con- cludes that these outcomes may have resulted from pepper spray use or misuse, possibly in combination with other fac- tors. Stopford (1996) was the largest of the seven studies. The work involved a sample of 6,000 officers exposed to pepper spray. Medical treatment was required for a “small but significant” proportion of cases. Eye problems, chest problems, and headaches persisting longer than 1 week were observed, although rarely. Broadstock notes that studies done using autopsy reports can be biased because the reports are usually nonspecific in nature. She cites as an example a study done by the ACLU of Southern California in 1995 that cited pepper spray as the cause of death for all of the subjects in its study. At the same time, a study done by law enforcement (Granfield et al. 1994) in a similar time period concluded that there was no link between pepper spray and the deaths. Broadstock concludes that most of the seven studies did not provide details on the type of pepper spray used, its man- ufacturer or strength, and whether it was used as recom- mended. Therefore, it is possible that the adverse events reported in the studies might have been caused by improper use of the pepper spray. BUS OPERATOR PERSPECTIVE Bruyere, D. and J. M. Gillet, National Operator Assault Sur- vey Results 2005, ATU Transit Operators. In 2005 an Assault Survey was undertaken by the ATU and its Ottawa local 741 owing to member perceptions that “the issue of potential violence for operators in an uncontrolled environment is paramount” and that “it is an issue that demands analysis and the development of strategies to prevent acts of violence in the workplace for transit operators” (p. 5). The objectives of the survey were to assess violence in the work- place, outline how operators perceive violence in the daily work environment, create an up-to-date document for leg- islative application to address transit worker safety, strengthen lines of communication, focus resources to implement edu- cation and training programs, and create awareness of the risks in the occupation based on operator perceptions. The survey involved 1,468 operators at seven union locals in Canada. Of these, 36% had experienced physical assault(s) and 55% had experienced verbal threats. Of the physical assaults, 16% were not preceded by verbal threats. In physical assaults, the following were contributing factors: • 77%, passenger misconduct; • 60%, nonpayment of fares; • 51%, alcohol or drugs; and • 11%, weapons. In verbal assaults, contributing factors were the following: • 80%, passenger misconduct; • 71%, nonpayment of fares; • 50%, alcohol or drugs; and • 9%, weapons. Forty-five percent of the responding drivers indicated that training was a concern; many requested additional training in violence awareness and response and in self-defense tech- niques. What to do after an assault had taken place and how to contact sources of support were also mentioned as desir-

able training content. Recommendations based on the survey analysis included development of a database for documenta- tion of incidents over time, pursuit of funding, lobbying for more violence prevention regulations, progress evaluations, and increased sample sizes for future surveys. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES International practices to protect bus operators by transit sys- tems can provide U.S. and Canadian agencies with ideas on innovative measures. Many European cities have had prob- lems with violence within their transit systems and have devel- oped and implemented methods to counter this violence. A recent International Union of Public Transport aggression study and the results of a 2003 TCRP study are described in this section. Bonfanti, G. and T. Wagenknecht, Human Factors Reduce Ag- gression and Fare Evasion, Jan./Feb. 2010, PTI, pp. 28–32. The authors describe the results of the International Union of Public Transport aggression study performed by the Bus Com- mittee and Human Resources Commission in 2008 and 2009 with data provided by more than 30 transit agencies and oper- ators from 19 nations. Aggression is defined as violent physi- cal contact or threat with weapons towards transit personnel and other passengers. Results of the study indicated that ag- gression toward bus personnel was more frequent and prob- lematic than aggression toward rail personnel, and occurred most often in the late afternoon. The majority of the aggres- sions were located inside the vehicle in the operator’s area. Technological tools that were most widely employed by the responding operators were video surveillance, alarms linked to radio communications, and protected operators’ cabins or windows. Alarms connected to radio communications were believed to be the most effective technological security mea- sure, followed by video surveillance. System operators planned to increase usage of video surveillance and alarms in their bus fleet, but planned to decrease use of barriers. Systems 18 with barriers have made them optional for operators. Systems that had considered but decided not to install barriers have made the decision on the basis of operator comfort, reflection and glare issues, and diminished customer contact; they have also increased or initiated operator training in conflict manage- ment. The study concluded that the barriers were not consid- ered to be very effective. The best nontechnological prevention tools were believed to be partnerships with police, security per- sonnel, and operator training. TCRP Research Results Digest 58: Safety and Security Issues at All-Bus Systems in Small- to Medium-Sized Cities in Western Europe, International Transit Studies Program. Transportation Research Board of the National Acade- mies, Washington, D.C., 2003. This TCRP Research Results report described security prob- lems experienced by bus transit systems in Western Europe and the methods used to combat them. The researchers con- cluded that the best approaches, based on these Western Euro- pean experiences, were to establish good policies, including zero tolerance-type strategies, and to address problems caused by youths by influencing social values and educating transit users at a very early age. Sheffield provided an incentive for schools to assist them in combating violence. Each day their students behave, the school receives bus miles that may be exchanged for free school trips. Other methods included sup- port pay, locating bus layovers in safe locations, use of glazed windows, and a concealed starter switch. Barriers and com- partments were adopted by Translink in Belfast, Arriva in Liverpool, First in Sheffield, and others. Translink’s screen has a small opening that may be opened in case the operator has a medical emergency. Translink also provides an escape hatch for operators because the barrier glass cannot be broken. Translink operators have reported that they did not like the enclosure. In terms of video surveillance, Translink had real and dummy video cameras installed on their buses to mitigate vandalism. Arriva and Manchester had visible and hidden video cameras, also designed to address vandals.

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TRB’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Synthesis 93: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault highlights practices and policies implemented by transit agencies to deter and mitigate assaults on bus operators.

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