Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault (2011)

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7BACKGROUND Although serious crime within transit systems is relatively rare and constitutes a small percentage of overall crime, even one serious incident of violence can make media headlines and diminish the perception of security, especially if the crime is against the transit operator. Less serious assaults against bus operators are much more frequent (1). Even seemingly minor assaults, such as spitting and verbal threats, can cause psycho- logical trauma and affect the work force. About 1,100 bus transit systems in the United States employed 195,181 work- ers and provided 5.57 billion passenger trips in 2008 (2). Violence against operators creates a stressful work environ- ment for victims and their coworkers, making it more chal- lenging for them to serve their customers. Transit agencies report lost productivity, increased absenteeism, and workers’ compensation claims as a result of assaults against their bus operators. Transit workers are at higher risk for violence than are workers in many other occupations. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the National Institute for Occupa- tional Safety and Health, there is an increased risk of work- place violence for workers who have direct contact with the public, have mobile workplaces or deliver services, work in community settings, deliver passengers, handle money, and work in small numbers (3, 4). When a passenger assaults a bus operator while the oper- ator is driving the vehicle, other passengers, along with other drivers and pedestrians, are placed at risk. In California, Omni- trans bus operator Lawrence Kester was stabbed on May 7, 2010, while operating a bus. After Kester was attacked, the bus veered off the road and crashed into a tree. The operator, a 15-year veteran of Omnitrans, died, leaving behind a wife and eight children. A 33-year-old man was charged with his mur- der. The agency made grief counselors available to Kester’s family and his coworkers (5). Some assaults, such as this one, occur out of the blue, and there was probably nothing the operator could have done differently to prevent this attack. Other assaults are preceded by disputes, often fare- related. On December 3, 2009, a veteran Edmonton Transit bus operator, Thomas Bregg, was severely injured in an assault during the morning peak hour. A man who boarded the 10 Clareview bus in northeast Edmonton began arguing about the fare and then attacked the operator, causing severe head and eye injuries that required surgery. The assailant was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault. This incident spurred the Edmonton Transit System to take addi- tional initiatives to address bus operator assaults (6). NYC Transit bus operator Edwin Thomas, 46, was attacked and killed on December 1, 2008, at a B46 bus stop on Malcolm X Boulevard in Brooklyn, N.Y. A paroled felon, Horace Moore, had used an invalid Metrocard and subsequently asked for a transfer at Gates Avenue. When operator Thomas refused, Moore punched him twice in the head and exited. Moore then returned and stabbed Thomas repeatedly with a knife. Thomas, a 7-year veteran of NYCT and the father of two teenage chil- dren, was pronounced dead at 1:11 p.m., less than 45 minutes after the attack had taken place (7, 8). There is a consensus among those in the transit commu- nity that violence against bus operators is a continuing and serious problem, and more needs to be done to prevent it. Bus operators are especially vulnerable because they interact with the public on a daily basis. They make use of a complex skill set, which includes communications and problem-solving skills, and need the right temperament to succeed at their jobs. Bus operators have been the victims of assaults by passengers for decades. However, there have been positive changes that have decreased the number of assaults over the years. In the 1960s, exact-fare policies were implemented by U.S. transit systems, and operators no longer had to carry change. The Automated Fare Collection systems were installed in the 1990s and helped mitigate fare-related disputes, although transfer issues persist. Also, the notion that the bus operator is the “enforcer” of fare payment and other rules has been changing. In the past decade, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, extensive investments in counterterrorism efforts have been made by federal and local agencies. Some of these investments are also useful in protecting bus operators against passenger assault. To optimize limited resources, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on National Preparedness required the establishment of an all-hazards preparedness goal. All- hazards preparedness for transit agencies is defined as inte- grated planning and capability building for safety, security, and emergency management to optimize and continuously improve the use of resources and the management of risks from hazards, threats, vulnerabilities, and adverse events or incidents (9). Using the all-hazards approach to risk manage- ment, transit agencies have been seeking to leverage homeland CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

security grants and stimulus monies to implement protective measures for bus operators. Bus Operator Protection Measures A wide range of methods to protect bus operators includes technology, policing, training, information management, poli- cies, and outreach. Methods can be direct and preventative or indirect and longer-term. Others are primarily for incident response, offender identification, and prosecution. School out- reach programs, especially those directed at younger children, are indirect and longer-term. Although most methods have deterrent capability, few are physically preventative. Some assaults are entirely unprovoked and are likely to be caused by individuals with mental illness or alcohol or drug problems, or by youths or gangs. The bus operator may be a stellar, veteran employee doing his or her job perfectly and still be attacked out of the blue. Physically preventative methods, such as the barrier and self-defense tools and training, may be the only methods that can deflect these types of attacks. The barrier that separates the operator from passengers is one of the few mea- sures designed to prevent an assailant from physically access- ing the operator. Self-defense training can prevent injury to the operator by teaching the operator techniques to defend himself or herself; the physical contact required for self-defense does pose a risk of injury to the operator. Self-defense tools are another preventative measure, may be used at a distance, and do not require physical contact with the assailant. Although these measures are primarily for operator protection, most other measures protect the passengers as well as the operator. Self- defense tools and training require the operator’s active par- ticipation in the training—if the operator has not undergone training on the appropriate use of the self-defense tool or self- defense techniques, both the agency and the operator could face liability for use of excessive force. Agencies in states that have weak firearm carry laws may be more amenable to issu- ing self-defense tools and providing self-defense training. Carry laws for concealed and open carry differ by state and can also vary by jurisdiction within a state. These laws influence the operator’s perception of his or her security. In states or jurisdictions with lenient firearms laws, greater pro- portions of households own firearms and there is greater like- lihood that any resident will carry them on their person and onto a transit vehicle. Carry laws pertaining to concealed firearms are categorized into the following groups: • “No-issue” states do not allow any private citizen to carry a concealed firearm. • “May-issue” states may issue permits for concealed fire- arms, partially at the discretion of local authorities. • “Shall-issue” states require a permit to carry a concealed firearm, but the granting authority must issue a permit when minimum criteria are met, making the acquisition of a permit relatively easy. • “Unrestricted” states allow residents to carry a con- cealed firearm without a permit. 8 Only three states are “unrestricted”—Alaska, Vermont, and Arizona. “No-issue” states are Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, along with the District of Columbia. Al- though Hawaii and New Jersey are technically “may-issue,” they are “no-issue” in practice. Other “may-issue” states in- clude California, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island. In some of these states, county authorities have discretion and carry laws can vary greatly within the state. For example, in New York state, New York City is “no-issue” in practice, whereas upstate areas practice “shall-issue” permit-granting policies. The remainder of the state is “shall-issue” (10). With regard to open carry or the ability of a private citizen to openly carry a firearm in public, states and jurisdictions also have varying levels of permissiveness. States may be categorized into the following groups: • Open carry state—Open carry is allowed without a li- cense on foot and inside vehicles. Open carry states include Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. • Open carry friendly state—Open carry is allowed with- out a license but not inside a vehicle. Open carry friendly states include Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. • Licensed open carry state—Open carry is allowed with a license on foot and inside vehicles. Licensed open carry states include Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Utah. • Nonpermissive open carry state—Open carry is highly restricted or banned. Nonpermissive open carry states include Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, New York, Okla- homa, South Carolina, and Texas. • Rural open carry state—Open carry is allowed in non- incorporated areas. California is the only rural open carry state (11). Agencies experiencing assaults on operators owing to fare disputes, rules violations, and customer service issues may consider refresher training for operators, customer ser- vice improvements, or changes in agency policy and super- vision role. For verbal assaults, audio surveillance may help determine the nature of the incidents and what may be done to prevent them, and in developing operator training in ver- bal techniques such as verbal judo. Also, a good operator selection practice can help agencies identify individuals who are resilient to the many stresses bus operators face on the job. The decision-making process on which measures and policies to deploy is based on many factors, including pur- pose, effectiveness, cost, feasibility, liability issues, and oper-

9ator and customer perspectives. The institutional and legal milieus in which the agency operates influence the security methods most relevant for its transit system. The ability of a measure to address other crimes, such as crimes against pas- sengers, vandalism, safety, and accident investigations, is a significant benefit for the agency. Also, agencies implement multiple methods simultaneously, and some methods, such as community and school outreach, are less direct and require time for their effects to become manifest. Other variables that will affect effectiveness may or may not be under the direct control of the agency. Customer service, which can have a sig- nificant effect on the likelihood of passenger assaults against operators, is in the direct control of the agency. However, the general crime rate and proportion of youths in the system are exogenous variables. Hence, it may be difficult for agencies to determine the effectiveness of a single policy or measure. Definition of Assault Transit agencies have differing definitions of operator “as- sault.” A broad definition is used in this report. Assaults are defined in this synthesis as follows: Overt physical and verbal acts by a passenger that interfere with the mission of a bus operator—which is to complete his or her scheduled run safely—and that adversely affect the safety of the operator and customers. This definition includes acts of aggression that may or may not result in injury to the operator, and is somewhat broader than the definitions used by the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program. The Uniform Crime Reporting cate- gories related to the definition of “assault” used in this syn- thesis are aggravated assault, simple assault, robbery, rape, and homicide. Aggravated assault, homicide, robbery, and rape are Part I offenses, which are more serious than Part II offenses. Aggravated assault is defined as “an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usu- ally is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily harm” (12). The weapon may be a firearm, knife or cutting instrument, other dangerous weapon, or parts of the body such as hands, fists, or feet. Simple assault is defined as: . . . an unlawful physical attack by one person upon another where neither the offender displays a weapon, nor the victim suf- fers obvious severe or aggravated bodily injury involving appar- ent broken bones, loss of teeth, possible internal injury, severe laceration, or loss of consciousness. To unlawfully place another person in reasonable fear of bodily harm through the use of threatening words and/or other conduct, but without displaying a weapon or subjecting the victim to actual physical attack (e.g., intimidation)” (13). Section 265(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada states that a person commits an assault when (a) without the consent of another person, they apply force intentionally to that person, directly or indirectly or (b) they attempt or threaten, by act or gesture, to apply force to another person, if they have, or cause that other person to believe upon reasonable grounds that they have, present ability to effect their purpose. The National Transit Database follows the Uniform Crime Reporting definitions and guidelines and requires all Part I and Part II assaults that result in an arrest to be reported in the Safety & Security 40 and 50 summary reports. Part II assaults not resulting in an arrest are not reportable to the National Transit Database. Recent Incidents The following incidents that have recently occurred on U.S. and Canadian transit systems highlight the need for increased protection of bus operators. • On March 8, 2010, on International Women’s Day, a Maple Ridge Coast Mountain Bus Company female bus operator was gripped by the neck by a disgruntled pas- senger and dragged from her seat. Passengers quickly summoned help (14). • On September 1, 2009, at 1:15 a.m., a 15-year-old drunken teen punched a Coast Mountain Bus Company operator in the right eye so severely that he lost control of the bus, which started weaving in traffic. The punch broke the operator’s glasses and the orbital bone in his right eye (15). • On June 4, 2009, 17-year-old Darrion Scott boarded a New Orleans Regional Transit Authority bus with her baby and was repeatedly asked to fold her stroller. She not only refused, but poured the contents of her baby’s milk bottle on Hanella Johnson, an RTA operator for 18 years, before stabbing her. Luckily, the operator survived (16). Many assaults are caused by fare disputes. The following examples highlight the importance of agency policies and operator training inasmuch as many assaults are preceded by interactions and disputes between the operator and patron: • On March 23, 2010, at 3:10 p.m., a Chicago Transit Authority operator was attacked with a blunt object and injured on a bus after a fare dispute. The operator was taken to Mount Sinai Hospital in serious condition (17). • In Edmonton, Canada, on January 26, 2010, a female pas- senger demanded a transfer even though she had not paid. The passenger then hit the operator, who was also female, twice. The operator, afraid for her safety, gave the pas- senger a transfer and politely asked her to sit down (18). • In January 2010, in Minneapolis, a male passenger assaulted a female bus operator after a passenger inserted the fare card incorrectly. As the operator was explaining what had happened, the passenger began verbally attack- ing the operator, and she asked him to exit the bus. He punched her in the stomach, and the operator returned the hit, which led to additional punches (19).

• On May 15, 2008, a Milwaukee County teenager as- saulted a bus operator whom he mistakenly believed was the operator who had previously expelled him from a bus for displaying a fake pass. After attacking the operator, the teen took control of the bus and crashed it into a tree. The teen was a 17-year-old former Milwau- kee public school student. His identification and capture was facilitated by footage from a video surveillance system (20). • On December 27, 2007, a NJ Transit bus operator was injured in Newark by a cane-wielding passenger after a fare dispute escalated into a physical fight. The passen- ger caused serious trauma to the operator’s left eye and was charged with aggravated assault (21). • A rough ride, whether or not the operator was responsi- ble, can also instigate assaults. On December 22, 2006, in Dorchester, Massachusetts, an MBTA bus operator slammed on his brakes after being cut off. One of the passengers became upset and initiated a fistfight with the operator, who had to be treated at a hospital. The passenger was taken into custody (22). PROJECT OBJECTIVES The primary objectives of this synthesis study were to docu- ment the state of the practice and report on the practices and policies implemented by transit agencies to deter and mitigate passenger assaults of bus operators. This report incorporates workplace violence issues, up-to-date information on bus oper- ator security measures and practices, and other related issues. Relevant resources for the synthesis project were reviewed, and the contractor team participated in a conference call to obtain feedback on the project objectives, survey, and desired outcomes of the project. This information led to the develop- ment of a technical approach to the project. A project time- line was created based on the technical approach, specific tasks needed to complete the project, and the deadlines pro- vided by TRB. Issues mentioned but not explored extensively in the syn- thesis were the impact of fare-free systems and off-board fare payment systems. Synthesis projects on these topics began in the fall of 2010. TECHNICAL APPROACH TO PROJECT The objectives of the project were met by performing the fol- lowing tasks: • A literature summary of relevant materials was con- ducted. • A survey was developed and distributed to 88 large and small transit agencies in various geographic regions of the United States and Canada, and one system in China. 10 • Profile studies on specific security practices and mea- sures were conducted. Literature Summary A literature summary of relevant materials on workplace vio- lence, operator assault, and transit security measures was performed by consulting various sources. International stud- ies were also reviewed. Survey The objective of the survey was to obtain information about bus system and security characteristics; agency policies on fare and rules enforcement; characteristics of bus operator assaults; and their assault prevention and mitigation prac- tices, including training, hiring, use of policing, technology, and self-defense tools and training. The draft survey instru- ment was developed, pilot-tested, and finalized on the basis of panel comments and input. The survey was distributed electronically or by mail to 88 multimodal and bus-only tran- sit agencies. Survey recipients included the 50 largest U.S. transit agencies operating bus services as well as randomly selected agencies representing medium and small agencies. Several Canadian agencies and a Chinese BRT system were also included in the distribution. Of the 88 agencies con- tacted for the survey, 66 agencies, or 75%, responded. The survey tool and list of respondents are presented in Appen- dices B and C. Profiles The profiles are studies focused on a specific security prac- tice or measure category. The objectives of the profile stud- ies were to obtain increased coverage of specific security methods and practices used by the selected transit agencies. The organizations to be interviewed were selected on the basis of survey responses, panel recommendations, and the results of the literature summary. Effort was made to obtain information from diverse agencies; in some cases an agency was able to provide profile information on more than one cat- egory. Open-ended questions covering a range of issues were developed for each security measure featured in the profile. Profiles were developed by contacting relevant agency practitioners on the following categories of operator protec- tion measures: • Technology and information management; • Personnel, policing, and training; and • Agency policies and legislation. The profile agencies are presented in Table 1.

11 REPORT ORGANIZATION The report is organized into seven chapters, including this introductory chapter. The literature summary is presented in chapter two, and the survey results are described in chapter three. Chapter four contains the profiles on technology and information management. Chapter five contains the profiles on personnel, policing, and training. Chapter six contains the profiles related to agency policies and legislation. Finally, chapter seven summarizes the findings of this project, pro- vides highlights of practices to prevent and mitigate bus oper- ator assaults, discusses related issues, and presents items for further research. The appendices contain supplemental mate- rial on agency practices, legislation and policies, the survey instrument, and participating agency list. TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT Barriers Miami-Dade Transit, SF MUNI, Milwaukee County Transit System, Rochester Genesee RTA, NYC Transit, Coast Mountain Bus Co., Toronto Transit Commission, Winnipeg Transit Information Management Edmonton Transit System Video Surveillance Greater Bridgeport Transit, Rochester Genesee RTA, King County Metro, IndyGo, Miami-Dade Transit, Pinellas Suncoast TA, Coast Mountain Bus Co., Toronto Transit Commission Audio Surveillance Greater Cleveland RTA, Madison Metro Transit, King County Metro, IndyGo, Pinellas Suncoast TA, San Antonio VIA AVL Greater Cleveland RTA, Madison Metro Transit, Pinellas Suncoast TA, San Antonio VIA, Coast Mountain Bus Co., Winnipeg Transit TODSS Pace Suburban Bus Emergency Communications Pinellas PSTA, Cleveland GCRTA DNA Kits London TFL PERSONNEL, POLICING, TRAINING Operator Selection CUTA, NYC Transit, Winnipeg Transit Policing Pierce Transit, Edmonton Transit, MBTA Self-defense tools Houston METRO, Minneapolis Metro Transit Self-defense training Pierce Transit, River City TARC, Calgary Transit, Winnipeg Transit Customer service training Pierce Transit, NYC Transit, Coast Mountain Bus Co. Behavioral Assessment Hampton Roads, Pinellas Transit AGENCY POLICIES AND LEGISLATION Suspension of Service Albany, NY CDTA, Madison Metro Transit, Montgomery County Transit, Pierce Transit, SUN METRO, Edmonton Transit, Charlotte CATS Workplace Violence WMATA, Pierce Transit Fare Policy Las Vegas Max Line, Cleveland GCRTA, King County Metro, Coast Mountain Bus Co. Legislation with Enhanced Penalties CTTRANSIT, WMATA Employee Assistance CTTRANSIT, Pierce Transit, Toronto Transit Commission Passenger Outreach NYC Transit, NJ Transit, Edmonton Transit, Hampton Roads, Albany, NY CDTA, Toronto Transit Commission School, Community Outreach Chicago CTA, Greater Cleveland RTA, King County Metro, San Antonio VIA, Rochester Genesee RTA, WMATA, Edmonton Transit Other Policies Toronto Transit Commission, Las Vegas Veolia Transportation TABLE 1 PROFILE STUDIES