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':5 Soviet "New Thinking" About ~ nternational Secu rity Roald SagUeev When important changes take place in international lifeespecially in the area of military confrontation they are generally signified by treaties. However, one very important event will probably never be confirmed by the signing of a treaty: I am speaking now about the end of the Cold War. I have a proposal to offer as testimony that the Cold War is over. This proposal is to rename Sakharov Plaza the "Plaza of People's Deputy Sakharov." There is a general consensus that the Cold War, even if it is over now, has left us with a tremendous overabundance of weaponsa tremendous "overarming." A couple of decades ago we introduced the term "over- kiD" while speaking about strategic nuclear weapons. But with an in- creasing recognition of the importance of a coherent approach, an integral approach, we are now speaking more and more about an overabundance of conventional weapons. So there is a conceptual understanding, per- haps a kind of consensus, Hat the very existence of overarming itself is very dangerous. Yet at the same time, there is no factual development that would bring us hope that we are moving toward a world without overarming. AH that 28

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29 SOVIET "NEW THINKING" ABOUTINTERNATIONALSECURITY is going on now are individual talks and negotiations, with no integral approach toward solving the problem of overarming. There are funda- mental differences in every individual negotiation. Only with a coherent global approach to reduce overarming can we achieve real success. The "new thinking" promoted by General Secretary Mikhail Gor- bachev during his first four years in power is now evolving toward the formulation of such a global system of common, or mutual, security a system that would provide a chance for the coherent development of future military configurations based on a drastic reduction of overarming. The reasons for this enormous overarming are quite obvious: the Cold War and many other unfortunate paralRe] developments. One of the important elements on our side is that we are now ready to recognize, to confess, that on many occasions and in many instances, the Soviet side was not clever enough. We were often ready to follow He Western lead in developing new military technologies and new armaments. However, we did not resist enough, as we say now, being provoked to participate in the arms race. We did not recognize the importance that political steps, political methods, could have had in strengthening international security. Indeed, in some cases we ourselves were the driving force for the "hard line." The present Soviet government recognizes that we made a number of errors and mistakes in military doctrine and in the actual development of our military system. On the basis of such confessions and recognition, the Soviet govem- ment has taken unilateral steps in many areas. I am talking about a rather long list of different unilateral moratoriums, not Al of them successful. Let me remind you that the first unilateral step was a moratorium on antisatellite weapons (ASATs), declared in August 1983. I consider this moratorium to have been a very successful step, especially since it was reciprocated by the American Congress. In fact, after six years, both sides still have this kind of de facto bilateral moratorium on ASAT testing and development. Another important unilateral step taken by our side was a reduction of conventional armaments both in Europe and Asia. This particular step was based on a recognition that there is a linkage between strategic and conventional forces, and a political linkage between negotiations on stra- tegic nuclear alms control and conventional anns control, in Europe especially. I fully agree with Professor Panofsky that these linkages should never

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30 CHAI1ENGES FOR THE 1990s be formalized to such an extent as to stop progress on any individual element of arms control. I would like to complement the figures that he gave on strategic forces with some figures on conventional armaments, and show you the official figures that are given by the Soviet side and by the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Table It summarizes the most recent interview given by Defense Min- ister General Dimitri Yazov, only two days ago. These figures deal with many kinds of armaments. They are integral figures, reflecting what is actuaBy in the arsenals of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. They do not include nuclear warheads or special strategic delivery sys- tems, except military aircraft. Manpower is counted in millions. In the figures given by General Yazov, there is a noticeable asymmetry in favor of NATO. I am not going to discuss whether these figures are consistent with Western presentations. General Yazov argues that there is no integral military imbalance between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. He bases his argument on figures given in response to some of the statements made by the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney. These numbers include military aircraft (excluding cargo planes), tanks, and surface ships. Some of the numbers for surface ships are rather conditional. For example, not every kind of ship is counted, only ships above a certain size something like 1,200 tons, I think. Then there are aircraft carriers and surface ships equipped with different kinds of cruise missiles. These are overall worId- wide numbers. Later on ~ will give you the Warsaw Treaty interpretation for conventional figures in Europe. Together with the figures given by Professor Panofsky on nuclear forces, ~ think this provides a complete integral picture of the existing balance. There is a strong imbalance in the number of tanks. One of the most important arguments on the Soviet side is that this substantial advantage for the Warsaw Treaty Organization is compensated for by two factors: part by NATO's advantage in strike aircraft and strike helicop- ters, and, in major part, by a strong NATO advantage in naval forces, including naval forces currently deployed in and near Europe. On the basis of such obvious disparities, the Soviet Union declared its intention to carry out some unilateral reductions. I will not give you the detailed figures, but personnel win be decreased on the Soviet side by a bit more than 500,000. The number of tanks will be decreased by 10,000,

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31 SOVIET"NEW THINKING" ABOUTINTERNATIONAL.~=U~ a fewer number of artillery guns, and a small number of aircraft. General Yazov confirmed in his last interview that at present, on April 21, 1989 so the figure is very fresh (it still would be the same two days later - 700 tanks were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, from East Germany, Czecho- sIovakia, and Poland, along with a number of troops. So the process of unilateral reduction to decrease dispanties is already in action. Reductions will also be seen in the figures of our military budget. I cannot argue about the size of our military budget; the figures are not yet published. While running to become a People's Deputy, I promised to my electorate that I would insist on the publication of such figures. Some relative figures have been given by the government, however. The reduction in military spending for 1989 is I.5 percent, including aU kinds of military expenditures~ecreased production by the military Industry, and so on. In 1990, military expenditures will decrease 7 percent, and in 1991, a decrease of up to 14.2 percent is promised. By that time, I am sure we will know not only the relative figures, but also the absolute figures. I hope they wild be published within the next Wee or four months, maybe even earlier.2 Table IT indicates corresponding figures related to European conven- tional forces. I took them from the long document issued by the Warsaw Treaty Organization in January 1989 in response to an identical NATO document published in late November 1988. These figures indicate that there is a balance in manpower, and a rather reasonable balance in the number of combat aircraft, counted as the sum of tactical, naval, and air defense. There is a substantial advantage on the side of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in interceptor aircraft, but these interceptors are considered by the Warsaw Treaty Organization to be unable to attack ground-based targets Hey can only act against objects in the air. Yet this imbalance is compensated for, roughly, by an advantage in naval aircraft and strike aircraft on the side of NATO. There is also a considerable disparity in the number of combat helicop- ters in NATO's favor, but a substantial advantage on the side of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in tanks. So out of 80,000 tanks, almost 60,000 are attributed to the European theater. To some extent, this is compensated for by NATO,s approximately I.6 to ~ advantage in antitank rockets and rocket-launching complexes. Again, looking at integral figures for naval forces, the numbers for the European theater are in favor of NATO, especially in aircraft carriers.

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32 CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990s Several key military figures on the Soviet sides recently suggested that the process of eliminating disparities in force balances in Europe should be extended to naval forces. Otherwise, there win be a substantial NATO advantage in naval forces. This is aU I win say about the existing figures. The concept we are developing now of how to proceed on our side is to make a very important development in the conventional arms area. We should keep in mind that it would be extremely difficult to achieve a completely symmetrical situation. Professor Panofsky was speaking about the origin of asymmetries, the origin of asymmetries coming from geo- graphical, geopolitical, and historical reasons. It would be naive to hope to eliminate all these asymmetries at once. It is quite clear that such a great disparity in land-based forces derives from our history, especially during the last years of World War II and the postwar period. I do not think we could ever base our military doctrine on reestablishing parity in the oceans and in the seas. This gives our military an additional argument as to why we should keep ourselves a little bit stronger on land. Even if we reach a common language, a common understanding, about the overall balance and the inevitability of disparities, there is the even more complicated issue of stability. We have spent many years trying to reach a common definition of nuclear stability. I think we are now very close to having a consensus about the criteria for strategic stability. Still, conventional stability is a new area, and we are only now entering this new land. The conventional forces reduction talks now under way in Europe should contribute a lot to the development of a common formula for, and a common definition of, conventional stability. Working from these two important conceptual understandings- strate- gic nuclear stability and conventional stabilitywe can try to develop a joint approach to coherent arms reduction in both spheres. However, it may take rather a long time to come to such a consensus. I agree with Professor Panofsky that, even with existing disagreements on strategic and conventional stability, we should not delay Me START talks or talks on conventional arms reductions in Europe until we reach such a consensus in the conceptual area. It is very important that we extend the definition of stability to actions on the seas and the oceans. In that case, He definition of stability would also include important geographical restrictions or agreements, the crea- tion of special ocean zones, and mutual confidence-building measures. This is a completely open area right now.

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33 SOVIET "NEW THINKING" ABOUTINTERNATIONAL SECURITY Negotiations and discussions that have nothing to do with nuclear or conventional stability are now going on in parallel at different levels. These tams concern chemical and biological weapons. We consider it Very important to have paraBel success in these areas, because success in these areas, where we have almost no disagreements in concept, win strengthen our positions in nuclear and conventional negotiations. We are approaching the time when strategic nuclear stability may enter into conflict with the process of the gradualit may be slow, but still it is moving approach of several nations to the nuclear threshold. If we ourselves are unable to make important progress in strategic nuclear arms control, it win be even more difficult to prevent an increased number of nations from approaching the nuclear threshold. The situation will be- come especially dangerous if both sides are unable to agree on nonmod- ernization of nuclear weapons. Nonmodernization can be achieved by nuclear test bans. The time has come once again to reconsider our mutual stance on nuclear testing. We are making important progress now in cutting off the production of fissile materials. The Soviet government has decided to introduce meas- ures to eliminate plutonium production and to shut down several plants that produce enriched uranium. In fact, these plants are environmentally and technologically obsolete. Our understanding is that Me United States also has old-fashioned, obsolete plants. This, therefore, is a very conven- ient moment to mutually agree on some parallel steps. We are rapidly approaching 1995, when the Treaty on Nuclear Non- Proliferation will have to be reaffirmed or extended. This is an important problem, again related to the issue of limiting the number of nuclear nations and the number of subnuclear nations approaching the threshold. If these rather modest parallel talks are successful, then the next step on our side will be discussions about the introduction of the concept of "reasonable sufficiency." This concept was suggested by Gorbachev two years ago and was supported conceptually by We Warsaw Treaty Organi- zation, but only as a concept. There is no concrete military doctrine developed as an interpretation of reasonable sufficiency. Some experts say that unilateral steps now under way are in the spirit of this reasonable sufficiency concept, but most experts think that reasonable sufficiency cannot be developed unilaterally- it should be a mutual, global step. There are a few preliminary ideas about how to define reasonable sufficiency. In the area of strategic nuclear weapons, there is a tentative desire to compare reasonable sufficiency with the older concept of mini-

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34 CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990s mum deterrence. I agree with Professor Panofsky, who essentially, with- out using such terminology, was speaking about hundreds of nuclear warheads on each side as a desirable threshold, compared with the tens of thousands existing now. Nuclear or strategic reasonable sufficiency probably win not be estab- lished without the participation of the other nuclear nations. This is the post-START stage, which, from the very beginning, was envisaged as being multinational. There is a strong temptation to develop the concept of reasonable sufficiency in the area of conventional forces on the basis of an intrinsic tie with the concept of "defensive defense." There are many interesting ideas about how this defensive defense could be configured. A similar idea could be extended to naval forces. There is a lot of discussion on the defensive defense posture for land-based forces, but very little discussion for naval forces. So a first idea would be, for example, to start with Hose components of naval forces that could be considered offensive such as aircraft carriers, ships that can deliver weapons, and so on. With such restructuring, naval forces could be given more and more defensive features. Another important issue concerns how to deal with subnuclear na- tions- the nations that are gradually approaching the nuclear threshold. Only combined global actions wild be sufficient. Some actions in the area of the economy and international trade would involve establishing special types of embargoes, and, very importantly, cutting military trade. There is a very important issue of regional conflicts. This area was recently accorded very great importance, and we already are seeing sev- eral tentative successes in regulating regional conflicts. It would also be important to include in Be concept of reasonable sufficiency the ability of the responsible nations to counteract or to fight against terrorism, whether it be individual, nongovernmental, or govem- mental terronsm, religious fanaticism, or other things of this kind. All these measures would require Me actual perestroika of international relations, which would touch not only military issues, but also economic and political issues. It is very difficult to separate the issues of intema- tional perestroika and international life from the perestroika that is going on inside my own country. I have already mentioned some unilateral steps. There are also other very important changes occurring in my

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35 SOVIET "NEW THINKING" ABOUTINTE.RNATIONAL SECURITY country, both in its economy and, probably most important, in its political life. Many candidates for People's Deputiessome of them have already been elected had in their programs important statements on military doctnne and anns control. One of the most important elements of my program, literaBy included in the published version, was to establish the people's control over the Soviet military-industrial complex. Some of the Deputies went into more detail and called for the establishment of control over the KGB.4 It is very difficult to change perceptions. One of the most difficult problems we now face is that we have to deal with perceptions. For example, I recently discovered that one of the groups in your country conducted a special public opinion poll that asked, "What would consti- tute the most dangerous threat to the life of Americans?" To my complete surprise, I discovered that the Soviet nuclear threat a military threat won only 13th place. It is nice that the image of us as the enemy is fading, but at the same time it was a shock, and somehow also a great humiliation for the Russians. Here we have sacrificed to create this superstrong military machine, overarming. We sacrificed many aspects of our mate- rial life. The most recent sacrifice being that last week, even in Moscow, sugar was rationedI hope this is not an outcome of the recent meeting between Gorbachev and Castro. I think we should always consider what is going on in the area of people's perceptions. On our side there has also been an important change: a decreased perception of the American military threat. For example, almost no candidate for People's Deputy put forward slogans calving for us to support a military buildup to counter the American threat. 1Editor's note: The two tables referred to in this tank were unavailable for publication. 2In June 1989, at the Congress of People's Deputies, the overall military budget was given as 77 billion rubles. States. 3In July 1989, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev reiterated this while visiting the United 4The Supreme Soviet in July 1989 established the Committee on Defense and the KGB.