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4 The INF Treaty: A Status Report on INF Inspections Roland Lajoie Last August I led a group of Ameri- can inspectors into the Soviet Union to witness the first elimination of a Soviet missile to be destroyed under the INF Treaty. The inspection took place at Kapustin Yar, a missile test facility that is about three hours east of Volgograd. During the preliminary inspection my On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) inspectors were allowed complete access to the missiles, which were in their canister. Both ends of the canister had been opened, allowing the inspectors to perform the requisite measurements and reas- sure themselves that this, in fact, was an SS-20 that was being eliminated. A sudden rainstorm interrupted this process and several inspectors moved inside the missile canister to get out of the rain. I thought to myself that four years ago as an Army attache in Moscow had ~ been within 100 miles of that facility, ~ would have found myself In a very, very difficult~ituation. And yet here we were a group of Amer~- can inspectors not only on a secret missile test facility, but blithely stepping inside a missile canister to get out of the rain as though it were the most natural thing to do. To my mind this one incident more clearly 36

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37 A SlATUS REPORT ON INF INSPECTIONS than anything else illustrates the dizzying changes that are occurring in U.S.-Soviet relationships. What I would like to teld you about today, then, is the "Road to Kapustin Yar." In other words to explain to you, in very nonabstract terms, what the U.S. Govemment is doing to implement the INF Treaty. I have a series of slides that win help me tell this story. I think you will find it interesting. The road to Kapustin Yar began last December in Washington when President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. Six months later, on 1 June 1988, the instruments of ratification were exchanged at the Moscow summit. Exactly 30 days later both sides began inspecting each other's INF bases. The INF Treaty is in fact not a single document but rather a basic treaty, two additional protocols to tell me in considerable detail how to conduct my inspections and what qualifies as an elimination and, finally, a memorandum of understanding (MOW) that lists all the INF systems covered by the treaty, their numbers, characteristics, and locations. ~ win just remind you at this point that the PNF Treaty is not in any fashion "an anyplace, anytime" inspection regime. I can only conduct inspections of those 133 inspectable activities listed in the MOU and must limit my inspections to those specific systems covered by the treaty. During the initial round of baseline inspections while verifying the technical data in the MOU, we were able to do some very, very detailed kinds of measurements that required intrusive access to the systems, on an unprecedented scale. Take for instance the SS-20. The Soviets indicated initially that this missile becomes so unstable outside its environmentally controlled canister Mat it is never removed from its canister, and therefore we could not have access to it. And eventually we were permitted access. The missile was taken out of its canister, broken down into its two stages, and then those stages were measured and weighed by our inspectors, using in all cases American devices. This was to my mind an impres- sively intrusive procedure. ~ would like now to discuss OSIA's mission and will attempt to limit myself exclusively to my specific responsibilities Mat have to do with in- spections; I did not negotiate the treaty; I have no responsibilities for the policy implications of the treaty. I do inspections, record my findings,

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38 CHAllE~GES FOR THE 1990s and send the data back to Washington, where the broader compliance judgments are made. Below are the five kinds of inspections my agency does: Baseline Inspections. This process to verify the declared inventory in the MOU was conducted in the first two months after Entry into Force of the Treaty (July-August 1988~. This meant that we were required in 60 days to travel throughout the Soviet Union, visit each of those 133 facilities that had an INF mission, and verify aU of the data contained in the MOU. Elimination Inspections. Each accountable item that is eliminated under the treaty is done so in the presence of our inspectors and according to the detailed procedures spelled out in the elimination protocol. When we are completely satisfied that the elunination processes have been carried out exactly as they should be, we sign the inspection report. C~se-out inspections. After an INF missile base or other related installation has had its INF systems removed to the designated elimina- tion facility and any INF-unique infrastructure has been eliminated, that base gets inspected. Our inspectors arrive, confirm that the base can no longer support an INF role, and sign an inspection report to that effect. You understand that many of those INF bases can and will be converted to another military use. An SS-20 base for instance could actually be turned into an SS-25 base; the Soviets are merely required to notify us of this conversion. We of course will have the right to utilize a quota inspection to gain access to the converted facility during the 13-yearlife of the treaty. We would at that point be checking to ensure that whatever new military function has been introduced to this base is not an INF system. Even for a former INF facility for instance, the one in Czechoslovakia that has been totally closed out and reportedly win be converted to a sanatorium, we can, if we choose, revisit it at any point during We life of the treaty. Short-Notice Inspections. These are the decreasing quota inspections that we wild be conducting for the 1 3-year life of the treaty. For whatever reason we can decide on a short-notice basis to check and recheck any INF installation covered by the treaty. Portal Monitoring. Finally, the most unique aspect of the entire treaty is what is caned portal perimeter monitoring. This is where each side permanency stations a group of inspectors at a missile production or assembly facility Mat formerly produced INF systems. These portal

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39 A STATUS REPORT ON INF INSPECTIONS monitors will stay there for the life of the treaty (on a rotational basis of course!), monitoring any production leaving the plant to make sure that it includes no prohibited system. The American side, particularly, insisted on this aspect during treaty negotiations. The U.S. portal is located at a Soviet missile assembly plant in the Urals, near a small city caned Vo~insk. Votkinsk formerly pro- duced the SS-20 missiles and currently produces the SS-25. The SS-25, as you know, is a mobile ICBM, whose external configurations are quite similar to those of the SS-20. This meant that the United States wanted to be able to closely monitor this activity and make sure that only SS-25's and not SS-20's were leaving the plant to constitute some kind of a covert IRBM force. The baseline inventory had to be completed in 60 days. This meant taking this brand-new organization that had never done inspections and immediately plunging into the most hectic period of our responsibilities, averaging two inspections every single day during July and August of 1988. That is aB behind us. Now we will be conducting a decreasing number of quota inspections, monitor Me portal at VoUcinsk (where we will have Americans for the next 13 years), watch eliminations, and check closed- out bases. So three years from now (unIess we pick up additional responsibilities in the conventional or START arenas), OSIA will have a very modest mission~he portal, which by then would hopefully become a rather sleepy night watchman's activity, and decreasing quota inspections. Just to remind you, the systems that are covered by the treaty on the Soviet side are: I. the SSC-X4, a developed, but nondeployed, cruise missile; 2. the shorter-range SS-12 and SS-23; 3. the older SS4's and SS-5's; and, finally, 4. the intermediate-range SS-20, which particularly concemed us. These systems are scattered across 117 different locations throughout the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. On the U.S. side, the systems covered by the treaty and subject to Soviet inspections are the (~) ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), (2) the Pershing II, and (3) the shorter-range and older Pershing IA.

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40 CHAI1E~NGES FOR THE 1990s Those systems are located in Me United States and at our basing countries in Western Europe some 32 separate inspectable sites to which the Soviet inspectors have access. As you can see, I have a very considerable inspection responsibility covering those 133 inspectable activities at 117 separate locations while my escort responsibilities are somewhat modest, because there are not that many Soviet inspectors coming over. My counterpart, General Me~ve- dev, has to devote much more attention to his escort apparatus because he has Americans in his area at aU times. Today, I have 87 Americans in the Soviet Union conducting inspections, while 41 of General MeUvedev's people are being hosted at U.S. bases. My mission is relatively straightforward: organize eveIything that is necessary to place the right group of American inspectors at the right place at the right time and then coordinate all activities associated with making sure that the Soviet inspectors are provided the opportunity to discharge their treaty responsibilities at our sites. I like this feature of having both sides of the coin. I do the inspections, and I facilitate and control the Soviet inspectors. Reciprocity playing such a large role in this treaty, it is useful to be involved in and directly influence both aspects. Let me say something about the concept of operation that we devel- oped when we were presented with the INF Treaty for implementation. I will not go into any details about how we created this organization from the ground up. We were handed the treaty and told to set up an organiza- tion that was capable of discharging the U.S. Gove~nment's responsibili- ties. Suffice it to say that it was a very, veIy exciting prospect of starting with a blank sheet of paper and building the basic organization, a support- ing infrastructure, and Me concept of operationexciting but at the same time daunting. Given the geographical spread of our inspection responsibilities and very tight time lines dictated by Me treaty, it became clear that we would not be able to support the number of inspections required of us. Attempt- ing to launch all our inspections from the United States would have risked missing our time windows. After coordinating with the governments of Japan and Germany we decided to establish "gateways" at Yakota Air Force Base in Japan and at Rhein Main Air Force Base in Germany. We then forward deployed our forces there and set up a brief~ng/debriefing apparatus and small operations/Iogistics cell to support the inspections. This allowed our inspectors to cycle into the Soviet Union and back to ..

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41 A HIATUS REPORT ON INF INSPECTIONS those gateways and back into the USSR without resuming all the way to the United States. To support this concept and meet all of the escort missions necessitated the creation of an infrastructure that spreads across 19 time zones. As you can see on the map, we have a small element in San Francisco that is responsible for receiving Soviet inspectors arriving In the United States to conduct inspections in the western part of the United States or rotating In or out of the Soviet portal. Out in Magna, Utah, is the Hercules plant that used to produce the Pershing II rocket motors and where the Soviets have their portal perimeter monitoring facility. There are 30 Soviets located there, and I have a similar number of Americans escorting the Soviets and making sure that an goes well. OSIA headquarters is located in Washington. In Frankfurt, Germany, as I mentioned, we have two activities: a reception center for ald Soviet inspectors coming in to conduct inspections at our basing countries in Westem Europe and the gateway to process our people enroute to the Soviet Union from Washington. In Moscow, because Ambassador Jack Matiock said that there was no way under his current diplomatic personnel ceilings that he could support this level of inspection activity in the USSR, we negotiated very quickly with the Soviets to raise the ceilings so that a six-person diplomatic aircrew escort contingent could be added to the embassy staff. The U.S. portal facility is located at the Votkinsk missile assembly plant in the Urals. And over here, east of Lake Baikal, is the eastern point of entry, Ulan Ude, through which we access the 33 inspectable sites in Siberia and the Far East. There are two Americans at this distant INF outpost to meet, greet, and facilitate OSIA inspectors. One is a Foreign Service officer, and her husband happens to be a Navy SEABEE noncom- missioned officer assigned to OSIA. It is an interesting little interagency team. And, finally, over here in Japan, as I mentioned, we have a small cell to take care of our inspectors transitioning Yokota enroute to the USSR. Inspecizon Teams. Forming inspection teams is not really a compli- cated matter. The treaty says that we can have 200 approved inspectors on a list and no more than 10 inspectors on one site (except for elimina- lions when the limit is 20) at any particular time. Early on we just divided all our resources into twenty 10-man teams. We provided each win a sprinkling of the kinds of talents that you would want on your side if you

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42 CHAILENGES FOR TTIE 1990s were going on to a Soviet installation to inspect missile activity. We also try to tailor the teams for each facility. Going on to an SS-20 missile- operating base, for instance, we would have more SS-20 specialists than if we went to an SS4 storage facility. The team chief is currency a military officer, usually a lieutenant colonel, or navy commander. The deputy team chief is invariably a USG civilian who probably has some Soviet- area expertise. We also have missile-operating specialists who are those young military officers and noncommissioned officers coming out of the Pershing or GECM units that are being disbanded. We include them into the team to provide us with a "blue" perspective. We find that they make a unique contribution. Then there are two dedicated military linguists and finally the technical specialists and the analysts. The latter come from the various government agencies and provide us with the technical know- how, so that when we arrive at a site we know exactly what we are look- ing at. The most important person on that team is not the specialist who has been studying SS-20's for a dozen years or the analyst or the linguist, but rather the team leader. Leading Hat disparate collection of specialists into the Soviet Union requires a good, strong leader. He is the key individual. We want to make sure that these people know what they are doing, that the U.S. Government discharges its treaty responsibilities. Escort Teams. Soviet INF inspectors in the United States or Westem Europe are not diplomats, and they are certainly not tourists. They are inspectors with privileges and immunities that are somewhat less than those of a diplomat or military attache. That means that their baggage is subject to search, and they themselves are constantly escorted during their inspections. Once again for escort purposes there is an obvious distribu- tion of specialties required to adequately perform this function. And here again the OSIA team chief is carefully picked. It is he who is the official interpreter of the treaty for the U.S. Government. As you might imagine, coordinating all this activity at each of our INF bases in the United States and with all of the basing countries in Europe was a complicated challenge that we faced early last spring. The Dutch and the Belgians and the Germans and the British and the Italians each have a slightly different interpretation of what "full escort" means. Since the INF Treaty is a bilateral accord, we had to ensure that there was a coherent and consistent U.S. Government approach while taking into account the understandable sovereignty concerns of our basing country

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43 A HIATUS REPORT ON INF INSPECTIONS alBies. Achieving a consistent but not necessarily identical approach required a lot of coordination. This prior coordination paid dividends, and actual implementation in Europe has been smooth indeed. Soviet inspectors, as they arrive, are met by our escort personnel at plane side. As ~ say, inspectors are not diplomats. AU of their luggage, to include any technical equipment, is subject to and routinely scrutinized by the Customs and Immigration people in Washington and San Francisco. Within 30 hours or so of their arrival, we take the Soviet inspectors to the INF site they have designated, where they are alBowed to do exactly what we do on an inspection, i.e., verify the numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of the systems mat are covered by the treaty. In We course of visiting an installation the entire area specified in the treaty is visited and all buildings, sheds, or vehicles capable of storing a treaty- limited item are carefully inspected. Most of this is not complicated. These are large systems, and they have a very obvious physical signature. We do routinely measure the systems regardless of our familianty with them. To exercise that right we also bring scales along during inspections to weigh items if we deem it necessary. I wild next quickly cover the pork monitoring sites to give you an idea of what happens there. Votkinsk. Votkinsk is actually a missile assembly plant; it is not a production facility. Rocket motors, canisters, and other components are sent there from various factories for final assembly. As I mentioned, SS- 20 missiles used to be assembled here and this accounts for the American presence, i.e., to make sure that all SS-20 activity has ceased. The problem is that SS-25's, which are three-stage mobile ICBMs, stile come out of there, and we need to scrutinize these shipments to make sure that anything leaving is in fact an SS-25 and not an SS-20. We have 30 Americans there. There are five OSIA officers who serge as overall supervisors of the facility and as the official interface with the plant officials and the Soviet escorts. The majority of the U.S. team is composed of civilian specialists from Hughes Technical Services Co., which bid on this project and won the contract. ~ can ten you that we have what ~ would consider a very impressive array of technical monitoring equipment in Votkinsk to make sure that no SS-20's come out. There are of course TV cameras, seals, and in-ground sensors, so that any vehicle leaving the plant triggers an alarm inside our data collection center. We also have an infrared profiler that will auto-

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44 CIlAllENGES FOR THE 1990s matic ally give you the external configuration of every item coming out of there and compare it against SS-20 statistics. We will shortly be shipping to the Soviet Union a rather large X-ray machine that additionalRy win give us the ability to look through every missile raid car leaving the plant. Currently, missile rail cars coming out are stopped, measured, and entered. Inside we also examine and we measure the canister. Eight times a year we have the option of looking inside the canister. For such interior examinations the raid car is brought into a special building, where the front dome is removed, allowing our inspectors to look inside. Be- cause it is difficult to see beyond the third stage, we are also negotiating win the Soviets on an optical-mechanical instrument that we win be able to insert inside the canister during such inspections to measure the second stage. It is the second stage that particularly concerns us, because it is within six inches of being identical to the second stage of an SS-20. We are thus poking around a Soviet ICBM to verify a treaty pertaining only to IRBM. When we install the X-ray equipment, in addition to the above, we will routinely X-ray every single missile car that comes through the portal. This will allow us to look through the car, through the canister, and even through a portion of the missile, to make absolutely sure that there is not somehow a missile inside of a missile, as would be the case if Votkinsk were still assembling SS-20's and slipping them inside sleeves made to look like "legal" SS-25's. Such subterfuge at the one location in the Soviet Union where 30 Americans are permanently encamped may not be the most likely cheating scenario, but nonetheless it is one that the X-ray equipment will allow us to defeat. Magna. Out at Magna, Utah, just outside Salt Lake City, is where the Hercules plant is located and where the Soviets exercised their reciprocal right to establish a perimeter monitoring facility. At Hercules the Persh- ing rocket motors were produced within a large complex that still pro- duces other kinds of rocket motors. It was therefore necessary to isolate that portion of the complex involved in the Pershing production and enclose the area by double fence. At Magna there is a main portal where every item large enough to contain a Pershing has to come out Trough Soviet inspection and two other exits, also monitored by Soviet inspec- tors, where all other items too small to be Pershings come out. Missile Eliminations. In the final analysis, what the INF treaty is all about is eliminating missiles. This, I can report to you, is moving along

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45 A STATUS REPORT ON INF INSPECTIONS smoothly. There are various ways to count the numerous systems and components covered by the treaty. Missiles are easiest to remember: 1,846 Soviet missiles, 846 U.S. missiles. Please remember that for each missile there are many associated items such as canisters and launchers and various support structures. AD total on the Soviet side, there are some 6,000 accountable items that have to be destroyed in front of U.S. inspec- tors. I will show you how this happens. The U.S. side does eliminations at three locations in the United States and one in Germany. The Pershing launchers are cut up in accordance with the treaty in Germany, where they are currently deployed. Rather than shipping those launchers ah the way back to the United States and using up C-S's and C-141's to do that, we cut them up at Hausen and sell Me scrap there. AU the Pershing and GLCM missiles, however, are destroyed in the United States because we did not want to have that possible environ- mental concern given to our allies. The U.S. Army has decided that the safest and most efficient way to eliminate these rocket motors is to bolt them to a stand, set off the firing mechanism, and then burn off all of the solid-rocket fuel. Once the fuel has been expended, the rocket motor casing is crushed and the remnants buried on Army property. The two Pershing elimination sites are in Pueblo, Colorado, and Marshall, Texas; in both cases, as you know, warheads and guidance packages have been removed prior to elimination. For ground-launched cruise missiles the process is even more straight- forward. After fuel is drained, the missiles and canisters are simply sawed in half. The Air Force does this on a round-the-clock basis, usually over one weekend. Soviet inspectors are flown in, and the elimination process proceeds for 48 hours straight. Then He inspectors go home, and the Air Force gets ready for the next batch. Given the asymmetrical nature of the INF Treaty, the Soviets end up with a lot more missile systems to destroy. Therefore, they have more sites dedicated to this process. They also elected to eliminate by launch- ing, one of the methods that was available to each side. The United States decided not to exercise this option because of the costs and complexities involved. The Soviets, however, did launch 72 missiles (which a Soviet officer insisted to me was the "natural" death of a missile). Incidentally, every one of those 72 SS-20 missiles went off on time, as advertised, win none of the standby missiles needed.

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46 CHAILFNGES FOR THE 1990s The entire elimination process for each different missile system is speBed out in excruciating detail in the treaty. For instance, a preliminary inspection of each item to be destroyed is conducted. Inspectors examine and measure each item, certify that it is the right missile, move back to a safe point, and then the item is blown in their presence. Although the results even from a safe distance are clearly unambiguous, our inspectors are required to go back to the site and make sure that, in fact, there is absolutely nothing left. We are currently about one-third of the way into the elimination period, and in fact both sides are slightly ahead of schedule. The Soviets, ~ believe, have eliminated about 46 percent of their missile inventory and we are at about 40 percent. There are no intermediate elimination goals for the IRBMs the only requirement is that at the end of three years aU the missiles be gone. I win conclude here. A very obvious and not terribly profound conc]Lu- sion, I suppose I could make, is that we are one year into a 13-year relationship. This is not the time for euphoric predictions. The experi- ences of this last year do, however, allow us to be optimistic about onsite inspection. But we must also remember what it does not do. Onsite inspection is only one tool in verifying this treaty. By far the more crucial capability remains the National Technical Means, which provide us an overmatch of the entire Soviet Union. I can only bring my inspectors to those facilities listed in the MOU and compare what I find with what is contained in the MOU. I can tell you with great certitude what is going on and what is not going on at those specific sites. But it is only one view. The onsite inspection process will give us more contact, more knowI- edge, more mutual understanding, and hopefully more predictability in our relationship. This in itself is, to my mind, a very positive develop- ment.