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7
Vitality of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Regime
Spurgeon M. Keeny,~Jr.
I
The United States has opposed the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries since the beginning of
the nuclear age in 1945. Over the years, however, the priority given to
this policy has varied when it came into conflict with over U.~. foreign
policy objectives.
Today, the highest arms control priority clearly should be directed to
early completion of a START treaty in order to control and reduce the
immense U.S.-Soviet nuclear arsenals, which could destroy civilization.
But the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries possibly pres-
ents He greater danger that nuclear weapons might actuary be used, if
ondy on a smog scale. In Be long term, with improved U.S.-Soviet
relations, widespread nuclear proliferation, with greater possibility of use,
could become the greater threat to U.S. and world security. Even small
numbers of nuclear weapons in the hands of fanatical or unstable nations
increases the likelihood of irresponsible use of these weapons. Such use
could, by design or accident, draw the major powers into regional con-
Dicts involving nuclear weapons, which in turn could lead to general
nuclear war.
64
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65
VITALITY OF TlIE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREA7r REGIME
Fortunately, our priority interest in the START treaty with the Soviet
Union and our nonproliferation policy are not in conflict but actually
reinforce each other.
1:I
Over the past few years a great deal of information has become pub-
licly available on the advanced state of nuclear weapons programs in
Israel, Pakistan, India, and South Africa. So far these countries have
denied possession of nuclear weapons and have let their adversaries and
the rest of the world speculate on the actual status of their nuclear
capabilities. On occasion they have stimulated these speculations by
well-placed, provocative, unofficial leaks. Throughout the world concern
has increased that one or more of these countries will decide to come out
of the closet and officially proclaim their possession of nuclear weapons.
Coming at this time, this latest nuclear proliferation crisis and this is
not the first—presents both a danger and an opportunity. It is a danger,
since formal proclamation of their nuclear capabilities could initiate a
domino effect of declarations by other closet nuclear weapons states at
this time, breaking down the current international norm against nuclear
proliferation.
Opportunity exists, since the United States, working with most of the
rest of the world community that has accepted the present nonprolifera-
tion norm, has increased leverage in preventing this confrontation. In
particular, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan should strengthen our
hand with Pakistan. In addition, Israel's increasing isolation and internal
problems should allow the United States to have increased influence on
this critical issue, through quiet diplomacy.
III
Pursuing this nonproliferation policy, the United States can make use
of an international nonproliferation regime, consisting of a complex of
international treaties, regional agreements, domestic legislation, informal
agreements, and bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives. This
regime, which has evolved over the past 45 years, probably has more
vitality today than at any time in the past.
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66
CHAI[ENGES FOR THE 1990s
First and most important, the Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPr, signed
in 1968, provides a framework for the regime. The NPI is based on a
fundamental bargain: namely, nonnuclear weapons states agreed to re-
nounce nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge of the three original
nuclear weapons states the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union to share peaceful nuclear technology with them. This is
really an extension of Eisenhower's original Atoms for Peace concept.
The nuclear weapons states also agreed to seek an end to the nuclear
arms race. And Al nonnuclear weapons state signatories agreed to place
all of their nuclear facilities under "fun scope" safeguards, operated by
the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. These safeguards,
which have been very successful, are designed not to prevent but rather to
sound alarms if illegal activities (e.g., diversions of materials) are sus-
pected at declared facilities.
There are now over 130 signatories to the NPP. Although the most
threatening proliferators—Israel, Pakistan, India, and Soup Africa have
not joined the NPI, the treaty has nevertheless established international
norms of nonproliferation that indirectly affect even the holdout states.
Moreover, even though France has never formally signed the SPIN, it
now, in practice, conforms with the treaty. China, also a nonsignatory,
has increasingly conformed with the treaty's objectives.
Second, regional nuclear free zones reinforce the NPI. The Latin
America Nuclear Free Zone, created by the Treaty of TIateloico, which
was signed in 1968 though not fully in force, has served to help exclude
nuclear weapons from Latin America. A protocol to this treaty, which has
been signed by alB five nuclear powers—the only such document in
existence—commits them to respect the nonnuclear nature of the zone.
By other agreements, nuclear weapons are also excluded by treaty from
Antarctica and, potentially, from the South Pacific.
Third, the regime is further reinforced by export controls, both infor-
mal and by statute. Every major nuclear supplier has informally agreed to
guidelines on sensitive nuclear equipment which they will not export to
other countries without IAEA safeguards.
The United States has also restricted exports of sensitive equipment by
domestic legislation. In 1978 He U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
called for tighter safeguards on exports than those imposed by the NPr, In
an attempt to discourage Be plutonium fuel cycle in commercial reactors.
This fuel cycle, which cannot now be justified on economic grounds,
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VITALITY OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REGIME
would create large inventories of plutonium, and thereby establish a base
for a relatively rapid breakout to a weapons program, as well as increase
the possibilities of diversions.
The U.S. Congress has also enacted legislation prohibiting economic
or military assistance to nations supplying or receiving nonsafeguarded
uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing equipment. But under
pressure of the conflicting priorities of U.S. support for Pakistan in
connection with the Afghanistan war, the Administration and Congress
backed off from implementing these provisions in the face of clear Paki-
stani violations. However, this matter is still open, and additional legisla-
tion has been passed specific to Pakistan, denying future aid military
and economic aid unless the President certifies that Pakistan does not
possess a nuclear explosive device. In addition, separate legislation,
which the President cannot override on national security grounds, re-
quires the cutting off of ah aid to any nonnuclear weapons state that tests a
nuclear weapon.
Fours, and often overlooked, is the fact that over the years the United
States has exerted quiet pressure, which has often been quite effective, on
various states not to pursue the nuclear weapons option. The most
successful examples were South Korea and Taiwan, which in the 1970s
were persuaded to abandon some nascent nuclear weapons ambitions.
In the case of South Africa, multinational diplomatic efforts undoubt-
edly discouraged its nuclear-test program, after a test site was discovered
by a Soviet satellite in 1977 in the Kalahari Desert. In this connection I
should note that reports that South Africa subsequently detonated a nu-
clear device in the South Atlantic are not supported by the facts.
In the case of Israel and Pakistan, while discouraging their nuclear
ambitions, the United States has not used the fun force of its considerable
influence on either Pakistan or Israel to this end.
IV
Under this regime I believe the overall assessment is that nuclear
nonproliferation has been remarkably effective. Looking back, one re-
calis government and academic predictions that by now there would be a
large number of nuclear states 25 or more. In the first 20 years, how-
ever, since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1945, there were only four
additional states: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and
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CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990s
China. This initial proliferation was probably inevitable, given the exist-
ing political situation.
In the next 25 years, since 1965, only one additional state has tested a
nuclear device, and that is India. Significantly, India insisted at the time,
and since, that its test was for peaceful purposes (such as excavation:
then a more popular concept than today and subsequently, apparently,
did not vigorously pursue its weapons program.
Moreover, 10 to 15 years ago, if I were to have given a list of states
with clear nuclear ambitions, it would have included eight states. In
addition to the present four, ~ would have included Argentina, Brazil,
South Korea, and Taiwan. But today the latter four states have probably
abandoned their immediate nuclear weapons operations, although future
changes in the governments in Argentina and Brazil could reopen this
problem.
Although the present four states- Israel, Pakistan, India, and South
Africa are obviously much further along today than they were 10 or 15
years ago, they are not new threats to the regime. Israel has been engaged
in its program for at least three decades, India has been engaged in its for
at least two decades, and Pakistan for some 15 years.
Above Al, it is also important to remember that not only the over-
whelming majority of states but also such industrial giants as Germany
and Japan have decided that their security is best served by remaining
nonnuclear weapons states.
V
I will say a word about the Israeli and Pakistani programs, which time
prevents me from discussing in detail. Let me emphasize that these
comments are not intended to diminish or dismiss the seriousness of the
continuation of these programs but rawer to keep them in perspective.
I would observe that both countries officially insist that they do not
possess nuclear weapons. Both countries also clearly have made a major
effort to develop nuclear weapons programs and have engaged in exten-
sive programs of espionage over We years to accomplish this objective.
Both countries also, unofficially, seek to build up the international image
of the effectiveness and significance of their programs.
In the case of Israel the revelations by Mordecai Vanunu in England,
before he was kidnapped and taken back to Israel for trial, in late 1986
suggest a larger and more advanced program than most informed observ-
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69
VITALLY OF TIlENUCI~ NONPROUFE~TION TRAM REGIME
ers had assumed previously. One now hears estimates that Israel's capa-
bility to deploy, or deploy on short notice, nuclear devices might be
between 50 and 200, based on availability of material. This compares
with earlier estimates that might be closer to 25. I would, myself, guess
that the truth lies at the lower end of the new scale. But this is still a very
significant capability. I also do not believe the evidence supports the
claims that the Israelis are stockpiling untested thermonuclear weapons,
in the sense that we would define a thermonuclear weapon. Nevertheless,
Israel clearly has a significant program and can presumably deliver these
weapons, both by aircraft obtained from the United States and by their
own Jericho II ballistic missiles.
As for the Pakistani program, there is pretty clear evidence, publicly
available, that they have or could assemble on short notice a few simple
nuclear devices, presumably employing enriched uranium from the cen-
trifuge enrichment plant at Kahuta. The Pakistan weapons program has
reached the point where the Administration has wamed Congress that it
will probably not be able to furnish the required statutory finding this year
that Pakistan does not have a weapons capability.
VI
What is to be done? Since Israel, India, South Africa, and even
Pakistan now have extensive indigenous technical capabilities, there are
limits to what the United States or the international community can do.
Nevertheless, let me suggest the most obvious actions we can and should
take within the existing nonproliferation regime.
First, the United States and the Soviet Union should sign the START
agreement, if possible, before the next NET five-year review conference
in 1990. Without fail, they must sign, ratify, and take major steps toward
implementation of a START treaty wed in advance of Me 1995 NPI 25th
anniversary conference, at which, according to the terms of the treaty, the
future duration of the treaty will have to be decided. By demonstrating
their good faith in meeting their APT commitment to nuclear anns reduc-
tions, the superpowers can help ensure a strong endorsement for the
indefinite, or at least long-duration, extension of a framework treaty upon
which the nonproliferation regime rests.
Second, the United States should work to bring South Africa into the
NPI, which South Africa has suggested it may be prepared to do. The
United States should press the Soviet Union to get Cuba to join the Latin
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CHAI1E;NGES FOR THE 1990s
America Nuclear Free Zone since this is necessary to bring the treaty into
full force, ensuring coverage of the Argentine and Brazilian programs. I
hope that Mr. Gorbachev's relations with Fidel Castro are sufficiently
good to make this possible.
The United States should press Israel and Pakistan to stay in the closet
and not confront neighbors with a declared nuclear weapons status that
would be seen by their neighbors as requiring them to develop a chemical
warfare response, which they could do in the relatively near future, and to
preclude pressure on them to move to a nuclear weapons response in the
more distant future.
To this end, we should (~) let Pakistan know that we win enforce the
current legislation cutting off economic and military aid if Pakistan tests
nuclear weapons, declares a nuclear status, or clearly possesses a nuclear
weapons capability, and (2) let Israel know that a declared nuclear weap-
ons status would necessitate a review of U.S. security policy toward Israel
and that Israel would be subject to the same cutoff legislation as other
countries if it conducts a nuclear weapons test.
Third, the United States should intensify work with other suppliers,
including the Soviet Union and China, to tighten export controls on
sensitive nuclear equipment and on delivery systems, such as long-range
ballistic missiles, which make absolutely no sense except with nuclear
warheads.
Fourth, and I would pursue the suggestion made by Roaid Sagdeev, the
United States and the Soviet Union should seek to expand the nonprolif-
eration regime by negotiating a multinational comprehensive test ban and/
or a cutoff of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. This would
effectively answer criticisms of the discriminatory nature of the nonpro-
Iiferation treaty bargain. Based on earlier statements, such treaties might
be acceptable to India and other holdout states and would certainly put
additional indirect pressure on them against declaring their nuclear status
or attempting to caner out nuclear weapons tests.
Fifth, above all, we should work to defuse tensions in critical Mid-East
and South Asian regions.
VII
In conclusion, I remain cautiously optimistic that with improved U.S.-
Soviet relations it should be possible to hold the line on emerging nuclear
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VITALITY OF TlIE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REGIME
weapons states. Even if in a moment of rash bravado or fear one or more
of the present closet nuclear weapons states decides to announce officially
its new status or to test nuclear weapons as a demonstration, cooperative
efforts by the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies should be
sufficiently damage limiting to prevent a domino effect that would col-
lapse the nonproliferation treaty regime.
But above all, in a practical sense, we must be certain that our actions,
particularly in connection with the early completion of the START treaty,
ensure that the NPI is extended in 1995, either indefinitely or for a
prolonged period, so that the framework on which the nonproliferation
regime is based win survive.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
south africa
