National Academies Press: OpenBook

Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers (2012)

Chapter: Chapter Four - Evidence Review

« Previous: Chapter Three - Case Studies
Page 33
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 33
Page 34
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 34
Page 35
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 35
Page 36
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 36
Page 37
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 37
Page 38
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 38
Page 39
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 39
Page 40
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 40
Page 41
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 41
Page 42
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 42
Page 43
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 43
Page 44
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 44
Page 45
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 45
Page 46
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 46
Page 47
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 47
Page 48
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 48
Page 49
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 49
Page 50
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 50
Page 51
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 51
Page 52
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 52
Page 53
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 53
Page 54
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 54
Page 55
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 55
Page 56
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 56
Page 57
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 57
Page 58
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 58
Page 59
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 59
Page 60
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 60
Page 61
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 61
Page 62
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 62
Page 63
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 63
Page 64
Suggested Citation:"Chapter Four - Evidence Review." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14637.
×
Page 64

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

33 This chapter presents findings relating to safety management in small motor carriers. Most information in this chapter is based on the project literature review; its methodology was described in chapter one. In addition, this chapter cites and recaps pertinent findings from the project survey of carrier managers (chapter two) and from the ten case study inter- views (chapter three). Chapter topics include: • Business, operational, and safety management in small companies • Small company violation and crash rates • Vehicle equipment and maintenance • Operational planning and risk avoidance • Driver hiring • Driver orientation, training, and communications • Driver supervision • Crash and incident investigation • Carrier performance tracking and benchmarking • Management development • Comprehensive safety management approaches. BUSINESS, OPERATIONAL, AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN SMALL COMPANIES This section addresses management in small companies, including business management, operational management and supervision, and safety management. Some of the stud- ies cited relate specifically to transportation companies, but most of this section relates to business and industrial man- agement in general. Transportation has its own unique issues, but by and large the same management principles and prac- tices apply across all types of businesses. Business Management In a nontransportation study, Jennings and Beaver (1997) explored the competitive advantages that small firms might have over larger ones, and the pitfalls that they might face. Small firms’ advantages include low overhead and the flexi- bility to pursue relatively small market opportunities quickly. Small company management is close to, and usually part of, the firm’s operations. Employee relationships are direct and informal, allowing many problems to be resolved immedi- ately. There is no need for accountability beyond the com- pany’s owner and customers. Jennings and Beaver define small business success as “the sustained satisfaction of prin- cipal stakeholder aspirations.” According to Jennings and Beaver, a disadvantage for small firms is the difficulty of sustaining both tactical and strategic decision making. A small company’s manager has a qualitatively different job than a manager in a larger firm. He or she cannot specialize or focus narrowly on one aspect of the business. Rather, the manager must fulfill multiple roles while responding to multiple exigencies. A risk is that man- agers become spread too thin and are continually occupied addressing immediate demands and short-term opportunities. They may make poor business decisions or take unwise actions because they are not able to rise above the fray to think strate- gically. Also, there is a risk in having a single key decision maker. The lack of checks and balances means that small companies are more vulnerable to wrong decisions based on the biases or mistaken beliefs of their leaders. A successful small business manager must be versatile, multi-talented, able to oversee both the operational and business sides of the enter- prise, and able to think strategically as well as tactically. As with many other businesses, individuals starting a truck or bus transport company tend to be much more knowl- edgeable and proficient with regard to the work of the busi- ness than with regard to the business per se. Although most small carrier owners and managers are former drivers they may be relatively inexperienced in running a business (Sage Corporation and FMCSA 2009). Although a principal moti- vation for small business owners is making money, many are unprepared for the rigors of business and financial manage- ment (Entrepreneur Media 1999). Once in business, carrier owners may find themselves overwhelmed with business concerns. Starting and sustain- ing a business involves developing a business plan, estab- lishing legal status (e.g., sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, and LLC), licensing (both business and operat- ing authority), finding and maintaining a location/facility, truck and other equipment purchase or leasing, costing of services, assessing and dealing with competition, advertis- ing, obtaining loans and other financing, record keeping, taxes, cash flow, contracts, creating a website, and many other management challenges largely unrelated to the work of transport. The typical small business owner starts as an expert worker, but must transition to become a business per- son and manager (Entrepreneur Media 1999). Many potential problems may lead to small business fail- ure. These include insufficient capital, overborrowing, poor CHAPTER FOUR EVIDENCE REVIEW

34 cash flow, inadequate tax and other financial planning, overly optimistic sales projection, saturation of the market by com- petition, poor access to markets (e.g., location, information, and contacts), inadequate equipment (especially advanced technologies), underpricing of services, inadequate insur- ance, lack of staff training and skills, and loose record keep- ing. Loose record keeping may extend to operational, safety, administrative, and financial data (Entrepreneur Media 1999). FMCSA is developing New Entrant training, which includes instruction in “generic” business management prac- tices (Sage Corporation 2009; Goettee et al. 2011). In the cur- rent research program this instruction is conducted by volunteers from SCORE, a nonprofit association providing training and mentoring to small businesses. SCORE teaches small business basics, such as how to develop a business plan, manage finances, and maintain business documentation (SCORE 2009). Business training for new entrants is not a reg- ulatory requirement. However, competent business manage- ment appears to have a clear relation to safety and overall operational management. In a large study of 656 carriers of various sizes, Corsi et al. (2002) found that 553 carriers with satisfactory safety ratings averaged 3% in annual profits, whereas 103 others not rated satisfactory (i.e., rated condi- tional or unsatisfactory) averaged 4% in annual losses. The project survey and case study interviews did not explic- itly ask about company business management practices or financial status. Several interviewees did mention the chal- lenge of keeping a small CMV transport company productive, financially viable, and safe, all at the same time. Uncertain cash flow and lack of funds were cited as key reasons for the lack of safety investments such as purchases of onboard safety technologies. Operational Management and Supervision Four “classic” functions of management in any organization are planning, organizing, leading, and controlling (Nelson and Economy 2005). These functions are further explained as follows: • Plan: Develop organization vision, mission, and spe- cific tactics; the “what” and the “how.” • Organize: Design and build the organization and its struc- ture. Designate people for positions and create clarity of roles. • Lead: Be a role model and motivate employees to achieve company goals. • Control: Establish performance standards, measure and report progress, take corrective or preventive action, enforce accountability. Nelson and Economy (2005) also suggest four “new” functions of management: energizing, empowering, support- ing, and communicating. These functions include the follow- ing activities: • Energize: Make things happen, praise and inspire employees. • Empower: Give workers the tools and authority to per- form well. Encourage individual responsibility and ini- tiative, and involve employees in decision making. • Support: Coach and counsel employees. Recognize and foster potential in each employee. Be a colleague, not just a boss. • Communicate: Provide fast, accurate information to employees and be open to receiving information. Management textbooks such as that by Nelson and Econ- omy recommend various practices for successful company leadership. Many of these suggestions are directed toward increasing employee motivation and productivity, with the indirect benefit of allowing managers to spend more time on strategic planning, marketing, and innovation. For example, two common recommendations for managers are to delegate as much as possible and to foster teamwork among employ- ees. However, the nature of CMV fleet operations may make these difficult. In businesses where employees work at one site, managers may delegate activities such as detail work, information gathering, repetitive assignments, and surrogate roles (e.g., filling in for the manager at meetings). Delegating such tasks is difficult in a transport environment where drivers are usually not physically present and their jobs are qualitatively different than the manager’s. Fostering esprit de corps and common purpose among driver employees may also be a challenge. There is typically little communication among drivers, and they are each pursuing their own individ- ual work goals rather than group goals. Establishing driver committees to address company issues or even holding regu- lar meetings among drivers can be problematic. What kind of personality makes for a successful chief executive? To find out, Miller and Toulouse (1986) con- ducted a survey study of 97 “small” firms representing many different kinds of businesses. Although the firms were characterized as “small,” they had an average of 382 employees, making them much larger than the average truck or bus company. Regardless of that, the study pro- vides insights into top executive personality types and how personality relates to management style and to success. They identified three types of executive personality types or styles, each with its own strengths and potential weak- nesses. The three types were (1) flexible personality, (2) high nAch (i.e., high need for achievement), and (3) internal locus of control. The textbox here defines and describes the three in greater detail. Is one of these personality types best for a small com- pany? Although there are likely to be many exceptions, it appears that the largest number of small company leaders fit the flexible personality profile. High nAch individuals may function better in larger, established organizations. Internal locus of control (LOC) is almost always a positive character- istic for company managers and professionals in general.

35 The project case study interviews did not include any per- sonality testing, but did provide impressions of managers’ styles and how their companies operated. By and large, the companies were informal, niche-oriented, and adaptable to market opportunities, and their managers appeared to best fit the “flexible personality” type. Safety Management This section presents general concepts relating to safety man- agement in organizations. The context is not specific to motor carrier safety, although many general safety manage- ment principles apply directly to transportation. At a top level, safety management involves many of the same ele- ments as organizational management in general. Figure 4 is a schematic illustrating the flow of the key aspects and activ- ities of a successful health and safety management system within a company. OSHA Safety Management Guidelines The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is an agency of the U.S. Department of Labor responsible for occupational safety and health, generally relating to work activities other than driving. Nevertheless, much of their work relates to safety in general, including driving. OSHA has published a handbook (OSHA 2005) to help small busi- ness employers meet the legal requirements imposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and to help them achieve in-compliance status in an OSHA workplace inspection. The handbook includes information about legal requirements, tips to help businesses meet these require- ments, self-inspection checklists, and information on sources for assistance. The handbook encourages owners to develop a safety and health management system, which addresses four basic elements of good safety and health pro- grams: (1) management commitment and employee involve- ment, (2) worksite analysis, (3) hazard prevention and control, and (4) training for employees, supervisors, and managers. The following textbox defines these four elements and pro- vides examples. Three Chief Executive Personality Types (1) Flexible Personality. Someone with a flexible personality is informal, confident, assertive, and adventurous. CEOs with flexible personalities often lack thorough analysis in their decision making. Rather, they tend to act on intuition rather than formal investigation. They often thrive in small firms, but less often in large ones where decisions are often more complex and require thorough analysis. Companies with flexible CEOs are often informal, niche-oriented, and adaptable to vari- ous market conditions and opportunities. Responsibilities are delegated to subordinates who may become highly motivated based on their sense of personal involvement in the company. (2) High nAch. The acronym “nAch” stands for need for achievement. Someone with high nAch is proactive, ana- lytical, and driven toward specific and tangible accom- plishments. CEOs with this personality type are usually successful in large firms and stable environments. They are risk-averse and use long-term planning in their deci- sion making. Firms operating under these types of CEOs are often formal and specialized. Often these managers do not delegate well, and they may stifle initiative by their subordinates by being overcontrolling. (3) Internal LOC. Although presented as a distinct, third manager type, this personality type does contain some elements of the first two types. A person with an inter- nal LOC is task-oriented, adaptable, and believes that consequences, good or bad, stem directly from his or her behavior and efforts. In contrast, a person with external LOC may believe that outcomes “just happen” inde- pendently of their efforts. A CEO with internal LOC is proactive and decisive, but also willing to delegate. These individuals are generally “risk neutral” in their decision making and may find success in any size firm, especially in dynamic environments. Their companies tend to be informal and adaptable. Policy Organizing Auditing & Oversight Planning & Implementing Measuring Performance Reviewing Performance Feedback loops to improve performance FIGURE 4 Key aspects and activities of a successful health and safety management system. Adapted from Health and Safety Executive (2008). OSHA’s Four Key Elements of Company Occupational Safety and Health Programs • Management Commitment and Employee Involvement. The manager or management team leads the way by establishing policies, assigning responsibilities, setting an example, and involving employees. Suggested examples: – Hold meetings with all employees to communicate your safety and health policies and objectives. Get employees involved and encourage them to help iden- tify and resolve safety and health issues.

36 a major requirement in motor carrier safety. Note, however, that the other 13 items listed are not primarily regulatory in nature. Rather, they involve active management that is largely “beyond compliance” (Knipling 2009). A generic element such as “Manage and control external exposures” has special relevance to CMV safety because of the large number of CMV crashes precipitated by the actions of other motorists. All of NSC’s 14 elements were evident in various inter- viewee statements in the chapter three case study interviews. “Manage regulatory compliance” was the most recurrent ele- ment and dominated the safety programs of some carriers. “Integrate safety into hiring” was the second most frequently mentioned element. Safety Culture and Climate “Culture” embodies a society’s shared beliefs, ideals, and behavior patterns. Companies and other organizations have cultures just as larger societies do. Safety culture refers to the shared values and beliefs within an organization that estab- lish safety as a priority and drive organizational policies and practices. Safety culture is embodied in company priorities, rules, management practices, worker behaviors, employee attitudes, and the safety record of the organization. As stated by Glendon and Stanton (2000), safety culture is “funda- mental to an organization’s ability to manage safety-related aspects of its operations.” In CTBSSP Synthesis 14, Short et al. (2007) examined the role of safety culture in motor carrier safety. The report exam- ined different concepts, aspects, and indicators of safety cul- ture, and found it was reflected in the attitudes of both managers and drivers within a company. Stability of a com- pany’s labor pool, careful analysis of safety problems, and strong safety communication across the company were among – Ensure that you, your managers, and your supervisors all follow the same safety requirements that apply to employees. For instance, wear a hard hat in work areas if you require other employees to do so. Periodically review what you have accomplished in meet- ing your objectives and reevaluate whether you need new objectives or revisions to the program. • Worksite Analysis. Managers continually analyze the work- site and processes to identify existing and potential haz- ards. Suggested examples: – Request a consultation visit from government officials overseeing occupational safety and health to get a full, independent survey of your operations. Contract for the same services from expert private consultants if you prefer. – Make sure your employees feel comfortable telling you about their safety concerns; for example, equipment or procedures that appear dangerous. – Review several years of accident, injury, or illness records to identify patterns that can help you devise strategies for improvement. • Hazard Prevention and Control. Establish methods to reduce or otherwise control existing or potential hazards. Suggested examples: – Enforce the rules for safe work procedures. Ask employ- ees to help you establish a disciplinary system that is fair and understood by everyone. – Provide for regular equipment maintenance and main- tain records of completion. Establish access to medical personnel for consultation on employee health matters. Employers do not need to pro- vide health care, but they must be prepared to deal with medical emergencies or other health problems connected to the workplace. • Training for Employees, Supervisors, and Managers. Train managers, drivers, and other employees to understand and deal with worksite hazards. Suggested examples: – Train employees on every potential hazard that they could be exposed to and how to protect themselves. Verify that they understand it. Pay special attention to new employees. – Train your supervisors to understand all the hazards faced by employees and how to reinforce training and company policies. – Have a behavioral management plan to include posi- tive recognition for safe performance and, if necessary, disciplinary action for misbehaviors. Source: OSHA (2005). The National Safety Council’s 14 Elements of a Successful Safety and Health Program • Recognize, evaluate, and control hazards • Design and engineer safe workplaces • Manage safety performance • Manage regulatory compliance • Address occupational health • Collect safety-related information • Incorporate and involve employees at all levels • Motivate employees and positively modify their behavior and attitudes • Train employees and orient them with new procedures and equipment • Communicate safety-related information • Manage and control external exposures • Manage external environments • Integrate safety into hiring and placement processes • Measure the performance of safety-related activities. National Safety Council’s 14 Elements The National Safety Council (NSC) promotes 14 Elements of a Successful Safety and Health Program. The 14 elements listed in the textbox apply to industrial organizations and operations of all types (NSC 1998). The 14 elements may be used as a self-evaluation checklist for any organization seek- ing to assess its safety management program and practices. The fourth item listed (“Manage regulatory compliance”) is

37 the key indicators. The synthesis offered a sequence of the general steps a company may take to enhance its safety culture, change specific practices, and attain crash reduction goals. Safety climate is similar to safety culture. Although cul- ture embodies values, beliefs, and underlying assumptions, climate is “a descriptive measure reflecting the workforce’s perceptions of the organizational atmosphere” (Flin et al. 2000). Broadly, safety climate is a “snapshot” of the estab- lished condition of safety of an organization at a given point in time. Any distinctions between “safety culture” and “safety climate” are far less important than the practices and outcomes associated with them. Safety climate is best measured by “leading indicators” of safety activity and performance. In the past two decades, there has been decreased reliance on “lagging” measures of safety such as retrospective statistics on crashes and viola- tions. Current emphasis is on using “leading” or predictive assessments of safety climate within organizations (Flin et al. 2000). This shift is driven by the conclusion that organiza- tional, managerial, and human factors, rather than technical failures, are the prime causes of accidents in industry. By looking at a company’s processes and practices, rather than merely its bottom-line crash or incident statistics, its safety climate can be better assessed. When researchers and safety consultants seek to effectively assess the safety climate of a company, they look at management areas and practices such as the following (Flin et al. 2000): • Management – Attitudes and behavior toward safety (especially among first-line supervisors) – Attitudes and behavior toward production – Employee selection – Discipline. • Safety system – Safety policies – Assigned responsibilities and areas of control – Safety committees with worker involvement – Safety equipment. • Risk – Explicit recognition and perception of risk factors or hazards – Amount of self-reported risk taking. • Control of work pressure – Reasonable individual workloads – Reasonable work pace – Realistic expectations. • Competence – Worker knowledge and skill – Worker qualifications – High selection standards. Flin et al. (2000) regard the most significant measures of safety climate to be management attitudes and behaviors in relation to safety. Positive management attitudes lead to other positive practices such as clear safety policies and sys- tematic employee selection and training. The researchers emphasize the importance of first-line supervisors in setting a good work atmosphere and thus a good safety climate for a company’s operations. The impact of the supervisor on safety management has been realized for many decades. “The supervisor . . . is the key [person] in industrial accident prevention. His application of the art of supervision to the control of worker performance is the factor of greatest influ- ence in successful accident prevention” (Heinrich 1959, quoted in Flin et al. 2000). Different dimensions of safety climate are related to work- related driving and occupational incidents. Wills et al. (2006) measured six different safety climate factors and four aspects of self-reported occupational driving. All of the safety climate factors were correlated with self-reported driving incidents, but some had more significant associations. Table 13 summa- rizes the relationships. The large X’s in Table 13 represent the safety climate factors that were the most significant predictors Safety Climate Factor Good Overall Driver Behavior Reduced Driving Distraction Reduced Traffic Violations Reduced Driver Error Pre-Trip Maintenance Open Communication x X x X X Low Work Pressures x X x x x Strong Relationships x x x x x Clear Safety Rules X X X X x Effective Driver Training x X x x x Management Commitment x X x X x Source: Based on Wills et al. (2006). TABLE 13 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CLIMATE FACTOR PREDICTORS

38 of occupational safety for drivers in the study. However, all cells of the table contain x’s, indicative of the authors’ view that all of these factors and behavioral indicators were inter- related. Safety climate is commonly cited as a predictor of injury occurrence. In a survey of 2,680 employees of 18 large com- panies in multiple industrial sectors, Huang et al. (2006) iden- tified the following indicators of a positive safety climate: • Management strongly committed to safety • Fair return-to-work policies • Reasonable post-injury administration policies • Effective safety training • Worker sense of safety control (i.e., workers feel knowl- edgeable about safety and are able to exercise control over their own safety). Huang et al. found these characteristics to be inversely associated with worker injuries. These company characteris- tics were also positively associated with each other. Worker sense of safety control appeared to be a critical bridge between company practices and outcomes. Safety outcomes were best when workers were knowledgeable about risks and correct practices, and were empowered to act on that knowledge. Findings from DeJoy et al. (2004) reinforce these conclu- sions. They found that companies with the best safety cli- mate: (1) were generally well-run and had effective general management policies and procedures in place, apart from safety; (2) had clear safety policies and programs in place; and (3) reduced specific hazardous conditions associated with the work. They concluded that “A positive safety cli- mate is more likely to exist in an environment that generally supports and values its employees and where there is open and effective exchange of information.” SMALL CARRIER VIOLATION AND CRASH RATES This section reviews available data on the roadside violation, moving violation, and crash rates of motor carriers of differ- ent sizes. It provides recent federal data and reviews pub- lished studies. Overall, statistics suggest that smaller carriers tend to have higher roadside inspection violation rates, and that they may also have higher moving violation and crash rates. However, there are important caveats attached to almost all of the statistics and studies cited in this section. Concerns about methodology are cited in the context of each study. By and large, the findings cited in this section are not definitive owing to methodological concerns. Roadside Inspection Data Average out-of-service (OOS) rates in roadside inspections vary inversely with carrier size. This is true both for driver and vehicle OOS rates. Figure 5 shows this for 2006–2009 based on an FMCSA retrieval of MCMIS data. Both driver and vehi- cle OOS rates for carriers in the 2–19 vehicle carrier size cate- gory are more than 50% higher than those for carriers in the 100+ vehicle category. However, there is a very important caveat attached to these and almost all MCMIS roadside inspection statistics, which is that roadside inspections are not random samples of passing trucks. Rather, the Inspection Selection System has been designed to primarily target carri- ers with poor safety performance based on SafeStat and now CSA. The size and consistency of the OOS rate differences by carrier size suggest true underlying differences in compliance, although the magnitudes of such differences may be affected by the nonrandomness of inspection selection. As part of the I-95 Corridor Coalition Field Operational Test 10, Stock (2001) looked at 13 different measures of reg- ulatory compliance based on roadside inspections. Statistics, broken down by seven carrier size categories, were based on U.S.DOT MCMIS statistics for an unspecified period. The 13 compliance measures were total OOS rate, vehicle OOS rate, driver OOS rate, average total violations per inspection, average number of vehicle violations, average brake viola- tions, average steering component violations, average wheel violations, average total driver violations, average driver qualifications violations, average medical certification viola- tions, average HOS violations, and average log violations. Without exception, each of the 13 measures showed clear relations to carrier size, with smaller carriers performing more poorly. Figure 6 shows total, vehicle, and driver OOS rates by carrier size. Overall, OOS rates for the smallest fleets were approximately 25% higher than those for the largest fleets. Figure 7 shows the average total number of violations, average number of vehicle violations, and average number of driver violations per inspection. The average total number of violations was approximately 50% higher for the smallest fleets than for the largest fleets. As with the Figure 5 statistics, these roadside inspection sta- tistics are not based on random samples. Instead, inspections 0.084 0.075 0.069 0.048 0.252 0.239 0.178 0.148 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 1 2-19 20-99 100+ Carrier Size Category (Number of Drivers) Driver OOS Rate Vehicle OOS Rate FIGURE 5 Roadside inspection out-of-service (OOS) rates by carrier size category. Combined 2006–2009 data based on 9/24/2010 MCMIS snapshot. Number of carriers represented: 9,982 (1), 22,408 (2–19), 3,687 (20–99), 719 (100+). Data retrievals conducted and provided by FMCSA.

39 for carriers of all sizes were targeted toward those with previ- ous violations and other risk indicators. Moses and Savage (1996) reported that a much larger percentage of smaller firms than larger firms are assigned negative safety ratings, which in turn means that a larger percentage of them are stopped at roadside. Although this small–large firm difference probably reflects true differences in risk, it could also contribute to con- founding of inspection violation comparisons. The reliability of carrier safety measurements is inherently related to carrier size and the number of carrier safety observations (e.g., inspec- tions). Even with true safety performance held constant, fewer safety observations would mean greater dispersion resulting from chance and thus more extreme values. In a recent report, the GAO (2011) noted that a large majority of small carriers have insufficient compliance data to be reliably ranked under the CSA SMS. Published Survey Statistics In a large 1997 survey of company drivers (excluding owner– operators), Monaco and Williams (2000) found a relation- ship between firm size and safety indicators. Drivers were interviewed and asked whether they had been involved in a crash, had a moving violation, and had a logbook violation in the previous 12 months. Driver companies were classified by size and operational characteristics. Driver demographics and education were also examined. As shown in Table 14, the effects of firm size were most apparent at the high end. That is, drivers for very large companies had significantly lower rates than those with medium-sized or small compa- nies. Unrelated to firm size, the study found that drivers under pressure to drive more hours and longer distances were also more likely to have logbook violations. There are several caveats regarding this study. Its data are based on interviews, which are inherently subject to error both from inaccurate memory and possible lack of candor. The data are also more than a decade old and not controlled for driver mileage expo- sure. In addition, they are time-based rather than mileage- based. Driver percentage involvement in crashes and violations over a time period varies directly with their mileage exposure for that time period. If drivers from smaller companies tended to drive more miles, it would give them higher time-based likelihoods even if their mileage-based involvement rates were the same or similar to drivers from larger companies. In the survey portion of the I-95 Corridor Coalition Field Operational Test 10, Stock (2001) assessed carrier attitudes and knowledge about regulatory compliance and enforce- ment. Figure 8 shows comparative responses for two truck company categories: those with 11–24 trucks and those with more than 100 trucks. Carrier attitudes about the compliance system were generally positive; favorable views were more common than negative views for all carrier sizes. However, smaller carrier respondents were more likely to have nega- tive views and were also generally less familiar with the enforcement system. This study is significantly out of date; federal enforcement systems and practices have dramatically 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 Carrier Number of Power Units Total OOS % Vehicle OOS % Driver OOS % FIGURE 6 Total, vehicle, and driver OOS percentages by carrier size from Stock (2001). 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 1 2-5 6-10 11-25 26-50 51-100 >100 Carrier Number of Power Units Total # Vehicle # Driver # FIGURE 7 Average total, vehicle, and driver violations per inspection by carrier size from Stock (2001). Firm Size % with Crashe s % with Moving Violations % with Logbook Violations 25 or fewer em ployees 18.8 40.4 54.5 25 to 99 em ployees 20.8 34.1 55.7 100 to 249 em ployees 16.2 24.7 61.7 250 to 499 em ployees 15.1 31.4 59.5 500 to 999 em ployees 8. 0 1 2. 9 6 8. 2 1,000 to 4,999 employees 5. 5 2 1. 8 3 7. 6 5,000 or mo re em ployees 11.1 12.3 27.6 From Monaco and Williams (2000). TABLE 14 FIRM SIZE AND DRIVER CRASH AND VIOLATION INVOLVEMENT IN THE PAST YEAR

40 changed over the past decade. Nevertheless, the findings are probably directionally accurate in relation to the situation today. Compliance Review Comparisons In a review of both alternative and traditional motor carrier regulatory compliance schemes, Murray et al. (2011) com- pared the effects of government Compliance Reviews (CRs) on safety outcomes for carriers of different sizes. Within the traditional enforcement framework (especially before CSA implementation), CRs were on-site safety audits, which assessed HOS compliance, driver qualifications and licens- ing, drug and alcohol testing, and vehicle inspection and main- tenance procedures. CR statistics for a five-year period from June 30, 2003, through June 30, 2008, were compared for four carrier size categories: 1–49, 50–249, 250–999, and 1,000+ power units. The percent distribution of carrier ratings fol- lowing a CR was related to carrier size; that is, smaller carri- ers were more likely to receive an “Unsatisfactory” rating and less likely to receive a “Satisfactory” rating. Moreover, within each of the three carrier rating categories (Satisfac- tory, Conditional, Unsatisfactory), small carriers consistently had higher driver and vehicle OOS rates than larger carriers. They also had a higher average number of crashes per power unit. The study did not control for mileage exposure or gen- erate crash rates for vehicle-miles traveled. Although these findings for CR fleets cast small carriers in a negative light, they should not be taken to represent the full population of motor carriers. Because all carriers in the study had received CRs, the sample was by definition skewed toward carriers with poorer safety records. The study also compared 12-month pre- and post-CR crash likelihoods (per power unit) for carriers of different sizes. Table 15 reproduces their results for 2004. The results for the next four years (2005–2008) were similar. One sees that smaller carriers generally had higher crash likelihoods both pre- and post-CR. In part, this could reflect the concept that safety performance variability is inherently greater in small carriers owing to the greater role played by chance in their safety outcomes. The most dramatic carrier size differ- ence, however, was in the effect of the CR. Small carrier crash likelihoods decreased by nearly one-half in the year following a CR, whereas large carrier crash likelihoods decreased by only about 5%. These results could be inter- preted as suggesting that small carriers are more affected by CRs. For example, they may feel more threatened by CRs, or 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Know how to check DOT inspection info on your fleet? Aware inspectors target carriers with poor safety records? Compliance reviews effective in improving road safety? Inspections effective in improving road safety? Are carriers treated fair during inspections? Selections for roadside inspection equitable? 10-24 >100 FIGURE 8 Carrier respondent compliance-related attitudes and knowledge from Stock (2001). Respondents compared are from carriers with 10–24 and >100 trucks, respectively. Number of Pre-CR Power Units (PUs) Nu mb er of CR Carriers Pre-CR Crash Likelihood (per 100 PUs) Post-CR Crash Likelihood (per 100 PUs) % Change in Crash Likelihood 1–5 3,213 11.3 5.7 − 49.6 6–20 2,182 7.8 5.3 − 31.5 21–100 1,150 6.8 5.8 − 14.8 101–250 177 4.8 4.4 − 9.1 251–1,000 79 4.3 4.1 − 5.4 1,001+ 16 4.4 4.2 − 4.9 Source: Murray et al. (2011). TABLE 15 2004 PRE- AND POST-CR AVERAGE CRASH LIKELIHOODS

41 their small size may enable them to improve their safety practices more quickly and dramatically following a CR. An alternative explanation for the pre- versus post-CR differences, however, is that the effect reflects, at least in part, a statistical artifact called regression to the mean. In statistics, regression toward the mean is the phenomenon that, if a variable is extreme on its first measurement, it will tend to be closer to the average on its second measurement (Everitt 2002). Regression to the mean is greatest when measurement-to-measurement correlations are lowest. This would be the case for year-to-year crash likelihoods for smaller carriers, because their crashes are fewer and thus inherently more subject to larger random variations. Larger carrier crash likelihoods vary less year-to-year because they tend to “average out” more each year. Because the study contained no control groups (i.e., carriers “deserving” CRs but randomly selected to not receive one), it is impossible to rule out regression to the mean as an alternative explana- tion for the observed stronger CR effects for smaller carri- ers in this study. The DOT Volpe Center published a Compliance Review Effectiveness Model with similar findings (Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 2008). It used a comparison group of all carriers not receiving a CR to control for global year-to-year changes in crash likelihood, but like the vehicle- miles traveled study did not use a control group consisting of carriers meeting safety performance criteria for receiving a CR but not actually receiving one. VEHICLE EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE Onboard Safety Technologies Numerous vehicle-based technologies are applicable to large truck safety and especially to the safety of long-haul trucks, which are usually tractor–semitrailers. The textbox lists var- ious safety technologies available for installation on large trucks. Tractor–semitrailers are in many ways the ideal plat- form for the use of advanced crash avoidance technologies. Although their crash rates per mile traveled are the lowest of major vehicle types, their high mileage exposures (5–10 times the average car) and high severity of their crashes (on average approximately twice that of cars) make them inher- ently high-risk vehicles (Wang et al. 1999; Knipling 2009). Zaloshnja and Miller (2007) calculated the average compre- hensive cost of a police-reported crash involving a large truck to be $91,112 in 2005 dollars. This included direct eco- nomic loss plus a monetary valuation of pain and suffering and quality-of-life lost. In spite of tractor–semitrailers’ gen- erally low crash rate per vehicle-miles traveled, the combi- nation of their high mileage exposures and high severities of crashes that occur drive up their average life-cycle crash costs to levels far above those of other vehicles. One direct comparison (Wang et al. 1999) found tractor–semitrailer per- vehicle life-cycle costs (all crashes regardless of fault and inclusive of all crash consequences) to be approximately five times those of straight trucks, light trucks/vans, passenger cars, and motorcycles. High average life-cycle crash costs mean that tractor–semi- trailers, among all major vehicle types, are generally the best platform for cost-effective applications of vehicle-based safety technologies. A safety device installed on a truck tractor at the time of purchase will generally perform for the life of the vehi- cle and have far greater opportunities to prevent a serious crash than the same device installed on a car, short-haul truck, or other low mileage vehicle. Moreover, approximately two- thirds of all human and material harm in large truck crashes is outside the truck (i.e., to other motorists), so there is high potential for large liability claims against truck drivers and their companies. A company that can afford to equip its vehi- cles with proven safety technologies is likely to reap positive returns-on-investments (ROIs) over time. Table 16 shows esti- mated median ROIs and median payback periods for fleets adopting three of the better-known, vehicle-based crash avoid- ance devices (FMCSA 2009). The previous discussion suggests that all CMV transport companies consider equipping their vehicles with crash avoid- ance technologies, and that they would profit from the investment. Unfortunately, there are economic obstacles to greater deployment of truck safety technologies (Houser et al. 2007; Knipling 2010). Large, successful companies may have sufficient capital and cash flow to finance pur- chases of vehicle safety technologies. But that is not true of most companies, and especially smaller companies, where tight profit margins are the rule. In addition, larger companies are more likely to be able to negotiate price reductions based Truck Vehicle-Based Safety Technologies • Improved Brakes (e.g., air disc brakes) • Electronic Stability Control • Roll Stability Control • Forward Collision Warning Systems • Side-Object Detection Systems • Backing Collision Warning Systems • Lane Departure Warning Systems • Onboard Safety Monitoring • Driver Alertness Monitoring • EOBRs • Electronic Data Recorders • Vehicle Condition Monitoring (e.g., tire pressure moni- toring systems) • Automated Transmissions • Speed Limiters • Truck-Specific Navigation Aids • Enhanced Trailer Conspicuity • Enhanced Trailer Rear Lighting/Warnings • Video Mirrors. Source: Knipling and Hyten (2010).

42 on volume purchases, and are more likely to have technicians on payroll who can support system use. A recent Transport Topics article by Johnson (2011) noted the problems small companies have keeping their equipment current. The article quoted Andy Ahern of Ahern and Associates, a consulting firm, to the affect that “The small guys are having a hard time. They’re not getting paid on time, they’re not getting the financing to buy equipment and many of them cannot get their rates up.” Vehicle safety equipment was addressed by several sur- vey questions. Question 23 asked about EOBR use. Only 16 of 110 respondents reported using EOBRs on their vehicles. Those using them gave them a high average effectiveness rating of 3.4 on the 0–4 Likert scale. Question 25 asked respondents if they “Purchase[d] advanced vehicle safety systems (forward collision warning, lane departure warning, electronic stability control, onboard computers to monitor driving, etc.).” Only 4 of 111 respondents answered yes. In Question 31 on the most important areas of safety manage- ment, the choice “vehicle safety equipment (e.g., technolo- gies such as collision avoidance systems)” received the fewest votes of the ten areas presented. The following are survey comments relating to vehicle safety equipment: • Vehicle safety equipment is more often than not too costly for small carriers to obtain in today’s economy. • The continual adding of expensive [equipment and] cost to new motorcoaches is pricing a new coach at an impossible level for many small companies. Thus, older vehicles will be used much longer. • We would love to try EOBR’s, but do not have the bud- get. Funding these safety advances will be critical to smaller operators. Few of the case study interviewees expressed an active interest in vehicle safety technologies. Carrier C, which hauls large 8-axle trailers, expressed an interest in trailer disc brakes for improved performance. Tire Pressure Monitoring Sys- tems were also mentioned in interviews. Some carriers con- sidered these technologies to be a “wish list” item, but cash flow problems eliminated them from serious consideration. More often, safety technologies were not mentioned by inter- viewees. Vehicle Maintenance Practices Proper vehicle maintenance is an essential legal requirement for CMV safety, and most carriers regard vehicle mainte- nance as their most fundamental safety activity (Knipling et al. 2003). Both federal and state governments have exten- sive vehicle regulations and enforcement programs targeting brakes, tires, lights, and other vehicle components with potential deficiencies. Mechanical failures are rare as a direct cause of crashes when compared with human causes, but they are still considerable. In the Large Truck Crash Causa- tion Study (LTCCS), 10% of truck at-fault involvements (5.5% of all truck crash involvements) were attributed to a vehicle-related Critical Reason (proximal cause). Types of failures included brake deficiencies, cargo shifts, tire/wheel failures, and suspension failures. The presence of a vehicle problem as an associated factor (even when not necessarily a cause) was strongly correlated to crash fault (i.e., Critical Reason assignment). Associated vehicle factors were noted in 62% of truck single-vehicle crashes, 50% of truck at-fault multi-vehicle crashes, but only 21% of truck not-at-fault multi-vehicle crashes (Knipling 2009). The nature of the vehicle deficiency can be associated with crash type. Blower (2009) reported that brake OOS violations were more com- mon in LTCCS crashes where the truck was the striking vehi- cle, whereas lighting OOS violations were more common when the truck was the struck vehicle. Vehicle maintenance is one of the seven CSA BASICs. Earlier in this chapter it was noted that small carrier vehicle OOS rates in inspections are greater than 20%, with the important caveat that these inspections target poor-performing carriers and thus are not random samples. Motor carriers of all sizes consider vehicle maintenance to be a priority safety management activity. Regular practices include pre- and post-trip inspections, annual vehicle inspec- tions, PM, and repairs. Small companies perform many maintenance tasks themselves, although some do not have facilities for major repairs. In CTBSSP Synthesis 1 (Knipling et al. 2003), respondents were asked to rate and rank 28 car- rier safety management practices for their importance. “Regularly scheduled vehicle inspection and maintenance” received the highest mean rating of all 28 practices. In a sur- vey of 148 safe carriers, Corsi and Barnard (2003) found that 76% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Cost is no issue when it comes to keeping our vehicles defect free.” Vehicle-Based Safety Technology Median ROI per $1.00 Investm ent Median Payback Period Forward Collision Warning $4.28 23 Months Lane Departure Warning $3.96 23 Months Roll Stability Control $5.51 18 Months Source: FMCSA (2009). TABLE 16 ESTIMATED BENEFIT-COSTS OF THREE LARGE TRUCK SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES

43 About 80% agreed that, “Deploying a defect-free fleet is the most important thing we can do to ensure highway safety.” More and more companies are using maintenance man- agement software to facilitate regular maintenance and scheduling. In 2003, Corsi and Barnard found that 56% of their “safe carrier” respondents used such programs. Per- centages varied by fleet size; that is, 78% for large fleets ver- sus 23% for small fleets. Perhaps because they used such programs, large carriers also tended to perform routine inspec- tion and maintenance tasks (e.g., brake servicing) more often than smaller fleets. A review of maintenance management software websites (Knipling et al. 2011) reveals numerous ways that truck main- tenance software can assist fleets. They help fleets and other truck maintainers to better manage PM schedules and tasks, parts inventory, fuel and tire use, and other maintenance- related needs. Software vendors claim that they reduce costs, improve productivity, increase warranty recoveries, improve auditing and billing, provide documentation of maintenance actions (that may be critical in enforcement and liability cases), and generally make equipment maintenance more systematic. However, their more sophisticated features (e.g., generating maintenance-related bar codes for vehicle parts) are probably beyond the needs of most small fleets. Survey Question 15 asked respondents to indicate the two most challenging CSA BASICs, and Question 16 asked for the two least challenging. Vehicle maintenance was rated as the third most challenging of the CSA BASICs. Survey Question 26 asked respondents if they maintained PM schedules and records for each vehicle. Overwhelmingly (109 of 112) respon- dents reported they did, and the practice received a high effec- tiveness rating of 3.2 on the 0–4 Likert scale. In Question 31 on the most important areas of safety management, the choice “vehicle PM” was rated second, behind only driver selection and hiring. In survey comments, one respondent said, “Most owner operators and small fleet operators do a good job of maintenance and safety but are lacking in the back up aspects such as paper work. I know owner operators that do their own maintenance work but don’t keep very good records.” In the project interviews, approximately half of the small carriers interviewed indicated that vehicle maintenance was their single biggest safety activity and concern. Cargo secure- ment was also a major concern, especially for flatbed opera- tors, but for others as well. Vehicle maintenance was strongly driven by the FMCSRs and the threat of violations, espe- cially under CSA. The smallest carrier interviewed, Carrier A, reported that its day-to-day safety practices were far more frequently related to vehicle maintenance and cargo secure- ment than to driver issues. Regarding vehicle problems, if there is “anything DOT [regulation-related], it doesn’t go down the road.” Carrier C runs high-productivity, double- trailer rigs with 42 tires and 20 brakes; it must be “obsessive” about vehicle maintenance. Although the case study interviewees affirmed the impor- tance of vehicle maintenance, they also complained about roadside vehicle inspections. Most often the complaints were about lack of consistency in vehicle-related violation criteria. Specific comments related to “gray areas” in vehicle compo- nent and cargo securement inspections. OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND RISK AVOIDANCE CTBSSP Synthesis Report 21 (Knipling et al. 2011) explored carrier operational efficiencies that may also provide safety benefits by decreasing exposure to risk. The report made a distinction between risk reduction and risk avoidance strate- gies in CMV transport. Risk reduction encompasses most CMV safety management practices and interventions such as vehicle maintenance and various efforts to improve drivers. Risk avoidance strategies are those where carriers plan and conduct their operations in ways that minimize exposure to crash risk. A good example is route planning prior to trips. Routes that maximize travel on Interstates and avoid urban traffic are not only efficient, they are far safer as well. They avoid risk. Other carrier risk avoidance strategies include reducing empty (“deadhead”) trips, minimizing loading and unloading and related delays, avoiding work zones, optimiz- ing travel times, use of higher productivity vehicles, and team driving. Risk avoidance can be represented schematically. Figure 9 shows a simple timeline of crash risk, cause, and occurrence. Both crash risk factors and causes may be human, vehicle, or environmental. The extended risk timeline on the left side is intended to show that pre-trip and pre-crash-threat decisions can reduce crash risk well before imminent crash threats are encountered. Pre-trip practices affecting risk include trip scheduling to avoid high-traffic times and driver fatigue. Once on the road, pre-crash threat avoidance includes route selection to eschew undivided highways, traffic congestion, and work zones. The dotted lines between the risk zones denote that many risk avoidance practices are operating across the zones. Loading and unloading delays are pre-trip events that raise crash risk before a trip even begins. These delays usu- ally increase driver fatigue, driver frustration, and trip sched- ule pressure. CTBSSP Synthesis 21 (Knipling et al. 2011) noted that smaller carriers are more vulnerable to both trip delays and schedule pressure by shippers because they do not have the economic leverage and wherewithal to assert carrier interests and, if necessary, walk away from a shipper account. A recent report by the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO 2011) addresses the issue of commercial driver deten- tion times. GAO’s summary findings included: • Detention of drivers at shipper or receiver facilities is a prevalent problem—of 302 drivers interviewed by GAO, 204 (68%) reported being detained within the past month.

44 • Of those drivers who had experienced detention, 80% stated that it affected their ability to meet HOS require- ments, and 65% reported losing revenue as a result of being detained. • Shippers and receivers control many of the factors lead- ing to driver detention, such as facility staffing, loading and unloading equipment, quality and promptness of service, and the readiness of products for pick up. • Shippers often disagree with carriers and drivers about the amount of detention time and its causes. • Carriers have some ability to mitigate the problem by charging detention fees to shippers, developing better working relationships with customers, improving com- munications, and abandoning shipper accounts where detention is a problem. • Larger carriers have greater resources and more lever- age with clients than smaller carriers and thus are gen- erally able to mitigate the problem more effectively. Drivers and carriers know that delay costs them money; however, it appears that they do not fully appreciate the cost. A recent analysis by Texas Transportation Institute (Miao et al. 2011) used a mathematical simulation model to esti- mate travel delay costs to tractor–semitrailer drivers and their carriers. They estimated the cost at $80 to $121 per hour, depending on conditions and assumptions in their model. Concurrently, they conducted a survey of drivers and carri- ers, asking them to estimate the cost to them of travel delays. Their mean estimates were in the $26 to $68 per hour range. The authors concluded that the many in the trucking industry do not fully realize the costs they incur owing to travel delays. Drivers paid by the mile perceived the cost to be higher, but it was still below actual costs, as estimated by the study. This study focused on roadway (e.g., traffic) delays, but its results apply to loading and unloading delays as well. Reimbursing toll charges to drivers is a way to reduce operational risks caused by “diversion.” Diversion occurs when truck drivers (or other motorists) choose not to drive on toll roads in order to avoid paying those tolls (Short 2006). They are likely to instead choose a parallel undivided high- way with far greater crash risks. Undivided highways have crash risks that are higher than those of toll roads “by at least a factor of 3 or 4 . . .” (Harwood 2006). The problem of loading and unloading was the primary operational planning issue addressed explicitly in the project questionnaire. Question 10 asked respondents to rate the safety importance of “Delays associated with loading and unloading cargo.” For truck respondents, this safety problem received a mean importance rating of 2.9 on the 0–4 Likert scale, placing it in the top half of the items. This was not an important issue for bus respondents. In the survey section on operational practices, Question 27 asked respondents if they charged detention fees for loading and unloading delays. Among truck respondents, 62 of 79 respondents charged them, and the practice received an aver- age effectiveness rating of 2.5 on the 0–4 scale. On Question 28, 98 of 111 respondents indicated that they reimburse toll charges to drivers or provide “EZ Pass” transponders. The practice was rated 2.8 on the 0–4 Likert scale for effectiveness. In Question 31 on the most important areas of safety man- agement, three of the ten items presented might fall (fully or partially) under operational planning and risk avoidance: • Item (e), driver scheduling and dispatching practices was rated 4th in importance. • Item (f), trip planning, routing, and navigation was rated 6th in importance. • Item (g), loading, cargo securement, unloading, and dock/ yard practices was rated 9th in importance. Loading and unloading delays were discussed in almost all of the truck case study interviews. In general, managers were frustrated by them and believed that small carrier efforts to reduce them were not always effective. Even when shippers or receivers paid detention fees, excessive delays disrupt car- riers’ operations and the drivers’ personal schedules. FIGURE 9 Risk-cause crash timeline with extended pre-crash risk segments. Reproduced from Knipling et al. (2011).

45 Another possible risk avoidance strategy was employed by Carrier C, which operates in a U.S. state permitting 8-axle “B-Train” trailer combinations with more than twice the cargo capacity of conventional single trailers. In this case, risk avoidance would be achieved by increasing driver and vehicle productivity without corresponding increases in crash severity or frequency. Otherwise, interviewees did not mention the kind of risk avoidance issues discussed in CTBSSP Synthesis 21 or rep- resented schematically in Figure 9. To some extent, small carriers may “not see the forest for the trees” with regard to operational efficiencies that may also decrease crash risks. Also, although small carriers often have a high level of flex- ibility to respond to customer demands, they do not have enough drivers and vehicles to employ different deployment strategies that might avoid risk. DRIVER HIRING Most of management is Human Resource Management (HRM). One may speak of “cradle-to-grave” HRM incorpo- rating employee recruiting, selection, hiring, orientation, training, supervision, evaluation, retention, and termination. This section addresses driver hiring (including recruiting, selection, and initial hiring) and the next two sections address other HRM stages. Importance of Driver Selection Numerous studies have revealed large and persistent individ- ual differences in driver crash risk (Knipling et al. 2004). For example, in one naturalistic driving (instrumented vehicle) study of commercial drivers (Hickman et al. 2005), 95 drivers were rank-ordered by their rate of involvement in at-fault road incidents. The worst drivers, with just 19% of total exposure, accounted for 53% of all at-fault events. The rest of the drivers had 81% of the exposure, but just 47% of the risk. For carriers of all sizes there is a safety premium on selecting good drivers for employment. As stated in the ATA Founda- tion publication SafeReturns (ATAF 1999b), “starting with the right people is key to overall safety performance.” CTBSSP Synthesis 21 (Knipling et al. 2011) reviewed driver selection methods in carriers of all sizes. Systematic driver selection involves assessment of various safety-relevant driver traits, such as personality, attitudes, psychomotor per- formance, medical status and conditions, behavioral history (particularly driving history), and mental abilities. Specific selection procedures and tests described are generally those designed to target one of these areas or, often, a more specific dimension within one of these areas. CTBSSP Synthesis 21 included a survey of both carrier safety managers and other experts in motor carrier safety. One question presented respondents with five different areas of safety management and asked them to select two of the five they considered most important in determining safety outcomes. The five choices were as follows: 1. Driver preparation—pre-hire CMV driving training and testing; for example, basic school training and CDL testing. 2. Driver selection and hiring—company driver recruit- ing, screening, selection, and hiring (includes both mandatory and voluntary hiring practices). 3. Company communications to drivers—driver orienta- tion, finishing, safety meetings, refresher training, pol- icy announcements, and safety reminders. 4. Driver evaluation—company monitoring and evalua- tion of individual drivers; for example, violation and incident tracking, ride-alongs, covert observations of driving, and onboard computer monitoring. 5. Company rewards and discipline—for example, incen- tives, feedback, recognition, letters (both commenda- tions and reprimands), bonuses, pay increases/decreases, and other consequences imposed by management. Figure 10 presents the proportion selecting each choice. Safety manager and other expert response profiles were quite similar. Within both groups, driver selection received the sec- ond highest number of votes behind driver evaluation. Both driver selection and evaluation may be considered assessment activities, whereas the other three choices, all receiving fewer votes, may be considered interventions to change behavior. These results suggest that many respondents considered dri- ver characteristics to be relatively enduring and resistant to change. Therefore, it is critical to assess driver safety-relevant characteristics accurately. Driver Selection Methods FMCSRs require carriers to perform certain actions in hiring commercial drivers. According to 49 CFR Section 391.51 and as summarized in FMCSA (2008), carriers must ensure that any driver hired meets federal minimum qualifications. To document this, carriers must maintain a qualification file for each employee with the following information: • Driver’s application for employment (completed and signed). • Driver’s MVR of past crashes and violations from the applicable state agency for the preceding 3 years. • Driver’s road test certificate or the equivalent. A current CDL is evidence of road test completion. • Annual review of driving record based on state agency inquiry and carrier review. Certification that driver meets minimum requirements is signed by the carrier. • Annual driver’s certification of violations. • Medical examiner’s certificate. • Record of inquiry(ies) to previous employer(s) for past 3 years.

46 CTBSSP Synthesis 21 (Knipling et al. 2011) identified additional carrier methods to improve commercial driver selection, with emphasis on specific tests and measurements used in making employment decisions. The study identified 15 driver hiring practices reported to be effective for motor carriers, and an additional nine practices that might be help- ful for some fleets. The following are some of the key hiring practices applicable to companies of any size: • Use multiple types of assessments (e.g., driving test, interview, and review of records) to capture a variety of driver characteristics and the “whole person.” • Use the FMCSA PSP service to see past crash involve- ments and inspection data. • Review driving records with special focus on major violations (e.g., reckless driving). • Assess past crashes with regard to preventability and, when possible, specific causes. • Conduct a road and range driving test of every applicant using a standardized checklist or rating form. • Conduct a standardized interview to tap key driver safety-related traits and skills directly related to the job. • Assess, either through interviews or questionnaires, driver personality traits such as aggressiveness, impul- siveness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, manageabil- ity, and attitudes toward risk. • Select for retention as well as for safety, as the two are associated. • Provide applicants with as much information as possi- ble on the company, job, and hiring procedures so there are “no surprises.” • Maintain a detailed and comprehensive assessment file for each driver. • Require a probationary period for new hires. In the I-95 Corridor Coalition Coordinated Safety Man- agement study (Stock 2001), a large majority of respondents from all carrier size categories considered driver hiring crite- ria to be important to safety. Among trucking companies in the 10–24 vehicle category, more than 80% required in- person interviews, tested for alcohol and drugs during screen- ing, and conducted on-road driving tests before hiring. Small (10–24 vehicle) carrier percentages relating to other specific practices were as follows: • Use third-party services to review driver histories: 39%. • Require a minimum number of years of experience: 52%. • Allow specific maximum number of points/crashes/ violations: 80%. • Require a written test on DOT regulations: 40%. In the Stock study (2001), the percentage of carriers engag- ing in various hiring practices generally varied directly with carrier size. For example, the percentages of responding carri- ers requiring a minimum number of years of experience for drivers were: 1–9 vehicles (50%), 10–24 vehicles (52%), 25–50 vehicles (64%), 51–100 vehicles (67%), and >100 vehi- cles (73%). Bus respondents (all sizes combined) were at 48%. Although Stock’s data are probably indicative, they are more than ten years old and were not statistically representative of all U.S. carriers. A qualitative difference between small carri- ers and large ones was also noted in the study. No statistics were provided, but Stock reported that some of the small car- riers in that study stated that they hired only drivers who were personally known to them prior to hire. This might be an advan- tage for small carriers, although it suggests that these carriers are not casting a wide net in their driver recruiting. Employee Hiring in Small Companies Two nontransportation management studies provide insights into employee recruiting and hiring in smaller companies. Carroll et al. (1999) asked whether small companies use 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 Driver Prep. & Basic Training Driver Selection & Hiring Company Communications Driver Evaluation Rewards & Discipline R es po nd en t V ot e Pr op or tio n Safety Managers Other Experts FIGURE 10 Judged safety importance of different management areas in Synthesis 21 survey. Each respondent had two votes. Source: Knipling et al. (2011).

47 systematic, formalized hiring procedures such as those out- lined in textbooks or used in some large organizations. The companies studied ranged from 7 to 207 employees, and rep- resented 5 different sectors, including trucking. They found that often small companies generally hire workers in an infor- mal manner. None of the companies conducted job analyses, in part because they believed that job tasks were variable and that written descriptions would be too rigid. Most companies preferred closed searches for new hires. That is, instead of conducting an open search using advertising or recruitment agencies, they favored simply “spreading the word” among existing employees that they were hiring new staff. Managers assumed that their current employees could judge their ac- quaintances’ suitability for the job and whether they would “fit in” well in the company. The hiring emphasis was often on “interpersonal fit” rather than on an objective comparison of job tasks and requirements to applicant qualifications. In a similar study of 27 firms in Australia, Barrett and Neeson (2007) found that many small companies did not analyze their jobs and had no list of required skills or other qualifications for their jobs. Most of their managers could verbally state the attributes they were looking for in new employees. However, those without written documentation of job requirements had difficulty reliably assessing new applicants. This Australian study went one step further: it compared the use of formal hiring and other HRM practices with company growth. The study found that 16 of the 27 small companies that formalized their HRM processes [e.g., by documenting job tasks, knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs), and minimum employee qualifications] were more successful in finding better employees than the 11 that did not. Managers of companies with formalized HRM processes and documentation were able to “sell their vision” of employee and company success to new applicants. This clarity of pur- pose appeared to help these companies make a profit and grow over time. Marchington et al. (2003) conducted case studies of truck- ing firms in Britain and their driver hiring practices. All were small-to-medium family businesses that had been in opera- tion for 20 years or more. These carriers were concerned both about the shortage of qualified drivers and the difficulty of finding good drivers when applicants were scarce. However, the companies were not aggressive about hiring new drivers and about company growth in general. Reasons for their general reticence to grow included: • They were generally satisfied with their market niche and current close customer relations; • They were somewhat afraid to grow larger and thus be forced to compete with “the big boys”; • They did not want to invest in new facilities, equipment, and personnel; and • There was a strong desire to maintain family control and succession to future generations. These might be threatened by rapid or excessive growth. Marchington’s companies tended to hire drivers they already knew, such as individuals initially hired for other jobs in their companies. They often hired their former drivers who had left for other firms but then returned. Study compa- nies did not approach driver hiring in a systematic or formal manner; they did not employ personnel specialists, did not conduct job analyses, and did not like working with driver recruiting firms. The companies often found themselves recruiting drivers continuously over long periods of time to field sufficient drivers for their workload. A general strategy was to maximize driver retention by establishing personal relationships with each driver hired as well as providing competitive pay and other tangible benefits. Survey and Interview Findings Survey Question 6 asked respondents to rate the safety importance of “recruiting and selecting good drivers.” This item received an average of 3.3 on the 0–4 scale, the high- est average rating assigned to any of the 14 safety problems presented. In Question 31, driver selection and hiring was rated as the most important of ten safety management areas presented. Questions 17 and 18 concerned specific driver hiring practices. On Question 17, 92 of 110 respondents indicated that they conducted road and range driving tests with all new driver applicants. Those using the practice assigned it a mean effectiveness rating of 3.0 on the 0–4 scale. Question 18 asked if respondents “have driver applicants complete a questionnaire on attitudes, personal- ity, or driving behaviors.” Only 20 of 112 respondents did so, and it also received a mean effectiveness rating of 3.0 from practitioners. A number of survey comments addressed driver selection and hiring, including the following: • It is all about having/hiring the right people who have the right attitude. Then monitoring their progress helps keep them on track. • We only hire experienced competent drivers. They know their job. • The most important safety feature in a truck is the driver. That is why we are very selective in our recruiting and try to be at the top of the pay scale to attract the highest quality driver. • Know who you are hiring, and do not make exceptions to hiring good drivers. It will harm you down the road. • Our biggest company problem is finding drivers. All ten of the case study interviewees either chose “driver selection and hiring” as a most-important safety management practice and/or mentioned it as such in their comments. Most of the managers personally interviewed and road tested driver applicants. Often the managers already knew driver applicants before they applied. By and large, however, driver selection procedures were not as elaborate as those described

48 by larger carriers in CTBSSP Synthesis 21 on driver selection (Knipling et al. 2011). The one large company interviewed for this study, Carrier J, believed that the systematic driver hiring regimen it imposed on its subsidiaries was important in maintaining company-wide driver quality standards. DRIVER ORIENTATION, TRAINING, AND COMMUNICATIONS An organization’s commitment to employee safety training and other communications is a strong indicator of its overall safety culture and climate. Effective safety training has been shown to have a negative correlation with occupational injuries in a workplace (Huang et al. 2006). Comprehensive, behavior-based safety training increases company safety per- formance and safety culture. A study published in 1995 by FMCSA’s predecessor agency (Dueker 1995; FHWA Office of Motor Carriers 1995) assessed the entry-level training of U.S. CMV drivers. In the study, a panel of 36 experts reviewed statistics on the training received by CMV drivers and of curricula used in that training. The study concluded that neither heavy truck nor motor coach drivers generally receive adequate entry- level training. The driving and overall job proficiency required to earn a CDL is widely regarded in industry as well below the level required for reliable driving in a full-time oper- ational setting. Thus, the adequacy of driver skills and knowl- edge is a major industry safety concern. For example, improved commercial driver training was the top recommendation from the 2002 International Truck and Bus Safety Research and Policy Symposium (Zacharia and Richards 2002). Driver train- ing was the focus of CTBSSP Synthesis 5 (Staplin et al. 2004), as well as CTBSSP Synthesis 13 (Brock et al. 2007). This report does not focus on entry-level CMV driver training; that is, the training that drivers may receive before obtaining a CDL. Rather, it addresses small carrier chal- lenges and activities involved in “finishing” training for new drivers (“pre-service” training) and in providing their expe- rienced drivers with continuing training (“in-service” train- ing). Safety meetings are another form of communications that overlap with training in both their content and methods. Also relevant to the current discussion is training that carrier owners and managers themselves may obtain to upgrade their business, technical, and management skills. This section addresses training and communications content first, followed by training and communications methods and media. Training and Communications Content The potential content of CMV safety training encompasses all driver and other employee KSAs relevant to safe CMV driving. CTBSSP Synthesis 5 (Staplin et al. 2004) reviewed basic training content and curricula, including a detailed model curriculum recommended in the 1995 FHWA OMC report (Dueker 1995). The 1995 model curriculum was itself based on a 1985 FHWA OMC report. Areas of instruction include basic vehicle operation and handling, safe operating procedures, special driving conditions, advanced driving skills (e.g., recovering from skids), vehicle-related nondriv- ing activities (e.g., pre-trip inspections), vehicle maintenance, nonvehicle activities (e.g., maintaining logs), passengers, and driver fitness (e.g., alcohol and drugs). The current Pro- fessional Truck Driver Institute model curriculum (PTDI 2011) is based largely on this earlier work. In its survey and literature review, CTBSSP Synthesis 5 attempted to assess salient driver training needs beyond entry- level training; that is, for carrier finishing training or continu- ing driver refresher training. The topic assessment also addressed potential training methods. The following candi- date training topics were addressed: • On-road speed and space management • Driving in hazardous weather conditions • Rollover prevention • Night operations • Tight maneuvering • Emergency maneuvering • Vehicle inspection and maintenance • Bus passenger safety • Truck coupling • Cargo loading, unloading, and securement • Driver wellness • Fitness-for-duty and fatigue management • Management of work schedule and family time • Management of finances. CTBSSP Synthesis 5 also suggested crash causation find- ings as a basis for driver training content. For example, the LTCCS (Starnes 2006) identified and provided statistics on the Critical Reasons (proximal causes) triggering large truck crashes. This includes various types of driver errors as well as vehicle and environmental causes. Along with proximal causes, drivers need to understand crash risk factors; that is, pre-trip and pre-crash-threat factors that can make crashes more or less likely to occur. These were discussed earlier in Operational Planning and Risk Avoidance based largely on CTBSSP Synthesis 21 (Knipling 2011). In the UM survey of safe motor carriers, Corsi and Barnard (2003) reported that 71% of their small-carrier respondents required pre-service training (i.e., for new hires), usually of 1 to 2 weeks duration. Eighty-three percent required in-service training (e.g., refresher training). Many small carrier respon- dents (43%) believed the two training approaches had equal safety impact. Of the remainder, in-service training was rated as having greater impact by more respondents (38%) than pre- service training (19%). The most frequent topics covered in pre-service and in-service training included accident notifica- tion, defensive driving, dispatch procedures, driver discipli- nary policies, federal safety regulations, HOS regulations,

49 injury prevention, pre- and post-trip inspections, and truck maintenance. The vast majority of small company driver training was conducted entirely by company personnel rather than outside parties. About 80% of small company managers considered their company-based training to be “a strategic safety investment.” However, only 17% of small company respondents believed that their company “spends more time on pre-service training than do most carriers.” For in-service training, the percentage was 25%. There are no federal requirements regarding training for commercial drivers before obtaining their CDLs; instead, there is the performance requirement of passing the test. A 2004 FMCSR does require, however, that drivers receive instruction in four specific topics within 90 days of beginning work as a commercial driver. The four topics are: (1) driver qualifications (e.g., medical conditions), (2) HOS and fatigue prevention, (3) driver wellness (diet, exercise, stress reduc- tion), and (4) whistleblower protection. Total instructional time for the four topics is estimated at about 10 hours. In recent years, many companies have voluntarily increased their in-service training and counseling on driver wellness and fatigue management. In CTBSSP Synthesis 15, Krueger et al. (2007) reviewed corporate health and wellness programs in the CMV industry. These programs implement employee training, communications, individual counseling, medical screening, and other methods to encourage healthful behav- iors (e.g., exercise and better sleep hygiene) and reverse risk behaviors (e.g., smoking and unhealthful eating). CTBSSP Synthesis 15 reviewed a number of successful truck and bus driver wellness programs, although all were in larger fleets. A joint U.S.–Canadian program, the North American Fatigue Management Program is developing a driver and carrier manager training system and website to support carrier-based training in companies of all sizes. The textbox provides a topical list of instructional modules under development. Most of these will be available both as web-based instruction and as courseware to support classroom lectures. Drivers are the principal instructional audience but some modules are for drivers’ families, carrier managers, executives, or shippers/ receivers. The first five survey questions related to safety problem areas that also could constitute training topics. These were Likert scale items where respondents rated the importance of the problem on 0–4 scale. The average rating among 14 items was 2.6, which might be regarded as a benchmark for distin- guishing problems of greater or lesser relative importance. The five items were: 1. Lack of basic driving skills among your drivers: 2.9. 2. At-risk driving behaviors (e.g., speeding and tailgat- ing): 3.1. 3. Driver fatigue/drowsiness: 2.9. 4. Driver health, wellness, and nutrition problems: 2.4. 5. Driver personal, family, and financial problems: 2.2. Training and Communications Methods Conventional Training Methods In CTBSSP Synthesis 13, Brock et al. (2007) overviewed train- ing strategies and methods applicable to the CMV industry. Some advanced methods (e.g., driving simulators and skid pads) are employed only in the largest and most innovative schools and fleets. The traditional, core instructional meth- ods of classroom lectures and supervised driving dominate most carrier-based training. This training is often supple- mented by written materials and may be further enhanced by the use of audiovisual presentations (e.g., videos). Supervised driving includes both road and range settings. In their survey of safe motor carriers, Corsi and Barnard (2003) reported that the majority of their small-carrier respondents required both pre-service and in-service training, and employed classroom, in-vehicle road, and in-vehicle-range training venues. Rela- tive to large carriers, smaller carriers made greater relative use of in-vehicle road training, but relatively less use of in-vehicle range and classroom training. Safety meetings overlap with training in both their methods and content. These meetings, which often include managers, dispatchers, drivers, and other safety-related fleet personnel, are a basic and useful means to promote and sustain safety awareness within fleets. The SafeReturns study of top- performing fleets (ATAF 1999a) found that fleets held regu- larly scheduled safety meetings, generally with mandatory attendance and paid attendance for drivers. Topics addressed include recent crashes or incidents, vehicle maintenance and inspection, defensive driving, health and wellness, fatigue man- agement and HOS, winter driving, and nondriving topics such as loading dock practices and hazardous material handling. In the I-95 Corridor Coalition “Best Practices” study (Stock 2001), 76% of responding carriers in the 10–24 vehi- cle range held regularly scheduled safety meetings, usually quarterly but sometimes monthly. Percentages were higher for larger fleets and lower for the very smallest fleets. Eighty- seven percent of all their respondents rated safety meetings as North American Fatigue Management Program Instructional Modules Under Development 1. Introduction and Overview 2. Fatigue Management Practices 3. Driver Education 4. Driver Family Education 5. Train-the-Trainer 6. Shippers and Receivers 7. Sleep Disorders (for Managers) 8. Sleep Disorders (for Drivers) 9. Driver Scheduling and Tools 10. Fatigue Management Technologies.

50 being important to carrier safety. Most responding small car- riers also displayed safety awareness posters and distributed safety-related letters, fliers, etc. E-Learning E-learning comprises various modes of remote web- and computer-enabled transfer of KSAs. E-learning encompasses computer-based training, web-based instruction (WBI), and other similar terms. A 12-year meta-analysis of e-learning research by the U.S. Department of Education (Means et al. 2009) found the following general advantages of interactive e-learning over conventional instruction: • Improved knowledge and performance for most topic areas. • Increased access with reduced travel time and expenses. • Convenience and flexibility to learners. • Sharper focus on required knowledge, skills, and com- petences. • More likely to be the product of a systematic instruc- tional design process, including validation of learning objectives and instructional content accuracy. • Eliminates variations in learning arising from variations in instructor knowledge and competences. • Better spacing of learning (allowing consolidation of knowledge between sessions). • Reduced overall training time. • Economies of scale. • Better tracking and recording of trainee, organizational, and training system performance. The advantages of e-learning are applicable to training in CMV transport. It potentially offers much to drivers, who often have extra time to devote to training by means of laptops while on trips (e.g., at stopovers or while waiting for loads), but precious little time at their home locations. E-learning affords drivers the opportunity to both refresh their basic knowledge and to acquire advanced and specialized knowl- edge on topics such as crash causation, hazardous materials transport, longer commercial vehicles and other truck con- figurations, and cargo handling and securement. Carrier man- agers, human resource managers, operations managers, sales staff, dispatchers, maintainers, and others can also benefit from e-learning offerings. In addition to ease of access, an advantage is that instructional content and quality can be stan- dardized. Conventional carrier-based training varies widely in quality and comprehensiveness as a result of differences in trainer knowledge, experience, resources, and facilities (Brock et al. 2007). A recent FMCSA report (Brock et al. 2011) focuses on the use of WBI to provide training in the FMCSRs. Although the training subject focus was the FMCSRs, findings from the study apply to other knowledge-based instructional top- ics. WBI has a particularly strong potential applicability to small carriers, because its use greatly reduces the need for both instructional facilities and expert trainers at remote locations. Essentially, drivers and carriers need only com- puters and online access. The report notes further that WBI and other e-learning can be more interesting and engaging than conventional instruc- tion. WBI can provide graphics, video, and sound of the high- est quality. It can be more individualized and provide better measures of success. Interactive e-learning can adapt the pace, mode, and content of instruction to meet the learning needs of each student. A well-designed WBI program tests each student as he or she progresses through an instructional program and provides both corrective feedback and selection of the next appropriate unit of instruction. WBI is applicable to many different kinds of learning, but not necessarily advan- tageous for all; for example, it does not work well for training multi-step procedures such as some PM procedures. Brock et al. (2011) cite a review by Dodds and Fletcher (2004) that identified a “law of thirds” in its evaluation of WBI and other e-learning effectiveness in various settings. Generally and approximately, e-learning reduces training costs by 33%, reduces needed instructional time by 33%, and increases learning by 33%. WBI is especially useful when personnel to be trained are geographically dispersed and/or in remote locations. For these and the reasons stated earlier, WBI is almost ideally suited for nationwide small carrier training initiatives, whether government-provided or com- mercial. One potential barrier to widespread use of WBI in the CMV industry is the limited computer proficiency of some drivers and managers. Although computer literacy has greatly increased throughout the industry in the past decade, not all drivers and carrier managers have access to comput- ers or feel comfortable using them. Another potential barrier for small companies may be high per-student costs. This would apply in the situation where carriers pay a company fee for WBI access but do not have enough employees to fully utilize it. Two survey questions asked respondents about training methods and media. Question 21 asked respondents if they used online training programs for drivers, other employees, or themselves. Just 35 of 111 respondents used online train- ing programs; users assigned the practice an average effec- tiveness rating of 2.4 on the 0–4 scale. Question 22 asked if they used training media in-house, such as DVDs and Power- Point presentations. Here, 65 of 110 respondents answered yes, and they assigned the practice a mean effectiveness rating of 2.6. Driver and other employee training is a major job task for small company owners/managers. The Carrier E interviewee stated, “Go the extra mile for safety because it will come back to bite you if you do not. Do lots of training. Play by the rules.” Two case study interviewees noted the driver training support their companies receive from their insurance carriers.

51 For example, one provides maintenance and driving training materials and a safety newsletter for employees. In dis- cussing plans for further growth, interviewees mentioned that they would like to be able to delegate driver training to another company employee instead of doing it themselves. DRIVER SUPERVISION Once drivers are hired, oriented, and trained, they must be supervised. This section deals with management and super- vision of drivers during their tenures with companies. Key management functions include evaluating drivers, deter- mining and applying management actions (i.e., rewarding and punishing driver behaviors), and working to retain drivers. These three functions are addressed in the follow- ing sections. Driver Evaluation Measuring and evaluating driver performance is a key ele- ment of carrier safety management. Recall from Figure 4, for example, that it is a major aspect of successful safety and health management systems. Recall also the earlier discus- sion of survey results from CTBSSP Synthesis 21 (Knipling et al. 2011) in which both carrier safety managers and other experts in motor carrier safety were asked about the relative importance of five different areas of safety management. The five areas were (1) driver preparation (e.g., entry-level train- ing), (2) driver selection and hiring, (3) communications (e.g., safety meetings), (4) driver evaluation, and (5) driver rewards and discipline. Both respondent groups rated the two assessment activities, driver selection and driver evaluation, as being more important than the other three functions, which could be characterized as behavior change activities. Figure 10 illustrated these survey results. Multiple aspects of driver performance can be monitored, including driving skills and habits (through direct observa- tion), vehicle care (e.g., pre- and post-trip inspections), road- side inspection violations, moving violations, crashes (of various categories), near-misses, cargo loss, other incidents, vehicle care, and loading and unloading practices (ATAF 1999b; Knipling 2009). Measuring employee performance is important for at least two fundamental reasons. First, it informs management both with regard to the individual’s performance, but also with regard to potential company- wide issues. Second, it permits feedback to employees. The Feedback Principle is one of the most universal psycho- logical principles (Holland 1975). Feedback, also known as knowledge of results, consistently facilitates learning and performance improvement. Feedback is most effective when it is immediate (or as prompt as possible), behavior-based, objective, credible (i.e., regarded as valid), and constructive. “Constructive” means that it is presented in a way that sug- gests a path to improvement, rather than just as blame for failure. CSA is a major paradigm shift in government safety sur- veillance because it monitors every driver individually in addition to monitoring carriers (Bearth 2010). In addition, far more safety-related data are recorded. Under CSA, every inspection and moving violation (including official warn- ings) is recorded, whereas in the past it was only OOS viola- tions and moving violation convictions. CSA puts drivers with serious violations under probation and then suspends their licenses for a second serious violation during the pro- bationary period. Each of the seven CSA BASICs provides a measure of driver safety. Carriers can monitor these metrics along with their own performance evaluation metrics. A caveat is that a high majority of small carriers have insuffi- cient compliance data to be reliably ranked under the CSA SMS (GAO 2011). Nevertheless, a carrier’s recorded data relating to each of the metrics is accessible to the carrier for monitoring. Beyond the tracking of driver violations and other out- comes, carriers can directly monitor their drivers’ behav- iors. Onboard safety monitoring (OBSM) is potentially a very strong technique for driver evaluation, because it has all the features of effective performance measurement and feed- back to drivers (Hickman et al. 2007; Knipling 2009). Driving behaviors that may be monitored include top speeds (also known as overspeeds), sharp vehicle decelerations (i.e., hard- braking), lateral accelerations (indicative of speed on curves), idling times, and fuel usage. If vehicles lack dedicated onboard monitors, they can still be taken to a dealership for a readout of the engine ECM (as is done by case study Carrier H). Crash avoidance systems such as Forward Collision Warning can also be monitoring systems to detect at-risk behaviors such as tailgating. Advantages of OBSM over conventional driver safety measures include the following (from Knipling 2009): • OBSM provides a 100% sample of driver behavior. • It captures specific behaviors that cause crashes, inci- dents, and violations. • Positive driving behaviors can be seen and rewarded. • Negative driving behaviors can be seen and corrected before a crash, incident, or violation occurs. • Driving behavior-based benchmarks can be established so drivers know where they stand in relation to carrier expectations. • Evaluations, feedback, and consequences (including both rewards and punishments) can be frequent and timely. Carriers monitor individual driver fuel economy to reduce costs, but it can also be an effective form of safety monitor- ing. Drivers who excel in fuel economy are also “smooth operators.” They tend to glide through traffic, avoiding rapid accelerating and decelerations. They drive defensively with good space management. An international initiative called “Ecodriving” has trained thousands of heavy vehicle operators on driving techniques to reduce fuel usage. One Ecodriving training program reduced truck driver fuel consumption by

52 27%, gear changes by 29%, and hard brake applications by 41% (Symmons and Rose 2009). The I-95 Corridor Coalition “Best Practices” study (Stock 2001) found that more than 90% of carriers of all sizes regu- larly monitored their drivers’ citations. Most also closely mon- itored HOS and logbook violations, although percentages were not as high for smaller carriers. Carrier size differences were seen in several types of driver behavioral evaluation as follows: • Observe drivers on the road – Small (10–24 vehicle) carriers: 25% – Large (>100 vehicle) carriers: 54%. • Use motorist call-in number to receive comments (“How’s My Driving?”): – Small carriers: 17% – Large carriers: 30%. • Use OBSM or vehicle tracking: – Small carriers: 16% – Large carriers: 45%. Corsi and Barnard (2003) reported that most driver eval- uation criteria used by carriers are outcome-based as opposed to behavior-based. They include crashes, FMCSR viola- tions, traffic violation convictions, and public complaints. The researchers noted a difference between large and small carriers in their methods of evaluating drivers. Large and small carriers were roughly equivalent in their use of vari- ous driver safety metrics based on time (e.g., crashes and violations over the past year). However, large carriers were much more likely to use metrics based on mileage exposure. For example, 46% of large (>95 vehicle) carriers tracked driver crashes over a specified number of miles, whereas only 17% of small (1–24 vehicle) carriers did so. Although basing driver metrics on mileage exposure requires more recordkeeping and tabulations, it generally provides more valid assessments. Question 7 asked the importance of “Assessing driver on-road safety (i.e., knowing how safe your drivers are).” Respondents gave this safety problem an average rating of 3.0 on the 0–4 scale, putting it near the top of the 14 items surveyed. Question 24 asked if carriers monitored individual driver fuel economy. As discussed earlier, driver fuel econ- omy is a valid safety metric in addition to being an efficiency measure. Of 112 respondents, 80 monitored driver fuel econ- omy. As a safety management practice, it received a mean effectiveness rating of 2.8 on the 0–4 scale. Question 31 presented ten areas of carrier safety manage- ment and asked respondents to select up to three that were the most important. Choice (c) was, “Driver evaluation (i.e., vio- lation and incident tracking, ride-alongs, covert observations of driving, onboard computer monitoring).” This choice received the fifth most votes of the ten items. As noted pre- viously, driver evaluation was rated the most important of five safety management areas in the CTBSSP Synthesis 21 survey (Knipling et al. 2011). A few case study interviewees had vehicles equipped with OBSM and/or monitored driver fuel economy. Carrier H did not have onboard computers but did get a quarterly download of data from its vehicle engines’ ECMs. This allowed them to review records for overspeeds and hard braking events. Rewards and Discipline Perhaps the most powerful and far-reaching principle in behavioral science is the Law of Reinforcement and Punish- ment, also known as the Law of Effect (Holland 1975). It states that behaviors that are rewarded will continue and likely increase in frequency, whereas those that are punished will generally decrease in frequency. Although most people do not think of this as a scientific principle, they practice it every day in their interactions with their co-workers, their family members, and their pets. Both rewards and punish- ments have strong effects on future behaviors. Over the long term, rewarding desired behavior is a more reliable and effective approach than is punishing undesirable behavior (Krause et al. 1999; Hickman et al. 2007). One can shape and sustain complex behaviors (e.g., following multiple safety rules and procedures) with positive rewards, including non- material rewards such as positive recognition. Punishments can reduce unwanted behaviors, but they also provoke nega- tive emotions such as aggression and escape. For commercial drivers, “escape” means turnover and churning. Behavior Based Safety (BBS) is the application of behav- ioral science to industrial safety. BBS engages workers in the improvement process, teaches them to identify and observe critical safety behaviors, provides feedback to encourage improvement, and uses gathered data to target system factors for positive change (Krause et al. 1999; Hickman et al. 2007). BBS combines applied behavior analysis, behavior modifi- cation, quality management, organization development, and risk management. It makes heavy use of rewards, usually in the form of positive recognition, to reinforce safety improve- ments. Material rewards such as pay bonuses may be used, but many BBS practitioners believe that awarding large pay bonuses for safety can become a source of discord within organizations, as those not receiving the awards may believe that they have been treated unfairly. BBS has an unmatched record of success in preventing occupational accidents and injuries in industrial settings such as factors and utilities. Guastello (1993) reviewed 53 occupational safety and health studies and found that applying BBS reduced injury rates by an average of 60% across the studies. Unfortunately, commercial vehicle transport is not an ideal setting for applying conventional BBS methods such as direct behavioral observation and group-based feedback. The work of commercial drivers is largely solitary and geographically

53 removed from their home work station. OBSM, described earlier, is the most effective means of providing the neces- sary observations of safety behaviors upon which to base improvement efforts. Another (and complementary) approach is behavioral self-management (Geller and Clarke 1999). Drivers may be taught to consider their own at-risk driving behaviors, their antecedents (situations leading to them), and their consequences. Drivers are encouraged to objectively observe and measure their own behavior, set goals for improve- ment, self-monitor their progress, and reward themselves for successes. Successful behavioral self-management can be reinforced by positive recognition by the carrier and by tan- gible rewards. Figure 11 shows a behavioral flowchart model of behavioral monitoring (see the earlier evaluation discus- sion) and behavior change interventions (e.g., feedback and positive reinforcement) reduce risk, which in turn reduces crashes, violations, and their consequences. The most obvious reward for working is pay, and most CMV drivers are paid by the mile. Incentive pay by produc- tivity is well-established in trucking and in many other pro- fessions; however, an inherent concern is that it may foster at-risk behaviors such as working excessive hours and speed- ing. Recognitions and rewards for driving safety are a way to counterbalance productivity incentives and establish an expectation and social norm of safety within a company. Structuring a system for recognition and rewards for safe driving behaviors has proven effectiveness in CMV transport. Nevertheless, nearly all carriers must also issue reprimands and penalties for driver offenses, and they are rated effec- tive by managers in surveys (e.g., Corsi and Barnard 2003; Knipling et al. 2003). Punishment is effective for reducing or eliminating specific behaviors. It is important that penalties be applied uniformly for specific, announced behaviors (e.g., following too closely) or “non-behaviors” (nonuse of safety belts). Punishments are to be timely and certain, but they do not have to be severe to be effective (Hickman et al. 2007; Knipling 2009). BBS emphasizes that consequences be in response to specific behaviors, not personality traits or atti- tudes. In other words, “punish the sin but not the sinner.” In a management textbook covering all types of busi- nesses, Nelson and Economy (2005) suggested the following sequence of disciplinary steps for employees performing poorly or misbehaving: (1) verbal counseling, (2) written counseling (i.e., document incident and any consequences), (3) giving negative performance evaluations (e.g., in an annual evaluation), and (4) termination. In CMV operations, a possible intermediate disciplinary step between (3) and (4) is temporary suspension. In the FMCSA/UM Survey of Safest Motor Carriers, Corsi and Barnard (2003) reported that 77% of its respond- ing carriers had safety reward programs for individual drivers. Small carriers were less likely to have a rewards program than were medium and large carriers, however. The respective percentages were 48% for small carriers (1–24 vehicles), 90% for medium carriers (25–94 vehicles), and 91% for large carriers (>95 vehicles). Types of rewards included verbal praise, public recognition, letters from man- agement, safety decorations, cash, and merchandise. Ordi- narily, rewards were time-based (e.g., one year of crash-free driving) rather than mileage-based. This was especially true for small carriers. In the I-95 Corridor Coalition “Best Practices” study, Stock (2001) found that 49% of responding small (10–24 vehicle) carriers offered their drivers incentive or bonus programs for safety performance, whereas 82% of large (>100 vehicle) fleets did so. Larger carriers were also somewhat more likely to reward drivers for making safety suggestions, and to FIGURE 11 Behavioral model for reducing crashes, violations, and associated consequences through monitoring and behavior change. Source: Knipling and Hyten (2010).

54 encourage drivers to participate in safety championships (that often are organized by state trucking associations). In a study of carrier safety in relation to economic health, Rodriguez et al. (2004) found that small carriers with high liquidity tended to have better safety performance. Liquidity was defined as the ratio of net carrier operating income to outstanding debt. The effect was not strong, but it suggested to the authors that financially healthy firms were better able to properly reward and equip their drivers. Consistent with this finding, the study also found that small firms that devoted a higher share of their revenues to labor expenses tended to have better safety outcomes. According to the authors, “these results suggest that it is important for public policy to encour- age small firms to rely on higher driver compensation in place of the kind of driver monitoring, training, and supervision that larger firms can provide.” Question 8 asked the importance of “Correctly reward- ing good driver behaviors and disciplining bad behaviors.” Respondents gave this safety problem an average rating of 2.9 on the 0–4 Likert scale, making it the fifth highest of item averages. Question 20 asked if carriers gave drivers bonuses or other rewards for safe driving. Approximately half of the respondents, 52 of 111, did so. As a safety management prac- tice, it received a mean effectiveness rating of 2.8 on the 0–4 scale. Question 31 presented ten areas of carrier safety man- agement and asked respondents to select up to three that were most important. Choice (d) was “Driver performance consequences; that is, rewards and discipline.” Surprisingly, perhaps, this choice received the eighth most votes of the ten items. The following are some survey comments relating to the general topic of driver supervision: • If you hire correctly, train effectively (not only at hire but throughout employment), use onboard monitor- ing, and set your trucks at 65, you will do fine in all departments. . . . Safety does pay. • Driver training and CDL requirements for motorcoach drivers are very low in the United States compared with other developed countries (Europe). • Do not get so big that the owner does not know every person on payroll and make it their business to person- ally check out every driver every day! Big companies are a big problem when they look only for income and not their relationship with those who provided it. Retention There is a current and continuing shortage of qualified com- mercial drivers in the United States, in spite of the high unemployment rate. Commercial driver turnover, owing in large part to driver “churning” among different companies, continues to be an industry problem, especially in the truck- load sector (Knipling 2009; ATRI 2011). ATA conducts a quarterly survey of driver turnover rates in large truckload car- riers, smaller truckload carriers, and LTL carriers. Turnover rates decreased during the “great recession” of 2008–2009, but the most recent statistics from the first quarter of CY 2011 find rates rising again (Watson 2011). The annual driver turnover rate for larger truckload fleets (those with $30+ mil- lion in sales) rose to 69%, whereas that for smaller truckload fleets was at 50%. Consistent with past findings, the driver turnover rate at LTL fleets was much lower at 8%. Among truckload carriers, the smaller companies’ advantage appears to reflect the more personal relationships found between man- agement and drivers. Quoted in Transport Topics (Watson 2011), Richard Mikes, a former official with Ruan Leasing, stated that smaller fleets “seem to relate better to their drivers. The driver is definitely viewed on a personal basis.” He added that smaller fleets tend to run shorter trips, which gives drivers more time at home. Driver retention promotes safety in multiple ways, as listed in the textbox. Many of the same personal traits asso- ciated with driver safety are also associated with longevity as an employee (Knipling et al. 2011). These include emotional stability, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Zimmerman 2008). In addition, longevity with a company changes drivers in ways that promote safety. Route familiarity is beneficial to safety (Knipling 2009). Retained drivers also become more proficient with company safety procedures and acceptance of safety policies. Low driver turnover means less management time spent on activities such as recruiting, hiring, and new employee orientation. This frees more time for supervision of drivers and operations. Further, there is a “positive feedback loop” between driver retention and safety (Knipling 2009). Improved safety makes a company more desirable for current and prospective drivers, which further supports retention. With some exceptions, driver turnover rate varies directly with company size, giving small carriers a safety advantage in this aspect of safety and operations. A 1999 survey of 422 trucking firms (Min and Emam 2003) found that most small carriers (defined as those with 1–49 trucks) had low turnover Retention Improves Safety • Company employment more desirable. • Retained drivers generally safer and more stable. • Fewer “bad apples.” • Fewer entry-level drivers. • Drivers more familiar with routes. • Drivers more familiar with company policies and pro- cedures. • Less management time spent on hiring and training. • More management time for current drivers and opera- tions. Source: Knipling (2009).

55 rates in the range of 1% to 10% per year. The corresponding rate in medium-sized carriers (50–499 trucks) was 11% to 50% annually, whereas in large companies it was 51% to 100%. However, this rule did not apply to every company. Among small companies, those running longer trips (e.g., national truckload carriers) tended to have turnover rates such as those of larger carriers. LTL carriers experienced much lower turnover than truckload firms. Figure 12 is a sim- plified schematic of study findings. Min and Emam (2003) attributed the lower turnover rate in small companies to more personalized attention paid to drivers and more open communications. In addition to the truckload–LTL difference, the researchers found state-to- state differences in turnover rates, perhaps reflecting differ- ences in economic opportunity. Among drivers in the same firm, those with tenures of six years or more were less likely to turn over. In other words, employment longevity begets employment stability. Employment with a small firm was associated with greater job satisfaction, but larger firms more often had the financial resources to attract drivers with higher compensation. The departure of older, longer-tenured drivers from small carriers for jobs with larger ones was usually motivated by higher pay and/or benefits. Question 9 asked the safety importance of “Driver turnover resulting in an unstable workforce.” Respondents gave this safety problem an average rating of 2.7 on the 0–4 Likert scale, putting it near the middle of the 14 items surveyed. Although small carriers usually have lower turnover than similar larger firms, the case study interviews suggested large variations among carriers. Carrier C is a regional TL carrier with six trucks; its driver turnover rate is less than 10% annu- ally. Carrier D, a short-haul TL carrier, also with six trucks, replaces approximately two-thirds of its drivers annually. The difference in this case might be pay; Carrier C runs high- productivity vehicles (HPVs), which allow it to haul more cargo and pay its drivers more than industry norms. Carrier B, a national TL lease operator, did not state a turnover rate but makes extraordinary efforts to keep its drivers happy and with the company. The Carrier B owner treats his drivers “like gold . . . I take care of them before I take care of myself,” he said. CRASH AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION An important function of safety management is accident investigation, both for the purpose of resolving the accident in question, and also for preventing future accidents. When a motor vehicle crash occurs, managers are called on to inves- tigate and document the causes of the crash and the extent of injuries and damage. This may include a visit to the crash site (if feasible), completion of company forms and other documentation, determination of fault/preventability, and decisions regarding corrective actions relating to the driver or procedures. Short et al. (2007) identified five goals of crash investigation: • Determine fault and preventability • Determine appropriate actions toward driver • Learn lessons for future crash prevention • Improve overall fleet safety • Protect company from liability. When a crash occurs, drivers need to document as much about the event as possible. Such documentation will directly assist carrier safety efforts and may reduce liability exposure. Most companies have their own crash and incident reporting forms (or checklists) that drivers carry with them. Insurance companies also provide standardized forms to their carrier clients. CTBSSP Synthesis 1 (Knipling et al. 2003) includes a list of post-crash information items for documentation by drivers. As part of the I-95 Corridor Coalition Field Operational Test, Stock (2001) looked at five different carrier practices relating to crash and incident investigation. As found with many other safety practices in their survey, larger carriers were generally more likely to have established, prescribed response practices following a crash or incident. Almost all Small Carrier: (1–49 Trucks) Low Turnover: (1%–10%) Medium Carrier: (50–499 Trucks) Medium Turnover: (11%–50%) Large Carrier: (500+ Trucks) High Turnover: (51%–100%) FIGURE 12 Simplified schematic of 1999 survey findings on carrier size and annual driver turnover rates. Based on Min and Emam (2003).

56 of the carriers in the study, regardless of size, instructed their drivers on what to do in the event of a crash. Except for the very smallest carriers (1–9 trucks), more than 90% in all fleet categories provided crash reporting forms. At the time of the study, very few mobile phones contained cameras. Instead, many drivers carried cameras in their vehicles to document incidents. In the study, 38% of carriers with 10–24 trucks provided drivers with cameras to document crashes, versus 62% of large carriers (>100 trucks). Smaller carriers were also much less likely to use trained specialists to investigate crashes, or to have an in-house panel to review them. None of the survey questions specifically asked about crash investigation procedures. The case study interviews suggest that many small carriers, especially those with good safety practices, simply do not have enough crashes and incidents to feel the need to develop formal, in-depth investigation pro- cedures. Managers were very aware of the negative conse- quences of crashes for their drivers and their companies. In addition to the human consequences, crashes greatly affect a company’s financial viability (e.g., see Case Study D) and their CSA status (e.g., see Case Study H). Negative consequences are usually greatest for preventable (i.e., at-fault) crashes, but they may be significant for nonpreventable crashes as well. CARRIER PERFORMANCE TRACKING AND BENCHMARKING As noted earlier in this chapter, a company’s safety climate is best measured by leading indicators of safety activity and performance (Flin et al. 2000). Leading indicators are more likely to reflect ongoing behaviors, risk factors, and crash causes. Lagging indicators such as crash rates are more likely to reflect the past. In addition, infrequent and catastrophic outcomes such as crashes are more affected by chance. Com- panies need to track and benchmark safety measures that are current, diagnostic, and predictive of future outcomes. In a study of industrial safety in general, Glendon and Stan- ton (2000) suggest that company safety performance should be monitored frequently. Steps in developing better safety moni- toring are shown in Figure 13. By regularly measuring and monitoring safety, companies can better understand their sources of risk and appropriate responses to them. Regularly repeated measurements lead to continuous improvements. Glendon and Stanton stress the importance of external feed- back; for example, benchmarking company practices against those of other companies to determine how improvements might be made. Carrier safety performance is ordinarily tracking using a rate or likelihood statistic; that is, an incident or outcome numerator divided by an exposure denominator (Knipling 2009). Numerators include observed at-risk behaviors, crashes (defined by various criteria), crash costs, injuries, moving vio- lations, incidents (e.g., cargo loss), inspection violations, and complaints. Denominators include vehicle-miles traveled, carrier number of power units, number of drivers, number of inspections, driver hours, trips, and pickups and deliveries. It is important that carriers consider the nature of their opera- tions and risks and carefully select a set of meaningful metrics, those most likely to predict future safety outcomes. Metrics Establish need to measure/monitor safety Develop safety measures Regularly measure/monitor safety Develop safety responses and practices Evaluate responses and practices External comparisons (benchmark others' safety practices) FIGURE 13 Developing and sustaining a company safety monitoring system. Source: Glendon and Stanton (2000).

57 that naturally generate more data are almost always more reli- able than those generating less data; for this reason, many carriers record and address every reported incident or failure regarding a driver or vehicle, no matter how small. The effectiveness of BBS in industry settings is the result of, in part, its practice of observing and recording many everyday behaviors to reduce at-risk behaviors and thereby reduce accident and injury outcomes (Hickman et al. 2007). CSA provides a standardized set of safety metrics for car- riers and drivers. The seven CSA BASICs are primarily lead- ing indicators of carrier risk factors. They include Unsafe Driving (mainly moving violations), Fatigued Driving (mainly HOS violations), Driver Fitness (CDL, medical qualifications), Alcohol/Drugs, Vehicle Maintenance (vehicle roadside vio- lations), Cargo Securement (based on inspection violations or mishaps), and Crash History (crashes weighted by sever- ity and recency). Each BASIC generates a SMS score for each carrier and driver, and most of these are leaving indica- tors of crash risk (Strah 2010). SMS scores are automatically benchmarked against other carriers and drivers, providing, the- oretically, the external comparisons suggested in Figure 13. Unfortunately, most carriers do not have enough inspections and other CSA-related events to permit reliable carrier rank- ings (GAO 2011). As one would expect, this is especially true for small carriers. GAO (2011) provides the following data sufficiency rates for carriers of various sizes, with “suffi- ciency” defined here as having enough compliance data for carrier safety ranking on any of the seven BASICs. • 0–5 power units: 5.7%. • 6–15 power units: 28.3%. • 16–50 power units: 50.2%. • 51–500 power units: 65.7%. • >500 power units: 83.7%. Survey Question 15 asked respondents to indicate the two most challenging CSA BASICs. One could consider the most challenging BASICs to also be the metrics small carriers regard as more important for compliance and continued oper- ation. As was presented in chapter two, CSA Compliance Challenges, the top three items were (b) Fatigued Driving (HOS), (a) Unsafe Driving, and (e) Vehicle Maintenance. Question 29 asked if respondents, “track overall company safety statistics (e.g., crash and violation rates, financial losses from crashes).” Of 110 respondents, 97 indicated that they did so, and the practice was assigned a mean effectiveness rating of 2.7 on the 0–4 scale. In the project case study interviews, few interviewees articulated an approach to safety monitoring as systematic as that seen in Figure 13. CSA is the primary safety moni- toring “overlay” for the small carriers contacted. Almost all of the small carrier managers interviewed closely moni- tored CSA scores, which include both carrier safety mea- sures (e.g., crashes and violations) and benchmarks against other carriers’ performance. None of the managers inter- viewed mentioned internally generated company safety mea- sures or benchmarks such as those in CSA, although many of them did collect and monitor such data on their individual drivers. MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT In an earlier section of this chapter, the general challenges of business management, operational management, and safety management in small companies was reviewed. This section deals with the challenge of professional development for small carrier owners and managers in the area of safety. The safety-related competency levels and professionalism of motor carrier managers vary widely. Most were drivers earlier in their careers, and many also held management positions with other companies. As in almost any higher management posi- tion, however, the knowledge and competencies constitut- ing a proficient worker or middle manager do not always transfer to success as a top manager. Consider the “generic” supervisor competencies listed in the textbox (from Bittel 1987). Most of these competencies are either unnecessary for commercial driving or are different in nature for drivers and carrier managers. Many former drivers are deficient in these competencies when they begin their own companies or are promoted to a management job. Ideally, professional development for carrier managers would have training and mentoring by more senior managers. In a family-owned business, mentoring comes from the older generation. The development process might include supervisory training, gradual expansion of responsibilities, close monitoring by senior managers, frequent feedback and guidance, and for- mal recognition for successes. This ideal scenario is proba- bly atypical in small truck and bus companies, however, because many of them are new startups without an organi- zational heritage. “Generic” Supervisory Competences • Planning work • Controlling work • Problem solving • Monitoring performance • Performance feedback • Coaching subordinates • Motivating/rewarding • Discipline/reprimands • Managing time • Oral communication • Written communication • Self-development • Representing company • Employee counseling • Conducting meetings. Adapted from Bittel (1987).

58 Many national and state CMV transport organizations offer professional training and related services to their mem- bers. Some programs offer formal certification for managers completing their courses of study. Others offer a combination of education and management-related services. Programs include: • ABA Certified Travel Industry Specialist Program (www. buses.org). • ATA Safety Management Council (www.truckline.com). • NASTC Management and Safety Program (www.nastc. com). • North American Transportation Management Institute (NATMI, www.natmi.org). • National Private Truck Council (NPTC) Private Fleet Management Institute (www.nptc.org). • OOIDA Education and Business Tools and webinar series (www.ooida.com). • Truckload Carriers Association (TCA) Truckload Academy (www.truckload.org). • United Motorcoach Association (UMA) Bus and Motor- coach Academy (www.uma.org). Transport manager professional development does not have to be formal or expensive. Participation in transport organization meetings is one way to acquire new knowledge and skills. Some carriers have organized their own safety benchmarking groups (Knipling 2009). They meet several times annually and share information and ideas for improved safety. Any group of similar carriers could do the same. Car- riers meeting with competitors must be careful to avoid dis- cussing cost- and price-related issues, because this could be a violation of federal anti-trust (e.g., price-setting) laws. How- ever, they can openly discuss safety management practices and learn from each other. Fuller-Love (2006) reviewed literature concerning man- agement development in small firms of all kinds. The article looked at the extent to which management development con- tributes to small company growth and whether a lack of man- agement skills contributes to failure. The article also identified barriers to management development, including certain char- acteristics and attitudes of small company entrepreneurs. The review found that, on balance, management development programs are effective and beneficial for small firms. Five of eight studies reviewed showed positive effects. Document- ing such positive effects is difficult because the benefits may not be immediate or easily quantified. One key distinction made by Fuller-Love is that between business education and management development. Busi- ness education, as one might receive in a Masters of Busi- ness Administration degree program, is broader and covers many specific courses of study. Management development is more job-related and involves a mixture of education, training, and experience. Key management competencies taught include: • Leadership development, • Developing management systems, • Team building, • Strategic thinking and innovation, • Delegation, and • Various specific techniques and skills. In general, small companies are less likely to engage in management training and development than are larger firms. This includes both in-house training and training from out- side sources. Small business owners with prior background in business education are more likely to appreciate the bene- fits of management development and their businesses are more likely to be successful. Business failures are usually caused by structural problems such as under-capitalization, poor liquidity, and insufficient capital; however, such fail- ures are usually accompanied by a lack of management expe- rience as well. Two obvious barriers to management development are time and cost. Solo managers rarely have the time to develop all the necessary competencies to sustain a growing business. In addition, they are often by nature independent, autonomous, and/or overcontrolling. They may not recognize or accept the need to develop professionally, or they may prefer the status quo regardless of possible lost opportunities. In contrast, suc- cessful entrepreneurs are open to both personal and business growth. They strive to create a “top team” to better cover the range of management tasks and skills required and to allow time for themselves and other top managers to think and plan strategically. Table 17 presents five stages of business development as identified by Fuller-Love (2006). The table tracks the stages of successful company growth, top managers’ roles, predom- inant management style, and typical organization structure. As a company grows and matures, different management roles, styles, and skills are required. A small business is mostly an extension of the owner; he or she is involving others in his or her life work. As the firm grows, direct ties decrease between the owner and company employees, and also between the owner and company work outputs. Rather dramatic personal and organizational transformations are required for a small company to grow successfully. Previous CTBSSP Synthesis reports have addressed car- rier management development, including CTBSSP Synthesis 1: Effective Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Management Techniques (Knipling et al. 2003), CTBSSP Synthesis 12: Commercial Motor Vehicle Carrier Safety Management Certification (Bergoffen et al. 2007), and CTBSSP Synthesis 14: The Role of Safety Culture in Preventing Commercial Motor Vehicle Crashes (Short et al. 2007). In the I-95 Corridor Coalition Coordinated Safety Manage- ment Study (Stock 2001), carrier managers were asked about their primary sources of safety and compliance information.

59 By and large these sources also provide information to help carrier owners and managers develop professionally. Per- centages were as follows for trucking managers in the 11–25 vehicle category. Note however that this was survey was taken before the growth of the Internet. • State carrier associations (71%) • Insurance companies (67%) • Periodicals (57%) • U.S.DOT (37%) • National carrier associations (32%) • Safety consultants (28%) • State enforcement agencies (26%) • Other private sources (25%). A separate sub-study of the same program (Stock et al. 2001) developed, pilot tested, and evaluated motor carrier safety education and outreach materials for managers of small motor carriers. Specific products developed included a three-hour seminar, a brochure highlighting frequently used management practices of safe carriers, and an interactive, web-based “safety toolbox” to allow motor carriers to bench- mark their safety management practices. Participants rated the importance of various management training topics. Top- rated areas included: • Pre-employment driver screening and testing, • Top management commitment and involvement in safety, • Driver training (e.g., defensive driving, fatigue manage- ment, and equipment inspection), and • Monitoring driver performance (e.g., citations, HOS logs, crashes, and incidents). Other topics rated but not receiving the highest impor- tance rankings included: • Vehicle inspection and PM, • Scheduled safety meetings, • Integration of safety into compensation and retention programs, • Safety recognition/rewards programs, • Crash/accident review process, and • Safety awareness posters, letters, messages. Survey Question 12 asked respondents to rate the safety importance of “Not enough management time to adequately address all safety management problems and issues.” The average importance rating for this item was 2.4 on the 0–4 scale, the 10th highest of 14 average ratings. Thus, the item was considered important, but not a priority among the prob- lems presented. Responses to Question 14 [“Lack of training materials (or easy access to them) for yourself as a man- ager.”] were similar. The mean rating was 2.2, putting it thir- teenth of 14 items presented. Question 30 asked whether respondents participated in formal or informal meetings with their peers (e.g., truck or bus association meetings). Seventy- three of 109 respondents did so, and they rated its safety effectiveness 2.9 on the 0–4 scale. In the case studies, the Carrier H interviewee mentioned that attendance at truck shows is beneficial because he receives training and information on both business and safety prac- tices. Carrier H also shares safety information, resources, and ideas with another carrier with a similar operation. Carrier I, a bus charter company, participates in a 20-carrier idea-shar- ing consortium organized by the UMA. Participating carriers meet several times annually to discuss all aspects of bus oper- ations and safety. SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES TO MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY MANAGEMENT This section describes several approaches to integrating mul- tiple safety management concepts and practices in a motor car- rier or similar (e.g., transit) setting. These approaches employ some of the safety culture and safety climate concepts dis- cussed in a more generic context earlier in this chapter. The approaches and examples described in this section are sys- tematic in a least two different ways. First, they represent log- ical, step-by-step approaches to problem solving. Second, they employ multiple interventions encompassing human, vehicle, and environmental factors. Driver safety is addressed through “cradle-to-grave” human resource management practices, beginning with driver recruiting and continuing after employ- ment with driver training, communications, performance measurement, and behavioral management. Stage Top Management Role Management Style Organizational Structure 1. Inception Direct supervision Entrepreneurial individualistic Unstructured 2. Surv iv al Supervised supervision Entrepreneurial adm inistrative Si mp le 3. Growth Delegation/coordination Entrepreneurial coordination Functional centralized 4. Expansion Decentralization Professional adm inistrative Functional decentralized 5. Maturity Decentralization Watchdog/ oversigh t Decentralized functional/product Source: Fuller-Love (2006). TABLE 17 STAGES OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT

60 Basic Safety Management Systems The FTA recently published a guide to safety management in transit agencies (Ahmed 2010). Although some of this guide is specific to the transit mode and/or to large organizations, much of it is generic and applicable to transport companies of all sizes and modes. The following definition and descrip- tion of safety management systems is derived primarily from the FTA report. A safety management system is an explicit element of transport company management responsibility. It sets out a company’s safety policies, defines how it identifies safety haz- ards and controls risks, and provides for goal setting, planning, and measuring performance. A safety management system is established at the company level, but devolves out and down to all company departments, employees, and activities. Each of these has its own safety processes and procedures. In addi- tion to reactive procedures (e.g., crash and incident investi- gation), a safety management system includes proactive measures to anticipate and prevent or reduce safety risks. Adoption of best practices and continuous safety improve- ment are overriding goals. A safety management system must be woven into the fabric of the company and become part of the way people do their jobs. Ahmed (2010) describes a straightforward “basic safety process” for addressing safety issues. First, a safety concern is raised, hazard identified, or a crash or other accident hap- pens, which is then brought to the attention of the manager. The manager and involved employee(s) analyze the issue to determine its sources, which may include both proximal causes and associated risk factors. They then take corrective action. As a follow-up, they evaluate the corrective action to make sure it was effective. If the issue is resolved, it is documented and the corrective action taken so that the safety enhance- ment is maintained. If the problem or issue is not resolved, they re-analyze it until it is resolved. Figure 14 illustrates the process. The NTSB annually identifies its “Top Ten Most Wanted” safety improvements. In 2011, NTSB listed transportation safety management systems as one of the top ten needs. Its website states that, “NTSB accident investigations have revealed that, in numerous cases, safety management system (SMS) or system safety programs could have prevented loss of life and injuries” (NTSB 2011). Further, safety manage- ment systems “. . . can be effective in all organizations regardless of size.” Transport Canada also promotes safety management sys- tems (Thiffault 2011). In the Canadian Railway Safety Act, a safety management system is defined as “a formal frame- work for integrating safety into day-to-day operations, which includes safety goals and performance targets, risk assess- ments, responsibilities and authorities, rules and procedures, and monitoring and evaluation processes.” This definition applies to motor carriers as well. Thiffault suggests the fol- lowing applications of safety management system concepts to small carrier operations: • Company commitment. Company policy statement that safety is critical in all activities and that the company strives to meet or exceed all legal safety standards. • Organization and responsibility. Company policy state- ment on safety roles of management, drivers, dispatchers, and mechanics. • Monitoring and reporting. Maintain safety data spread- sheet (crashes, violations, incidents, inspections, vehicle problems). • Assessment. Monitor trends in safety performance and take corrective actions. • Training. Informal training during employee meetings and/or short training sessions. • Communications. Manager communicates safety objec- tives, issues, and plans through meetings and written communications. Haddon Matrix The Haddon Matrix (Haddon 1980) is a framework for under- standing crash reduction strategies. It provides a conceptual Safety Concern, Hazard, or Occurrence Report Analyze Correct Document Evaluate Unresolved Resolved FIGURE 14 Basic process for addressing safety issues. Adapted from Ahmed (2010).

61 structure for identifying crash factors by dividing the crash scenario in terms of timeframe (i.e., pre-crash, crash, and post-crash) and in terms of the primary “actors” affecting the event. These actors are the human (primarily driver), the vehi- cle, and the roadway/environment. As shown in Table 18, the Haddon Matrix is a 3×3 matrix with three rows (pre-crash, crash, and post-crash) and three columns (human, vehicle, and roadway/environment). The Haddon Matrix is one of the most important concepts in the history of motor vehicle safety (Williams 1999; Runge 2003); however, Will Murray (Murray et al. 2003, 2009) and others (e.g., Faulks and Irwin 2002) have argued that the conventional Haddon Matrix is insufficiently detailed for conceptualizing the full array of crash countermeasures applicable to CMV transport. Most notably, carriers are an important fourth actor and thus could be added as a fourth column. With regard to the timeframes, “pre-crash” actually encompasses several qualitatively different timeframes: pre- trip, pre-threat, and pre-crash impact (recall Figure 9). It is possible to plan schedules, routes, and trips to greatly reduce risks well before crash threats are imminent. Murrays’ pre- scription for carriers is a comprehensive safety program that seeks to proactively identify all important crash factors and establish multiple complementary carrier practices to address them. Such a systematic approach is more likely to be embraced by larger companies than by smaller ones. Nevertheless, one medium-sized trucking company has been showcased for its adoption of a comprehensive safety management program based on this model. Suckling Transport is a petrochemical transport contractor in the United Kingdom (RoadSafe 2010, 2011). It operates a fleet of 65 articulated tanker trucks. In 2008, it launched its Zero Incident Project, with the goal to eliminate crashes and other accidents entirely. The approach included the following main initiatives: 1. Audit all company safety systems, policies, and pro- cedures. 2. Ensure all aspects of regulatory and traffic law com- pliance. 3. Improve near-miss and incident reporting by the work- force. 4. Identify technologies and other improvements that could reduce crashes. 5. Improve trip planning. 6. Improve driver training. When the project started, managers met in focus groups with drivers and other employees to review past crashes, other accidents, and incidents. They analyzed each incident using the Haddon Matrix, with emphasis on pre-accident risk factors that could have been changed. They also looked at company response: both the emergency reaction to the event and at longer-term remediation. Post-event remediation could be directed toward humans (e.g., employee training), the environment (e.g., removal or mitigation of hazards), and/or vehicles (e.g., onboard technologies). The Zero Incident Project included an audit of company compliance, with continuing monthly updates of perfor- mance measures. This has included drug and alcohol testing, driver licensing and medical qualifications, HOS compli- ance, vehicle speeds, driver mobile phone use, and return-to- work procedures following injuries. Medical qualifications renewals and MVR checks are now performed more fre- quently than required by law. The Suckling safety project encompasses both driving and nondriving (e.g., petrochemical handling) safety. Employees are encouraged, and even given incentives, to report inci- dents and near-misses in addition to actual accidents. “Every accident, near-miss, or potential incident is an opportunity to improve safety,” said the company manag- ing director. Zero Incident Project team members audited every regu- lar delivery route and every customer site to identify risk fac- tors and hazards. They identified travel “Safe Havens” for their drivers; routes deemed the least risky and rest stops (e.g., travel plazas) considered “truck friendly.” They also invited their primary customers, major oil companies, to con- duct independent, external audits of Suckling operations involving their products. The project also encompassed the safety of fleet autos. These drivers, mostly managers or technicians, were held to ìActor ”/Factor: Ti me fra me : Hum an (Driver) Vehicle Roadway/ Environm ent Pre-Crash Driver licensing Driver traits Driver training Brake, tire condition Vehicle safety equipm ent Roadway markings Divided highways Curves Crash Restraint use Bone density Vehicle size Crashworthiness Guard rails Em bankm ents Post-Crash Victim general health Rehabilitation Gas tank integrity Van/cargo tank integrity EMS availability EMS response EMS = emergency medical service. TABLE 18 HADDON CRASH FACTOR MATRIX AND EXAMPLES

62 the same driving standards as company truck drivers. In 2008, Suckling designated a team of six drivers/instructors to mon- itor vehicle onboard computer data and incidents to determine individual and collective training needs. Employee training is a continuous activity. According to the company, “training is now seen by the workforce as career development, not as pun- ishment” (RoadSafe 2011). The Zero Incident Project has proven to the company direc- tor that “road safety saves money as well as lives” (RoadSafe 2010). Over the course of the project, Suckling Transport has seen significant reductions in crashes, other accidents, employee injuries, and insurance claims. Figures 15 and 16 document Suckling’s safety improvements using two met- rics. The company director added that, “the benefits of our Zero Incident Project are multiple and include a significant reduction in vehicle downtime, improved fleet and fuel effi- ciency, a reduction in driver turnover and improved rela- tionships with our customers contributing to new contract wins . . .” In 2010, Suckling Transport was awarded the U.K. Motor Transport Safety in Operation award for its safety and organization development achievements (see Figures 15 and 16). Element Fleet Safety Model Mooren and her associates at the University of New South Wales in Australia have put forth a 12-element model of com- pany fleet safety as follows (Mooren 2007, 2010): 1. Policy and procedures. Clear statement of safety as a priority combined with defined behavioral expectations. 2. Recruitment. Selection of low-risk drivers. 3. Induction. Ensuring that employees understand the priority placed on safe driving. 4. Safe work planning. Ensuring that work tasks do not compromise driving safety. 5. Fleet selection/maintenance. Equipping and main- taining vehicles that are safe for occupants and other road users. 6. Crash [and incident] reporting. A system to ensure timely and accurate reporting of crashes and other incidents. 7. Data analysis. Rigorous scrutiny and interpretation of crash/incident reports and fleet statistics. 8. Risk resolution. Follow-up interventions to mitigate identified risks. 9. Incentives and sanctions. Rewards or recognition for safe practices and safety results, and sufficient penalties to deter unsafe practices. 10. Driver education. Education and training of drivers on crash risks and how to avoid them. 11. Leadership. Senior managers demonstrate an active and practical commitment to safety 12. Communication. Regular communication within the organization about fleet safety issues. The Mooren model is based on both theoretical principles (e.g., of behavioral psychology) and past research on motor carrier safety management. At a practical level, the model has been used by companies and their consultants as a struc- ture and “do list” for conducting safety reviews and audits of companies. For example, Mooren and Grzabieta (2010) reviewed the safety management of a dangerous goods (haz- ardous materials) transport company, first by administering an internal questionnaire on the perceived importance of the 12 elements within the company, and then by investigating perceived gaps. The company implemented many recom- mendations for safety improvements based on the model and intervention approach. Systematic Assessment of Carrier Safety Culture and Climate Recall from earlier in this chapter that safety culture is defined as the shared values and beliefs within a company that establish safety as a priority and drive company policies and practices. Safety climate, a very similar concept, is a company’s collec- tive workforce perceptions of the organizational safety atmos- phere (Flin et al. 2000). The U.K. Department for Transport 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Cr as he s Pe r M ill io n VM T FIGURE 15 Suckling Transport crashes per one million vehicle miles traveled, 2004–2009. Source: Suckling Transport (2011). 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 To ta l C la im s (T ho us an ds o f U . S. D ol la rs ) FIGURE 16 Total Suckling Transport insurance claims in thousands of U.S. dollars, 2005–2009. Source: Suckling Transport (2011).

63 (DFT 2000) conducted a study of organizational safety cul- ture (and, although the term was not used, safety climate) in transport companies, including small trucking firms. The study investigated the relationship between company safety culture, driver attitudes, and crash risk. The aim of the study was to identify the most important transport company safety culture improvements. The research involved three main phases: (1) manager survey of organizational safety culture, (2) interviews with drivers on their safety attitudes and per- ceptions of company safety, and (3) collection of company crash and loss data. The confidential one-hour interviews with drivers addressed their backgrounds and experience, crash and incident involve- ments, attitudes toward company driving rules and proce- dures, attitudes about specific driving violations, sources of work pressure, feelings of fatigue, and organizational driving safety management practices. Based on driver responses, company safety culture was assessed in relation to six man- agement areas: driver training, safety rules and procedures, operational planning, incident management and feedback, supervision (e.g., performance monitoring and rewards and discipline), and communications. The work was conceptual- ized within the framework of the Occupational Road Risk model shown in Figure 17. Although this model was devel- oped with larger transport firms in mind, it nevertheless pro- vides a useful perspective on companies of all sizes. Company policies, perhaps reflective of external influences, become focused areas of safety management, which in turn create var- ious safe conditions within the company and operation. The study safety climate assessment encompassed the six man- agement areas underlined in Figure 17. Driver recruiting and selection, a key area of safety management, was not assessed, perhaps because employees, once hired, do not continue to regularly encounter that management function. The study found that driver safety attitudes were generally more positive than negative, but that smaller companies tended to be more variable; that is, driver attitudes for a par- ticular company were either predominantly positive or pre- dominantly negative. Larger companies tended to be more uniformly positive. This suggested to the authors that small companies with predominantly negative driver safety atti- tudes were the companies that would benefit the most from interventions to improve safety management. The study’s collection of company crash and loss data was more successful in larger companies, as smaller companies tended to have poorer documentation and fewer quantitative records. Drivers in small companies might have high judg- ments of company safety competence, but they reported fewer safety activities such as training, incident reporting, feedback, and guidance. Drivers in small companies rated their fellow drivers more highly than did drivers for larger companies. This External Influences Company Policy Level Areas of Safety Management Safety Conditions Created Political Contracting strategy Recruiting & selection Competence Regulatory Ownership & control Pay and conditions Compliance Market Organizational structure Training Motivation/morale Societal Safety management Procedures Awareness of risk factors Labor relations Operational planning Fatigue management Profitability Incident management/feedback Safety attitudes noisivrepus/tnemeganaM Stress/pressure management snoitacinummoC Drug/alcohol control htlaehlacisyhPgnisahcruptnempiuqE snoitacinummoc/noitamrofnIngisedecalpkroW secruosernamuhelbatiuS ecnanetniam&noitcepsnI ytilibarepoelciheV tnemnorivneelcihev-nI staerhtlanretxefolortnoC FIGURE 17 Occupational road risk model. Adapted from DFT (2000). Underlined areas of management were included in the study safety climate assessment.

64 was attributed to closer personal relationships among drivers in smaller companies. In small companies, drivers were more likely to believe that they and their companies were already competent in safety and did not need improvement. Drivers for larger companies reported more safety actions (e.g., training, communications, policies, and consequences) and more recep- tivity to ongoing safety improvements. In other words, larger companies were more likely to have safety management sys- tems, whereas smaller companies were more likely to simply expect and depend on individual driver competence. The study included both company truck drivers and com- pany car drivers (e.g., salespersons driving company cars). Truck drivers in the study were generally more safety con- scious (e.g., appreciative of driving risks) than were car drivers, and generally had a higher opinion of their fellow truck drivers than car drivers had of fellow car drivers. On the negative side, truck drivers from both small and large companies believed that they often drove under high sched- ule and productivity pressure. Based both on the study interviews with truck drivers and a subsequent series of group workshops, priority areas for safety management improvements were operational plan- ning, driver fatigue reduction, and supervision of drivers. Additional priority areas based on workshop discussions included incident management and feedback, driver training, and reduction of work pressure. Two areas not identified as priorities were work procedures and communications. Chap- ter five presents safety management suggestions for compa- nies from the DFT report. All four of the frameworks and applications described in this section could be used by companies to systematically assess their safety cultures, climates, and practices. A com- pany could choose to follow one approach that fits its man- agement style and current situation, or it might develop its own hybrid approach. Two important common features of these four approaches are their systematic nature and their willingness to gather new data on safety issues and then ini- tiate new interventions to address them.

Next: Chapter Five - Conclusions and Further Research »
Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers Get This Book
×
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

TRB’s Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program (CTBSSP) Synthesis 22: Safety Management in Small Motor Carriers explores small motor carriers' strengths and weaknesses in safety management, and identifies potentially effective safety practices.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!