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59 TABLE 17 STAGES OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT Stage Top Management Role Management Style Organizational Structure 1. Inception Direct supervision Entrepreneurial Unstructured individualistic 2. Survival Supervised supervision Entrepreneurial Simple administrative 3. Growth Delegation/coordination Entrepreneurial Functional centralized coordination 4. Expansion Decentralization Professional Functional decentralized administrative 5. Maturity Decentralization Watchdog/ Decentralized oversight functional/product Source: Fuller-Love (2006). By and large these sources also provide information to help Survey Question 12 asked respondents to rate the safety carrier owners and managers develop professionally. Per- importance of "Not enough management time to adequately centages were as follows for trucking managers in the 1125 address all safety management problems and issues." The vehicle category. Note however that this was survey was average importance rating for this item was 2.4 on the 04 taken before the growth of the Internet. scale, the 10th highest of 14 average ratings. Thus, the item was considered important, but not a priority among the prob- State carrier associations (71%) lems presented. Responses to Question 14 ["Lack of training Insurance companies (67%) materials (or easy access to them) for yourself as a man- Periodicals (57%) ager."] were similar. The mean rating was 2.2, putting it thir- U.S.DOT (37%) teenth of 14 items presented. Question 30 asked whether National carrier associations (32%) respondents participated in formal or informal meetings with Safety consultants (28%) their peers (e.g., truck or bus association meetings). Seventy- State enforcement agencies (26%) three of 109 respondents did so, and they rated its safety Other private sources (25%). effectiveness 2.9 on the 04 scale. A separate sub-study of the same program (Stock et al. In the case studies, the Carrier H interviewee mentioned 2001) developed, pilot tested, and evaluated motor carrier that attendance at truck shows is beneficial because he receives safety education and outreach materials for managers of training and information on both business and safety prac- small motor carriers. Specific products developed included a tices. Carrier H also shares safety information, resources, and three-hour seminar, a brochure highlighting frequently used ideas with another carrier with a similar operation. Carrier I, management practices of safe carriers, and an interactive, a bus charter company, participates in a 20-carrier idea-shar- web-based "safety toolbox" to allow motor carriers to bench- ing consortium organized by the UMA. Participating carriers mark their safety management practices. Participants rated meet several times annually to discuss all aspects of bus oper- the importance of various management training topics. Top- ations and safety. rated areas included: Pre-employment driver screening and testing, SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES TO MOTOR Top management commitment and involvement in safety, CARRIER SAFETY MANAGEMENT Driver training (e.g., defensive driving, fatigue manage- ment, and equipment inspection), and This section describes several approaches to integrating mul- Monitoring driver performance (e.g., citations, HOS tiple safety management concepts and practices in a motor car- logs, crashes, and incidents). rier or similar (e.g., transit) setting. These approaches employ some of the safety culture and safety climate concepts dis- Other topics rated but not receiving the highest impor- cussed in a more generic context earlier in this chapter. The tance rankings included: approaches and examples described in this section are sys- tematic in a least two different ways. First, they represent log- Vehicle inspection and PM, ical, step-by-step approaches to problem solving. Second, they Scheduled safety meetings, employ multiple interventions encompassing human, vehicle, Integration of safety into compensation and retention and environmental factors. Driver safety is addressed through programs, "cradle-to-grave" human resource management practices, Safety recognition/rewards programs, beginning with driver recruiting and continuing after employ- Crash/accident review process, and ment with driver training, communications, performance Safety awareness posters, letters, messages. measurement, and behavioral management.

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60 Basic Safety Management Systems Safety Concern, Hazard, or The FTA recently published a guide to safety management in Occurrence transit agencies (Ahmed 2010). Although some of this guide is specific to the transit mode and/or to large organizations, much of it is generic and applicable to transport companies of all sizes and modes. The following definition and descrip- Report tion of safety management systems is derived primarily from the FTA report. A safety management system is an explicit element of transport company management responsibility. It sets out a Analyze company's safety policies, defines how it identifies safety haz- ards and controls risks, and provides for goal setting, planning, and measuring performance. A safety management system is established at the company level, but devolves out and down to all company departments, employees, and activities. Each Correct of these has its own safety processes and procedures. In addi- tion to reactive procedures (e.g., crash and incident investi- gation), a safety management system includes proactive measures to anticipate and prevent or reduce safety risks. Adoption of best practices and continuous safety improve- Evaluate ment are overriding goals. A safety management system must Unresolved be woven into the fabric of the company and become part of the way people do their jobs. Resolved Ahmed (2010) describes a straightforward "basic safety Document process" for addressing safety issues. First, a safety concern is raised, hazard identified, or a crash or other accident hap- pens, which is then brought to the attention of the manager. FIGURE 14 Basic process for addressing safety issues. The manager and involved employee(s) analyze the issue to Adapted from Ahmed (2010). determine its sources, which may include both proximal causes and associated risk factors. They then take corrective action. As a follow-up, they evaluate the corrective action to make lowing applications of safety management system concepts sure it was effective. If the issue is resolved, it is documented to small carrier operations: and the corrective action taken so that the safety enhance- ment is maintained. If the problem or issue is not resolved, Company commitment. Company policy statement that they re-analyze it until it is resolved. Figure 14 illustrates the safety is critical in all activities and that the company process. strives to meet or exceed all legal safety standards. Organization and responsibility. Company policy state- The NTSB annually identifies its "Top Ten Most Wanted" ment on safety roles of management, drivers, dispatchers, safety improvements. In 2011, NTSB listed transportation and mechanics. safety management systems as one of the top ten needs. Its Monitoring and reporting. Maintain safety data spread- website states that, "NTSB accident investigations have sheet (crashes, violations, incidents, inspections, vehicle revealed that, in numerous cases, safety management system problems). (SMS) or system safety programs could have prevented loss Assessment. Monitor trends in safety performance and of life and injuries" (NTSB 2011). Further, safety manage- take corrective actions. ment systems ". . . can be effective in all organizations Training. Informal training during employee meetings regardless of size." and/or short training sessions. Communications. Manager communicates safety objec- Transport Canada also promotes safety management sys- tives, issues, and plans through meetings and written tems (Thiffault 2011). In the Canadian Railway Safety Act, a communications. safety management system is defined as "a formal frame- work for integrating safety into day-to-day operations, which includes safety goals and performance targets, risk assess- Haddon Matrix ments, responsibilities and authorities, rules and procedures, and monitoring and evaluation processes." This definition The Haddon Matrix (Haddon 1980) is a framework for under- applies to motor carriers as well. Thiffault suggests the fol- standing crash reduction strategies. It provides a conceptual

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61 structure for identifying crash factors by dividing the crash 4. Identify technologies and other improvements that scenario in terms of timeframe (i.e., pre-crash, crash, and could reduce crashes. post-crash) and in terms of the primary "actors" affecting the 5. Improve trip planning. event. These actors are the human (primarily driver), the vehi- 6. Improve driver training. cle, and the roadway/environment. As shown in Table 18, the Haddon Matrix is a 33 matrix with three rows (pre-crash, When the project started, managers met in focus groups crash, and post-crash) and three columns (human, vehicle, with drivers and other employees to review past crashes, and roadway/environment). other accidents, and incidents. They analyzed each incident using the Haddon Matrix, with emphasis on pre-accident risk The Haddon Matrix is one of the most important concepts factors that could have been changed. They also looked at in the history of motor vehicle safety (Williams 1999; Runge company response: both the emergency reaction to the event 2003); however, Will Murray (Murray et al. 2003, 2009) and and at longer-term remediation. Post-event remediation others (e.g., Faulks and Irwin 2002) have argued that the could be directed toward humans (e.g., employee training), conventional Haddon Matrix is insufficiently detailed for the environment (e.g., removal or mitigation of hazards), conceptualizing the full array of crash countermeasures and/or vehicles (e.g., onboard technologies). applicable to CMV transport. Most notably, carriers are an important fourth actor and thus could be added as a fourth The Zero Incident Project included an audit of company column. With regard to the timeframes, "pre-crash" actually compliance, with continuing monthly updates of perfor- encompasses several qualitatively different timeframes: pre- mance measures. This has included drug and alcohol testing, trip, pre-threat, and pre-crash impact (recall Figure 9). It is driver licensing and medical qualifications, HOS compli- possible to plan schedules, routes, and trips to greatly reduce ance, vehicle speeds, driver mobile phone use, and return-to- risks well before crash threats are imminent. Murrays' pre- work procedures following injuries. Medical qualifications scription for carriers is a comprehensive safety program renewals and MVR checks are now performed more fre- that seeks to proactively identify all important crash factors quently than required by law. and establish multiple complementary carrier practices to address them. The Suckling safety project encompasses both driving and nondriving (e.g., petrochemical handling) safety. Employees Such a systematic approach is more likely to be embraced are encouraged, and even given incentives, to report inci- by larger companies than by smaller ones. Nevertheless, one dents and near-misses in addition to actual accidents. medium-sized trucking company has been showcased for its "Every accident, near-miss, or potential incident is an adoption of a comprehensive safety management program opportunity to improve safety," said the company manag- based on this model. Suckling Transport is a petrochemical ing director. transport contractor in the United Kingdom (RoadSafe 2010, 2011). It operates a fleet of 65 articulated tanker trucks. In Zero Incident Project team members audited every regu- 2008, it launched its Zero Incident Project, with the goal to lar delivery route and every customer site to identify risk fac- eliminate crashes and other accidents entirely. The approach tors and hazards. They identified travel "Safe Havens" for included the following main initiatives: their drivers; routes deemed the least risky and rest stops (e.g., travel plazas) considered "truck friendly." They also 1. Audit all company safety systems, policies, and pro- invited their primary customers, major oil companies, to con- cedures. duct independent, external audits of Suckling operations 2. Ensure all aspects of regulatory and traffic law com- involving their products. pliance. 3. Improve near-miss and incident reporting by the work- The project also encompassed the safety of fleet autos. force. These drivers, mostly managers or technicians, were held to TABLE 18 HADDON CRASH FACTOR MATRIX AND EXAMPLES A ctor "/Factor: Human Roadway/ Timeframe: (Driver) Vehicle Environment Pre-Crash Driver licensing Brake, tire condition Roadway markings Driver traits Vehicle safety equipment Divided highways Driver training Curves Crash Restraint use Vehicle size Guard rails Bone density Crashworthiness Embankments Post-Crash Victim general health Gas tank integrity EMS availability Rehabilitation Van/cargo tank integrity EMS response EMS = emergency medical service.

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62 6 Element Fleet Safety Model Crashes Per Million VMT 5 Mooren and her associates at the University of New South 4 Wales in Australia have put forth a 12-element model of com- pany fleet safety as follows (Mooren 2007, 2010): 3 2 1. Policy and procedures. Clear statement of safety as a priority combined with defined behavioral expectations. 1 2. Recruitment. Selection of low-risk drivers. 0 3. Induction. Ensuring that employees understand the 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 priority placed on safe driving. 4. Safe work planning. Ensuring that work tasks do not FIGURE 15 Suckling Transport crashes per one million compromise driving safety. vehicle miles traveled, 20042009. Source: Suckling Transport (2011). 5. Fleet selection/maintenance. Equipping and main- taining vehicles that are safe for occupants and other road users. 6. Crash [and incident] reporting. A system to ensure the same driving standards as company truck drivers. In 2008, timely and accurate reporting of crashes and other Suckling designated a team of six drivers/instructors to mon- incidents. itor vehicle onboard computer data and incidents to determine 7. Data analysis. Rigorous scrutiny and interpretation of individual and collective training needs. Employee training is crash/incident reports and fleet statistics. a continuous activity. According to the company, "training is 8. Risk resolution. Follow-up interventions to mitigate now seen by the workforce as career development, not as pun- identified risks. ishment" (RoadSafe 2011). 9. Incentives and sanctions. Rewards or recognition for safe practices and safety results, and sufficient penalties The Zero Incident Project has proven to the company direc- to deter unsafe practices. tor that "road safety saves money as well as lives" (RoadSafe 10. Driver education. Education and training of drivers on 2010). Over the course of the project, Suckling Transport crash risks and how to avoid them. has seen significant reductions in crashes, other accidents, 11. Leadership. Senior managers demonstrate an active employee injuries, and insurance claims. Figures 15 and 16 and practical commitment to safety document Suckling's safety improvements using two met- 12. Communication. Regular communication within the rics. The company director added that, "the benefits of our organization about fleet safety issues. Zero Incident Project are multiple and include a significant reduction in vehicle downtime, improved fleet and fuel effi- The Mooren model is based on both theoretical principles ciency, a reduction in driver turnover and improved rela- (e.g., of behavioral psychology) and past research on motor tionships with our customers contributing to new contract carrier safety management. At a practical level, the model wins . . ." In 2010, Suckling Transport was awarded the has been used by companies and their consultants as a struc- U.K. Motor Transport Safety in Operation award for its ture and "do list" for conducting safety reviews and audits safety and organization development achievements (see of companies. For example, Mooren and Grzabieta (2010) Figures 15 and 16). reviewed the safety management of a dangerous goods (haz- ardous materials) transport company, first by administering an internal questionnaire on the perceived importance of the 12 elements within the company, and then by investigating 400 perceived gaps. The company implemented many recom- (Thousands of U.S. Dollars) 350 mendations for safety improvements based on the model and 300 intervention approach. Total Claims 250 200 Systematic Assessment of Carrier Safety Culture 150 and Climate 100 50 Recall from earlier in this chapter that safety culture is defined 0 as the shared values and beliefs within a company that establish 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 safety as a priority and drive company policies and practices. FIGURE 16 Total Suckling Transport insurance Safety climate, a very similar concept, is a company's collec- claims in thousands of U.S. dollars, 20052009. tive workforce perceptions of the organizational safety atmos- Source: Suckling Transport (2011). phere (Flin et al. 2000). The U.K. Department for Transport

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63 (DFT 2000) conducted a study of organizational safety cul- policies, perhaps reflective of external influences, become ture (and, although the term was not used, safety climate) in focused areas of safety management, which in turn create var- transport companies, including small trucking firms. The ious safe conditions within the company and operation. The study investigated the relationship between company safety study safety climate assessment encompassed the six man- culture, driver attitudes, and crash risk. The aim of the study agement areas underlined in Figure 17. Driver recruiting and was to identify the most important transport company safety selection, a key area of safety management, was not assessed, culture improvements. The research involved three main perhaps because employees, once hired, do not continue to phases: (1) manager survey of organizational safety culture, regularly encounter that management function. (2) interviews with drivers on their safety attitudes and per- ceptions of company safety, and (3) collection of company The study found that driver safety attitudes were generally crash and loss data. more positive than negative, but that smaller companies tended to be more variable; that is, driver attitudes for a par- The confidential one-hour interviews with drivers addressed ticular company were either predominantly positive or pre- their backgrounds and experience, crash and incident involve- dominantly negative. Larger companies tended to be more ments, attitudes toward company driving rules and proce- uniformly positive. This suggested to the authors that small dures, attitudes about specific driving violations, sources of companies with predominantly negative driver safety atti- work pressure, feelings of fatigue, and organizational driving tudes were the companies that would benefit the most from safety management practices. Based on driver responses, interventions to improve safety management. company safety culture was assessed in relation to six man- agement areas: driver training, safety rules and procedures, The study's collection of company crash and loss data was operational planning, incident management and feedback, more successful in larger companies, as smaller companies supervision (e.g., performance monitoring and rewards and tended to have poorer documentation and fewer quantitative discipline), and communications. The work was conceptual- records. Drivers in small companies might have high judg- ized within the framework of the Occupational Road Risk ments of company safety competence, but they reported fewer model shown in Figure 17. Although this model was devel- safety activities such as training, incident reporting, feedback, oped with larger transport firms in mind, it nevertheless pro- and guidance. Drivers in small companies rated their fellow vides a useful perspective on companies of all sizes. Company drivers more highly than did drivers for larger companies. This External Company Areas of Safety Safety Conditions Influences Policy Level Management Created Political Contracting strategy Recruiting & selection Competence Regulatory Ownership & control Pay and conditions Compliance Market Organizational structure Training Motivation/morale Societal Safety management Procedures Awareness of risk factors Labor relations Operational planning Fatigue management Profitability Incident management/feedback Safety attitudes Management/supervision Stress/pressure management C o m m u n i ca t i o n s Drug/alcohol control Equipment purchasing Physical health Workplace design Information/communications Suitable human resources Inspection & maintenance Vehicle operability In-vehicle environment Control of external threats FIGURE 17 Occupational road risk model. Adapted from DFT (2000). Underlined areas of management were included in the study safety climate assessment.

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64 was attributed to closer personal relationships among drivers in Based both on the study interviews with truck drivers and smaller companies. In small companies, drivers were more a subsequent series of group workshops, priority areas for likely to believe that they and their companies were already safety management improvements were operational plan- competent in safety and did not need improvement. Drivers for ning, driver fatigue reduction, and supervision of drivers. larger companies reported more safety actions (e.g., training, Additional priority areas based on workshop discussions communications, policies, and consequences) and more recep- included incident management and feedback, driver training, tivity to ongoing safety improvements. In other words, larger and reduction of work pressure. Two areas not identified as companies were more likely to have safety management sys- priorities were work procedures and communications. Chap- tems, whereas smaller companies were more likely to simply ter five presents safety management suggestions for compa- expect and depend on individual driver competence. nies from the DFT report. The study included both company truck drivers and com- All four of the frameworks and applications described in pany car drivers (e.g., salespersons driving company cars). this section could be used by companies to systematically Truck drivers in the study were generally more safety con- assess their safety cultures, climates, and practices. A com- scious (e.g., appreciative of driving risks) than were car pany could choose to follow one approach that fits its man- drivers, and generally had a higher opinion of their fellow agement style and current situation, or it might develop its truck drivers than car drivers had of fellow car drivers. On own hybrid approach. Two important common features of the negative side, truck drivers from both small and large these four approaches are their systematic nature and their companies believed that they often drove under high sched- willingness to gather new data on safety issues and then ini- ule and productivity pressure. tiate new interventions to address them.