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TABLE 17
STAGES OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
Stage Top Management Role Management Style Organizational Structure
1. Inception Direct supervision Entrepreneurial Unstructured
individualistic
2. Survival Supervised supervision Entrepreneurial Simple
administrative
3. Growth Delegation/coordination Entrepreneurial Functional centralized
coordination
4. Expansion Decentralization Professional Functional decentralized
administrative
5. Maturity Decentralization Watchdog/ Decentralized
oversight functional/product
Source: Fuller-Love (2006).
By and large these sources also provide information to help Survey Question 12 asked respondents to rate the safety
carrier owners and managers develop professionally. Per- importance of "Not enough management time to adequately
centages were as follows for trucking managers in the 1125 address all safety management problems and issues." The
vehicle category. Note however that this was survey was average importance rating for this item was 2.4 on the 04
taken before the growth of the Internet. scale, the 10th highest of 14 average ratings. Thus, the item
was considered important, but not a priority among the prob-
· State carrier associations (71%) lems presented. Responses to Question 14 ["Lack of training
· Insurance companies (67%) materials (or easy access to them) for yourself as a man-
· Periodicals (57%) ager."] were similar. The mean rating was 2.2, putting it thir-
· U.S.DOT (37%) teenth of 14 items presented. Question 30 asked whether
· National carrier associations (32%) respondents participated in formal or informal meetings with
· Safety consultants (28%) their peers (e.g., truck or bus association meetings). Seventy-
· State enforcement agencies (26%) three of 109 respondents did so, and they rated its safety
· Other private sources (25%). effectiveness 2.9 on the 04 scale.
A separate sub-study of the same program (Stock et al. In the case studies, the Carrier H interviewee mentioned
2001) developed, pilot tested, and evaluated motor carrier that attendance at truck shows is beneficial because he receives
safety education and outreach materials for managers of training and information on both business and safety prac-
small motor carriers. Specific products developed included a tices. Carrier H also shares safety information, resources, and
three-hour seminar, a brochure highlighting frequently used ideas with another carrier with a similar operation. Carrier I,
management practices of safe carriers, and an interactive, a bus charter company, participates in a 20-carrier idea-shar-
web-based "safety toolbox" to allow motor carriers to bench- ing consortium organized by the UMA. Participating carriers
mark their safety management practices. Participants rated meet several times annually to discuss all aspects of bus oper-
the importance of various management training topics. Top-
ations and safety.
rated areas included:
· Pre-employment driver screening and testing, SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES TO MOTOR
· Top management commitment and involvement in safety, CARRIER SAFETY MANAGEMENT
· Driver training (e.g., defensive driving, fatigue manage-
ment, and equipment inspection), and This section describes several approaches to integrating mul-
· Monitoring driver performance (e.g., citations, HOS tiple safety management concepts and practices in a motor car-
logs, crashes, and incidents). rier or similar (e.g., transit) setting. These approaches employ
some of the safety culture and safety climate concepts dis-
Other topics rated but not receiving the highest impor- cussed in a more generic context earlier in this chapter. The
tance rankings included: approaches and examples described in this section are sys-
tematic in a least two different ways. First, they represent log-
· Vehicle inspection and PM, ical, step-by-step approaches to problem solving. Second, they
· Scheduled safety meetings, employ multiple interventions encompassing human, vehicle,
· Integration of safety into compensation and retention and environmental factors. Driver safety is addressed through
programs, "cradle-to-grave" human resource management practices,
· Safety recognition/rewards programs, beginning with driver recruiting and continuing after employ-
· Crash/accident review process, and ment with driver training, communications, performance
· Safety awareness posters, letters, messages. measurement, and behavioral management.
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Basic Safety Management Systems Safety Concern,
Hazard, or
The FTA recently published a guide to safety management in Occurrence
transit agencies (Ahmed 2010). Although some of this guide
is specific to the transit mode and/or to large organizations,
much of it is generic and applicable to transport companies
of all sizes and modes. The following definition and descrip-
Report
tion of safety management systems is derived primarily from
the FTA report.
A safety management system is an explicit element of
transport company management responsibility. It sets out a
Analyze
company's safety policies, defines how it identifies safety haz-
ards and controls risks, and provides for goal setting, planning,
and measuring performance. A safety management system is
established at the company level, but devolves out and down
to all company departments, employees, and activities. Each
Correct
of these has its own safety processes and procedures. In addi-
tion to reactive procedures (e.g., crash and incident investi-
gation), a safety management system includes proactive
measures to anticipate and prevent or reduce safety risks.
Adoption of best practices and continuous safety improve- Evaluate
ment are overriding goals. A safety management system must Unresolved
be woven into the fabric of the company and become part of
the way people do their jobs. Resolved
Ahmed (2010) describes a straightforward "basic safety Document
process" for addressing safety issues. First, a safety concern
is raised, hazard identified, or a crash or other accident hap-
pens, which is then brought to the attention of the manager. FIGURE 14 Basic process for addressing safety issues.
The manager and involved employee(s) analyze the issue to Adapted from Ahmed (2010).
determine its sources, which may include both proximal causes
and associated risk factors. They then take corrective action.
As a follow-up, they evaluate the corrective action to make lowing applications of safety management system concepts
sure it was effective. If the issue is resolved, it is documented to small carrier operations:
and the corrective action taken so that the safety enhance-
ment is maintained. If the problem or issue is not resolved, · Company commitment. Company policy statement that
they re-analyze it until it is resolved. Figure 14 illustrates the safety is critical in all activities and that the company
process. strives to meet or exceed all legal safety standards.
· Organization and responsibility. Company policy state-
The NTSB annually identifies its "Top Ten Most Wanted" ment on safety roles of management, drivers, dispatchers,
safety improvements. In 2011, NTSB listed transportation and mechanics.
safety management systems as one of the top ten needs. Its · Monitoring and reporting. Maintain safety data spread-
website states that, "NTSB accident investigations have sheet (crashes, violations, incidents, inspections, vehicle
revealed that, in numerous cases, safety management system
problems).
(SMS) or system safety programs could have prevented loss
· Assessment. Monitor trends in safety performance and
of life and injuries" (NTSB 2011). Further, safety manage-
take corrective actions.
ment systems ". . . can be effective in all organizations
· Training. Informal training during employee meetings
regardless of size."
and/or short training sessions.
· Communications. Manager communicates safety objec-
Transport Canada also promotes safety management sys-
tives, issues, and plans through meetings and written
tems (Thiffault 2011). In the Canadian Railway Safety Act, a
communications.
safety management system is defined as "a formal frame-
work for integrating safety into day-to-day operations, which
includes safety goals and performance targets, risk assess- Haddon Matrix
ments, responsibilities and authorities, rules and procedures,
and monitoring and evaluation processes." This definition The Haddon Matrix (Haddon 1980) is a framework for under-
applies to motor carriers as well. Thiffault suggests the fol- standing crash reduction strategies. It provides a conceptual
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structure for identifying crash factors by dividing the crash 4. Identify technologies and other improvements that
scenario in terms of timeframe (i.e., pre-crash, crash, and could reduce crashes.
post-crash) and in terms of the primary "actors" affecting the 5. Improve trip planning.
event. These actors are the human (primarily driver), the vehi- 6. Improve driver training.
cle, and the roadway/environment. As shown in Table 18, the
Haddon Matrix is a 3×3 matrix with three rows (pre-crash, When the project started, managers met in focus groups
crash, and post-crash) and three columns (human, vehicle, with drivers and other employees to review past crashes,
and roadway/environment). other accidents, and incidents. They analyzed each incident
using the Haddon Matrix, with emphasis on pre-accident risk
The Haddon Matrix is one of the most important concepts factors that could have been changed. They also looked at
in the history of motor vehicle safety (Williams 1999; Runge company response: both the emergency reaction to the event
2003); however, Will Murray (Murray et al. 2003, 2009) and and at longer-term remediation. Post-event remediation
others (e.g., Faulks and Irwin 2002) have argued that the could be directed toward humans (e.g., employee training),
conventional Haddon Matrix is insufficiently detailed for the environment (e.g., removal or mitigation of hazards),
conceptualizing the full array of crash countermeasures and/or vehicles (e.g., onboard technologies).
applicable to CMV transport. Most notably, carriers are an
important fourth actor and thus could be added as a fourth The Zero Incident Project included an audit of company
column. With regard to the timeframes, "pre-crash" actually compliance, with continuing monthly updates of perfor-
encompasses several qualitatively different timeframes: pre- mance measures. This has included drug and alcohol testing,
trip, pre-threat, and pre-crash impact (recall Figure 9). It is driver licensing and medical qualifications, HOS compli-
possible to plan schedules, routes, and trips to greatly reduce ance, vehicle speeds, driver mobile phone use, and return-to-
risks well before crash threats are imminent. Murrays' pre- work procedures following injuries. Medical qualifications
scription for carriers is a comprehensive safety program renewals and MVR checks are now performed more fre-
that seeks to proactively identify all important crash factors quently than required by law.
and establish multiple complementary carrier practices to
address them. The Suckling safety project encompasses both driving and
nondriving (e.g., petrochemical handling) safety. Employees
Such a systematic approach is more likely to be embraced are encouraged, and even given incentives, to report inci-
by larger companies than by smaller ones. Nevertheless, one dents and near-misses in addition to actual accidents.
medium-sized trucking company has been showcased for its "Every accident, near-miss, or potential incident is an
adoption of a comprehensive safety management program opportunity to improve safety," said the company manag-
based on this model. Suckling Transport is a petrochemical ing director.
transport contractor in the United Kingdom (RoadSafe 2010,
2011). It operates a fleet of 65 articulated tanker trucks. In Zero Incident Project team members audited every regu-
2008, it launched its Zero Incident Project, with the goal to lar delivery route and every customer site to identify risk fac-
eliminate crashes and other accidents entirely. The approach tors and hazards. They identified travel "Safe Havens" for
included the following main initiatives: their drivers; routes deemed the least risky and rest stops
(e.g., travel plazas) considered "truck friendly." They also
1. Audit all company safety systems, policies, and pro- invited their primary customers, major oil companies, to con-
cedures. duct independent, external audits of Suckling operations
2. Ensure all aspects of regulatory and traffic law com- involving their products.
pliance.
3. Improve near-miss and incident reporting by the work- The project also encompassed the safety of fleet autos.
force. These drivers, mostly managers or technicians, were held to
TABLE 18
HADDON CRASH FACTOR MATRIX AND EXAMPLES
A
ì ctor "/Factor: Human Roadway/
Timeframe: (Driver) Vehicle Environment
Pre-Crash Driver licensing Brake, tire condition Roadway markings
Driver traits Vehicle safety equipment Divided highways
Driver training Curves
Crash Restraint use Vehicle size Guard rails
Bone density Crashworthiness Embankments
Post-Crash Victim general health Gas tank integrity EMS availability
Rehabilitation Van/cargo tank integrity EMS response
EMS = emergency medical service.
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6 Element Fleet Safety Model
Crashes Per Million VMT
5 Mooren and her associates at the University of New South
4 Wales in Australia have put forth a 12-element model of com-
pany fleet safety as follows (Mooren 2007, 2010):
3
2
1. Policy and procedures. Clear statement of safety as a
priority combined with defined behavioral expectations.
1 2. Recruitment. Selection of low-risk drivers.
0
3. Induction. Ensuring that employees understand the
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 priority placed on safe driving.
4. Safe work planning. Ensuring that work tasks do not
FIGURE 15 Suckling Transport crashes per one million compromise driving safety.
vehicle miles traveled, 20042009. Source: Suckling
Transport (2011).
5. Fleet selection/maintenance. Equipping and main-
taining vehicles that are safe for occupants and other
road users.
6. Crash [and incident] reporting. A system to ensure
the same driving standards as company truck drivers. In 2008, timely and accurate reporting of crashes and other
Suckling designated a team of six drivers/instructors to mon- incidents.
itor vehicle onboard computer data and incidents to determine 7. Data analysis. Rigorous scrutiny and interpretation of
individual and collective training needs. Employee training is crash/incident reports and fleet statistics.
a continuous activity. According to the company, "training is 8. Risk resolution. Follow-up interventions to mitigate
now seen by the workforce as career development, not as pun- identified risks.
ishment" (RoadSafe 2011). 9. Incentives and sanctions. Rewards or recognition for
safe practices and safety results, and sufficient penalties
The Zero Incident Project has proven to the company direc- to deter unsafe practices.
tor that "road safety saves money as well as lives" (RoadSafe 10. Driver education. Education and training of drivers on
2010). Over the course of the project, Suckling Transport crash risks and how to avoid them.
has seen significant reductions in crashes, other accidents, 11. Leadership. Senior managers demonstrate an active
employee injuries, and insurance claims. Figures 15 and 16 and practical commitment to safety
document Suckling's safety improvements using two met- 12. Communication. Regular communication within the
rics. The company director added that, "the benefits of our organization about fleet safety issues.
Zero Incident Project are multiple and include a significant
reduction in vehicle downtime, improved fleet and fuel effi- The Mooren model is based on both theoretical principles
ciency, a reduction in driver turnover and improved rela- (e.g., of behavioral psychology) and past research on motor
tionships with our customers contributing to new contract carrier safety management. At a practical level, the model
wins . . ." In 2010, Suckling Transport was awarded the has been used by companies and their consultants as a struc-
U.K. Motor Transport Safety in Operation award for its ture and "do list" for conducting safety reviews and audits
safety and organization development achievements (see of companies. For example, Mooren and Grzabieta (2010)
Figures 15 and 16). reviewed the safety management of a dangerous goods (haz-
ardous materials) transport company, first by administering
an internal questionnaire on the perceived importance of the
12 elements within the company, and then by investigating
400 perceived gaps. The company implemented many recom-
(Thousands of U.S. Dollars)
350 mendations for safety improvements based on the model and
300 intervention approach.
Total Claims
250
200
Systematic Assessment of Carrier Safety Culture
150
and Climate
100
50 Recall from earlier in this chapter that safety culture is defined
0 as the shared values and beliefs within a company that establish
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 safety as a priority and drive company policies and practices.
FIGURE 16 Total Suckling Transport insurance Safety climate, a very similar concept, is a company's collec-
claims in thousands of U.S. dollars, 20052009. tive workforce perceptions of the organizational safety atmos-
Source: Suckling Transport (2011). phere (Flin et al. 2000). The U.K. Department for Transport
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(DFT 2000) conducted a study of organizational safety cul- policies, perhaps reflective of external influences, become
ture (and, although the term was not used, safety climate) in focused areas of safety management, which in turn create var-
transport companies, including small trucking firms. The ious safe conditions within the company and operation. The
study investigated the relationship between company safety study safety climate assessment encompassed the six man-
culture, driver attitudes, and crash risk. The aim of the study agement areas underlined in Figure 17. Driver recruiting and
was to identify the most important transport company safety selection, a key area of safety management, was not assessed,
culture improvements. The research involved three main perhaps because employees, once hired, do not continue to
phases: (1) manager survey of organizational safety culture, regularly encounter that management function.
(2) interviews with drivers on their safety attitudes and per-
ceptions of company safety, and (3) collection of company The study found that driver safety attitudes were generally
crash and loss data. more positive than negative, but that smaller companies
tended to be more variable; that is, driver attitudes for a par-
The confidential one-hour interviews with drivers addressed ticular company were either predominantly positive or pre-
their backgrounds and experience, crash and incident involve- dominantly negative. Larger companies tended to be more
ments, attitudes toward company driving rules and proce- uniformly positive. This suggested to the authors that small
dures, attitudes about specific driving violations, sources of companies with predominantly negative driver safety atti-
work pressure, feelings of fatigue, and organizational driving tudes were the companies that would benefit the most from
safety management practices. Based on driver responses, interventions to improve safety management.
company safety culture was assessed in relation to six man-
agement areas: driver training, safety rules and procedures, The study's collection of company crash and loss data was
operational planning, incident management and feedback, more successful in larger companies, as smaller companies
supervision (e.g., performance monitoring and rewards and tended to have poorer documentation and fewer quantitative
discipline), and communications. The work was conceptual- records. Drivers in small companies might have high judg-
ized within the framework of the Occupational Road Risk ments of company safety competence, but they reported fewer
model shown in Figure 17. Although this model was devel- safety activities such as training, incident reporting, feedback,
oped with larger transport firms in mind, it nevertheless pro- and guidance. Drivers in small companies rated their fellow
vides a useful perspective on companies of all sizes. Company drivers more highly than did drivers for larger companies. This
External Company Areas of Safety Safety Conditions
Influences Policy Level Management Created
Political Contracting strategy Recruiting & selection Competence
Regulatory Ownership & control Pay and conditions Compliance
Market Organizational structure Training Motivation/morale
Societal Safety management Procedures Awareness of risk factors
Labor relations Operational planning Fatigue management
Profitability Incident management/feedback Safety attitudes
Management/supervision Stress/pressure management
C o m m u n i ca t i o n s Drug/alcohol control
Equipment purchasing Physical health
Workplace design Information/communications
Suitable human resources
Inspection & maintenance
Vehicle operability
In-vehicle environment
Control of external threats
FIGURE 17 Occupational road risk model. Adapted from DFT (2000). Underlined areas of management were included in the study
safety climate assessment.
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was attributed to closer personal relationships among drivers in Based both on the study interviews with truck drivers and
smaller companies. In small companies, drivers were more a subsequent series of group workshops, priority areas for
likely to believe that they and their companies were already safety management improvements were operational plan-
competent in safety and did not need improvement. Drivers for ning, driver fatigue reduction, and supervision of drivers.
larger companies reported more safety actions (e.g., training, Additional priority areas based on workshop discussions
communications, policies, and consequences) and more recep- included incident management and feedback, driver training,
tivity to ongoing safety improvements. In other words, larger and reduction of work pressure. Two areas not identified as
companies were more likely to have safety management sys- priorities were work procedures and communications. Chap-
tems, whereas smaller companies were more likely to simply ter five presents safety management suggestions for compa-
expect and depend on individual driver competence. nies from the DFT report.
The study included both company truck drivers and com- All four of the frameworks and applications described in
pany car drivers (e.g., salespersons driving company cars). this section could be used by companies to systematically
Truck drivers in the study were generally more safety con- assess their safety cultures, climates, and practices. A com-
scious (e.g., appreciative of driving risks) than were car pany could choose to follow one approach that fits its man-
drivers, and generally had a higher opinion of their fellow agement style and current situation, or it might develop its
truck drivers than car drivers had of fellow car drivers. On own hybrid approach. Two important common features of
the negative side, truck drivers from both small and large these four approaches are their systematic nature and their
companies believed that they often drove under high sched- willingness to gather new data on safety issues and then ini-
ule and productivity pressure. tiate new interventions to address them.
