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Suggested Citation:"VI. LARGO EXTENSION OF BLUE LINE PROJECT." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Suggested Citation:"VI. LARGO EXTENSION OF BLUE LINE PROJECT." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Page 27
Suggested Citation:"VI. LARGO EXTENSION OF BLUE LINE PROJECT." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Page 27
Page 28
Suggested Citation:"VI. LARGO EXTENSION OF BLUE LINE PROJECT." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Page 28

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25 PFC was a nominal charge for every flight passenger departing JFK Airport. In addition to the funding de- bate, the Air Transportation Association filed suit to block the AirTrain project over the definition of en- hanced capacity. The lawsuit halted the review proce- dure until the Port Authority resolved the funding issue with the FAA. In response, the Port Authority pur- chased the Van Wyck right-of-way to Jamaica Station and submitted required detailed design and construc- tion documents to the FAA. The FAA reviewed the doc- uments and determined that the Port Authority could use $1.2 billion of the $1.6 billion in PFC funds collected before 1992 for the AirTrain Project. After the Port Authority resolved the funding issues, various conflicts arose with the contractor due in large part to the minimal functional design information pro- vided in the RFP. Generally, line and grade drawings as well as station locations were provided to define the corridor. Limited information was provided with respect to station design. In the Technical Provisions section of the RFP, the Port Authority stipulated that the contractor shall address…aesthetic issues with the same degree of care that will be given to the more easily evaluated technical aspects of the System. This means inducting good architects, signage and graphic designers, site planners and others on the design-construct team that will contribute to the aesthetic quality of the end re- sult. Apart from this description, the Port Authority did not provide specific details for the design aesthetic of the train stations. Consequently, the designers planned the stations according to their interpretation of the re- quirements. In some cases, the station design choices did not conform to the Port Authority’s expectations for level of quality or standard of care. Generally, the Port Authority and ARTC worked to resolve these conflicts within the bounds of the contract, but these issues caused delays in the project schedule. At the conclusion of design and construction, roughly $40 million worth of changes or claims remained unsettled. Through exten- sive negotiations, the majority of the disputed amounts were resolved, generally in ARTC’s favor, so conse- quently no further legal actions were required. Another delay in the project occurred in the testing phase of the AirTrain system. On September 27, 2002, a car operator died when a test train, travelling at an unknown speed, derailed and crashed in the parapet. The crash caused the front car of the train to tear open and the guideway wall to shear away 150 ft. The Na- tional Transportation Safety Board is still investigating the cause of the incident. According to the investigation, the test operation may have been faulty as it involved the placement of 16 unsecured concrete blocks in three cars of the trains to simulate passengers. The 2,000 pd blocks shifted as the train rounded the curve. In the end, the final cost of the AirTrain project came to $1.9 billion, approximately $770 million more than the con- tract award amount. Currently, the railway operates at approximately one-half of the projected ridership. VI. LARGO EXTENSION OF BLUE LINE PROJECT Project Overview The Largo Extension project consists of a 3.1 mi ex- tension to the WMATA Blue Line train. The extension links the existing Blue Line to Largo Town Center in an effort to relieve the area’s severe traffic congestion and provide more public transit service. Original estimates showed that after the extension the number of daily transit passengers would increase by an estimated 20,000 customers. WMATA awarded a DB contract for line, trackwork, and systems (Contract 2) to the Lane, Granite, Slattery- Skanska Joint Venture (LGS) in the amount of $218 million. WMATA awarded separate contracts for site clearing/preparation (Contract 1, $14 million, DBB) and the construction of two new stations (Contract 3, $92.9 million, DB). The work under Contract 1 preceded the Contract 2 work, and was performed by Lane Construc- tion. The total projected budget for the entire extension project was $460 million. The project secured funds from two sources: a local funding agreement with the Maryland DOT for $173.6 million, and an FFGA with the FTA for $260.3 million as part of its New Starts Program (49 U.S.C. 5309), which provides funding for extensions to fixed guideway systems. This section cov- ers the procurement, contracting strategies, and per- formance of Contract 2. Procurement Scope of Work The DB RFP stipulated that the design-builder pro- vide the following services: engineering and architec- tural services for the final design, drawings, and speci- fications; schedules and cost estimates; and all labor, equipment, materials, project management, QC, and architecture and engineering required for construction. The primary scope of the work included double-box structure cut-and-cover work with some aerial and re- tained cut construction. The work as defined by the RFP included the tasks shown in Table 8.

26 Table 8. Largo Extension Project Tasks Project Task Subtasks Structures • Retained cut with walls • Retained fill with walls • Cut-and- cover double box and single box • Aerial guideway • Aerial through girder • Vent shaft • Multicell culverts under box structure in wet areas Trackwork • Mainline track • Storage track • Two No. 10 tangential geometry double crossovers • Three No. 10 tangential geome- try turnouts • Primarily direct fixation con- struction with some ballasted track Automatic Train Control System • Automatic train protection • Operation • Supervision • Connections and compatibility with existing Blue Line system Traction Power • Two 9-MW substations • Tie breaker • Distribution system Voice and Data Communications Systems • Telephone • Remote indication and control of operating facilities • Security • Radio • Public address • Passenger information display system Systems • CCTV • Fire • Intrusion Corrosion Con- trol n/a Jet Fan • Tunnel air circulation • Control room Operations Building n/a Facility Sys- tems • Mechanical • Electrical • Plumbing Additionally, the scope of the project included sev- eral points for interfacing and integrating with the ex- isting Blue Line system. The extension connects with aerial and at-grade structures and elements of the ex- isting Addison Road station. It also connects with a Beltway-crossing bridge built under Contract 1. The proposer was obligated to coordinate with track, trac- tion power, train control, communications, and systems providers to accommodate station construction under Contract 3. Additionally, the proposer was to facilitate integration with WMATA system elements at large. WMATA’s goal was to have the trains running before the 2005 Presidential Inauguration, an unchanging goal, which ultimately governed the pace of the project. Process Overview WMATA used a two-phase, best value selection proc- ess for procuring a DB team. The first phase of pro- curement was based on a request for qualifications (RFQ), which resulted in the selection committee nar- rowing the proposers down to a shortlist of four entities. In the second phase, each of the shortlisted proposers submitted a detailed proposal in response to an RFP. Selection and Award Criteria WMATA’s evaluation committee used a combination of technical capability and price to determine the ulti- mate design-builder. The technical proposal considered the management plan, key staff, preliminary safety plan, quality plan, and a preliminary schedule. Price was set forth in a separate, sealed, cost proposal. The price proposal structure is illustrated in Table 9, whereby WMATA included estimated incentives and allowances and the proposer provided lump-sum and options costs.

27 Table 9. Largo Extension Price Proposal Struc- ture Base Proposal Item De- scription Amount All Work Lump sum (to be determined by pro- poser) Authority Share of Part- nering Cost* $20,000 Authority Share of Dis- putes Review Cost* $50,000 Safety Awareness Program Costs $500,000 Schedule Incentives $900,000 Allowance for Fiber Optics $600,000 Allowance for Spare Parts $2,000,000 BASE PROPOSAL PRICE To be determined (TBD) *Design-builder portion of partnering and dispute review costs are part of lump sum bid. OPTIONS* AMOUNT A—Reduced Excava- tion/Aerial TBD B—Retained Fill TBD C—Reduced Excava- tion/Retained Fill** TBD D—6-Month Extension TBD E—9-Month Extension TBD *Proposers choose option A or C and option D or E. **Option C may only be selected if option B is as well. WMATA evaluated the proposals based on the Base Proposal Price plus the price of options multiplied by a factor (not given in the RFP). The factor allowed for Alternatives A or C and Alternatives D or E, with af- fordability as a key consideration. At first, each of the proposers submitted proposals that exceeded the cost budget estimated by WMATA. WMATA then requested that the proposers submit their BAFO. The BAFO adjusted the project milestones so that final completion and acceptance had to be achieved in 1,005 days from Notice to Proceed, a reduc- tion of 130 days (approximately 4½ months) from the duration indicated in the RFP, which in essence main- tained the original December 2004 completion date. After price negotiations, WMATA awarded the Contract 2 work through a DB contract to LGS. Key Contract Provisions Ownership of Documents The request for proposal and contract documents does not address ownership of documents beyond WMATA’s provided precaution in protecting proprie- tary, pricing, and technical information in the proposal process. In the event that participants detect inconsis- tencies in the project requirements, the contract assigns the following order of precedence for the documents: 1. Change Orders and Contract Amendments. 2. Section 00500: Agreement and Section 00600: Bonds and Certificates. 3. Section 04450: Representations and Certifications. 4. Section 00800: Special Provisions. 5. Section 00700: General Conditions. 6. Division 01, General Requirements. 7. Contract-Specific Mandatory Drawings and Specifi- cations. 8. WMATA’s Design Criteria. 9. Standard Drawings and Specifications. 10. Design-Builder’s Accepted Technical Proposal. Design Review The contract stipulates a two-phased design review: Intermediate Review and Final Review. The design re- view includes specifications, drawings, and submittals. WMATA was to review design submittals solely to as- certain their conformance to the Mandatory Docu- ments. The Mandatory Documents as defined by the RFP are: • Division 00, Proposing and Contracting Require- ments. • Division 01, General Requirements. • Division 02 to 16, Specifications. • WMATA Design Criteria. • WMATA Construction Safety Manual. • WMATA Insurance Requirements. • Volumes 1 to 5, Mandatory Drawings. • All other documents incorporated by reference in the above. WMATA was to approve or disapprove submittals when, in its sole judgment, those submittals deviated from the Mandatory Documents. The contract’s General Conditions further indicate that WMATA’s review, ap- proval, or acceptance of submittals would not waive the design-builder’s responsibility for the quality, technical accuracy, and coordination of the design documents. Suspension and Termination The contract required liquidated damages if the de- sign-builder does not achieve the project work within the specified period of performance or if the design- builder does not meet project milestones. Table 10 shows the sum per day for each calendar day that con- stitutes a delay in the project schedule.

28 Table 10. Largo Extension Milestones and Liquidated Damages Milestone Description Required Date Sum per calen- dar day 1 • Complete service rooms • Duct connections to service rooms • Full access to station contractor to al- low commencement of Contract 3 Notice to Proceed (NTP) + 564 $1,500 2 Complete energization of line NTP + 765 $1,500 3 Achievement of Operations Readiness Date (ORD) NTP + 975 (ORD) $4,500 4 • Final Completion and Acceptance • As-built drawings • Manuals • Punch list items December 30, 2004 (Note: After the RFP, the date was changed to November 30, 2004) $1,500 The contract stipulated that WMATA has the au- thority to extend the period of performance as often as and in time periods deemed necessary by the perform- ance of the work. It also had a preestablished table that identified expected dates of adverse weather for each month of the year. These days were to be the responsi- bility of the design-builder and factored into its sched- ule. Adverse weather conditions exceeding the desig- nated number of days were to be a risk borne by WMATA. The contract stipulated that should a suspension of work order be issued in the life of the project and sub- sequently canceled, the design-builder must resume work. The contract has provisions for an equitable ad- justment to the project schedule, price, or combination thereof and any other contract provisions affected by the suspension in the event that 1. The suspension results in an increase in schedule or cost to the design-builder in performance of the con- tract, and 2. The design-builder submits a claim within 30 days of resuming work. Contractor Proposed Changes in Standards or Requirements The contract included provisions for design-builder submissions of VECPs in the design phase of the pro- ject. The provisions stipulated that WMATA will accept VECPs according to the following conditions: requires significant change to contract and mandatory docu- ments, decreases contract price, maintains contract requirements, does not require an unacceptable exten- sion to schedule, and passes a 2-phase review and eval- uation process. Phase 1 involved conditional approval and Phase 2 involved final approval. WMATA was to share the savings with the design-builder 50/50 based on net savings. Dispute Resolution The contract required the use of a DRB as the first stage in resolving contractual or process disputes re- lated to the project work. Each party was obligated to pay 50 percent of the costs of the DRB. Disputes that could not be resolved at the DRB level were ultimately to be brought by the complaining party to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The contract also required the development of a partnership charter to encourage cooperation among the owner, design-builder, lead design professional, and principal subcontractors and suppliers. While the estab- lishment of such a charter does not negate the legal relationship of the parties, it is meant to achieve the following goals: 1. For the owner and design-builder to establish a cohe- sive partnership with the objective to build a quality product on time, at a satisfactory cost to the owner and a satisfactory profit to the design-builder. 2. To establish trust and open communication for the life of the project. 3. To develop an understanding for the management of the project. 4. To resolve disputes. 5. To avoid disputes and confrontation. Other Provisions The contract included a safety awareness program provision that provides incentives to the design-builder for positive safety performance. The design-builder was to share in an incentive value worth 1 percent of the Base Proposal Price or contract value upon the date of completion (whichever is higher). To determine the in- centive, the contract employed a formula for determin- ing IR on the job site. The contract assumed a base IR of 4.0. The actual IR at the date of substantial comple- tion is computed using the following formula:

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TRB’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Legal Research Digest 39: Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies explores the use of various project delivery methods, including design-build, construction management at risk, and a number of options considered public-private partnerships, through the examination of seven separate construction projects in various parts of the United States.

The examinations of the seven selected projects are designed to show how particular, and often unique, problems were addressed in each project by utilizing a wide variety of procurement and delivery methods.

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