National Academies Press: OpenBook
« Previous: VI. LARGO EXTENSION OF BLUE LINE PROJECT
Page 29
Suggested Citation:"VII. PORTLAND SOUTHERN CORRIDOR--PORTLAND MALL SEGMENT." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
×
Page 29
Page 30
Suggested Citation:"VII. PORTLAND SOUTHERN CORRIDOR--PORTLAND MALL SEGMENT." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
×
Page 30
Page 31
Suggested Citation:"VII. PORTLAND SOUTHERN CORRIDOR--PORTLAND MALL SEGMENT." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
×
Page 31
Page 32
Suggested Citation:"VII. PORTLAND SOUTHERN CORRIDOR--PORTLAND MALL SEGMENT." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
×
Page 32

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

29 IR = N x 200,000 MH Where: N = Number of lost work day injuries and/or illness MH = Total hours worked by all construc- tion site employees 200,000 = Base for 100 full-time equivalent workers working 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year In addition to a section for safety performance, the contract documents included incentives for early project completion. Early completion is based on the ORD of 975 days. The incentive equals $10,000 for every day to a maximum of 90 days for each day earlier than the ORD. Accordingly, the maximum incentive allowed by the contract is $900,000. Project Performance In March 2002, WMATA issued a Notice to Proceed to LGS. LGS self-performed the majority of the civil and structural work on the project, using several major sub- contractors. It encountered a number of delays, which allegedly included access delays, late relocation of utili- ties or work of other WMATA contractors, and delays associated with deficiencies in and/or changes to WMATA’s Mandatory Design. During the project, the Washington, DC, area experienced severe inclement weather, including excessive rain, a hurricane, and re- cord cold temperatures and snowfall. LGS claimed that this unusually severe weather—which started in Octo- ber 2002 and continued through the winter of 2003/2004—exacerbated the effect of the delays. LGS claimed that WMATA instructed LGS that it would not grant time extensions and that LGS must complete the project by the contractual completion date in December 2004. LGS allegedly undertook a number of measures to accelerate the work and was able to overcome the vari- ous alleged WMATA delays as well as the unusually severe weather, completing the project by the original contract completion date as directed by WMATA. In April 2004, LGS sought a time extension and submitted to WMATA an Analysis of Schedule Impacts and Cost Increases, indicating the reasons for the re- quested extension. It subsequently submitted a $30 million Request for Equitable Adjustment in November 2004. Attempts to negotiate a settlement were unsuc- cessful. In January 2006, WMATA ultimately denied virtually the entire claim, and its contracting officer issued a Final Decision that was unacceptable to LGS. Subsequently, in February 2006, LGS appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals and filed a $32 million loss of productivity claim for delay and con- structive acceleration, arguing that the project experi- enced delay events that would have delayed the project by 197 days but for the acceleration of LGS. The pri- mary basis for its claims rested on adverse weather, although LGS also argued that it was delayed by delays in utility relocation and WMATA’s failure to obtain right-of-way access. WMATA initially disputed LGS’s argument that the delays it experienced were excusable delays that im- pacted activities on the critical path. It contended that LGS did not appropriately request and substantiate time extensions as required, thus depriving WMATA of the opportunity to make informed decisions about schedule relief before any purported acceleration oc- curred. WMATA also disagreed that the delaying events claimed by LGS were the cause of the additional costs incurred by LGS and its subcontractors. WMATA at- tributed some of the delays to the weakness of LGS’s ability to plan and execute its work, particularly its seeming inability to generate a workable project sched- ule in a timely fashion. WMATA also felt that LGS had particular difficulty in reaching a productive level on the “learning curve” due to the unique double-box tun- nel construction and the associated steel-box traveler forms called for in the contract. After limited discovery, LGS altered its claim theo- ries and argued that the majority of its delays were caused by a change to the jet fan design, which had ar- guably been resolved by a change order at the begin- ning of the project. WMATA defended this theory on a variety of grounds, but its primary argument was that LGS had failed to provide requisite notice that its loss of productivity claim was based on the jet fan change order—since the weather, utilities, and right-of-way were the items that had been claimed for years. The parties decided to conduct a mediation with a retired Contract Appeals judge, with the participation of representatives from the State of Maryland, the con- tract’s funding source. The parties exchanged mediation position statements and key documents, including ex- pert analyses of the sources of contract delay and the associated performance costs. The parties then met for 2 days—in joint sessions and in caucuses with the me- diator. The mediator provided his assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions to both sides in separate, oral discussions. After ad- visement from the mediation judge, LGS and WMATA reached a settlement of $9.5 million to resolve all claims pertaining to the contract; it was subject only to ap- proval by WMATA’s Board of Directors and funding by the State of Maryland. The State of Maryland ulti- mately agreed to pay the settlement amount. After the claim settlement in December 2007, the total project budget (for all three contracts) grew from $459,458,604 to $468,958,604. VII. PORTLAND SOUTHERN CORRIDOR— PORTLAND MALL SEGMENT Project Overview The Portland Transit Mall is the public transporta- tion network operating in the Portland, Oregon, metro- politan area. The light-rail network in this region, known as the Metropolitan Area Express (MAX), runs

30 three lines (Blue Line, Red Line, and Yellow Line) and has been operated by the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (TriMet) since 1986. The growing transportation needs of the increasing population in the region (an estimated one million new residents by 2030) required further expansion of the MAX light-rail network. To meet this need, it was pro- posed to add a new line (the Green Line) to the existing network. This expansion project was officially titled the I-205/Portland Mall Light Rail Extension Project. The Portland Mall Light Rail Extension Project and the I-205 Light Rail Extension Project together form the I-205/Portland Mall Light Rail Extension Project, which is the first phase of the South Corridor Project. Phase 1 was proposed to bring the MAX Green Line service to I- 205 between Clackamas Town Center and Gateway, where it would then use the existing MAX Blue and Red line tracks to downtown Portland, and then run on new tracks along the Portland Mall to Portland State University. The second phase of the South Corridor Project is the Portland-Milwaukie Light Rail Project. This section discusses the Portland Mall Light Rail Extension Project segment. Launched in 2005 by TriMet and its partners—the City of Portland, MAX, Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), and Clackamas County—the 3.4-mi Portland Mall light-rail project was completed in fall 2009. This segment of the Green Line runs the length of the Mall, connecting 15 stations from Union Station to Portland State Univer- sity. TriMet managed the construction of the Portland Mall under one CMAR contract. The contract, a fixed unit-price type, was awarded as a single contract to a joint venture formed by Stacy & Witbeck and Kiewit Pacific. The contractor was responsible for assisting the team during the preconstruction period in the ad- vancement of the drawings into 100 percent final design and construction documents. As a part of this process, the contractor was required to perform a detailed re- view of the design drawings for constructability, value engineering, and cost savings opportunities, and to pro- vide a detailed construction cost estimate and take-off that reflected the then current market conditions and pricing. The CMAR was required to provide precon- struction services and serve as general contractor for the civil, utilities, and systems construction. The CMAR contract included a preconstruction services agreement and, upon successful negotiation of a GMP, a contract for construction services. Procurement Scope of Work The scope of the construction project included all of the construction work for the Mall with the exception of shelters for the light-rail platforms. The contractor ap- pointed was brought on during the final design phase to provide design review, value engineering, a detailed schedule, and cost estimates to meet the contract schedule and budget. The scope was predefined by TriMet in the RFP document. The anticipated scope of preconstruction services under the contract was identified by task order number. The scope included tasks such as: • Consult with owner and design team to advise and assist and provide recommendations on civil, utility, and systems elements. • Provide full-time services of the proposed project manager for 15 months beginning with "Notice to Pro- ceed." • Provide and submit written documentation and plans related to value engineering, constructability rec- ommendations, QA/QC plans, and a preliminary and final "Conduct of Construction," which address con- struction aspects such as phasing and sequencing of events and special considerations like storm water drainage management, emergency vehicle provisions, and public and worker safety provisions. • Submit detailed schedules, work plans for different phases of construction, contracting plans with goals such as maximizing DBE opportunities and construc- tion of systems work, cost estimates, Critical Path Method schedules, and safety plans. • Following completion of 100 percent of the final design and construction documents, submit a GMP. The scope of the construction services involved the finalized submission of cost and schedule plans, con- tracting documents, QA/QC plans, and other project documents, in accordance with the plans presented dur- ing preconstruction services. Apart from this, the scope involved implementation of an effective safety program and the DBE and Work- force Training programs, all in accordance with plans developed during the preconstruction phase. The scope also included conducting weekly job meetings with TriMet, resolving disputes between subcontractors and suppliers as a result of construction, obtaining neces- sary permits for construction, and completing all con- struction work for a price not exceeding the established GMP. Process Overview The bid evaluation procedure was divided into three phases—the determination of a competitive range based upon written proposals, an interview process of short- listed firms, and a final score to select the firm that would be awarded the contract. TriMet and the Office of Transportation of Portland had appointed an Evalua- tion Committee (EC) to determine a competitive range and evaluate the proposals of various firms based on the range. Only the firms that fell in the competitive range were considered for award of the contract. This was the first stage. The EC then interviewed those firms that scored within the competitive range. The interviews had a two- fold purpose. First, it allowed the proposers to clarify written proposals in response to questions from the EC. Second, it provided the proposers an opportunity to ask questions on any provisions of the RFP. Following the

31 interview, the proposers were given the opportunity to revise their proposals and submit a BAFO. In the final stage, the EC assigned evaluation points to each proposer upon receiving the BAFO. The evalua- tion points were assigned utilizing certain pre- established criteria (see next section). The EC based its decision of selecting the most favorable proposal on these evaluation points and forwarded its recommenda- tion to the Executive Director of Capital Projects and Facilities of TriMet for authorization. Selection and Award Criteria The EC evaluated the submitted written proposals on the basis of certain predetermined criteria and set a score for each criterion, totaling to a maximum of 150 points. Each criterion was further divided into subcrite- ria with scores associated with them. The score of each individual criterion was computed using these subcrite- ria. The evaluation criteria and corresponding subcrite- ria are listed in Table 11. Table 11. Portland Transit Mall Segment Selection Criteria Group Criterion Maximum Score SubCriteria Firm experience and project team 25 1. Capacity 2. Similar project experience 3. Proposed team 4. Specific roles 5. Resumes Project approach, safety and man- agement plan 50 1. Within budget 2. On-time completion 3. Community impacts 4. Safety Price 50 1 Preconstruction services price 2. Lump-sum fixed fee price DBE and Workforce Training Pro- gram 25 1. Workforce diversity 2. Subcontractor utilization 3. Project subcontracting plan Group Criterion 1: Firm Experience and Project Team.—The capability of each proposing firm in execut- ing projects of this nature was evaluated through rele- vant subcriteria. Based on the findings, the firms were allotted scores (maximum of 25 points). The capacity of the proposer was assessed based on the firm’s annual volume figures for the previous 5 years, current firm commitments, and current bonding capacity. The ex- perience of the proposing firm was gauged through the performance of its projects over the previous 10 years that were similar in scope and value to the current pro- ject as identified in the RFP. The performance of previ- ous projects was evaluated through information such as location of the project, the completion date, a brief de- scription of the project highlighting similarities in scope and value, the amount of initial contract award and final contract close-out, and the number and dollar amount of the claims and legal expenses incurred in the project. An organizational chart showing the proposed key staff for this project at the field and corporate level was required to be submitted. The proposing firm was required to identify key personnel involved in activities

32 such as preconstruction services, DBE and workforce utilization, safety, QC, budget control, schedule control, and utility coordination. The firm was further required to provide the resumes of all the individuals listed in the organizational chart. Group Criterion 2: Project Approach, Safety, and Management Plan.—The proposing firms were required to identify how the project was planned for completion within the established GMP and on time. A preliminary baseline schedule with the proposed phasing, sequenc- ing of work, durations, and number of concurrent work zones had to be submitted by the proposing firms. They were further required to report and justify what per- centage contingency the Owner had to retain, and which tasks of the project would be subcontracted. The proposers had to highlight the steps taken to minimize adverse impact to the surrounding environment of the site, and to establish good relations and productive communication with all interested parties. The propos- ing firms were required to identify their plan and ap- proach to incident-free management of public safety risks and highlight their safety experience and per- formance on projects involving in-street construction under vehicular and pedestrian traffic in central city areas. Based on these subcriteria, the firms were allot- ted a maximum score of 50 for this evaluation criterion. Group Criterion 3: Price.—The proposing firms had to provide a not-to-exceed price based on the units and scope of the project as identified in the RFP. In addi- tion, the firms were required to provide their “fixed fee” for construction services as a firm, lump-sum price, in- clusive of all the services mentioned in the RFP. The proposed “Preconstruction Services Price,” which was inclusive of all associated costs and profit, was not in- cluded in the GMP and would be paid under a profes- sional service contract. The fixed-fee lump-sum price for the construction services was included in the GMP, which was calculated as the sum of the reimbursable costs, contractor’s risk/contingency, and fixed fee. Based on these subcriteria, the firms were allotted a maxi- mum score of 50 for this evaluation criterion. Group Criterion 4: DBE and Workforce Training Program.—The proposing firms were required to take all necessary and reasonable steps in accordance with federal laws to ensure that DBEs were given the maxi- mum opportunity to compete for and participate in the performance of the project. The proposer was required to agree that the firm will not discriminate on any grounds in the award of subcontracts or in performance of this project. The proposer had to provide a descrip- tive analysis of the current utilization of minorities and women in its workforce, the previous training and em- ployment opportunities provided to them, and remedial action planned to counter current underrepresentation of minorities and women, if existent. Each proposing firm was required to provide a nar- rative description of its previous experience in promot- ing participation of DBEs as contractors, consultants, or suppliers, along with supporting data identifying the level of activity by task in man-hours to be performed by DBE firms, and the percentage of the total work ef- fort that it represented. Further documents required to be submitted were a detailed outreach program or plan for obtaining maximum utilization of DBE firms on the project, including a detailed schedule of events and steps to maximize DBE participation. It was high- lighted that in no event should there be an increase in the contract price due to changes in DBE participation. Key Contract Provisions Design Review The project drawings were provided by TriMet, and the contractor was required to assist the team during the preconstruction period in the advancement of these drawings into 100 percent final design and construction documents. As a first priority, the contractor was re- quired to perform a detailed review of the design draw- ings for constructability, value engineering, and cost savings opportunities, and to provide a detailed con- struction cost estimate and a take-off based on current market conditions and pricing. The design consultant was responsible for the development of specifications that would govern the construction of the project. Suspension and Termination TriMet had the right to terminate all or part of the contract if it was determined that termination was in the public interest. The termination would be effective upon delivery of written notice of termination to the contractor. The contractor would be entitled to payment for the contract work completed before termination, and to payment for all reasonable contract close-out costs. TriMet reserved the right to terminate the project contract if the contractor failed to perform the services within the time specified in the contract or make pro- gress or otherwise performed in a way to endanger the performance of the project. In such a case, TriMet's right to terminate the contract could only be exercised if the contractor did not rectify the failure within 10 cal- endar days (or more if authorized in writing by the con- tract administrator) after receipt of notice from the con- tract administrator specifying the failure. In the event of TriMet terminating the contract, the contractor would be liable to TriMet for any excess costs incurred for seeking alternate supplies and services similar to those terminated. The contractor would be paid the con- tract price only for completed services delivered and accepted. If later determined by TriMet that the con- tractor had an excusable reason for not performing, TriMet could allow the contractor to continue work, or treat the termination as a termination for convenience. Inclusion of DBEs The DBE program required that the contractor ob- tain a list of certified DBE firms from TriMet's online DBE directory or the state certification list and appoint a DBE coordinator to manage all DBE matters on the project. The contractor was required to solicit the inter-

Next: VIII. THE RIVER LINE (SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT SYSTEM) »
Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies Get This Book
×
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

TRB’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Legal Research Digest 39: Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies explores the use of various project delivery methods, including design-build, construction management at risk, and a number of options considered public-private partnerships, through the examination of seven separate construction projects in various parts of the United States.

The examinations of the seven selected projects are designed to show how particular, and often unique, problems were addressed in each project by utilizing a wide variety of procurement and delivery methods.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!