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Suggested Citation:"IX. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Suggested Citation:"IX. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Suggested Citation:"IX. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Suggested Citation:"IX. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Suggested Citation:"IX. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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Suggested Citation:"IX. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14639.
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36 The contractor provides all personnel and materials for maintaining the facility. If the owner decides to terminate the contractor during the O&M period, be- cause the owner deems it in its best interest, the owner has the right to terminate for convenience. The contrac- tor has the right to any costs incurred up to the termi- nation date and costs incurred solely as a result of the termination, any unusual costs incurred to oper- ate/maintain the facility, and previously unreimbursed capital expenditures within a 12-month period. At the end of the contractor-obligated O&M period, the contract stipulates that the contractor train any owner personnel to take over the O&M. In addition, the contract requires that the contractor perform an inven- tory of all O&M equipment and replace any missing equipment, to be deducted from the contractor’s com- pensation. If the price of replacement equipment ex- ceeds the contractor’s compensation, the owner must replace any and all equipment within 15 days after the termination of the contractor’s obligation. The contract also stipulates the condition of the as- sets upon the completion of contractor-obligated O&M. All assets, including LRT cars, must be in good condi- tion, normal wear and tear excepted. All assets must have a physical and economic life expectancy consistent with the timeline provided in the mandatory docu- ments. The contract does not provide any more specific information regarding the state of the facility at the termination of contractor-obligated O&M. Project Performance General In June of 1999, NJ Transit issued a letter of intent to award the contract to Rail Group, and subsequently it entered into an agreement with Rail Group for the design, construction, and O&M of the SNJLRTS. A no- tice to proceed was issued in December of 1999 with an original opening date in 2003. The procurement and contract documents included both mandatory compli- ance requirements and reference design documents. Rail Group was granted substantial flexibility with re- spect to design, construction, and operating details; however, it agreed to deliver the system for a fixed price and by a specified date. Further, Rail Group assumed the obligation to coordinate various design and con- struction issues with local municipalities and entities along the corridor. Following extensive delays and dis- putes, the River Line opened for service in March 2004. Issues, Claims, and Settlement Progress and changes became challenges relatively early in the project. Delays, cost overruns, and disputes were the result of several factors: 1) difficulties in es- tablishing final design parameters, which were com- pounded by Rail Group’s need to coordinate final design with multiple government agencies and municipalities along the corridor; 2) identification, protection, or relo- cation of utilities throughout the corridor; 3) issues re- lated to the condition of existing freight railways and bridges that were to be rehabilitated as part of the agreement; and 4) discrepancies with respect to the quality of work or equipment specified for installation. For over a year, the two parties sought to resolve devel- oping issues within the bounds of the contract. In 2002, Rail Group filed suit. The case was heard in the Superior Court in Essex County, New Jersey, for over 4 years. The primary basis of Rail Group’s claim was that it had encountered substantial increases in project cost and schedule due to owner-caused disrup- tions, delays, and changes in the scope of the work. An- other key issue relative to Rail Group’s argument was the function of the Reference Documents provided by NJ Transit as the basis for Rail Group’s bid for DB ser- vices. Rail Group’s claim amounted to $125 million in “extras” and an extension in the project’s schedule. This claim was in addition to $28 million for changes already authorized by NJ Transit. NJ Transit’s counterclaims, in excess of $56 million, were based upon their argu- ment that required work was either deficient or not yet completed, credits were due to NJ Transit for items of work that were removed from the original scope of work, and payment of liquidated damages. In addition, NJ Transit argued that Rail Group had failed to provide it with the necessary evidence to substantiate its re- quests for changes in the contract price. Ultimately, the two parties settled, but throughout the case several findings impacted the terms of the set- tlement agreement. During discovery, NJ Transit was found to have not adequately addressed some basic pro- ject issues such as right-of-way management. The court, however, dismissed Rail Group’s assertion that mis- takes in the Reference Documents had cost it roughly $20 million. The contract stated that the Reference Documents were for informational purposes only, so Rail Group had an obligation to assess, in particular, the accuracy of these documents relative to existing conditions during the bidding process. As NJ Transit’s counsel, Philip White, commented, “[the contract] was very onerous on the contractor and it was enforced.”25 Ultimately, NJ Transit agreed to pay $53 million to Rail Group. Of this amount, however, $15 million was pay- ment of the Rail Group joint venture’s undisputed re- tainer, and $8 million was payment for agreed-upon changes. NJ Transit also agreed to extend the contract by 438 calendar days, which allowed Rail Group to avoid liquidated damages. IX. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION General Overview The seven cases investigated illustrate an array of delivery approaches, procurement processes, contract provisions, and outcomes. A general summary of each case (in the order presented in the digest) is depicted in the following table. 25 Public Works Financing, NJ Transit Rail DBOM Claims Settled, Vol. 215, at 4 (2007).

37 Table 13. Overview of Case Studies Project Delivery Method Contract Value (mil- lions)26 Start Finish Comments BART Ex- tension to SFIA DB $530 1997 2003 Track work and systems portion of project was delayed and experienced cost escalation; this portion encountered undiscovered endan- gered species, had construction accidents, and difficult site conditions. Project inclusive of oth- er contracts was 20 months late and 33 percent over budget. DART Green Line Construction Man- agement/General Contractor $497.5 2005 2010 Opened ahead of schedule and on budget. Dulles Metrorail DB $1,600 2007 2013 Construction of Phase 1 in progress and ap- pears to be on time and generally within budget. AirTrain JFK Design-Build- Operate-Maintain $1,134 1998 2003 Roughly 1 year late and 67 percent over budget. Largo Ex- tension Design-Build $218 2002 2004 On time and ultimately 4 percent over budg- et; delay claims initially of $30 million, but set- tled through mediation for $9.5 million. Portland Mall Seg- ment Construction Man- agement/General Contractor $220 2005 2009 On time and slightly over budget; no known claims or major issues. Southern New Jersey Light Rail System DBOM $605 1999 2004 438 days late and ultimately 9 percent over budget; $125 million in claims by contractor and $56 million counterclaim by owner. After exten- sive litigation, $53 million settlement and time extension of 438 days. 26 For CMAR delivery, value is for construction; for DB, value is for design and construction; for DBOM, value is for design, construc- tion, and operations.

38 While the intention of this study was not to compare the performance of one delivery method with another, the evidence gathered, while anecdotal, does permit some basic inferences about the circumstances associ- ated with each project and its delivery method. DBOM Projects The two DBOM projects—AirTrain JFK and South- ern New Jersey Light Rail—were complex endeavors, and each experienced its share of issues and challenges. Both employed best-value type of procurement proc- esses, but both strongly emphasized the fixed-price for design, construction, and operations services. The fixed prices delivered by the proposers were based on func- tional designs prepared by each agency. For the Air- Train JFK, the technical provisions and contract draw- ings were developed only to a 5 to 10 percent level of design at the time of procurement.27 This eventually caused issues, particularly in finalizing the station de- signs. However, the project team was driven to work through issues: “Everyone was motivated to make things work. No one wanted to be the bad guy in terms of stopping the project.”28 Still, the project had $40 mil- lion in unresolved claims and changes as it neared con- clusion. Ultimately, these issues were solved through negotiations, thanks to the prevailing attitude to “make things work.” The SNJ Light-Rail Project (i.e., the River Line) had a different philosophy and outcome. At the time of pro- curement, NJ Transit provided proposers with Manda- tory and Reference Documents as a basis for developing their fixed prices. NJ Transit made it clear and con- tended throughout the process that the Reference Doc- uments were for informational purposes only, so the accuracy of the information was not confirmed or vali- dated. This position effectively required that proposers complete their own design development activities, con- duct their own site investigations, or assume the risks inherent in not doing so—risks such as unknown condi- tions or latent defects of existing facilities requiring enhancement or rehabilitation as part of the contract. Once the contract was awarded and work progressed, existing site and facility conditions (as well as finalizing detailed design) became issues for the contractor. Liti- gation ensued, but as counsel for NJ Transit noted, the contract “was very onerous on the contractor and it was enforced.”29 General lessons that may be drawn from these two cases relate principally to the level of design detail and 27 A. Cracchiolo & V. Simuoli, JFK AirTrain: Project Man- agement Issues on a Large DBOM Project, ASCE 8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMATED PEOPLE MOVERS PROC., San Francisco, CA (2001). 28 A.L. C. deCerreno, AirTrain JFK, Integrated Transporta- tion and Land Use Planning: Facilitating Coordination Across and Among Jurisdictions 42, Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management, NYU Wagner School of Public Ser- vice, New York (2008). 29 Public Works Financing, supra note 25, at 4. project information provided by the owner. In both cas- es, uncertainty existed in site conditions and design requirements at the time of procurement. In one in- stance, however, the owner adopted more of a risk- sharing philosophy in the project whereas in the other the owner maintained a risk-transfer stance. Although these two issues are not unique to DBOM contracts, the real question is whether it was appropri- ate for the agencies to shift the risks of site conditions and defects in the design documents developed by the agency to the contractor. For example, the purpose be- hind the standard differing site conditions clause used by the federal government (which has been a central tenet of construction contracts for decades) is that no contractor can control preexisting site conditions, and there is a benefit in having the contractor strip its bid of contingencies for these risks and have the owner pay actual costs if a differing site condition is actually found. It is axiomatic that, notwithstanding contract language to the contrary, if a contractor encounters a site condition risk that it did not price, it will file a claim and the parties will become adverse to each other. The agencies in both of these case studies experienced this firsthand. DB Projects The three DB projects—BART Extension to SFIA, Largo Extension of the Blue Line, and Dulles Metrorail (Phase I)—varied in terms of scale and complexity. The Largo Extension was one of three contracts associated with expanding service in the Washington, DC, metro- politan area and had a value of $210 million. This con- tract required trackwork and necessary appurtenances but no station design. While the project was delivered on time, the design-builder claimed that it had suffered $30 million in loss of productivity. The project’s pro- curement process, to some extent, may have contributed to this. The BAFO process resulted in the design- builder shaving 4½ months off of its schedule. While not directly stated by the project personnel interviewed, it is conceivable that this eliminated time needed by the design-builder to deal with, among other things, bad weather. The line and track DB contract for the BART Exten- sion was one of several contracts for extending service to the San Francisco Airport and had a value of $530 million. Like the Largo Extension, it required track- work and necessary appurtenances but no station de- sign. This project, however, experienced substantial delays and cost overruns. Of note was the discovery of an endangered species on the project site, which caused over 2 weeks of delay. More significant were the site conditions where soils were so rigid and hard that they bent steel pilings.30 As noted by a BART project repre- sentative at the time, “construction has gone pretty much as planned. But every day you have something that slows you down, you lose ground.” Additional is- sues were encountered on other contracts associated 30 Cabanatuan & Wilson, supra note 20.

39 with the overall project involving the lead contractor in this case, but these were discussed previously. The Dulles Metrorail is unique among these three projects since it developed out of an unsolicited proposal allowed by Virginia’s PPTA. The unsolicited proposal was delivered in 1998, and it was not until 2004 that a CA for the total project was executed. Essentially, the CA gives DTP the right to develop the project for the MWAA (recall that Virginia transferred the CA to MWAA in 2006). The DB project investigated in this report was a negotiated contract between DTP and MWAA under the CA. This first phase of the project is well under construction, and the contract includes an aggressive scheduling specification. Daily liquidated damages are staged at $25,000 to $100,000 per day and capped at $60 million, but incentives for early comple- tion are also provided; the contractor may earn up to $10 million in incentive payments for completing the project up to 5 months early. The two “conventional” DB projects reinforce the simple fact that large-scale infrastructure projects often face unexpected issues. The Largo and BART Extension projects were not atypical, and each confronted charac- teristic construction challenges. Such issues caused significant problems in the BART project. Alternatively, the Dulles Metrorail project demonstrates the potential of public-private arrangements; the unsolicited proposal catalyzed action on a concept that had been notional for years. Somewhat paradoxically though, it also high- lights the commercial and legal complexity of such con- tractual arrangements. It took nearly 10 years from the original unsolicited proposal for a design and construc- tion contract to finally get executed. CMAR Projects The two CMAR projects—DART Green Line (North- west segments) and TriMet Portland Mall Segment— were two of the more recent cases studied. As project delivery options continue to open up for owners, new methods are being employed. In each of these cases, the projects involved substantial design development activi- ties and community engagement. For instance, the Portland Mall project was part of the expansion of light- rail service in Portland’s southern corridor. The Mall Segment involved the development of light rail in a dense urban setting where disruption of urban busi- nesses was a concern. By involving a construction or- ganization during the preconstruction phase, TriMet was able to work closely with the designer and the con- struction management team to package the work to minimize construction impacts. The work proceeded through different zones sequentially to contain activi- ties to specific locations.31 This type of interaction and planning was not necessary on the I-205 portion of the expansion since the railway largely followed an existing 31 TriMet, I-205/Portland Mall: Max Light Rail Fact Sheet 1 (2009). transitway; consequently, TriMet used a DB approach for this section.32 A possible lesson from these two projects is the po- tential that the CMAR method has to bring construc- tion expertise into the preconstruction phase of a pro- ject. Such involvement generally promotes better work sequencing and enables other activities such as con- structability reviews and value engineering. While the CMAR approach has been used frequently in commer- cial vertical construction for similar reasons, it has been used infrequently on public sector projects. The transit community should consider this delivery method along- side other options for its projects, as CMAR is an attrac- tive alternative where an owner 1) desires to retain significant influence over design development but still wants to fast-track a project; or 2) expects involving a construction manager early in a project outweighs the need for substantial construction pricing competition. Procurement Processes Generally, the procurement processes employed in the case studies were multiphased arrangements where prequalified teams submitted proposals in response to an RFP. Evaluation methodologies and criteria were fairly diverse, but broadly speaking, procurement prac- tices that had characteristics of “best value procure- ments” were observed in five of the seven cases. There were two “outlier” cases. The BART Extension used a prequalification process, followed by a procure- ment strategy that ensured that proposals met mini- mum technical requirements. Award was based on low- est responsible price. The second outlier case, the Dulles Metrorail, was ultimately the result of an unso- licited proposal that generated a CA, and the DB con- tract for a phase of the overall project outlined in the CA was a negotiated arrangement. In the remaining cases, categories of selection crite- ria including price were evaluated. Some processes used scoring systems for the categories, which provides pro- posers an indication of the relative importance of the criteria. Scoring approaches, however, do not necessar- ily provide a clear indication of how the points in any particular category will be assigned. In other cases, categories were assigned relative weights, while in oth- ers, categories were only prioritized or the relative im- portance of the categories was not disclosed. Table 14 provides a detailed summary of the procurement proc- esses for each case sorted by delivery method. The cases demonstrate commonality in general procurement ap- proach but some diversity in definition of selection cri- teria and assessment of those criteria. 32 Id.

40 Table 14. Summary of Procurement Processes Project Delivery Method Procurement Process DART Green Line Construction Man- ager/ General Contractor RFP with selection based upon multiple scored qualitative criteria: a) project approach, b) project personnel, c) team composi- tion/subcontracting, d) firm/team experience, e) oral presentations, and f) proposal risk assessment and lowest responsive price; price weighted most heavily in the overall assessment Portland Mall Segment Construction Man- ager/ General Contractor Multiphase selection: Phase 1—150 points in 4 categories to estab- lish a competitive range: a) firm experience and project team [25 pts], b) project approach, safety and management plan [50 pts], c) price [50 pts], and d) DBE and workforce training programs [25 pts]; Phase 2— interviews with proposers in the competitive range; and Phase 3 – BAFO BART Extension to SFIA DB Prequalification; RFP with proposals selected based upon minimum price and meeting minimum specified technical requirements Dulles Metrorail DB Unsolicited proposal that led to CA; DB contract for a phase of overall project negotiated within the bounds of the CA Largo Extension DB RFQ followed by short-listing; RFP with selection based on techni- cal proposal and separate sealed price proposal; technical proposal considered: a) management plan, b) key staff, c) preliminary safety plan, d) quality plan, and a preliminary critical path method schedule AirTrain JFK DBOM RFQ followed by short-listing; RFP with multiphase selection: Phase 1—evaluation of non-price proposal based on multiple qualita- tive criteria; Phase 2—evaluation of NPV of design, construction, and operations services; Phase 3—establishment of a competitive range; Phase 4—BAFO Southern New Jersey Light Rail System DBOM RFQ followed by short-listing; RFP with selection based on 300 points for technical proposal and 700 points for price (points awarded based upon percent of bid to low bid) Not surprisingly, price was a dominant or heavily- weighted selection factor in every case except the Dulles Metrorail. Note, however, that while selection of the design-builder in the Dulles Metrorail project was not dependent directly on price competition, steps were taken by MWAA to ensure that the price was reason- able. This finding increases the substance of the inde- terminate pricing question, which was fundamental to this study. Interestingly, two cases—Largo Extension and AirTrain JFK—had procurement processes that deviated somewhat from the planned approach. In both cases, the initial prices provided by the proposers ex- ceeded those expected. In the Largo project, WMATA instructed the proposers to submit their BAFOs. Subse- quently, the Authority finalized a deal with its selected contractor. In the AirTrain JFK project, the Port Au- thority directed the proposing consortia to submit re- vised proposals at lower prices. After receiving the sec- ond proposals, the Authority short-listed two proposers and selected one of the remaining two. The procure- ment documents provided both owners with the latitude to adjust the process as necessary to identify and select a preferred bidder. Indeterminate Pricing Each case study is, to some extent, an example of the procurement of design and construction services based on indeterminate pricing, inasmuch as the final design of the project was not fully defined before contracts were awarded to the contracting teams. In all of the DB and DBOM arrangements, agencies required the pro- posers to advance the RFP design to a point where they could provide a fixed price for final design and construc- tion (and, for DBOM, operations). Where operations services were requested, it was common to include means to adjust the prices of some commodity items over extended periods of time via indexing techniques. The Dulles Metrorail project was a bit different. Of the DB and DBOM contracts surveyed, it was the only one where the contracting entity was able to both ad- vance the design and then negotiate the contract prior to contract award. As a result, there was no direct com- petition at the prime design-builder level, and there was no other DB price for MWAA to consider in evalu- ating the reasonableness of DTP’s price. Rather, MWAA and its consultants were able to evaluate, on an open- book basis, DTP’s assumptions and conduct their own assessment of what the project should cost. The other DB and DBOM projects selected the contractor through a competitive process.

41 The other unique feature of Dulles Metrorail vis-à- vis indeterminate pricing was the use of an innovative allowance process for $600 million of what would ordi- narily have been lump-sum work. These allowances were developed because some subcontractors had a challenge in pricing their work so many years in ad- vance of their actual work. By taking these items out of the fixed price, the owner assumed the risk of subcon- tractor pricing, but eliminated what would have been substantial contingencies for the affected subcontrac- tors. Based on reports from the project personnel, the allowance program has been highly successful, and the actual pricing has been, for most items, at values less than the allowance prices—and far less than the values that would have been contained in the fixed price. In the AirTrain JFK case, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey chose to negotiate a contingency fund with its selected contractor to segregate elements of the project where potential risks forced escalation of the overall fixed price. In doing so, the Authority estab- lished a reimbursable payment scheme with a ceiling price for these items and provided the contractor incen- tive to minimize costs by sharing 40 percent of any sav- ings below the ceiling with the contractor. In the River Line case, NJ Transit provided propos- ers with Mandatory and Reference Documents in the solicitation, with the Reference Documents being for informational purposes only. As a result, proposers were expected, in developing their prices, to anticipate and verify existing conditions before submitting propos- als. This shifted the risk of pricing incomplete docu- ments to the design-builder, and based upon the result of the litigation, this risk shifting was successful. In the two CMAR cases, the approaches employed were similar. In each, the owner defined preconstruc- tion task orders and the proposers submitted unit pric- es for the items of work. In each, the owner and the contractor negotiated a GMP for construction services once the scope of the project was more fully defined. In the DART Green Line project, the owner developed a detailed schedule of anticipated items of construction work, so proposers had to submit unit prices against these items as well as an expected not-to-exceed price. These prices served as the basis for subsequent GMP negotiations. In the Portland Mall Segment project, however, the owner requested that the proposers only submit a fixed fee for construction period services, which would be included in the GMP. In the DART case, the owner needed to do far more front-end plan- ning and the proposers had to have a reasonable level of confidence in the developed schedule of construction items if it was to have any true value to the project. To increase competitive pressure when soliciting bids from subcontractors, both CMAR arrangements had procurement provisions for this purpose. In the DART case, the RFP required proposers to submit a completed schedule of anticipated subcontractors/subconsultants. Further, before the award of any subcontract or subcon- tract modification expected to exceed $100,000, the con- tractor was required to submit the subcontractor’s cost or pricing data unless the price was based on adequate price competition, based on established catalog or mar- ket prices of bulk commercial items sold to the general public, or set by law. In the Portland Mall Segment project, TriMet re- quired each proposer to identify in its contracting plan any construction trade work that it proposed to com- plete by other than low-bid subcontracting. Proposers were allowed, however, to accomplish work either by selecting subcontractors on a best-value basis or through self-performance. TriMet retained the right, however, to require competitive bidding for all work, to negotiate firm prices, or to allow all work on a cost- reimbursable basis. Any self-performed work was re- quired to be based on competitive pricing. Contract Provisions Overall, the contract provisions in the case studies did not provide any substantial surprises with regard to ownership of documents, design review, contractor pro- posed changes, suspension and termination, or inclu- sion of DBEs and dispute resolution. Instead, the case studies confirmed that owners still expect to maintain the right to review design documents when DB or DBOM approaches are employed. Likewise, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms remain a staple of con- tractual arrangements for these types of projects. Two of the case studies coupled partnering/team-building initiatives with alternative dispute resolution mecha- nisms to encourage participant cooperation. Of note, however, were some of the other provisions discovered such as the monetary incentives or damages employed to motivate contractor safety or schedule performance. Legal Issues and Disputes Disputes arose in three of the cases studied. Of the remaining four, two cases had yet to reach a point where disclosure of disputes, if any, was possible. Inter- estingly, both DBOM cases had issues related to scope definition and existing conditions. Each of these pro- jects provided a limited functional description of the project in the solicitation documents as well as limited or “nonbinding” information regarding existing condi- tions. In one case, the owner held fast to the conditions of the contract, so the disputes went into litigation. During litigation, the court tended to hold the contrac- tor to the contract conditions and requirements, so a large claim was ultimately settled, generally in favor of the owner. In the other case, the owner chose to miti- gate apparent contingency pricing in the winning pro- posal by negotiating a contingency fund that would pay for certain items of work or encountered conditions on a reimbursable basis up to a maximum price. In addition, the owner worked through various issues with the con- tractor to the point where disputed items of work were resolved by the completion of construction. In the end, both owners obtained the projects they solicited, even though the means for handling issues with the contrac- tor were different.

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TRB’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Legal Research Digest 39: Competition Requirements of the Design/Build, Construction Manager at Risk, and Public-Private Partnership Contracts—Seven Case Studies explores the use of various project delivery methods, including design-build, construction management at risk, and a number of options considered public-private partnerships, through the examination of seven separate construction projects in various parts of the United States.

The examinations of the seven selected projects are designed to show how particular, and often unique, problems were addressed in each project by utilizing a wide variety of procurement and delivery methods.

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