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issue more fines and fewer warnings for evading fares on cies, performance reports, management audits, manuals and
the LRT--a decision that was not publicized. Using weekly SOPs, and fare inspector job descriptions.
data for 163 weeks, the researchers examined the effect of
the lower inspection rates and the higher fining rate on LRT Statutes, Ordinances, Policies
fare evasion and found that the largest change in fare evasion
rates--a reduction of 21% (from 5.3% to 4.2%)--was when Statutes related to fare enforcement, officer authorities,
the chance of receiving a citation (rather than a warning) was penalties, and adjudication were reviewed from California,
substantially increased. Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Washington.
Several local policies and ordinances related to PoP and fare
Lee reported on the results of a comprehensive sampling evasion were also available from New Jersey Transit, Salt
of fare evasion in San Francisco (9). The work was performed Lake City Utah Transit Authority (UTA), San Diego Met-
by SFMTA in 2009 and involved a survey of 41,239 customers ropolitan Transit System (MTS), Tempe (Arizona), and
on 1,141 transit vehicle runs, bus and light rail. SFMTA uses Seattle. As examples, two California statutes that cover a
a hybrid or modified PoP fare collection system for its system range of fare enforcement and adjudication definitions and
of bus and light rail services. At subway light rail stations, functions can be found in Appendix C.
faregates are used; at light rail surface stops, prepaid custom-
ers can board at any door, whereas cash-paying riders must Agency Performance Reports
pay at the front door and obtain a transfer/fare receipt. Results
from the survey provided disaggregated data with regard to Sample reports have been received from transit agencies in
specific modes and routes, time periods, level of enforcement, Buffalo (NFTA), Dallas (DART), Denver Regional Transit
use of rear-door boarding, and transit vehicle occupancy. The District (RTD), Edmonton Transit System, Los Angeles (LA
average fare evasion systemwide was found to be 9.5%. Metro), MinneapolisSt. Paul (Metro Transit), New Jersey
Transit (NJT), Salt Lake City (UTA), San Diego (MTS), San
In 2007, Transportation Management & Design, Inc., Francisco (SFMTA), Seattle (Sound Transit), and St. Louis
undertook a systematic sampling of fare payment on LA Met- (Bi-State). They range from formal to informal, and from
ro's rail transit lines and the Orange Line BRT (10). The sam- one page to 15 to 20 pages. An example of a concise monthly
pling was 100% of the patrons on each vehicle boarded. The report is included in Appendix D. This sample is from the
inspection was performed in "plain clothes," and citations or UTA in Salt Lake City. It is one page, titled "Public Safety
warnings were not issued. The resulting analysis provided Monthly Report," and contains key statistics for the month:
fare evasion statistics by line, time of day, and weekdays and total ridership, passengers checked, violations, citations, and
weekend days. Overall, the evasion rate ranged from 3.5% to violator percentage.
6.9% for the lines, with the Orange Line BRT at 5.6%.
Management Audits
Reddy et al. reported on substantive research on the sub-
ject of fare evasion in the NYCT subway operation (11). Four audits were reviewed: two conducted by the Metropoli-
The authors discussed NYCT's multipronged approach for tan Council (MinneapolisSt. Paul) for the Hiawatha LRT
managing subway fare evasion, an approach that also can and Northstar Commuter Rail lines, respectively; one for
be applied where PoP fare collection is employed. The SFMTA; and one for Vancouver TransLink. The Vancouver
approach includes advanced automated fare collection turn- audit is discussed below, and the MinneapolisSt. Paul and
stiles designed with security features to physically prevent San Francisco audits are reviewed in their respective case
abuse and facilitate audits, a legal framework that gives tran- studies in chapter four. The audits are rather lengthy and for
sit police tools to enforce law and order, data collection and that reason are not reproduced in this report's appendixes,
analysis that keep an accurate picture of evasion trends and but all are available on the LRT Committee website (http://
TVM vandalism, and a comprehensive press strategy that research.lctr.org/trblrt/).
ensures that NYCT's efforts in clamping down on evasion
are publicly communicated. Although Vancouver was not selected as a case study can-
didate, it is the only operator in this study that uses PoP fare
collection and indicated that it was planning to move away
MANAGING PROOF-OF-PAYMENT WITHIN THE from PoP and implement a barrier system. This audit was
TRANSIT ORGANIZATION performed in 2007 for Vancouver TransLink by PriceWater-
houseCoopers (12). The scope of work of the audit included
An objective of this study was to assemble materials related reviewing and offering recommendations with regard to the
to PoP operations from the transit operators. These materials methodology for estimating the amount fare evasion and the
can provide a foundation for agencies considering PoP fare processes and procedures for fare checking and fare enforce-
collection and for those desiring to benefit from the practices ment. A summary of recommendations from the audit is
of others. These materials include statutes/ordinances/poli- listed here:
