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12 issue more fines and fewer warnings for evading fares on cies, performance reports, management audits, manuals and the LRT--a decision that was not publicized. Using weekly SOPs, and fare inspector job descriptions. data for 163 weeks, the researchers examined the effect of the lower inspection rates and the higher fining rate on LRT Statutes, Ordinances, Policies fare evasion and found that the largest change in fare evasion rates--a reduction of 21% (from 5.3% to 4.2%)--was when Statutes related to fare enforcement, officer authorities, the chance of receiving a citation (rather than a warning) was penalties, and adjudication were reviewed from California, substantially increased. Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Washington. Several local policies and ordinances related to PoP and fare Lee reported on the results of a comprehensive sampling evasion were also available from New Jersey Transit, Salt of fare evasion in San Francisco (9). The work was performed Lake City Utah Transit Authority (UTA), San Diego Met- by SFMTA in 2009 and involved a survey of 41,239 customers ropolitan Transit System (MTS), Tempe (Arizona), and on 1,141 transit vehicle runs, bus and light rail. SFMTA uses Seattle. As examples, two California statutes that cover a a hybrid or modified PoP fare collection system for its system range of fare enforcement and adjudication definitions and of bus and light rail services. At subway light rail stations, functions can be found in Appendix C. faregates are used; at light rail surface stops, prepaid custom- ers can board at any door, whereas cash-paying riders must Agency Performance Reports pay at the front door and obtain a transfer/fare receipt. Results from the survey provided disaggregated data with regard to Sample reports have been received from transit agencies in specific modes and routes, time periods, level of enforcement, Buffalo (NFTA), Dallas (DART), Denver Regional Transit use of rear-door boarding, and transit vehicle occupancy. The District (RTD), Edmonton Transit System, Los Angeles (LA average fare evasion systemwide was found to be 9.5%. Metro), MinneapolisSt. Paul (Metro Transit), New Jersey Transit (NJT), Salt Lake City (UTA), San Diego (MTS), San In 2007, Transportation Management & Design, Inc., Francisco (SFMTA), Seattle (Sound Transit), and St. Louis undertook a systematic sampling of fare payment on LA Met- (Bi-State). They range from formal to informal, and from ro's rail transit lines and the Orange Line BRT (10). The sam- one page to 15 to 20 pages. An example of a concise monthly pling was 100% of the patrons on each vehicle boarded. The report is included in Appendix D. This sample is from the inspection was performed in "plain clothes," and citations or UTA in Salt Lake City. It is one page, titled "Public Safety warnings were not issued. The resulting analysis provided Monthly Report," and contains key statistics for the month: fare evasion statistics by line, time of day, and weekdays and total ridership, passengers checked, violations, citations, and weekend days. Overall, the evasion rate ranged from 3.5% to violator percentage. 6.9% for the lines, with the Orange Line BRT at 5.6%. Management Audits Reddy et al. reported on substantive research on the sub- ject of fare evasion in the NYCT subway operation (11). Four audits were reviewed: two conducted by the Metropoli- The authors discussed NYCT's multipronged approach for tan Council (MinneapolisSt. Paul) for the Hiawatha LRT managing subway fare evasion, an approach that also can and Northstar Commuter Rail lines, respectively; one for be applied where PoP fare collection is employed. The SFMTA; and one for Vancouver TransLink. The Vancouver approach includes advanced automated fare collection turn- audit is discussed below, and the MinneapolisSt. Paul and stiles designed with security features to physically prevent San Francisco audits are reviewed in their respective case abuse and facilitate audits, a legal framework that gives tran- studies in chapter four. The audits are rather lengthy and for sit police tools to enforce law and order, data collection and that reason are not reproduced in this report's appendixes, analysis that keep an accurate picture of evasion trends and but all are available on the LRT Committee website (http:// TVM vandalism, and a comprehensive press strategy that research.lctr.org/trblrt/). ensures that NYCT's efforts in clamping down on evasion are publicly communicated. Although Vancouver was not selected as a case study can- didate, it is the only operator in this study that uses PoP fare collection and indicated that it was planning to move away MANAGING PROOF-OF-PAYMENT WITHIN THE from PoP and implement a barrier system. This audit was TRANSIT ORGANIZATION performed in 2007 for Vancouver TransLink by PriceWater- houseCoopers (12). The scope of work of the audit included An objective of this study was to assemble materials related reviewing and offering recommendations with regard to the to PoP operations from the transit operators. These materials methodology for estimating the amount fare evasion and the can provide a foundation for agencies considering PoP fare processes and procedures for fare checking and fare enforce- collection and for those desiring to benefit from the practices ment. A summary of recommendations from the audit is of others. These materials include statutes/ordinances/poli- listed here: