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15 operators employ fare inspection officers who are all quali- resent a limited data set, the numbers provide an incentive fied with police powers. to dig deeper on the subject in future research. TABLE 4 The productivity of inspectors was also measured in FARE INSPECTORS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICE terms of inspectors per 1,000 daily riders and is shown in POWERS Table 6. The average and median were 0.51 and 0.39, respec- Power n % tively, and there was quite a large range in the numbers, from Yes, officers have police powers 17 58.6 0.04 inspectors per 1,000 riders to 2.00. No 12 41.4 Total responding agencies 29 100.0 MONITORING AND INSPECTING FOR FARE PAYMENT Table 5 shows what other functions the fare inspection Each operator has internal procedures, written or perhaps force carries out. Most of the officers also provide basic unwritten, that deal with fare evaders. In many instances policing and security services (79.3%) and enforce agency when an inspector encounters a rider without valid proof of ordinances (58.6%). For five operators (17.2%), the fare fare payment, there is some discretion involved in whether to inspection force assists with passenger counts. issue a citation. In most situations, the fare inspection force is authorized to issue warnings. As noted in chapter two, exam- TABLE 5 ples of SOPs from various properties are available at the TRB ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF FARE INSPECTORS LRT Committee's website (http://research.lctr.org/trblrt/). Duty n % With regard to issuing citations, as indicated in Table 7, Policing/security 23 79.3 nearly all of the 29 respondents authorize their inspectors to Passenger counts 5 17.2 issue warnings (96.5%). Two-thirds (19 of 29) of the respon- Enforce other ordinances of the agency 17 58.6 dents issue written and oral warnings, whereas in nine cases Other 8 27.6 only oral warnings are permitted. None 2 6.9 Multiple responses allowed; percentages do not add to 100%. TABLE 7 TYPES OF WARNINGS AUTHORIZED FOR FARE EVASION In Table 6, the number of inspectors [full-time equiva- Warning n % lents (FTEs)] employed by the operators was compared Written and oral 19 65.5 on a financial basis and productivity basis. The data were Oral only 9 31.0 judged to not be sufficiently reliable to allow for an evalu- None 1 3.4 ation by mode. For the respondents, the average number Total responding agencies 29 of employees per $100,000 was found to be 1.15 and the Percentages to do not add to 100% because of rounding. median 1.43. TABLE 6 Of the 28 agencies that issue warnings, 26 provided data NUMBER OF INSPECTORS RELATED TO COSTS AND on the number of annual citations and warnings issued and, RIDERSHIP of those, eight do not keep records of the number of warn- Duty Number of Inspectors (FTEs) ings issued. For the remaining 18 operators, the relationship Per $100,000 Annual between the numbers of citations issued compared with Inspection Budget Per 1,000 Daily Riders warnings showed a wide range. In Table 8, a comparison Average 1.15 0.51 between citations issued with warnings issued is summa- rized for these 18 operators. If citations equal warnings, then Median 1.43 0.39 the value would be 1.00. As shown in Table 8, seven agencies Total responding agencies = 24 have values less than 1.00, indicating that they issue more warnings than citations over the course of a year. For the 18 The data were examined to determine whether differ- responding agencies, the average is 3.5 more citations than ences exist between agencies using their own employees for warnings and the median is 1.1. fare enforcement and agencies employing contract private employees. The average number of inspectors per $100,000 When it comes to monitoring fare evasion, counts are con- for the two operators with contract private employees ducted in a variety of ways. As shown in Table 9, the most was found to be substantially higher than the average and common is by way of the fare inspection force; 65.5% of median, at a rate of 2.58. So, although the two samples rep- the agencies use inspector counts. Internal agency samples