8


Putting It All Together

Each of Chapters 2-7 provides details of one of six primary phases of effective capability surprise mitigation. As noted throughout, there are many nuances in each phase, but the overarching goal is to provide senior Navy leadership with an accurate picture of the landscape of potential surprises that naval forces may face. The chapters also discuss the available mechanisms to prepare for delivering a surprise or responding to one whether intelligence-inferred or disruptive, and whether mitigation would consist of defensive counters or offensive preemptive surprises of our own.

A number of surprise areas are currently being addressed by the Navy establishment, including by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the Office of Naval Research-Global (ONR-G), fleet combatant and component commands, among others. Yet while each of these groups is addressing some aspect of surprise preparation, providing input through their respective chains of command, there is not a focal point within the naval forces enterprise to look holistically across the breadth of potential surprise or at the phases of response and preparation. No particular component of the Navy is able to advise the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and other OPNAV components of the institution’s ability to address surprise and, specifically, certain intelligence-inferred surprises, especially those in the gaps between missions and programs, for which there should be some plan available in advance.

Naval forces can leverage existing capabilities and work to integrate the potential contributions to adequately prepare for capability surprise and also to ensure collaboration with the other services and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

As discussed in detail throughout this report, the committee has identified



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8 Putting It All Together Each of Chapters 2-7 provides details of one of six primary phases of effec- tive capability surprise mitigation. As noted throughout, there are many nuances in each phase, but the overarching goal is to provide senior Navy leadership with an accurate picture of the landscape of potential surprises that naval forces may face. The chapters also discuss the available mechanisms to prepare for delivering a surprise or responding to one whether intelligence-inferred or disruptive, and whether mitigation would consist of defensive counters or offensive preemptive surprises of our own. A number of surprise areas are currently being addressed by the Navy es- tablishment, including by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the Office of Naval Research-Global (ONR-G), fleet combatant and component commands, among others. Yet while each of these groups is addressing some aspect of surprise preparation, providing input through their respective chains of command, there is not a focal point within the naval forces enterprise to look holistically across the breadth of potential surprise or at the phases of response and preparation. No particular component of the Navy is able to advise the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and other OPNAV components of the institution’s ability to address surprise and, specifically, certain intelligence-inferred surprises, especially those in the gaps between missions and programs, for which there should be some plan available in advance. Naval forces can leverage existing capabilities and work to integrate the potential contributions to adequately prepare for capability surprise and also to ensure collaboration with the other services and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As discussed in detail throughout this report, the committee has identified 131

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132 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Challenges Readiness Communicate/ Engage Capability Risks Stakeholders in Enterprise-wide Process Selected Program Approach Plan Surprise Mitigation Office PEOs, SYSCOM FFC, CG, MCCDC FIGURE 8-1 Recommended functional framework for addressing capability surprise. six functional phases to be performed by a capability surprise mitigation office. Figure 1-3, 8-1, S-1 These phases, illustrated in Figure 8-1, provide the backdrop for engaging the full array of capability acquisition,image (Spiral) Mostly a fixed fielding, and training entities. To effectively coordinate and accomplish these tasks, a surprise mitigation office should be es- tablished within OPNAV. It could be a new office or it could also be an existing office with a modified charter within one of the codes. As discussed in Chapter 1, of the alternatives, the committee considers N9I the best option based on its pres- ent role, but recognizes that the CNO may select an alternative as better aligned with priorities. This office can serve as the focal point for capability surprise among all naval forces (i.e., the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard). While the office may not be the lead for all aspects of the capability surprise enterprise, it should serve as a leader element to ensure completion and delivery of any operational capability that addresses surprise mitigation. The six key functions that should be represented in this office are as follows: • Scanning and Awareness, • Assessing Surprise, • Prioritization, Option Development, and Decision Formulation, • Resource and Transition Planning, • Implementation and Fielding, and • Force Response.

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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 133 The preceding chapters describe these phases in some detail. In this chapter the committee tabulates their attributes. It then illustrates how they can be in- terwoven into the existing naval organization structure. Finally, the committee summarizes how the framework could be applied to more effectively address the three examples of surprise that recur throughout this report. ROLES AND ACTIVITIES Figure 8-2 summarizes the outputs, owners, stakeholders and participants, and activities of each phase of the framework as described in the previous chap- ters. The committee has determined that many, or most, of the requisite functions already reside within the naval organization. However, the functions are not suf- ficiently integrated, prioritized, or advocated. That is the primary motivation for Recommendation 1, which suggests that a surprise mitigation office be established to lead in coordination and prioritization. The committee shows the surprise miti- gation office is the coordinating “owner” for the first four phases. The final two phases of the framework would be led by the existing organization once OPNAV has prioritized, defined, and planned the appropriate measures. OPNAV will con- tinue to participate in the final phases and to ensure that the surprise mitigation capabilities are deployed in a timely manner. The stakeholders and participants are brought together, as appropriate to the topic, to address signs of emerging sur- prises from the scanning and awareness activities of the operational, research, and intelligence establishments in phase 1, and to move toward the modeling and as- sessment organizations and laboratories to verify feasibility in the middle phases. Finally, the acquisition and operational organizations are the primary players in the final phases. The activities of each phase are summarized, and the primary output of each phase is shown in the first row of the table, from identification of chal- lenges to delivery of capability and readiness to deploy. The committee notes that sometimes, with disruptive surprises recognized only in the heat of an operation, a crash program will involve just the last three phases as the early ones have been preempted by new findings on the battlefield or disaster area. ORGANIZATIONAL ALLOCATION OF STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS Because this study is largely about the integration of leadership and pro- cesses, the recommendations are necessarily focused on different parts of the naval organization. The recommendations must be viewed as an integrated set— that is, implementing some recommendations, but not others, will not lead to an integrated process in the committee’s view. On the other hand, the committee worked to ensure that the present organization is leveraged to the maximum extent and with a minimum of change. For the convenience of the reader, Figure 8-3 is provided to map the recom- mendations to elements of the naval organization, and Box 8-1 summarizes the

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134 Surprise Mitigation Challenges Readiness Office PEOs, SYSCOMs Communicate/ Engage Capability Risks Stakeholders in FFC, USCG, MCCDC Enterprise-wide Process Selected Program Approach Plan Scanning & Assessing Surprise Prioritization, Option Resource & Transition Implementation & Force Response Awareness Development & Planning Planning Decision Formulation Outputs Challenges Risk Priority, feasibility, & Program plan Capability Readiness affordability Owner(s) Surprise Mitigation Surprise Mitigation Surprise Mitigation Surprise Mitigation PEOs FFC Office Office Office Office SYSCOMs USCG FORCECOM MCCDC Stakeholders ONR-G N81 N2/N6 DASN RDTE/CTO Surprise Mitigation OSD/SCO ONI FFC N8 MCCDC Office Surprise Mitigation FFC USCG FC-A N9 USCG CG-8/ N9 Office USCG FC-A MCCDC DASN RDTE/CTO FORCECOM N2/6 USCG FC-E & FC-T MCCDC ONR/CNR SYSCOMs DASN RDTE/CTO MCCDC MCCDC USCG FC-P USCG FC-P SYSCOMs Participants/ Industry NWDC, MCWL NWDC, MCWL Industry OPTEVFOR USN, USMC, & USCG Performers Labs/Warfare Centers Industry Industry Labs/Warfare Centers Industry Operational Forces Academia Labs/Warfare Centers Labs/Warfare Centers PEOs Labs/Warfare Centers IC Think tanks Think tanks SYSCOMs Services’ Colleges Services’ Colleges ONR Activities Technical Intelligence Campaign models TTP Program Planning, TTP/CONOPS TTP/CONOPS S&T monitoring Cultural assessments Modeling Budgeting, & System Modifications Assessment Physical modeling System modeling Prototype Coordination New Programs Testing Experiments/ATD Training Exercises Equipping FIGURE 8-2 Roles and activities to address capability surprise.

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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 135 3 & 5a Novel red teaming & 1 5b Program Framework 4 Plaƞorm margins Other USG planning CollaboraƟon Tailored acquisiƟon CNO OSD with OSD ASN RDA Agencies surprise office CMC DARPA 2 CTO CUSCG 3 AƩenƟon to OPNAV PEOs DASN “gapped” SYSCOMs SOCOM PMs RDT& E surprises & M&S FFC N1 Warfare ONR Centers 6 a, b, & c N2/N6 Training for CPF ONR -G surprise N3/N5 2 2 ONR-G Surprise CLF Virtual Lead offices N4 for scanning & awareness CNE N8 ONI 1& 5c Surprise MiƟgaƟon N9 Office FIGURE 8-3 Mapping of recommendations to organizations within and outside the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Many of the acronyms have already been identified in the text. See Appendix D for the definitions of those that have not so far been spelled out. BOX 8-1 Abridged List Figure S-3 and 8-3 of Committee Recommendations 1. Implement surprise framework and establish surprise mitigation office to ensure priority capability surprises are addressed and deployed. 2. Combatant commanders and component commands establish surprise mitigation offices with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (DASN RDT&E) designated as CTO and ONR-G given leadership of scanning and awareness. 3. Initial tasking of surprise mitigation office to focus on horizon scan, model- ing, and red teaming involving experts, especially in gapped areas. 4. Collaboration with corresponding Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) surprise offices. 5. In planning for surprise, (a) Design margins in platforms for future payloads, (b) Tailored acquisition, and (c) Rapid fielding. 6. In preparing for surprise, (a) Realistic planning and training for surprise with collaborating organizations, (b) Leveraging of Navy Readiness Reporting Enterprise (NRRE), and (c) Broader training for classified capabilities.

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136 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE recommendations. As shown from the mapping, the organizational impact of each individual recommended change on any part of the organization is rather small. However, the sum of these rather minor changes results in a much more integrated and prioritized organization, in the committee’s view. One area that is not explicitly addressed is the requisite resourcing for sur- prise phases, especially those where there is no existing program whose resources could be reprioritized. To address the resourcing question requires more detailed consideration of the organizational and process changes that would be needed. However, note that the DOD offices involved in surprise mitigation are resourced for tens of millions of dollars to integrate the early-phase functions. 1 These of- fices apparently rely on reprioritizations from the respective Services’ acquisition and fielding elements to resource development, acquisition, deployment, and training to address surprise. The committee observes that sufficient funds may already exist within the OPNAV, ONR, and ONI organizations to ensure adequate support for the early phases. Reprioritization of acquisition and readiness funds would be required only in the latter phases. If handled within existing programs, internal prioritization, resourcing, and management appears tractable to the com- mittee. However, if the required response to an emerging capability surprise is a new system or major system upgrade, with appropriate program process tailoring, the need and reprogramming might be accomplished within the existing processes and programs in some cases and might require new resources in others. Examples of the Proposed Framework FOR THE THREE Scenarios In Appendix A, the three scenarios—(1) loss of space access, (2) social media manipulation, and (3) a natural disaster—are described in detail. In this section, the committee summarizes its understanding of how those activities are being addressed as well as how they could be more effectively addressed with the recommended framework. (1) Space Access Scenario How the Space Access Threat Is Being Addressed Today The committee did not uncover an overarching plan or program to address the general force-level problem of space access denial. Several studies were identified as having provided assessments of vulnerabilities (see Figure 8-4), and certain individual acquisition programs are known to have incorporated antijam designs to ensure operation in projected denied environments. There is 1  response to the Defense Science Board Summer Study on Capability Surprise, the Office of the In Secretary of Defense has established the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) in AT&L.

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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 137 Comms ISR GPS Uplink Jammed X Kinetic Attack GPS Jammed, Downlink Comms Dazzling Jammed X High Power Ground Jammer GPS Jammer Mobile ISR Ground Jammed Jammer Airborne ISR & Comms Jammer Airborne LOS Range Sea Surface Surface Jammer LOS Range Airborne LOS Range FIGURE 8-4 Space access scenario. evidence of some consideration for adaptive switching among networks from an individual platform perspective—for example, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command’s (SPAWAR’s) Automated Digital Network System (ADNS)—but ap- parently not from a multiuser network perspective with quality of service needs considered, such as antijam margin, propagation fading, or message error rate. There has been some consideration of how backup services might be provided— for example, via aircraft in lieu of satellites. However, no plans to implement such backup capabilities were identified. One could expect that perhaps N2/N6 in conjunction with SPAWAR is the appropriate authority to ensure detailed planning for near-term contingencies and longer-term space resilience. However, practical and effective planning would require participation of the platform, weapons, and C2 programs to ensure un- derstanding of impacts and priorities. Further, changes in joint programs such as GPS and certain communications and intelligence, surveillance, and recon- naissance (ISR) systems would likely be limited without substantial funding or DOD direction.

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138 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE How Proposed Framework Functions Could Mitigate the Space Access Threat Scanning and Awareness. The threat already appears to have been well character- ized by the intelligence community. Assessing Surprise. It would be expected that a red team would first run models and perform other calculations to determine performance shortfalls of critical individual systems carried on deployed units for the expected geometries. For example, What are the needs for Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) cueing by remote radars and Which ISR data are required to plan for prompt strike mis- sions? The resulting inventory of affected systems and impacts could then be used to run a war game series to assess the impact on the campaign objectives and to explore alternative strategies, testing, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) or system modifications to mitigate the impacts. Prioritization, Option Development, and Decision Formulation. The results and alternative mitigation approaches for the near and far term would be prioritized according to cost-and-time effectiveness. This phase would sponsor the appro- priate laboratories and industry to perform the engineering trade-offs to identify potential technical concepts. A trade-off of the concepts would be expected to lead to identification of those few most favorable concepts for practical near-term implementation at reasonable cost and requiring the least complex integration. Resource and Transition Planning. If prototyping and critical experiments are required, ONR would be expected to lead coordination of that activity, involving laboratories and industry, perhaps in conjunction with SPAWAR. Since joint and other Service programs such as GPS are also likely involved, the surprise mitiga- tion office would coordinate with those program offices, perhaps in concert with appropriate OSD offices. After the prototype testing validates the most expedient approach previously identified via modeling and analyses, a program office would be established or designated to develop the integrated plans and gain industry participation. It is likely that existing industrial players already associated with key elements such as GPS and certain communications and platform capabilities would be selected for limited capability fielding without requiring a time- and cost-consuming competition. However, it may turn out that a more robust, long- term approach is found to be necessary for which a follow-on acquisition program would be appropriate. Then, tailored acquisition processes already in place and determined appropriate to the intended acquisition would be exercised. Implementation and Fielding. A special project would be established to coor- dinate the near-term measures such as developing interim airborne alternative services (if that is the selected approach after trade-off analyses and prototype validation), coordinate development of TTPs, and perhaps coordinate longer term

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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 139 developments with both Navy and joint program offices if there is no appropriate program office for longer term acquisition. Force Response. Fleet Forces Command (FFC) would develop plans for deploy- ing and training for the near-term stopgap measures in conjunction with any joint forces via the COCOMS. FFC would also be involved in ongoing fleet experi- ments and training to anticipate space access issues and how to respond, thus building resilience and adaptation capabilities among operational users. (2) Social Media Manipulation How Such Manipulation Is Being Addressed at Present The committee learned that some research is under way on how social media like Twitter might be a reliable indicator of population mood as well as on how it could be used by activists, both allied and adversary, as a C2 tool (see Figure 8-5). In addition, studies have been performed on how governments have attempted to thwart such social media, locate leaders via their messages, and influence the crowd by inserting their own messaging and attributions. Recent examples such as the Arab Spring and unrest in London have been studied, for example. This analysis and review is a form of limited horizon scanning. It is also recognized that groups such as special operations forces (SOF) are able to consider the use of social media to promulgate messages and solicit cooperation. It is believed that the sum total of these research and evaluation efforts would engender expertise in the use of social media to impact crowd behavior, so that if the scenario described in Appendix A about the fictitious place called Provencia were to transpire, experts could be brought into a situation room conference to plan responses. However, except possibly for SOF, there does not appear to be any activity, especially across appropriate U.S. departments, to consider how to strategically leverage social media or respond to threats against U.S. interests facilitated by such media. Also, there does not appear to be significant training or TTP development to prepare forces to respond and prevail in a social media environment. Using the Surprise Framework to Mitigate Manipulation of Social Media Scanning and Awareness. Additional effort would be expended to gather intel- ligence on how others are using, plan to use, and have used social media for crowd manipulation and control. Also, a technology scan of new commercial media products and their projected influence on large numbers of people could be undertaken. If it is determined that evolving social media products present a sufficient threat and/or opportunity over an identified time frame, red teaming be considered.

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140 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Social media reception • Command & Control • Awareness Onground Operations Adversary attempt to subvert and control social media Evacuations U.S. Interest U.S. Forces • Situational awareness • Information flow • Situation influence FIGURE 8-5 Social media manipulation. Assessing Surprise. For this scenario, it is of particular importance to understand the socio-cultural context of trends and unrest around the world that could impact U.S. interests and thus draw in naval forces. To adequately red team potential de- velopments it would be critical to include experts in specific cultures where such scenarios could evolve. Also important would be access to experts with military and political knowledge of the countries or entities of interest. Red teaming would be expected to produce situations where social media could foment particularly volatile protests against U.S. interests. A question then would be, How might U.S. forces respond, including using social media? This, in turn, could lead to identification of which and how many social media assets should be available to naval forces from the command level to the troops. Finally, the red team results could be a backdrop for defining training and exercise needs. Prioritization, Option Development, and Decision Formulation. This function would lead to definition of potential counters using existing publicly available social media in concert with timely situation awareness knowledge from in- field intelligence. It should also lead to computer modeling of how to detect and interpret the potential intent of adversaries and third parties to manipulate the population. New approaches to situation awareness and command and con-

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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 141 trol may be required. The identified options may not allow numerical trade-off analysis, and as a result, additional red teaming and wargaming may be needed to complement the limited amount of crowd-sourced data for modeling based on human dynamics. Resource and Transition Planning. One solution might be to resource broader SOF contingency planning, TTP preparation, and more equipping and training of naval forces. It is likely that only limited acquisitions may be needed for the introduction of contingency capabilities. However, over the long term ONR might want to increase research on better predictive and response assessment tools for social media mitigation and leveraging. Implementation and Fielding. It may be that a limited supply of social media de- vices and applications should be acquired for the training of key players and for contingency planning. Because of the expected rapid changes in such products, it would be important to plan for limited buys, quick access if needed, and rapid product refresh. Also, as mentioned above, some aspects of social media might begin to be integrated into naval C2 facilities. Whatever decisions are made, it is important that resilience to cyberattacks should be considered, especially since open source products are involved. Force Response. As actual social media events occur, training and contingency planning might be incorporated into real-world exercises and methodical lessons- learned feedback as actual social media events occur. (3) Fukishima Disaster How the Situation Was Addressed from the U.S. Perspective In Operation Tomodachi, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) was engaged within 24 hours of the earthquake and tsunami in a massive human assistance/ disaster relief (HA/DR) operation that involved major contributions from the U.S. Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Army. Operation Tomodachi involved about 24,000 U.S. personnel, 189 aircraft, and 24 naval vessels, with the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group (CSG) leading the way.2 U.S. efforts focused heavily on transport of relief supplies, SDF personnel [(Japanese) Self Defense Force], and equipment; surveillance of the affected area to search for stranded victims; and restoration of critical infrastructure, such as damaged airfields, in order to sustain operations.3 2  Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery. 2011. Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., June 2. 3  Ibid, p. 4.

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142 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE The ability to conduct these sorts of operations relied heavily on training within PACOM, on the significant U.S. armed forces presence already resident in Japan (e.g., Yokosuka Naval Base), and on the coordination and training already existing between U.S. and Japanese forces. In fact, Operation Tomodachi was the first time that Japanese helicopters operated from U.S. aircraft carriers and was the first time that U.S. military units operated under Japanese command in actual operations. Key to U.S. participation were contributions to the opening of ports and airfields for supply movement.4 U.S. naval activities centered around the use of the USS Ronald Reagan CSG to facilitate air operations. USMC operations centered around hands-on ground services to clear transport points, establish relief hubs, and distribute supplies. Air activities concentrated on supply transport and airfield augmentation (e.g., to as- sist operations at Tokyo’s Narita Airport) and included the use of Global Hawk to survey the landscape. Ground activities included the use of U.S. Army personnel already assigned to Japan, including U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel. 5 Lessons Learned from Operation Tomodachi6 The official lessons learned are listed below to (1) indicate the areas that could perhaps have been anticipated had there been broader discussions among international HA/DR parties and (2) serve as a guide for what should be routinely done in the future. • Prescribe HA/DR material to be on hand for future use. • Improve interoperability training between Japanese and U.S. aircrews. • Adhere to a memorandum of understanding between U.S. and Japanese forces. • Provide Voice Over IP (VOIP) capability for CENTRIXS and SIPRNET for deploying strike groups. • Prescribe and approve (by Commander, Seventh Fleet) a list of standard materials that are carried onboard Commander, Task Force 73’s Combat Logistics Force (CLF) assets in addition to the HA/DR kits that could be used in future HA/DR evolutions. • Create two logistics cells: a tactical cell and a strategic cell. • Continue to use social media as the number one method to quickly disseminate information to the public at large. Additionally, authorize and fund programs that increase the bandwidth of ships with organic public affairs support. • Joint Task Force Joint Interface Control Officer needs to push out the correlated common operational picture. 4  Ibid. 5  Ibid. 6  U.S.Pacific Fleet, Warfighting Assessment and Readiness Directorate, personal communication with NRC staff officer, July 27, 2012.

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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 143 • Employ F/A-18 Shared Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) capability in HA/DR when available. Institute capability doctrinally. • Formalize a method for coordinating the transportation of nongovern- mental organizations (NGOs) or civilian-provided HA/DR supplies to reduce confusion about the process during the next HA/DR mission. • Ensure that all concerned are aware of the information-sharing agree- ments and systems. The Navy clearly had a preparation and readiness capability learned from previous disasters and from ongoing procedures and contingencies for nuclear systems safety. It is important to note that the U.S. Navy has decades of experi- ence operating nuclear-powered ships and submarines and in protecting personnel in a chemical, biological, radiation, or nuclear (CBRN) environment. Particularly important, the Navy had the vast experience of HA/DR associ- ated with Operation Unified Assistance, which was established to help with the massive Indian Ocean earthquake and resulting tsunami on December 26, 2004. This disaster, the deadliest tsunami on record (approximately 230,000 dead in 14 countries),7 served as excellent training in the use of naval forces for HA/DR (the USS Lincoln Battle Group), and cooperation and coordination with the military resources of Australia, Japan, Singapore, Russia, France, and Malaysia. 8 Specific Lessons Learned from Operation Unified Assistance • Importance of tsunami early warning systems and damage reporting. “An Indian Ocean tsunami early warning system could have saved many lives.”9 Also, had more accurate damage reporting been available, the U.S. Navy and other disaster relief assets could have begun their operations earlier. 10 • Importance of rapid and flexible sea basing. Sea basing is essential for disaster areas with little or no infrastructure. Operation Unified Assistance’s sea basing served as a model for post-Hurricane Katrina cleanup. 11 7  U.S. Geological Survey. 2013. “Magnitude 9.1 – Off the West Coast of Northern Sumatra, Earth- quake Summary,” Significant Earthquake Archive, online, last modified February 15. Available at http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2004/us2004slav/#summary. Accessed February 27, 2013. 8  Bruce A. Elleman. 2007. Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, Newport Paper 28, Naval War College Press, Newport, R.I., February. Available at http:// www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/Newport-Papers/Documents/28-pdf.aspx. Accessed February 13, 2013. 9 Ibid, p. 90. 10 Ibid, p. 90. 11 Ibid, p. 91.

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144 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Within the Surprise Framework Although considerable naval experience was brought to bear, and multiple agencies and departments were involved as well as international partners, there appear to be a number of additional steps to be taken using the proposed frame- work. In the case of Tomodachi, therefore, the committee recognizes that the key elements of the operation were already operable. However, in the interest of dis- closing “best practices,” the committee notes that, in particular, the Coast Guard and Marine Corps have contingency units that continually operate all the elements of the framework. Therefore, from the standpoint of the surprise framework, the committee suggests what additional measures might be considered. Scanning and Awareness. A team could explore how emerging technologies, such as more interoperable radios, portable cell towers, and portable power might be used to better prepare for future incidents. Assessing lessons learned from the introduction of new experimental technologies as events unfold could also inform the decision on adding new capabilities. For example, during the Haiti disaster, airborne imaging sensors were brought in from laboratories such as the Mas- sachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) to track population movements for better coordination of aid. This opportunity revealed the value of the sensors and suggests how they might best be used in future disasters. Assessing Surprise. The Coast Guard and the Marine Corps appear to merge red teaming with training to prepare for future incidents. This arrangement—merging of red teaming and training—could be extended to all naval forces as well as to other government agencies and perhaps key regional allies and partners. Prioritization, Option Development, and Decision Formulation. There is a huge body of experience and lessons learned from response to disasters in CONUS and to disasters far from the United States. In some cases there have been political implications, e.g., U.S. assistance to Iranian fishermen, and in other cases, gov- ernments have prevented or resisted attempts to conduct rescue and assistance. It also appears that some lessons learned and postevent assessments are not always taken to heart by all parties. It is therefore suggested that some scenarios developed by red teaming be considered for multiservice/department contingency planning. As part of the planning the requisite assets and their prepositioning implications could be determined. Further, different approaches to accountabil- ity, both within the United States and with other countries, should be anticipated and accommodated in the planning. This activity could lead to several capability ”packages” that resemble contingencies that the Marine Corps and Coast Guard have developed, but on a larger scale. Resources and Transition Planning. Lessons learned and technology introduc-

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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 145 tion opportunities can inform prioritization of assets, interdivisional policies and practices, and planning by expected responders. Development and Implementation/Force Response. Global emergencies that occur from time to time have resulted in continuing resourcing, replenishment, contin- gency planning, and training opportunities for the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, broadening their naval scope. THE WAY AHEAD All naval forces of the world have been nurtured in an environment that depends heavily on an individual’s ability to deal with surprise. A professional mariner was often judged on his ability to “read” the wind and the sea or to “weather” a storm without loss of limb or loss of the vessel. This single-handed ability of the captain of a vessel to deal with the surprises is a classic template that has colored naval operations from the beginning. Thankfully, tremendous advances in technology and information sharing have given ship captains enhanced tools and data with which to face today’s sur- prises—as long as the event or one similar to it has been previously experienced and a solution to it has been documented. However, when a totally new surprise emerges, it takes strong leadership to steer away from “let the captain handle it” or “let the commander and his staff figure this one out.” An ad hoc approach to facing a new problem is not likely to result in a high-quality solution and is even less likely to be worthy of attribution to the mature and capable naval forces of the United States. Historically, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard have regis- tered some remarkable successes based on timely and thoughtful ad hoc reaction to surprise. Similarly, some solutions have been less than stellar. The goal of naval forces must be to always find the best reaction to a surprise, using the fullest measure of knowledge, intelligence, experience, and talent that can be brought to bear.

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