1


Framing the Problem

BACKGROUND

Recent reports have addressed the issue of surprise, though not specifically as it relates to U.S. naval forces (the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard). The 2009 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Capability Surprise noted, among other things, as follows:

Surprise can spring from many sources. It can arise in the laboratory—a result of scientific breakthrough. It can arise during the transition from concept to fielded product: rapid fielding of the same technology can create tremendous advantage to whoever fields the system first. It can also arise when an existing capability is employed in an unconventional way or when low-end technology is adapted in unforeseen ways that create an effective capability against high-end U.S. systems.1

In short, the DSB report reviewed many historical surprises to our nation and categorized them as either “known surprises” (i.e., surprises that should have been anticipated and acted upon because they were clearly in the offing) or “surprising surprises” (i.e., those that may have been anticipated by some but were not addressed—swamped as these persons or institutions were by thousands of other surprise possibilities—or those that actually were true surprises).2

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1Defense Science Board. 2009. Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise, Volume I: Main Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C., September, pp. vii and viii.

2The temporal and impact aspects of capability surprises vary widely and call for different approaches to prepare for and respond to them. As additional background for this study, the committee examined several historical examples of “surprises” that have had significant impact on naval and



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1 Framing the Problem Background Recent reports have addressed the issue of surprise, though not specifically as it relates to U.S. naval forces (the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard). The 2009 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Capability Surprise noted, among other things, as follows: Surprise can spring from many sources. It can arise in the laboratory—a result of scientific breakthrough. It can arise during the transition from concept to fielded product: rapid fielding of the same technology can create tremendous advantage to whoever fields the system first. It can also arise when an existing capability is employed in an unconventional way or when low-end technology is adapted in unforeseen ways that create an effective capability against high- end U.S. systems.1 In short, the DSB report reviewed many historical surprises to our nation and categorized them as either “known surprises” (i.e., surprises that should have been anticipated and acted upon because they were clearly in the offing) or “surpris- ing surprises” (i.e., those that may have been anticipated by some but were not addressed—swamped as these persons or institutions were by thousands of other surprise possibilities—or those that actually were true surprises). 2 1 Defense Science Board. 2009. Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise, Volume I: Main Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C., September, pp. vii and viii. 2 The temporal and impact aspects of capability surprises vary widely and call for different approaches to prepare for and respond to them. As additional background for this study, the committee examined several historical examples of “surprises” that have had significant impact on naval and 15

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16 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE In addition, a 2008 Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) report entitled Disruptive Commercial Technologies noted, among other things, that “the internet functions effectively as both an R&D resource and supply chain for irregular forces throughout the world. Commercial technologies pose a real and enduring threat to Marine forces.”3 The NRAC report concluded that there exist globally available commercial technologies that could be used in hostile ways against Marine forces. While the NRAC report did not focus on technology surprise per se, it did examine the power of unconventional and unconstrained imagination that can be used against Marine forces operating around the world. Defining “Surprise” From a military operational standpoint and for the purposes of this report, surprise is an event or capability that could affect the outcome of a mission or campaign for which preparations are not in place. By definition, it is not pos- sible to truly anticipate surprise. It is only possible to prevent it (in the sense of minimizing the number of possible surprises by appropriate planning), to create systems that are resilient to an adversary’s unexpected actions, or to rapidly and effectively respond when surprised. The committee identified two classes of sur- prise that fall within this military operational context and described them using the terminology in the study’s terms of reference and in the interim report: (1) intelligence-inferred surprise and (2) disruptive technology and tactical surprise. Intelligence-inferred surprise is an event or capability that developed over a relatively long time—years—and that naval forces were aware of in advance of its operational introduction but for which they may not have adequately prepared. Disruptive technology (including the disruptive application of existing technol- ogy) and tactical surprise involve short-timeline events or capabilities—hours to months—for which naval forces probably have not had sufficient time to develop countermeasures unless they were at least somewhat anticipated. A surprise may fit in both categories—for example, Blitzkrieg warfare combined the latest tank and aircraft technology with surprise penetration tactics. Much intelligence-inferred surprise is being continually monitored by naval program areas such as air and missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and strike warfare systems. Here, the future threat is projected, and upgrades to naval sys- tems to meet the threat are being developed and fielded. This report will not so military operations, including short-lived surprises (such as the suicide bomb attacks on the USS Cole and the 9/11 World Trade Center) and longer-term surprises, resulting in major changes in U.S. naval and military forces (such as the battle between the Monitor and Merrimac, the first-ever battle between ironclad warships), as well as Russia’s launch of Sputnik (a surprising use of space, leading to the creation of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA]) and Germany’s Blitzkrieg, uniquely combining and exploiting the capabilities of known entities. 3  Naval Research Advisory Committee. 2008. Disruptive Commercial Technologies, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Washington, D.C., June 26, p. 15.

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FRAMING THE PROBLEM 17 much deal with intelligence-inferred surprises, which are already being addressed (except those that were selected as exemplars of key programs enabling naval ca- pabilities to keep abreast of threat and technology opportunities). Instead, it deals with intelligence-inferred surprises for which cradle-to-grave upgrades do not exist or whose defeat requires coordination among a number of naval programs. One example of such an orphan intelligence-inferred surprise—denial of space access—is brought up throughout this report. Two variants of disruptive technology and tactical surprise have been identi- fied. The first is the pop-up of a new capability enabled by a new technology or an unexpected application of an existing well-known technology—for example, new kinds of triggers for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as unex- pected tactics. The second variant, black swan events, may be “self-inflicted” surprises—for example, blind spots or vulnerabilities in our own systems. Here, no amount of surveillance would have allowed anyone to predict the event. 4 Such events may be the result of a sudden U.S. policy change or directed action, such as Operation Burnt Frost,5 or natural disasters that are to be anticipated but not on such an extreme scale—for example, the March 2011 Fukushima Disaster. 6 In the broadest sense, surprise grants an adversary the chance to take unex- pected action or to produce consequences that we did not prepare for. Surprises may also result from operational, social, natural, or political factors for which technology or lack of mitigating technology may not be the primary impactor. Initial Observations The Committee on Capability Surprise on U.S. Naval Forces has found that addressing surprise as it might impact U.S. naval forces is a complex subject with multiple dimensions, including time, mission and cross-mission domains, anticipation of enabling technologies, physical phenomena, and new tactics that can enable surprise. Surprises may come over timescales ranging from seconds up to minutes in a complex engagement; alternatively, time may be seen as a cause of evolving, breakthrough surprise that has been secretly developed over decades. 4  Nassim Taleb defines a black swan as “a highly improbable event with three principal character- istics: It is unpredictable; it carries a massive impact; and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes it appear less random, and more predictable, than it was.” For additional reading on black swan events, see Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 2010, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improb- able, 2nd edition, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, N.Y. 5  Operation Burnt Frost was the mission to shoot down a nonfunctioning National Reconnaissance Office Satellite in 2008. RADM Brad Hicks, USN, Program Director, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: Press Briefing, March 19, 2008,” presented to the committee by RADM Joseph A. Horn, Jr., USN, Program Executive, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, and Conrad J. Grant, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, May 16, 2012, Washington, D.C. 6  partial profile of U.S. naval response to the Fukushima disaster—a combined earthquake, A tsunami, and nuclear reactor catastrophe—in a coordinated effort known as Operation Tomodachi is found at http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=121. Accessed June 13, 2012.

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18 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Missions such as air defense and undersea warfare, which U.S. naval forces con- duct in the open ocean and the littoral regions all have myriad entry points from which capability surprises can originate (land, air, space, and cyberspace). There are also accelerating new technological advancements globally, which again, singularly or in combination, can constitute the basis of a capability surprise. Given the complexity of surprise, there is no simple way to guard against it. A number of explicit actions are needed. First and foremost, leadership must help others recognize the importance of understanding capability surprise and what it demands of U.S. naval forces, such as ensuring that organizations include prepa- ration for and mitigation of surprise as one of their functions, including scanning and related activities, in order to discern potential surprises. Here, it is important that organizations are timely and diligent in examining the scope and seriousness of such surprises, and that they can identify other organizations that might be able to help anticipate, mitigate, or respond to these surprises. A number of different kinds of surprise were discussed. One was an adver- sary’s deployment of disruptive technologies against naval operations (such as specific “Zero Day” cyberoffense payloads). Another was the potential inter- ruption of critical supply chains (such as those for rare earth elements). Yet an- other kind of surprise was the unfolding of geopolitical events (such as regional economic instability) that affect national security. The committee reviewed case studies of previous surprises and some of the circumstances leading up and sur- rounding them. Three of these are discussed next. Surprise Scenarios Three scenarios were selected that could be used to study capability surprises and, ultimately, to make recommendations: • Scenario 1: Denial of space access; • Scenario 2: An asymmetric engagement with complex use of cyber- methods in a naval context; and • Scenario 3: A black swan event, to which the front-end scanning and prioritization framework for mitigating surprise is not applicable. These three surprise scenarios are pertinent to U.S. naval forces and were used to carry out the tasks listed in the study’s terms of reference. The commit- tee selected them in part because each addresses an issue important to one of the three naval forces. Denial of space access is treated in a Navy context, social media manipulation is framed to apply in a Marine Corps environment, and do- mestic disaster relief is largely a Coast Guard mission. They are introduced below and more completely described in Appendix A. The scenarios are also used to illustrate key points throughout the chapters, with a summary of how they would be addressed via the proposed framework in Chapter 8.

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FRAMING THE PROBLEM 19 Surprise Scenario 1 (An Intelligence-Inferred Surprise) The committee considers the denial of space access to include the potential loss of space access due to antisatellite capabilities and electronic or optical countermeasures, including loss of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeds, communications, navigation (GPS), and timing (also GPS). The space-access scenario has been much discussed in the open media7not to mention that U.S. naval warfighting systems rely on positioning, navigation, and timing (PN&T). In essence, an adversary, in order to deny access to space assets of our forces, could employ the following measures against the space assets, either simultaneously or with unpredictable frequency, to render dependence on those assets unreliable: • Jamming the GPS receivers of U.S. combatants or, • Mounting cyberattacks on command and control (C2) centers and combatants, • Jamming or dazzling surveillance sensors to obscure U.S. orbital ISR observations, • Jamming communications reception by satellite receivers, or • Kinetic engagement of orbital systems. It was also recognized that cyberattacks or other interference in this scenario could originate from threats embedded in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hard- ware and software that is widely deployed in present naval systems and could render naval systems and networks inoperable at the critical moment of need. The reliance on certain widely used satellite communications operating in frequency bands that can be more readily jammed is a particular concern. Jamming of com- munications and denial-of-service attacks are clearly an intelligence-inferred surprise that can be mitigated by deploying alternative systems. 8 Surprise Scenario 2 (A Disruptive Technology and Tactical Surprise) The committee then considered an example of disruptive technology and tactical surprise—an asymmetric engagement with complex use of cybermethods. 7  For example, see Background Briefing on Air-Sea Battle by Defense Officials from the Pentagon, News Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Novem- ber 9, 2011; available online at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4923, accessed May 9, 2012. See also Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, 2012, “Asymmetric Warfare, American Style,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 138(4):24-29; Andrew Erickson and Amy Chang, 2012, “China’s Navigation in Space,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 138(4):42-47; and David Fulghum, 2012, “Under Siege: Foreign Countermeasures Proliferate as U.S. Electronic Warfare Programs Falter,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 174(13):22-23. 8  The issue of cyberdefense for U.S. naval forces will be covered more extensively in an upcoming NSB study, commissioned by the CNO, and anticipated to begin in 2013.

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20 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE An adversary could use social media to gather a crowd that could place U.S. personnel and property at risk in foreign countries or threaten our domestic infrastructure. The potential implications of population unrest, spontaneous or induced, were explored. As happened in the Arab Spring, social media can be used to turn a local population against the United States and to facilitate the co- ordinated search and engagement of U.S. citizens and U.S. assets on the ground. 9 This is an event that may require a combination of tactics, techniques, and pro- cedures (TTPs) and perhaps the creation of a new situation awareness capabil- ity, especially as it might involve naval ships and personnel or other U.S. naval resources operating in foreign ports. This scenario also lends itself to examining the complexities of attempted cybermanipulation of a crowd’s mood and actions and provides a context for the potential engagement of on-the-ground and coastal operation. Surprise Scenario 3 (A Black Swan Surprise) Black swan surprises comprise a full range of unexpected events that could have a significant impact on the capabilities of U.S. naval forces. They might come from natural disasters (tsunamis, earthquakes, disease outbreak, and the like) or from decisions made in the face of political or economic exigencies. One national strategic decision was the recent decision to deploy the U.S. Coast Guard to remote areas of global conflict and, earlier, U.S. naval forces’ provision of hu- manitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010. Exemplars In addition to various data-gathering activities and discussions that helped it formulate the three surprise scenarios described above, the committee was briefed on several programs that appear capable of timely anticipation and response to surprise. It decided to explore the three surprise scenarios and three of the pro- grams, which it called “examplars,”10 to help illuminate the following: • Certain areas of potential surprise outside the mainstream acquisition programs that may impede anticipation and/or response; • Successful principles and infrastructures that might be integrated into existing naval organizational structures and processes to deal with broader capa- bility surprises; • Structures and processes that could accommodate the three surprise scenarios that are currently unaddressed or underaddressed (space access, flash mob arranged for by social media, disaster response); 9  Lisa Anderson. 2011. “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs 90(3):2-7. 10  Exemplars are programs that the committee thought were particularly promising.

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FRAMING THE PROBLEM 21 • Capabilities, policies, and metrics that support successful structures and processes; and • Changes to better prepare for capability surprise mounted against naval forces and to be more resilient to it. The three exemplar programs chosen by the committee are (1) the Navy SSBN Security program,11 (2) the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation program (Air Force red team),12 and (3) the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) pro- gram, whose responsiveness was exemplified by the shooting down of the way- ward National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite in Operation Burnt Frost.13 The principles and key ingredients used by each exemplar program to deal with potential capability surprise are similar: a stable program and infrastructure; a capability thread that includes research and technology development; modeling and simulation; expert staff; acquisition and industrial capability; testing infra- structure; and very visible senior leadership support and top cover. Several or- ganizations, including the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Forces, the Coast Guard forces responsible for responding to natural disasters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Rapid Prototyping Office, and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) have developed a remarkable resilience that allows them to anticipate and respond to rapidly developing, on-the-ground needs. 14 A unique fourth exemplar should be briefly mentioned: It is the ability of the highly adaptive and responsive special operational forces (SOF), in which Navy SEALs play an important role, to plan and induce surprise. Events revealed to the public during the past decade testify to how SOF can engage covert nonstate adversaries or apply novel surprise capabilities to degrade an adversary nation state’s power. These forces are perhaps one of the best means for the United States to impose surprise on others. 11  Stephen C. Schreppler, Andrew F. Slaterbeck, and CAPT Christopher J. Kaiser, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N97, “SSBN Security Program Perspectives,” presentation to the committee, April 12, 2012, Washington, D.C. 12  Christopher Roeser, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, “Air Force Red Team Overview,” presentation to the committee, May 16, 2012, Washington, D.C. 13  RADM Brad Hicks, USN, Program Director, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: Press Briefing, March 19, 2008,” presented to the committee by RADM Joseph A. Horn, Jr., USN, Program Executive, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, and Conrad J. Grant, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, May 16, 2012, Washington, D.C. 14  Benjamin Riley, Principal Deputy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding, “Rapid Prototyping Perspectives,” presentation to the committee, February 29, 2012, Washington, D.C, For additional information on the OSD Rapid Prototyping Office, see National Research Council, 2009, Experimentation and Rapid Prototyping in Support of Counterterrorism, National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.

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22 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Capability Surprise Framework With the above scenarios and exemplars in mind, and to guide the approach and understanding needed to address potential capability surprise for U.S. naval forces, the functional framework shown in Figure 1-1 was developed. It consists of six phases that can be aligned with the development functions, accountabilities, and principles observed in the exemplar programs. The six phases—(1) Scanning and Awareness, (2) Assessing Surprise, (3) Prioritization, Option Development and Decision Formulation, (4) Resource and Transition Planning, (5) Implementation and Fielding, and (6) Force Re- sponse—are introduced briefly below and discussed in more detail in the follow- ing chapters. • Phase 1, Scanning and Awareness. Involves scanning the horizon for po- tential technologies, technical applications, and operational behaviors that could Functional Framework Identify potential Equip and train surprises Assess Develop, surprise test, field & rank in Communicate/ terms of Engage likelihood Stakeholders in & severity Enterprise-wide Process Resource and Develop candidate mitigation plan for concepts & strategies and mitigation select FIGURE 1-1 Six phases required for mitigating capability surprise. This is a continuous process in which each element informs the next. For example, force response adjustments may generate a loop-back in the process. Further reaction to a tactical or black swan sur- Figure 1-1 prise may enter one of the three right-most phases depending on the nature and timing of the required response. This framework can be used as a guide, with the understanding that surprises may occur at different points in the cycle.

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FRAMING THE PROBLEM 23 cause surprise, which is defined here as a lack of preparedness or awareness to counter unexpected developments. • Phase 2, Assessing Surprise. Includes key items like effective modeling, simulations, analysis, and red teaming. The somewhat overused term “red team- ing” is applied here to emphasize the dynamic tension required of the operational, technical, and intelligence communities to discern potential negative impacts of surprise and to prioritize those that should be addressed in each time frame, from short term through long term. • Phase 3, Prioritization, Option Development, and Decision Formula- tion. Includes concept development and evaluation to scope out possible solutions to the surprise risks identified in the preceding phase. • Phase 4, Resource and Transition Planning. Involves identification of naval organizations to be assigned the task of resourcing and delivering the ca- pability needed to address the surprise associated with the first three phases. • Phase 5, Implementation and Fielding. Can take several forms depend- ing on the results of the previous four phases: —Development of new tactics, perhaps using existing assets or tech- nologies in unexpected ways; —Development of new variant capabilities within existing programs— for example, converting the software of a surface-to-air missile to a surface-to- surface missile, as was done with SM-1 in the 1970s; —Rapid prototyping in order to field a few critical units as either suf- ficient to meet the need or as a stop-gap before an item can be produced and acquired by conventional means; —Use of naval support centers to make changes to systems that are in service but out of production; and —More aggressive use of Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) or other authorities.15 • Phase 6, Force Response. U.S. naval forces test operational capability, leveraging the U.S. naval test infrastructure; ensure training and proficiency; and determine the impact of a new capability on readiness in the face of surprise. These six phases form the basic organizational structure for this report. Each of the Chapters 2 through 7 discusses one phase. The report’s final chapter brings together the overall concept and highlights the key aspects of the proposed framework. It is important to recognize that these six phases are necessary to successfully anticipate or react to potential or real surprises. Specifically, the first four phases allow for the impact of a surprise scenario to be assessed so that it can be assigned a high or low priority. In Phase 4, several decision outcomes 15  “QRC programs leverage DODI [Department of Defense Instruction] 5000.02 procedures and authorities to speed up the fielding of systems and capabilities to satisfy near-term urgent warfight- ing needs.” See Air Force Instruction 63-114, January 4, 2011, Quick Reaction Capability Process, p. 5, para. 1.1.

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24 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE are possible, including the development of new tactics. At this point, there is a natural tendency to implement a “quick and dirty” partial solution between Phases 4 and 5, and to ignore the residual risks to operations of such a solution. Accordingly, the adequacy of proposed responses should be assessed before any outcome emerges from Phase 5. Phases 1 through 4 would help naval forces to anticipate intelligence-inferred surprises. Natural disasters (although not those on a black swan scale, such as the March 2011 Fukushima disaster) would enter the framework at Phase 5. Events in theater might require tactical or strategic operational adjustments in Phase 6, when the adequacy of proposed responses is assessed. In addition to the Navy SEALs being part of SOF, naval forces often support SOF. The committee surmises that SOF and naval forces could figure out even more ways to collaborate to enhance both the mitigation of surprise (defensive) and the implementation of surprise (offensive). It would therefore appear highly advantageous to have SOF represented on the teams that address scanning and awareness and training and readiness, and possibly the other aspects as well of the surprise framework. CrossCutting Activities The committee recognizes that three activities pervade all the phases of the framework: (1) Modeling and Simulation, (2) Red Teaming, and (3) Research and Experimentation. It introduces these activities and discusses them where they first play a major role. Therefore, Modeling and Simulation and Red Teaming are introduced in Chapter 3, “Assessing Surprise.” Research and Experimentation are discussed primarily in Chapters 2 (research) and 7 (experimentation) in the context of feasibility determination and resilience building, respectively. Figure 1-2 indicates the relationship between the three activities and the six phases of the framework. options for COORDINATING SURPRISE MITIGATION The committee discussed in detail how to recommend leadership and associ- ated activities that could enable our naval forces to implement the surprise mitiga- tion framework. It first recognized that, besides the exemplar programs, virtually every development and acquisition program has some form of the following: • Threat-response activity that includes projecting future threats, • Development effort toward meeting the projected threats, and • Continual assessment of existing and developmental system designs for potential vulnerabilities so that corrective measures can be addressed.

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FRAMING THE PROBLEM 25 Surprise Mitigation Office PEOs, SYSCOM FFC, CG, MCCDC Scanning & Assessing Prioritization, Option Resource & Implementation & Force Response Awareness Surprise Development, & Transition Planning Planning Decision Formulation Modeling & Back-of-the- Phenomenology System models for Cost models System models for Verification and Simulation envelope models for trade-off analyses Logistics planning test planning and updating of models calculations feasibility models prediction System models for response Campaign models for impact Red Teaming Experts debate Wargaming with Red team concepts Review of planning Red team test Exercise red team to risks and timing cultural effects and capabilities vignettes relative to challenge trainees included threat Research & Feasibility Impact assessment Validation via Risk reduction Assess effectiveness Operational readiness Experimentation exploration of via experiments prototyping and testing verification tests via testing and tactics exercises and tactics potential disruptive development experiments technology FIGURE 1-2 Cross-cutting activities mapped to the functional framework. The committee was therefore primarily concerned with those mission, or mission support, capabilities for which: 1-2 Figure Broadside • There is presently no authorized office to ensure similar considerations, • There are vulnerabilities that span a number of programs and for which there is no identified executive to coordinate the surprise mitigation, • The surprises pop up as a result of emerging technologies or applications of existing technology whose potential impact on mission capabilities is presently ambiguous, and • There is not sufficient attention being paid to identified risks. The committee was especially mindful that in the present environment of limited resources and the need to consider affordability, the setting up of a new office would be considered unrealistic. On the other hand, the committee was keenly aware that it would be ineffective to just declare the need for the frame- work to be addressed and to state that the naval culture should consider potential surprises. This was the Navy’s initial approach with FORCEnet, i.e., the realiza- tion of network-centric operations. While the Navy generally defined FORCEnet as the operational construct and architectural framework needed for network-

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26 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE centric operations, the construct and framework were ineffective by themselves. In short, additional resources and governance mechanisms, among other things, would be needed to realize FORCEnet.16 To meet the committee’s obligations as set forth in the terms of reference, eight options were considered for coordinating and ensuring adequate attention to surprise mitigation. The options fell between the extremes of a completely new office on the one hand and the mere encouragement of a culture of surprise anticipation on the other. Option 1: Incorporate into the Existing N9I Office The N9I office ensures integration across programs; specifically, across war- fare systems (expeditionary, surface, undersea warfare, and air warfare). Although its main role is integrated financial and budget management, the N9I also man- ages the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) program. This program is particularly interesting because it requires technical and operational integration of sea surface, land, and airborne combatants (including Aegis, Army Aerostat, and E-2D) that share information over networks to engage airborne cruise missiles over terrain that is potentially beyond the line of sight of the firing units, using composite track and targeting data. The ability of N9I to coordinate programs is essential to mitigate surprises that are probably not addressed by a single program or capability upgrade. To extend the N9I office’s mission to also address capability surprise mitigation seems synergistic, but it does introduce the need for additional staffing and coordination. Option 2: Incorporate into the Existing N2/N6I Office The N2/N6 information dominance role resonates with a number of potential surprises, including the scenarios (Appendix A) and exemplars (Appendix B) considered for space access and social networking. However, the N2/N6I already has a key role to play with respect to intelligence operations. Further, whereas the solutions to capability surprise threats may be implemented by N2/N6, the vul- nerabilities leading to the need for mitigation of the loss of capability will likely apply to mission systems. For example, whereas alternatives to GPS and satellite communications might best be resourced by N2/N6, mitigating the impacts of the reduced availability of GPS and communications on a wide variety of combatants, commands, sensors, and weapons appears to go beyond the scope of N2/N6 and appears to be a better fit in N9I. The N2/N6, however, should be included in any arrangements made by the entity responsible for surprise mitigation. 16  National Research Council. 2005. FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.

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FRAMING THE PROBLEM 27 Option 3: Establish a New Center of Excellence One option considered was to declare an existing organization within the naval community as a center of excellence for surprise mitigation. The organiza- tion would be the one where technical capability is most closely aligned with the initial phases of the surprise mitigation framework—that is, it would best be able to interpret surprise risks by horizon scanning, red teaming, and analyzing the risks and options, and then to make recommendations. Potential centers of excellence that were considered included the Navy Warfare Development Com- mand and the Naval Postgraduate School. There were a number of drawbacks to this approach, however. First, the need for deep technical expertise beyond that available at such centers requires the ability to identify and the authority to marshal experts from across the naval community, such as technical specialists, especially those with validated system and physics models, as well as cultural experts. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, there is a tension between the need to continually turn over, and refresh, expertise and the need to maintain a permanent expert staff. This is not to say that the aforementioned organizations, and others, do not have a key role to play. It is just that the particular combination of qualities—authoritative assembly, temporary duties, and prioritized resourc- ing—does not exist in a single, established technical center. Option 4: Assign to the Office of Naval Research Since the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is recognized as key to organizing research horizon search and assessment activities, through leadership from ONR- Global in collaboration with the Office of Naval Intelligence and others, and since ONR is expected to lead in the formation of critical technical experiments and prototyping, perhaps it could be assigned responsibility for coordinating surprise mitigation for naval forces. On the other hand, the committee believes that such an office will need the robust involvement of the operational community as well as the technical community, which would make the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) a more desirable place from which to coordinate surprise mitigation. Option 5: Create a Rapid Acquisition Office with PEO Over time, program executive offices (PEOs) have been established or re- chartered to embrace new programs. For example, the PEO for Theater Air Defense of the 1990s was expanded to become the PEO for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO-IWS), with additional acquisition programs and missions in sur- face and undersea warfare and tactical command and control. Whereas such PEOs can be instrumental in addressing the broader problems of emerging needs, they do not necessarily address the emerging cross-mission and pop-up threats in a manner that also considers operational options.

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28 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Option 6: Create a New OPNAV Office The committee observed several recent lessons, including the N00X office (the Naval Warfare Integration Office in OPNAV), which was established several years ago and more recently disestablished. Although the N00X office, while it existed, provided useful broad context for potential naval capability needs and deficiencies, it was deemed insufficiently resourced, staffed, and authorized to be effective. The committee thought it best that an existing authoritative office in N9, with a compatible charter but access to resources, be expanded in scope and authority so as to provide greater impact and response. Option 7: Delegate to a Surprise Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD established a Strategic Capabilities Office last year featuring a shift of $60 million to support the stand-up of the new strategic capabili- ties office charged with analyzing emerging threats, developing innovative and architecture-level concepts, intelligence concepts, red teaming and conducting demonstrations of disruptive technologies.17 This is a positive DOD initiative to enhance preparedness against surprise and appears to incorporate some of the essence of the first several phases of the framework presented and recommended in this report. One could argue that with the OSD office now in place, the need for a naval surprise mitigation office is obviated. However, while the committee considers the OSD office to be a focus of collaboration across the Services, the office would not be expected to focus on predominately naval surprise issues. Furthermore, mitigation of surprises directed against our naval forces must be implemented by the naval organizations them- selves, especially in the case of rapid fielding, acquisition system upgrades, and the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Still, the support of the OSD office should make it unnecessary to concentrate on Joint services’ response to surprise, thereby freeing the recommended naval surprise mitigation office to focus more on naval-specific concerns. Option 8: Incorporate into Existing DASN RDT&E The committee also considered whether it would be appropriate for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (DASN RDT&E) to establish a capability surprise mitigation office. Such an option could provide advantages in terms of rapid prototyping develop- 17  Christopher J. Castelli. 2013. “DOD Seeks $11.98 Billion for Science and Technology in FY-14 Budget,” Inside Defense.Com, April 9.

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FRAMING THE PROBLEM 29 ment and modification of acquisition systems. Moreover, the committee believes that the DASN RDT&E should play a key role in ensuring that appropriate techni- cal responses to potential threats and surprises are considered in program design reviews and upgrade planning (the committee’s belief is embodied in its recom- mendation that DASN RDT&E serve as the Chief Technology Officer. However, the committee believes that responding operationally to potential surprises should be the fundamental driver and that inputs and preparedness efforts begin and end with the operational commands. Accordingly, the committee believes that such an office is best suited to reside in OPNAV, where it will have greater access to operational communities. In summary, the committee considered the N9I office within OPNAV to be the most likely existing organization from which to coordinate surprise mitiga- tion for naval forces in concert with joint forces and national assets. However, the committee considered that it would be presumptuous to recommend that office if the CNO determines, based on plans and considerations of which the committee is not aware, that another office is more appropriate. Therefore, the committee recommends the establishment of a surprise mitigation office, considers N9I the most likely organization that could grow into this role, but understands that the CNO may identify a more appropriate entity to take on the surprise mitigation coordination role according to the framework presented and recommended in this report. Regardless of who is assigned responsibility, an office with sufficient authority and connectivity, as defined by the recommended framework, is neces- sary to effectively address surprise. As pointed out directly by the Defense Sci- ence Board, “Rarely is there a case of true surprise. Post mortems almost always identify that someone has provided warning, but that warning was not heeded.”18 Leadership The committee acknowledged the challenges and complexities faced by na- val forces in dealing with capability surprise, as exemplified in the three surprise scenarios and the three exemplars described earlier and in Appendixes A and B. In each of these scenarios and exemplars, the various stakeholders (e.g., opera- tional, intelligence, technical, and acquisition related) should be involved to bring awareness of the potential vulnerability posed by capability surprise. Likewise, different entities should be responsible for prioritizing, resourcing, exercising, and developing TTPs against such scenarios. For example, entities ranging from the Atlantic and Pacific fleets to the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Office of Naval Research may be involved in scanning for potential surprise. Laborato- ries, naval operating forces, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), the Navy’s OPNAV N2/N6 and N9 organizations, and the PEOs have 18  Defense Science Board. 2009. Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Ca- pability Surprise, Volume I: Main Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C., September, p. xii.

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30 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE key roles to play in prioritizing and developing responses and ensuring readiness. While many stakeholders are involved, there does not appear to be a designated lead working across the Navy to ensure recognition of these potential capability surprises and also to ensure the required integration and prioritization of efforts to help mitigate their negative impact. There does not seem to be a supporting infrastructure or lead integrating authority to work through the complexities that cut across various naval authorities.19 Not just new or emerging technologies must be scanned and addressed: Scanning activities should also search for the use of existing technologies and capabilities in unforeseen ways. Other countries’ exer- cising, doctrine, publications, and technologies must be scanned. This leads to the major finding and recommendation of this report, Finding 1 and Recommenda- tion 1, which tie the naval organizational framework to the six-phase functional framework for capability surprise that is introduced above and discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters of this report. Finding and Recommendation Finding 1: Capability surprise is both inevitable and inherently complex, and it requires U.S. naval forces to engage in a broad spectrum of issues, from horizon scanning to red teaming to experimentation and rapid proto- typing, to exercising, fielding, and training. While there are a few exemplar organizations in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard as well as the Department of Defense that effectively work on capability surprise, there is neither an overall framework for nor a clear delineation of U.S. naval forces responsibilities.20 Recommendation 1: The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Comman- dant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and the Commandant of the Coast Guard (CCG) should establish a common framework for U.S. naval forces to ad- dress capability surprise, as shown in Figure 1-3. The CNO, in concert with the CMC and the CCG, should establish and fund a surprise mitigation office to serve as the executive agent for ad- dressing capability surprise for U.S. naval forces. Specifically, this office should comprise a set of organic operational, technical, assessment, and intelligence-oriented staff and draw input and analysis with a global, mul- 19  The potential impact of a recently announced OPNAV structural reorganization, creating the N9 as a single office to oversee warfighting programs, is a step toward providing structure that may help mitigate capability surprise. The impact of this new structure will become apparent over time. For additional information on this realignment, see Navy Office of Information, “CNO Realigns OPNAV Staff,” March 3, 2012. Available at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=65845. Accessed May 24, 2012. 20  Some exemplars identified by the committee include the Navy’s SSBN Security program, the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation Program (Air Force Red Team), and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program (in response to Operation Burnt Frost).

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FRAMING THE PROBLEM 31 Challenges Readiness Communicate/ Engage Capability Risks Stakeholders in Enterprise-wide Process Selected Program Approach Plan Surprise Mitigation Office PEOs, SYSCOM FFC, CG, MCCDC FIGURE 1-3 Recommended framework for addressing capability surprise. ticultural perspective 1-3, 8-1, S-1 of communities: operational; intelli- Figure from a multitude gence; acquisition, research, and development; system commands; program Mostly a fixed image (Spiral) executive offices; war colleges; military fellows; government laboratories; Federally Funded Research and Development Centers; university-affiliated research centers; industry; and academia. To ensure that U.S. naval forces are proactive in developing and anticipating surprise capabilities it is recom- mended that representatives from Special Operations Command (SOCOM) be an integral part of this office. Based on the CNO’s decision above on which option to pursue (see Table S-1), the office should support the timely transition of surprise capabilities to the appropriate organizations of primary responsibility and monitor the transition to, and effectiveness within, opera- tional forces.