OPERATION BURNT FROST
The committee reviewed the events leading to rapid modification of the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) combat system and associated national systems that led to the shooting down of a wayward National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite within only a few weeks of an analysis and then a decision by the Bush administration. It appears to the committee that the Aegis BMD and other national programs have the key elements of their functional frameworks and organizational constructs embedded in the respective program infrastructures that enable quick reaction to a disruptive surprise.
Within the Framework
There were some lessons learned, which are as follows:
Organization. The R&D, acquisition, implementation, and operational authority chains within Aegis BMD, in collaboration with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), are mature and based on the long-established Aegis program. The NRO authority chain provided information on the satellite configuration and status as well as updates on its orbit and tumbling movement for targeting purposes. However, since the capability for Aegis antisatellite operation was not in place, some authority discontinuities and operational connectivity issues had to be addressed. Separate security processes required special attention to gain release of certain information.
Scanning and Awareness. This function is not likely to have pointed to the need to prepare for such an action in the name of national safety. Even if it had, the multiplicity of variables in such a scenario would have made it impossible to prepare. As it happened, when the request came to determine if such a capability could be rapidly implemented, the existing expertise and the associated physics and systems models and databases allowed a quick answer.
Assessing Surprise. A vigorous debate was enabled among experts from the laboratories, government, and industry that allowed realistic consideration of the risks and identification of needed information.
Prioritization and Decisions. Given the emergency nature of the situation and the high-level decision makers it had attracted, the “crash effort” was expedited.
Implementation and Fielding. Because Aegis BMD is a highly organized acquisition program, modifications could be made rapidly, and procedures for verification, testing, and certification could be expedited because the maturity of the program, technical expertise, and special facilities enabled informed expert tailoring of baseline modifications and procedures. Further, the changes were primarily in software, allowing relatively rapid changes to be implemented and recertified via system-in-the loop facilities and test beds.
Force Response. Rapid development and rehearsal of procedures from the command to the crew of the USS Lake Erie were required. Technical assistance from the laboratory and the contractor community was supplied, as needed, at every level.
Lessons Learned
Operation Burnt Frost involved the authorized shooting down of a wayward NRO satellite. A number of lessons learned surfaced in connection with the following:
• Procedural problems,
• Operational connectivity—members, expertise, subject matter expert (SME) level, etc.
• Authority discontinuities—standard operating procedures (SOPs) for chains of command, priority assessment, and
• Special sensitive information authority (security experience, risk-actual, and security).
The difficulties encountered with this event can be mitigated by adopting the concept prepared by a former Commandant of the Coast Guard, ADM Thad
Allen—namely, by identifying possible contingencies and developing standing mission response teams. First, the specific likely contingency situations or conditions are developed. After examining the contingency excursion, SMEs and informed experts from appropriate discipline fields are identified as team members for the scenario or contingency. These individuals are assigned to a contingency team. They gather for meetings and briefings prior to an actual event and are on on call and activated when an actual event occurs. Channels of communication, protocols, and relationships are worked out prior to activation. Participation and membership can be at the level of an action officer, a deputy, or a principal.
AIR FORCE RED TEAM
The Air Force has operated a red team program, the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation Program, for many years, with technical leadership by the Lincoln Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The program focuses on the threats to tactical air penetration of an adversary’s defenses for effective precision engagements. The approach covers all the elements of the framework as follows:
Scanning and Awareness. Technical intelligence is continually collected, and follow-up information requests are made as needed. From this information a projected threat is modeled in terms of its technical characteristics, the projected time frame, and how effectively it performs against U.S. systems.
Assessing Surprise. A structured, scenario-based approach allows assessing the impact of the emerging threats to a mission and evaluating potential material and nonmaterial approaches to mitigating the threat, through use of modeling and simulation.
Prioritization and Decisions. The results are evaluated and program revisions are made as needed, whether the mitigation is by development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), modifications to an existing system, or start of a new acquisition.
Implementation and Fielding. For material solutions the standard acquisition processes are followed. If a quick reaction is needed, the program is capable of adapting in a manner similar to Aegis BMD.
Force Response. The program includes testing, force introduction, training, and assessment activities associated with acquisition programs. The advantage of this program approach is that it provides authority to ensure resourcing and collaboration for those solutions requiring changes to multiple, interoperating systems.
The SSBN Security program began in the 1970s to examine, through theory and experiment, any potential phenomenon or technology that might enable detection of deployed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Over the years it became clear that the same approach could be extended to attack submarines (nuclear) SSNs. Today the program continues to carry out security against the detection of SSNs, SSBNs, and nuclear-powered, guided-missile submarines (SSGNs).
Scanning and Awareness. The program relies not only on technical intelligence but also on the monitoring of scientific communities by technical experts in key areas for identification of any phenomena and technologies that might be of interest. Those are prioritized in terms of technical risk and risk to the missions.
Assessing Surprise. A review process allows objective consideration of the potential for detection and under which conditions. Modeling and scientific expertise are coupled with deep operational knowledge and prior at-sea experimental results. Recommendations are provided on (1) what bears watching for further development and (2) what needs further prioritization in light of the development stage—for example, proof-of-concept demonstration or gathering of experimental data.
Prioritization and Decisions. In accordance with recommendations, plans are developed with resource allocations against the funding line.
Implementation and Fielding. Scientific investigations and prototyping are conducted by national and naval laboratories and naval activities in coordination with the fleet. If results indicate that design changes are needed or new capabilities must be acquired, plans are developed with industry for implementation.
Force Response. Sea trials and training are conducted as required.
