3


Assessing Surprise

METHODS TO ASSESS AND ANALYZE SURPRISE

Intelligence-inferred surprise comes not from a lack of knowledge but from an inability to adopt countermeasures to meet a new threat. Even disruptive technologies and tactical surprises should typically have some leading indications, most often recognized in hindsight.

To evaluate responsiveness to threats and develop new tactics to respond to surprise, one must practice in an environment that closely mirrors reality. Accordingly, naval forces often exercise red teams and rely on anticipatory modeling and analysis to predict surprise, identify vulnerabilities, and develop countermeasures, either by rapidly fielding existing response technologies or, in extreme cases, engaging the acquisition process to build new naval capabilities.

In the course of this study, a number of communities were heard from that have successfully implemented red teaming,1 modeling, and analysis. Through use of separate teams within the maritime force structure or leveraging not-forprofit labs (government and industry) to evaluate threats to national security, the Department of Defense (DOD) has established a formal mechanism to evaluate and respond to technology surprise in specific areas. A number of entities were heard from in detail that illustrate successful independent evaluation: Air Force Red Team program, the SSBN Security program, and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program (in response to Operation Burnt Frost), to name

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1Red teaming and many of the other tools discussed in this report have applications in many of the recommended phases for addressing surprise. They are not necessarily discussed in detail every time they may be relevant.



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3 Assessing Surprise Methods to Assess and Analyze Surprise Intelligence-inferred surprise comes not from a lack of knowledge but from an inability to adopt countermeasures to meet a new threat. Even disruptive tech- nologies and tactical surprises should typically have some leading indications, most often recognized in hindsight. To evaluate responsiveness to threats and develop new tactics to respond to surprise, one must practice in an environment that closely mirrors reality. Accordingly, naval forces often exercise red teams and rely on anticipatory modeling and analysis to predict surprise, identify vulnerabilities, and develop countermeasures, either by rapidly fielding existing response technologies or, in extreme cases, engaging the acquisition process to build new naval capabilities. In the course of this study, a number of communities were heard from that have successfully implemented red teaming,1 modeling, and analysis. Through use of separate teams within the maritime force structure or leveraging not-for- profit labs (government and industry) to evaluate threats to national security, the Department of Defense (DOD) has established a formal mechanism to evaluate and respond to technology surprise in specific areas. A number of entities were heard from in detail that illustrate successful independent evaluation: Air Force Red Team program, the SSBN Security program, and the Aegis Ballistic Mis- sile Defense (BMD) program (in response to Operation Burnt Frost), to name 1  Red teaming and many of the other tools discussed in this report have applications in many of the recommended phases for addressing surprise. They are not necessarily discussed in detail every time they may be relevant. 43

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44 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE three. The activities of each of these exemplars are provided in Appendix B to this report. In each of these examples, the red teams have been granted independence in assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating threat responses. Each entity also has access to a strong base of expertise available to brainstorm vulnerabilities and solutions. Technical subject matter experts (SMEs) in academia and industry are engaged as necessary; they perform detailed analysis, use their imagination, or brainstorm on a particularly challenging problem. In the SSBN Security program, for example, the diverse SME team is preplanned, extensible through outreach, and explicitly identified as the “Friends of SSBN” network; it is a standing team, ready to be called on to respond to surprise issues. It is also noted that in order to identify threats and anticipate surprise, red teams perform modeling, simulation, and analysis at three levels of fidelity: (1) campaign-level modeling validated through (2) system-of-systems simulation made realistic by (3) high-fidelity physics-based models. Successful implementa- tion of this multitiered modeling involves an ability to leverage existing simula- tions that are being developed in the national laboratories and industry, often by individuals in the SME networks. Running exercises and threat scenarios through this three-tiered modeling and analysis capability will identify potential threats, allow for response evaluation, and identify potential vulnerabilities and risk. Subsequently, in-depth vulnerability analysis (including precise evaluation of al- gorithms, software, hardware, or system performance issues) has proven essential to determining the impact of a threat and the necessary response. In some cases, this response will require a change to existing assets or ac- quisition of a new technology. Therefore, red teams are able to recommend and/ or deploy solutions to the field as necessary. The methodology for assessing and responding to surprise that is used by the SSBN security red team serves as an excellent representative approach (see Figure 3-1) for evaluating vulnerabilities in large programs of record. As an independent group that seeks to challenge the organization in order to improve effectiveness, the SSBN Security program leverages simulation, modeling, and analysis to assess risks to submarine security and recommends mitigation strate- gies. Similar success has been noted in the approaches used by the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation Program. Each of these exemplars leverages modeling and analysis tools in conjunction with a network of experts to expose bias, of- fer critical review, model vulnerabilities, and demonstrate alternative ways to respond to surprise. U.S. naval leadership should leverage the approaches used by the three exem- plar organizations (SSBN security, Air Force red team, Aegis BMD’s Operation Burnt Frost) to further anticipate, model, and simulate both intelligence-inferred and potential disruptive surprise. The hallmarks of these successful approaches are as follows:

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ASSESSING SURPRISE 45 • Senior leadership support (commonly termed “top cover”); • Team independence; • Access to a strong base of cross-disciplinary technical and operational expertise with corresponding models and simulations that have been verified and improved via test results; • An ability to identify threats through campaign-level modeling, system- of-systems simulation, and high-fidelity physics-based models (see next section for further explanation); • Precise vulnerability modeling and analysis capability; • Mechanism to recommend and/or deploy solutions as necessary; • Adequate, steady funding; and • Focus on a particular mission. The committee recognizes that naval forces face a wider spectrum of chal- lenges than just those addressed by these exemplars. Nevertheless, the approaches used by them can serve as a model for successfully addressing capability surprise in other complex mission areas. Assessments Capability Known vulnerabiliƟes that may become issues based on Problems idenƟfied by: IniƟal Assessment: Define threat capability, will, or PotenƟal Vulnerability SSBN OPS • Physics Projects (Based on ParƟal or Full • Intel ValidaƟon, Tracked via • Red Team Assessments, Included in Annual Preliminary Vulnerability Force Security Assessment) • Senior Technical Assessment Advisory Group • Fleet SSBN Force • SSBN OperaƟons Advanced Concept Study: Vulnerability Bounds the vulnerability or AƩribute • S&T OrganizaƟons defines need for full scale • Force Vulnerability validaƟon Assessment Significant Unfunded AcousƟcs Hydrodynamics Environment Vulnerability ValidaƟon Project Physics Projects: Unknown physics limiƟng assessments FIGURE 3-1 Methodology used by the SSBN Security program. SOURCE: Stephen C. Schreppler, Andrew F. Slaterbeck, and CAPT Christopher J. Kaiser, USN, OPNAV, N97, “SSBN Security Program Perspectives,” 3-1 Figure presentation to the committee, April 12, 2012, Washington, D.C.

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46 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE System-of-Systems Modeling AND Simulation for Experimentation AND Risk Reduction Assessing potential surprise and its impact on the naval forces requires input from and interaction among a diverse set of communities, including naval forces, the intelligence community, the defense industry, national laboratories, universi- ties, and commercial industry. In some sense, these communities can themselves be viewed as “sensors” that collect and process information that is relevant to detecting potential surprise, assessing its likely impact, and formulating measures to deal with it. However, each community has domains in which its sensors are more effective and domains where they are less effective. Figure 3-2 attempts to provide some sense of domains where the strengths of the various communities reside. Implementation • Concepts Impact analysis and response/ • TTPs decisions/recommendations • Directions • Programs • Funding “Sensors” for Detecting and Naval Intel Defense Defense Universities Commercial Assessing Forces Agency Industry Labs Industry Defense Surprise Domain for Finding Surprise Navel OPS Naval Exercise Intel Collection Lab Experiments M&S DOD RDTE DOD Acquisition Other Govt R&D Commercial R&D Commercial Market “Sensor” Effectiveness: High Moderate Poor FIGURE 3-2 Domains of surprise “sensor” effectiveness.

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ASSESSING SURPRISE 47 No single community has strong “sensor” capability in all the domains that can uncover potential surprises. It is therefore necessary to take advantage of the collective strength of the relevant communities so as to gain a more coherent and authoritative understanding of the potential for surprise, analyze its potential impact, and create and implement solutions. In other words, this assembly of sensors must itself be viewed as a system. The complexity of this system is clear from Figure 3-2, as is the need for sophisticated tools to exploit it. Modeling and simulation (M&S) is a natural tool for dealing with this type of complexity and has become an integral part of determining the capabilities and vulnerabilities of naval systems and assessing the potential for surprise. The overall undertaking is vast, and the models employed cover many different disciplines: basic physics, engineering design for development of platforms and weapon systems, mission planning, training, intelligence gathering and interpretation, conduct of actual military operations, and the subsequent evaluation of their outcomes. Clearly, a complete discussion of M&S in support of the naval forces would not be practi- cal. However, as an attempt at illustration, the brief discussion in this section will focus on the role of M&S using first principles. To achieve the M&S capability it needs, the naval scientific and technical community is organized into various discipline areas for the purpose of devel- oping and maintaining the SMEs and facilities needed to support naval mis- sions. The disciplines include platform (ship, aircraft, spacecraft, etc.) design and construction, radar systems and technology, acoustic systems and technol- ogy, missile systems and technology, electronic warfare systems and technol- ogy, communication systems and technology, space systems and technology, electronics, materials, chemistry, environmental (ocean, atmosphere, and space) science and technology, and more. The overall community spans the government and private sectors. It necessarily includes not only theoretical modeling and analysis capability but also evaluated results of well-designed and instrumented tests to validate the M&S and ensure their improvement as greater systems and phenomenology understanding emerges from the tests and experiments. Each of the SME communities is responsible for developing the levels of models needed to meet its responsibilities for contributing to naval superiority. The various SME communities must interact with one another. For example, the placement of ra- dar on a ship influences ship design and vice versa. Electronic warfare systems need input from and also influence radar systems and communication systems. Radar systems, acoustic systems, electronic warfare systems, and communica- tion systems all need input from the appropriate environmental communities. The required working-level ties among the various SME communities needed for model development are maintained in each SME community—the sponsors of the SME communities require this. This rather loose federation has proven to be effective for advancing M&S in all the communities. The process becomes much more formal when a decision is made to proceed with development of a particular weapon system or with conduct of a fleet exercise. In either case, coordinated and

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48 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE specific input from several SME communities would be required to perform the M&S needed for that development or exercise or when an effort is initiated to assess the potential for surprise in a particular area. At that point, an overall pro- gram management structure is usually employed, an organization is designated to coordinate the overall M&S program, and the appropriate contractual obligations are put in place. This requires significant interaction among the relevant SME communities, the naval staff, the appropriate acquisition offices, the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) community, and others as necessary. Modeling, simulation, and analysis tools are critical for the development and deployment of naval platforms, systems, logistics, and training. These tools, when properly leveraged by a network of SMEs in academia, industry, laboratories, and service colleges, form a strong framework within which to anticipate and respond to surprise. Technology-Focused Vulnerability Study Groups There exists a set of known surprises that are of immense concern to naval forces. Many of these surprises have surfaced as lessons learned from humani- tarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts, from discovery during fleet exercises, or in the course of regular mission operations. The committee heard common concerns from Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps leadership about port security, mine warfare, cyberthreats, use of commercial shipping for hazard- ous materials, and small vessel threats. It recognizes that government agencies are working to characterize these concerns and understand their potential impact. However, inconsistencies were found in the way the results of these efforts were being applied in exercises and red team activities. In some sense, because every- one is concerned about these threats, no one organization appears to be tasked with truly characterizing them and therefore with identifying threat response and mitigation strategies for widespread use. In other words, it appears difficult to focus on disruptive threats within the existing infrastructure and processes. Vulnerability assessments for critical technology infrastructure have so far been based on small exercises and the like, and the effects must be better quanti- fied, modeled, and/or characterized in order to be leveraged more effectively into the operation of fleet forces. For example, threats to precision navigation and timing sources, the potential for cyberattacks embedded within navy weapon sys- tems, or vulnerability of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance (ISR) system could significantly impact naval operations; however, little evidence was found that the element of surprise has consistently been incorporated into fleet exercises and training. Similarly, while known potential threats to U.S. interests (including those that threaten the homeland)—for example, semisubmersibles, small vessels, and the mining of U.S. ports—are acknowledged and characterized as disruptive surprise issues and potentially catastrophic, there appears to be a lack of training

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ASSESSING SURPRISE 49 and exercises and insufficient preparation by U.S. naval forces in responding to these threats and in developing a concept of operations for response using existing capabilities in the event these threats materialize. It is encouraging, however, that a significant body of knowledge exists within the wider DOD community in the form of M&S resources and a network of SMEs familiar with these subjects at various levels of fidelity. However, the disconnect between experts capable of better modeling and characterizing the threats and the fleet forces charged with responding to new threats leaves the Navy vulnerable to surprise. The recommended surprise mitigation office could continually identify and prioritize vulnerable operational or technological areas that are not owned by a single mission. In each of these vulnerability areas, the office should establish a threat study group (TSG) to further characterize, quantify, and model the threat. A given TSG would leverage existing resources (modeling, simulation, and analysis tools used by a network of SMEs in academia, industry, laboratories, and service colleges) to characterize the risk so that it will be useful for campaign-level modeling and fleet exercises. Improving Red Teams Through NonTraditional Perspective A lack of appreciation for other cultures is a recognized weakness in U.S. intelligence and defense planning. Compared to other nationalities, Americans on average speak fewer foreign languages, travel infrequently beyond our nation’s borders, and lack a working understanding of the cultural nuances that could result in surprise. There is overall, a great tendency to look at how an adversary will behave from an American standpoint. Sadly, however, when assessing the potential for an adversary to introduce surprise, it is the adversary’s cultural val- ues, societal norms, and geopolitical priorities that must be taken into account. Naval forces must find a way to incorporate nontraditional perspectives into exercises, red team activities, and training efforts. The question is how to best approach this challenge from the standpoint of both human resources and tech- nology infrastructure. History has numerous examples—for example, kamikazes, the Maginot Line, and suicide bombers—of not anticipating a surprise because of flawed cultural perspectives. Throughout this study, red teams were heard from that were assembled to evaluate weapon systems performance, analyze specific technology vulnerabili- ties, and run naval exercises given various adversarial scenarios. These red teams leveraged a strong system-of-systems M&S capability that focused on the physi- cal systems that naval forces would employ in any warfighting activity. However, there is little evidence of the systematic use of human social, cultural, and behav- ioral (HSCB) modeling to inform red team activities or exercises. It also found

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50 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE no consistent attempt to capture and incorporate nontraditional perspectives for these exercises from personnel with broader cultural backgrounds. There appear to be major shortfalls in constructing red teams that can simu- late or represent the thinking of adversaries across global cultures. As our under- standing of potential surprise matures, it is important that independent red teams are assembled with the appropriate balance of skills and HSCB consideration to ensure an understanding from military and cultural perspectives that may not exist within the core organizations. Fortunately, DOD recognizes the need for diverse perspectives and cultural understanding and has invested in HSCB research in order to introduce the human dimension into defense planning. In the course of this study, the committee found a number of examples of research in HSCB modeling that illustrate the potential for evaluating surprise taking into account cultural differences in a controlled training environment. For example, the Office of Naval Research has invested in an HSCB modeling program to build a knowledge base and create training capacity to understand, predict, and shape human behavior across global cultures. This program seeks to understand the HSCB factors that influence behavior at individual, group, and societal levels. In doing so, researchers are developing computational M&S capabilities, visual analytical toolsets, and mission-rehearsal systems that will give naval forces the ability to come up with a culturally sensi- tive forecast. The committee recognizes that understanding the totality of human behav- ior is beyond the scope of HSCB and that in order to be effective for military planning, HSCB research must focus on the role of the military in the context of government actions and on behavioral understanding required to specify data and models relevant to the military missions. In that light, various projects of the Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) were also reviewed. Established in 1999 with a multiyear contract from the U.S. Army, ICT is a multidisciplinary research institute at the University of Southern California focused on exploring and expanding how people engage with com- puters, through virtual characters, video games, and simulated scenarios. ICT develops advanced immersive technologies to create human synthetic experiences that are so compelling the participants will react as if they are real. Herein lies a potential for anticipating and assessing surprise. Given promising quantitative interpretations of the qualitative findings of social psychology, military doctrine, and proven mathematical modeling techniques, ICT has developed a frame- work, PsychSim, that is sufficiently realistic to train users in cultural awareness, battle space preparation, and mission operations. In the safety of a virtual world, trainees interact with virtual humans and experience situations and dilemmas that they are likely to face in the real world. Such interaction drives outcomes based on choices that are made in this immersive environment. The PsychSim framework is explained as follows:

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ASSESSING SURPRISE 51 [Designed] to explore how individuals and groups interact and how those inter- actions can be influenced[,] PsychSim allows an end-user to quickly construct a social scenario, where a diverse set of entities, either groups or individuals, interact and communicate among themselves. Each entity has its own goals, relationships (e.g., friendship, hostility, authority) with other entities, private beliefs and mental models about other entities. The simulation tool generates the behavior for these entities and provides explanations of the result in terms of each entity’s goals and beliefs. A user can play different roles by specifying actions or messages for any entity to perform. Alternatively, the simulation itself can perturb the scenario to provide a range of possible behaviors that can identify critical sensitivities of the behavior to deviations (e.g., modified goals, relationships, or mental models). A central aspect of the PsychSim design is that agents have fully specified decision-theoretic models of others. Such quantita- tive recursive models give PsychSim a powerful mechanism to model a range of factors in a principled way.2 Given the technology maturity of HSCB research for use in military appli- cations, the committee proposes that select HSCB learning tools be introduced into the system-of-systems modeling capability that naval forces may leverage to evaluate potential surprise. It notes that the Navy has already invested in this technology through the Immersive Naval Officer Training System (INOTS) pro- gram. Targeting leadership as well as basic counseling for junior leaders in the Navy, “the INOTS experience incorporates a virtual human, classroom response technology, and real-time data tracking tools to support the instruction, practice, and assessment of interpersonal communication skills.”3 The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) has also employed this tech- nology in counter-IED training systems involving video narrative, immersive environments, and geospecific multiplayer gaming scenarios. The Dismounted In- teractive Counter-IED Environment for Training (DICE-T) system sends trainees on various interactive missions that emphasize critical components of dismounted patrol: planning a route, executing a patrol, and countering threats, and mis- sion debrief or after-action review. The game scenarios represent real-world dismounted patrol situations. The DICE-T system teaches novices to think like experts before they are deployed. These examples are cited as evidence that HSCB research has been trans- formed into useful tools for military planning. Given the growing need to under- stand human terrain and cultural differences in future military operations, the committee suggests that future red team participants could benefit from these 2  Stacy C. Marsella, David V. Pynadath, and Stephen J. Read. 2004. “PsychSim: Agent-Based Mod- eling of Social Interactions and Influence,” Proceedings of the International Conference on Cognitive Modeling, Pittsburgh, Penn. Available at http://people.ict.usc.edu/~marsella/publications/iccm04.pdf. Accessed February 6, 2013. 3  Description available at http://ict.usc.edu/prototypes/inots/. Accessed July 10, 2013.

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52 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE immersive training tools, which would accelerate their understanding of the military operating environment. U.S. naval leadership should take steps to ensure that red teams, provided they have sufficient independence, expertise, and a fresh influx of participants, depart radically from traditional thinking in order to prepare forces for combat and have them to develop new tactics. Efforts must be made to diversify the composition of teams to better represent the adversary’s thinking. It would be desirable for red teams to vary in terms of culture, ethnicity, and international experience. They should have multiservice, multigenerational, multidisciplinary, and independent backgrounds and should include nonmilitary, business/commer- cial, and academic sector members. The committee recognizes that ONR has made significant progress by bring- ing together sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, engineers, computer scientists, warfighters, and analysts to develop an influence operations portfolio for U.S. naval forces. However, the full integration of these HSCB models with the more traditional military models will require further advances in modeling the whole of society. Figure 3-3 illustrates the spectrum of modeling capability that is required to tackle the new challenges faced by the defense community. On the left side of the scale, one sees the traditional defense modeling capabil- ity. Based on known mathematical approaches, the Navy’s simulation enterprise as described earlier in this report is based on the laws of physics and weapon system performance parameters validated through testing and operational use. On the right side of the scale, one sees the social science models, based largely on heuristics. Both modeling environments should be part of military assessment activities going forward. As military forces are increasingly used as an integral component of overall political operations, red teams will need to bridge this gap, learning from HSCB models and using this perspective to inform military operations. The committee recalls the words of Secretary of Defense Gates: “No one should ever neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions Dominated by known mathematical relationships Based on heuristics Engineering Models Scoping Models Social Network Weapons Systems Multiwarfare Tool-Assisted Models Scaling Law Platforms Models Wargaming Bayesian Influence Models (Red Teams) Networks Warfighting Models Economic Models Training Systems Systems Dynamics Agent-Based Mission Rehearsal Models Models FIGURE 3-3 Defense systems modeling domain. SOURCE: Adapted from S.K. Numrich and Andreas Tolk, 2010, “Challenges for Human, Social, Cultural and Behavioral Model- ing,” SCS M&S Magazine, January.

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ASSESSING SURPRISE 53 of warfare. War is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain, and it is important to be skeptical of systems analyses, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.”4 This message continues to hold true. modeling and red teaming opportunities in the committee defined scenarios Modeling and Simulation in the Context of Space Systems Over the years the U.S. Navy has developed ever greater use of and de- pendence on space-based assets. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) is now used and depended on for ship navigation, tracking, situational awareness, cartography, time synchronization, precision weapon guidance, force protection, command and control and logistics management, among other things. As another example, the recent launch of MUOS-1 continues the evolution of SATCOM into the regime of mobile users as they traverse the battle space. The use of space-based surveillance assets for battle planning, execution, and damage assessment continues to increase. All of the above are further enhanced by rapid developments in cyber capabilities. Collectively, these developments make space assets a significant force multiplier. As with all force multipliers, the use of and dependence on space assets is accompanied by vulnerabilities. These can range from a minor degradation of capabilities to a significant or even a total loss of that force multiplier. M&S provides critical tools for understanding the various vulnerabilities and for suggesting and assessing approaches to ameliorate or overcome the vulnerabilities. It is helpful to have some understanding of how M&S plays in the space infrastructure. In a simplistic sense, one can break the problem into several categories: the spacecraft themselves; the physical environment in which the spacecraft sit; the propagation links that exist among the spacecraft and the vari- ous entities from which they receive or to which they transmit information; and the properties of the entities that transmit information to or receive information from spacecraft. The latter entities can be in space, in the atmosphere, on land, on the sea, or under the sea. The resulting systems are so complex as to themselves require significant levels of M&S in design, operation, and maintenance and in the response to their degradation. Modern spacecraft typically consist of a platform or bus on which are in- stalled sensors, processors, and communication equipment. Each of these areas requires extensive M&S in the design of the spacecraft, in its subsequent opera- tion, and in the response to the various stimuli to which the operational spacecraft is subjected, manmade or natural. Spacecraft and their associated models are 4  Robert M. Gates. 2009. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88(1):28-40.

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54 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE tested extensively on Earth. No spacecraft of any consequence is constructed without the involvement of a variety of simulation communities. These commu- nities will generally follow the spacecraft through its operational life and play a key role in resolving problems that might arise with the spacecraft. The associ- ated M&S is generally done using a “hardware in the loop” approach, where model output is used to stimulate the spacecraft and the spacecraft response is then used to stimulate the M&S. The same is true for the ground control systems that control the spacecraft. This type of M&S can be characterized as electrical, mechanical, and product assurance. A more detailed but still high-level discussion of this type of M&S can be found at the European Space Agency Website. 5 This type of M&S and the associated communities work at the state of the art and are an integral part of the international spacecraft program. M&S of the environment in which a spacecraft sits is critical to its routine operation and to managing the spacecraft when it is subject to anomalies (natu- ral or manmade). The M&S of spacecraft environment and associated natural anomalies (solar flares, energetic particle events, and the like) is covered under the rubric “space weather.” Because of its broad military and commercial im- pact, there exists a National Space Weather Program, the details of which can be found at the National Space Weather Program Portal.6 The DOD component is discussed in the National Space Weather Program: The Implementation Plan (2nd Edition).7 This program encompasses monitoring, modeling, and predicting the space environment and its impact on SATCOM, GPS positioning and timing, and spacecraft. It pulls together all of the relevant U.S. M&S communities and represents the state of the art regarding the natural environment and its impact on space systems. However, there may be some concern regarding the M&S situation as it relates to high-altitude nuclear explosions. This will be commented on below in the context of GPS issues. M&S related to the communication links among spacecraft and associated receivers and transmitters is a well-developed field. In a simplistic sense, this M&S attempts to predict the characteristics of the signal received by an antenna to the signal transmitted by a spacecraft, ground station, or other transmitter. It is generally referred to as link analysis and deals with matters such as system noise, environmental noise, atmospheric attenuation refraction and scattering, and sources of signal interference. The M&S tools are highly developed and the simulation community works at the state of the art. However, as with all M&S, the output of a simulation is no better than the input, which, as can be seen from the topics addressed by this M&S, can be subject to high levels of uncertainty or ignorance. As a result, this M&S becomes an essential tool in reconciling a 5  Available at http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering. Accessed February 6, 2013. 6  Available at http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/portal. Accessed February 6, 2013. 7  National Space Weather Program Council. 2000. The National Space Weather Program: The Implementation Plan, 2nd edition, Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology, Washington, D.C., July. Available at http://www.ofcm.gov/nswp-ip/pdf/nswpip.pdf. Accessed February 6, 2013.

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ASSESSING SURPRISE 55 spacecraft’s expected performance with its observed performance. Understanding the essential interplay between expectations and observations is paramount in space systems (or any complex system) development. Designers have a tendency to understate matters that might reduce system performance, and simulators can only simulate based on their knowledge at the time. It is the reconciliation process that ultimately determines the system performance. The GPS is a good example of this interplay as it has occurred from its conception to its present status. The GPS ranks among the great scientific and technical achievements of the twentieth century. It has changed the way that the world works, including the way that the Navy works. Its improvements are so seductive that its impact has penetrated far beyond that envisioned by its inventors and at a speed that is dif- ficult to comprehend. It is quite likely that its impact on naval operations is not fully understood. Perhaps an interesting M&S undertaking might be to compile the full penetration of GPS dependence into areas that the naval forces depend on and to assess the broad impact on naval operations that the penetration implies. The results might be surprising. One fact that is now well accepted is the relative ease of jamming GPS receivers owing to the low broadcast power of the GPS system. This creates a grave concern due to the ever deepening penetration of GPS-based technology into the military and commercial domains. One approach to dealing with this concern has been the attempt to significantly reduce the vulnerability of the GPS approach to navigation and time transfer. It has resulted in a several orders-of- magnitude improvement in jamming rejection over that available in the original GPS implementation. The M&S tools discussed above played an important role in this undertaking. One of the outputs of this activity has been the advancement of controlled reception pattern arrays (an approach to electronic beam forming and null forming to maximize GPS signal and minimize jamming signal) to the point where they are sufficiently reduced in size that they may be considered for a broad array of platforms. However, even with these advances, further improve- ments in antijam capability are needed, and other approaches should be consid- ered to reduce cost. M&S tools will be essential to making progress and trade-offs regarding this much-needed capability. Another approach to dealing with the jamming vulnerability has been to examine alternatives to GPS. The Office of Naval Research, for example, has funded a diversified program with the objective of identifying technologies that might form the basis of alternatives to GPS that could be viable for the naval mission. This program has advanced technologies in the areas of precision celes- tial navigation, inertial navigation based on fiber optics, microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), and quantum mechanical approaches and the development of small atomic clocks. It may be that several of these developments have advanced to a point where they by themselves or in some combination with one another could demonstrate sufficient promise as to warrant more aggressive develop-

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56 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE ment. The employment of the M&S tools analogous to those mentioned above may provide a cost-effective approach to make an initial assessment in this area. A third approach has been to consider alternative fallbacks in the event of a significant degradation or loss of GPS capability. One such proposal has been to reestablish the now disabled LORAN navigation system but using today’s technology. Such an effort is under way in the United Kingdom and Europe. That system is designated eLoran. The objective of this undertaking is as follows: The GLAs have been providing their prototype eLoran trial service since 2007. eLoran satisfies the requirements of the international maritime community for a digital e-Navigation future that specifies an independent, dissimilar and comple- mentary backup for GNSS. eLoran allows users to retain GNSS-levels of navi- gational safety even when satellite services are disrupted.8 While this approach has obvious limitations regarding the U.S. Navy mis- sion, there is certainly some intersection with the Navy’s broad interest in reliable navigation and time transfer. M&S could be helpful in identifying the extent of the intersection. A concern was mentioned above regarding M&S capabilities related to high-altitude nuclear explosions in the ionosphere. While such explosions are unlikely, they must be considered as a possibility with large consequences. The M&S concern relates to the ability to realistically model the geographically large ionospheric modification that will persist for hours after the explosion. Low earth orbit (LEO) spacecraft that survive the explosion may pass over this disturbed region. Such plasmas have a tendency to become highly structured (striate). Furthermore, it is known from natural events (generally referred to as Spread F) that the GPS signal can undergo significant phase fluctuations when it propagates through such plasmas. This can lead to deep fading of the signal at the GPS receiver causing obvious problems (such as loss of lock-on). The level of M&S sophistication needed to simulate the nuclear-explosion-induced plasma is high, and while it once existed, it is not clear that it still exists. Since M&S is the only way to quantify this problem, it would be a good idea to ensure the availability of the needed expertise. There are many other aspects of the role of M&S in military space systems that could be discussed. However, it should be clear that its role has been and is essential. Furthermore, it is clear that M&S will play a key role in resolving the GPS vulnerabilities that confront the Navy and that there are potentially viable approaches to that end. 8  Research & Radionavigation Directorate, General Lighthouse Authorities. 2013. “eLoran.” Avail- able at http://www.gla-rrnav.org/radionavigation/eloran/index.html. Accessed February 6, 2013.

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ASSESSING SURPRISE 57 Potential Use of Modeling and Simulation in the Social Media Manipulation Scenario Only recently has the world seen the power of virtual communities influ- enced or called to action by social media. As outlined in the Crowd-Sourcing via Social Media Scenario (see Appendix A), which is about a fictitious place called Provencia, a well-planned Internet-based propaganda campaign can poison the hearts and minds of a population, escalating and organizing discontent to the point where lives are lost and military intervention is required. In this scenario, social media are an important means for our adversaries to rapidly change the game for U.S. interests. To operate effectively in this sort of complex, public opinion-laced scenario, U.S naval forces would likely leverage red teaming and M&S to prepare for both kinetic and nonkinetic response. Since kinetic sys- tems M&S traditional red teaming has long been utilized throughout the Navy’s system-of-systems enterprise, the committee next briefly explores how HSCB and social media modeling could enhance current M&S environments and better prepare naval forces for a scenario such as the one faced in fictitious Provencia. Social Network Modeling and Influence Operations Imagine a modeling environment and open simulation framework that allows naval forces to rapidly assemble a reasonable representation of the Provencia situation, including (1) forecasting and predictive models of human behavior for Provencia’s general population, easily influenced activists, and Freedom for Provencia (FFP) renegades and (2) social media feeds to serve as a catalyst for these human behavior models. The simulation interface could allow military mission planners to create news reports or social media feeds that would then be parsed by the simulation software for keywords used to potentially enrage the population and introduce new behaviors into the Provencia environment model. Using this crowd-sourced, behavioral predictor, military planners could then evaluate the potential impact of kinetic and nonkinetic responses to the uprising. What if the Provencia situation became a prolonged challenge for U.S. in- terests? At some point, the HSCB framework could be leveraged to model social networks within Provencia, understand the network’s nodes and tipping points, and evaluate or influence operations scenarios. What would it take to convert public opinion in favor of the United States? Which social media (blogs, postings, etc.) would have the most impact and should therefore be exploited to address the situation? These are among the questions that could be considered through the use of a robust HSCB modeling tool. It is important to note that the usefulness of an HSCB modeling tool would depend on how well the culture is understood.

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58 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Leveraging HSCB Models into Red Teams and Wargaming Ideally, one could merge physics-based systems models with those based on social science to create a comprehensive simulation environment to be used in defense operations planning. However, at this time, it would not be that simple. Engineering models for weapon systems and platforms are firmly based on math- ematical principles, whereas social science models are based largely on heuristics and do not lend themselves to traditional approaches for validation, verification, and accreditation. Therefore, for the near future, the committee suggests devel- oping a mechanism to leverage what is learned through the use of these HSCB modeling tools and then using it for a broader red team and wargame scenario. For the situation in Provencia, a red team should be prepped for the situation us- ing the human behavior modeling framework and then employed in a wargaming experience that has been carefully orchestrated to include social media–based upsets and nonkinetic response. Red teams should be varied in culture and inter- national makeup and have multiservice, multigenerational, and multidisciplinary personnel, including those well versed in the social sciences. Summary Ultimately, the United States must train and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of deterring aggression, maintaining freedom of the seas, and, if deter- rence fails, winning wars. As the world becomes more connected and threats have become more obscure, a new surprise mitigation office on behalf of stakeholders in the Navy Fleet Forces Command (FFC)-Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), USCG Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM), and Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) must consider new perspectives in assessing surprise. This activity must take full advantage of experts in industry, academia, the national laboratories, and government to identify and characterize risk, consider solutions, develop mitigation plans, and deploy change. As was observed in the exemplar programs and as has been the general expe- rience of committee members concerning the acquisition programs, the technical intelligence community is generally responsive to requests and tasking concern- ing potential technical threats to mission systems. However, for those systems that represent the infrastructure support to mission systems, such as GPS, ISR, and communications, the committee did not observe that any mission organiza- tion was tasking, reviewing, and assessing threats against infrastructure systems; consequently, some organizations tended to assume their availability. At any rate, the committee observes that if a responsible organization were taking threats to these infrastructures more seriously, there would have been significant evidence of ongoing serious efforts to address their vulnerabilities with stop-gap systems or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

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ASSESSING SURPRISE 59 Finding and recommendation Finding 3: Organizations that anticipate and respond effectively to potential capability surprises—such as the Navy’s SSBN9 Security program, the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation program (Air Force red team), and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program (in response to Operation Burnt Frost)—appear to possess the following characteristics: senior leadership support; team independence; access to a strong base of cross-disciplinary technical and operational expertise; an ability to identify threats through campaign-level modeling, system-of-systems simulation, and high-fidelity physics-based models; precise vulnerability modeling and analysis capabili- ties validated by test and experiment data; mechanisms to recommend and/or deploy solutions as necessary; adequate, steady funding; and focus on a par- ticular mission such as Navy SSBN Security. In addition, these organizations appear to leverage modeling, simulation, and analysis tools in conjunction with a network of experts to expose bias, offer critical review, model and test against potential vulnerabilities, and demonstrate alternative solutions to respond to surprise. At the same time, assessments of threats to the critical technologies that enable U.S. naval forces appear to be conducted on a small scale rather than being quantified, modeled, and characterized for U.S. naval forces as a whole. For example, threats to precision navigation and timing sources or cyberattacks embedded within Navy weapon systems could impact a wide array of naval operations. However, U.S. naval forces as a whole do not seem to be utilizing the best methodologies for assessing surprise. One of these methodologies would be the creation of red teams, that could simulate or represent adversarial thinking across global cultures. Recommendation 3: As its first tasking from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the surprise mitigation office (see Recommendation 1) should (1) identify and prioritize any broad response to operational and technology threats that are not owned by any one mission authority and (2) establish threat study groups to characterize, quantify, and model these specific threats as well as leverage existing resources (modeling, simulation, and analysis tools and test data used by a network of subject matter experts in academia, industry, laboratories, and the Service colleges). The output from (1) and (2) should be disseminated to U.S. naval leadership as soon as possible. Careful attention should be paid to surprises not addressed by any program, or where a substantial gap exists between programs. The CNO, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and the Com- mandant of the Coast Guard (CCG) should take steps to ensure that red teams—with sufficient independence and expertise but, at the same time, 9  SSBN, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

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60 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE a fresh influx of participants—are able to depart radically from traditional thinking in order to help U.S. naval forces as a whole prepare for combat and develop new tactics. In particular, efforts should be made to expand and periodically refresh the composition of red teams to achieve a greater diver- sity in thinking and better represent the adversary.