6


Implementation and Fielding

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the challenges associated with implementing and fielding a solution to a capability surprise. Implementation and fielding begin with a program plan and end with the deployment of a new capability. The importance of flexibility, timeliness, and affordability to capability surprise and how the existing acquisition structure can support those needs are discussed. The concept of open architecture is reviewed and how it is important to implementing capability surprise solutions through the concepts of repurposing and spiraling in new capabilities.

Needs

Surprise is difficult to predict, as discussed previously in this report. When it does materialize, the ability of naval forces to react effectively is dependent on three important principles: flexibility, timeliness, and affordability.

Flexibility

Flexibility deals with the ability to redirect and manage existing resources effectively in the face of surprise. Existing processes for acquisition afford us the flexibility to respond effectively, but we fail to take on the challenges of using this built-in flexibility because we are risk averse. The design and development processes have their waiver procedures, but many times programs prefer to manage to 100 percent of the requirements rather than a “good enough” solution that is more timely.



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6 Implementation and Fielding Introduction This chapter discusses the challenges associated with implementing and fielding a solution to a capability surprise. Implementation and fielding begin with a program plan and end with the deployment of a new capability. The importance of flexibility, timeliness, and affordability to capability surprise and how the existing acquisition structure can support those needs are discussed. The concept of open architecture is reviewed and how it is important to implementing capability surprise solutions through the concepts of repurposing and spiraling in new capabilities. Needs Surprise is difficult to predict, as discussed previously in this report. When it does materialize, the ability of naval forces to react effectively is dependent on three important principles: flexibility, timeliness, and affordability. Flexibility Flexibility deals with the ability to redirect and manage existing resources effectively in the face of surprise. Existing processes for acquisition afford us the flexibility to respond effectively, but we fail to take on the challenges of using this built-in flexibility because we are risk averse. The design and development processes have their waiver procedures, but many times programs prefer to man- age to 100 percent of the requirements rather than a “good enough” solution that is more timely. 79

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80 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Rapid acquisition procedures have been used effectively during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, based on these experiences, the logistics and support services need improvement and must be adequately addressed in future conflicts. Finally, more flexibility must be incorporated into the budgeting process to allow for capability surprise. Restrictive budget planning and allocation does not allow for the resources to address unexpected surprises. The development, test, and acquisition communities need to have more flexibility to allocate reserves and/or reallocate existing funding without the delays inherent in the existing programming, planning, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. Timeliness Addressing the capability surprise challenge is very similar to addressing the needs that have created the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) process. In both instances one is challenged to provide the operational warfighter with a capability that is lacking in the face of an unexpected adversarial threat and to answer that threat in as short a time period as possible. The JUONS process generally entails looking for a solution to a known enemy capability for which we do not have a response. It is real, immediate, and usually significantly impairs the warfighter’s ability to freely operate. The capability surprise challenge can be categorized into three different elements based on the time horizon of the threat, defined as follows: • Urgent. 0-2 years response horizon. • Emergent. 0-5 years response horizon. • Deliberate. 2-6+ years response horizon. When it comes to urgent surprises, hostilities are most likely already under way, and solutions to unanticipated threats from our adversary are needed and being pursued. This is very similar to the scenario for the JUONS requests. Emergent surprises are different from urgent surprises in that they are often proactive responses to estimated threats during peacetime conditions. There is assumed to be some time period in which one can prepare a response before one expects to have to address it under operational conditions. There is a limited time period one has to prepare the new response, test and train with it, and then deploy it in anticipation of the enemy’s threat. In times of active conflict, efforts to prepare for emergent surprises will merge with efforts to prepare for urgent surprises, especially for early-stage initiatives. In this type of scenario one could find oneself both preparing new capabilities to rapidly field against observed surprises (urgent) as well as proactively pushing new capability to the field in anticipation of estimated new capabilities of the enemy (early-stage emergent).

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 81 Affordability Figure 6-1 indicates how the number of acquisition professionals has de- clined over the last 20 or so years while procurement dollars have increased over the same period, primarily owing to the ongoing wars. Given this trend, a key to improving the rapid acquisition of solutions is the quality and type of the staff in these positions. Simply slashing a workforce already overloaded with demands makes it difficult to apply the innovative thinking necessary to address the acquisition needs for capability surprise. If the staff are focused on work flow, they will become very process driven, impeding the innovative thinking needed for fielding a rapid solution. This will breed bureaucracy, where the letter of the requirement or contract will become the driving factor rather than the time to fielding. A properly balanced workforce is required to ensure that innovative thinking is brought to bear and will provide managed risk solutions in a timely manner to our warfighters. 120 800 Procurement Appropriations (Billion $) DOD Authorization Act for FY96 700 100 required DOD to reduce its acquisition Acquisition Workforce (thousands) workforce by 25% by the end of 600 FY2000 80 500 60 400 300 40 200 20 100 0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 DoD Procurement Dollars Acquisition Organization Workforce FIGURE 6-1 DOD acquisition workforce: SOURCE: Jacques S. Gansler, University of Maryland, “Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs,” presentation to the committee, Irvine, Calif., June 27, 2012. Source of workforce data: DOD IG Report D-2000-088, February 29, 2000, and DOD IG Report D-2006-073, April 17, 2006. Source of budget data: Annual Defense Reports, available at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html. Procurement supplementals for FY2005 and FY2006 not yet reflected in Annual Defense Reports were obtained from Congressional Research Service Reports (Defense Science Board, 2008).

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82 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Using the Acquisition Process to Be Responsive to Capability Surprise A natural reaction in response to delays in fielding new capabilities is to point at the DOD acquisition system and address changes through an update to the DOD 5000 procedures.1 Traditionally this update has focused on the Federal Acquisition Regulation System/Defense Federal Acquisition Regula- tion Supplement (FARS/DFARS) procedures with a particular emphasis on the requirements oversight process—for example, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This committee takes a different view of the acquisition challenge in the face of capability surprise. It focuses less on the procurement process and more on the way we ask industry to develop and provide capability. The answers must not only be capable but must also be timely and affordable for the military and industry alike. Repurposing Repurposing Platforms—How Repurposing Has Worked in the Past Repurposing in the naval forces and the military in general is not a new con- cept. It has been successfully applied in numerous instances and has saved the nation a fortune. It also has permitted rapid and timely redeployment of assets to meet new threats and resulted in incredible longevity for important platforms. In many cases, the repurposed “vehicles” were robust and large enough to accom- modate payloads and purposes that were never foreseen or planned when they were first designed. B-52 Stratofortress The B-52 (Figure 6-2) was introduced in 1955 as a high-altitude nuclear bomber. It was repurposed during the Vietnam conflict to drop conventional bombs from a high altitude. It was again repurposed during the cold war as a low-altitude conventional bomber (while keeping its original mission as a nuclear bomber). During the 1980s, the B-52s had a stand-off mission when they were equipped with air-launch cruise missiles (ALCMs). During the cold war, they were repurposed to carry other weapons and to deploy mines. During the first night of Desert Storm, two B-52s flew the opening stages at 500 ft. In Afghani- stan and Iraq, the B-52s were again repurposed to provide close air support by 1  There have been many reports that have made recommendations to address systemic DOD acquisi- tion issues. For example, see National Research Council, 2010, Information Assurance for Network- Centric Naval Forces, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.; National Research Council, 2004, The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.; and http://acquisition.navy.mil/home/policy_and_guidance.

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 83 FIGURE 6-2 B-52. SOURCE: U.S. Air Force. the addition of targeting pods and smart weapons. These remarkable 57-yr-old platforms are expected to remain in service for another 15-30 years, giving us an effective platform for nearly 90 years. USCG Secretary-Class Cutters The Coast Guard provides an interesting historical example of repurposing. In 1936, the Treasury Department built seven Secretary-class 327-ft cutters (Fig- ure 6-3) modeled after the Navy’s Erie-class gunboats. Their original purpose, envisaged during Prohibition, evolved into revenue cutters used for the interdic- tion of narcotics. Shortly thereafter, at the outbreak of the Second World War, they were rearmed and operated very effectively for the Navy in convoy escort duty and amphibious force flag ships. After the war, the USCG became independent again. The cutters were repurposed as weather ships and midocean search and rescue for transoceanic passenger aircraft. After rearming again, they performed coastal gunboat duty in the Vietnam conflict and returned afterward to midocean weather ship duties, until 1986. Because of their initial robustness, sea kindliness, and endurance, and the intentional repurposing, they served for half a century as “the Nation’s maritime workhorses.”2 2  CAPT John M. Waters, Jr., USN (Retired). 1967. Bloody Winter: Critical Months in the Battle of the Atlantic As Seen from the Conning Tower and Bridge, J.D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, N.J.

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84 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE FIGURE 6-3 USCG Secretary-class cutter. SOURCE: Courtesy of the Historic Naval Ships Association and the U.S. Coast Guard. USS Enterprise (CVN-65) The USS Enterprise, ordered from Newport News Shipbuilding in 1957, was the world’s first nuclear aircraft carrier (Figure 6-4). She was in continuous service for over 51 years. From her original role as an anti-Soviet fighter plane platform, over the past half century she has deployed to provide strike sup- port in the Vietnam and Southeast Asian conflicts, humanitarian aid, blockades, show-of-force in critical areas throughout the world, air support in Iraq and Afghanistan, and numerous other missions. To fulfill these roles, the platform has been adapted, reequipped, lengthened, and otherwise modified to meet the needs of new missions with new technology, aircraft, weapons, etc. This second oldest U.S. Navy commissioned vessel (decommissioned in December 2012) was repurposed numerous times because her size, robustness, and endurance ca- pabilities made it possible. She has been able to quickly and effectively respond to surprises. Spruance-Class Destroyers The Spruance-class destroyer is another example of repurposing (Figure 6-5). This class was built during the 1970s to replace the Second World War

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 85 FIGURE 6-4 USS Enterprise. SOURCE: U.S. Navy. FIGURE 6-5 Spruance-class destroyer. SOURCE: U.S. Navy.

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86 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE Gearing and Sumner classes. Its original mission was to provide antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and escort duties for carrier groups. The Spruance class was built in a semimodular manner, and that made repurposing easier. Ac- cordingly, during the 1990s, a large number of these vessels were updated by the addition of 61-cell vertical-launch missile systems and Tomahawk missiles. The USS Cushing, the last of the class, was also fitted with a 21-cell RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launcher on the fantail. While the last Spruance-class destroyer was decommissioned in 2005, it is an example of how a surface ASW/ escort vessel could be repurposed to a multipurpose, guided-missile destroyer. Ohio-Class Submarines Eighteen nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Ohio class were built starting in 1976 (Figure 6-6). In the 1990s, based on new stra- tegic arms limitation agreements, rather than retire the early Ohio-class SSBNs it was decided to reconfigure some of them as nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs). Starting in 2002, four of the class underwent modifications to their Trident missile launch tubes. They were modified to accommodate large FIGURE 6-6 Ohio-class submarine. SOURCE: U.S. Navy.

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 87 vertical-launch systems (VLSs), whereby the tubes could accommodate clusters of Tomahawk cruise missiles, submarine-launched, intermediate-range ballis- tic missiles (SLIRBMs), submarine-launched, global strike missiles, operating equipment for special operations forces (SOF), countermine warfare packages, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, and a variety of other payloads. The submarines can potentially accommodate future conventional cruise, ballistic, and boost-glide missiles. These reconfigured submarines are also able to deploy and supply SOF. This highly innovative and cost-effective reconfiguring of the Ohio class has provided the Navy with greatly expanded capabilities at a relatively modest cost. This was possible because the Ohio class was originally built with adequate robustness, the ability to forward deploy for long periods, and with adequate size and space. It is yet another excellent example of the Navy’s successful repurpos- ing efforts. Repurposing Payloads The key elements of repurposing an asset to enable new capabilities for new missions include upgrades of data processing capability, guidance and navigation, and energy management. Processing capabilities have been following Moore’s law since the 1970s and have enabled an explosion of products in both the mili- tary and commercial sectors from small, smart, precision weapons and unmanned systems to personal mobile communication devices such as smart phones and tab- lets. Advances in guidance and navigation have allowed miniature weapons with meter-level targeting accuracy and personal location systems tied to advanced schemes using mobile communication devices. Finally, new energy sources and management techniques enable systems to perform longer in stressing environ- ments. Unmanned vehicles, drones, and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) have all greatly benefited from these advances. Naval forces too have greatly benefited from taking assets with existing capabilities and quickly upgrading them with new capabilities to respond to “surprises” in the operational environments. This was demonstrated with the preprogramming of the SM-3 missile to neutralize a failing satellite in a desta- bilizing orbit by shooting it down in an operation known as Burnt Frost. Repur- posing was responsible for the procurement of air-to-surface missile capabilities using unmanned air vehicles during the Iraq War. In each case, existing platform and payload capabilities were minimally altered to provide significant new ca- pabilities within a short period of time. This saved significant development and testing schedule time by leveraging established system performance capabilities. Furthermore, the appropriate level of regression testing was identified, which appropriately set testing and qualification requirements and focused them on the new capabilities to enable earliest deployment times. Besides avoiding the usual requirement creep of a new systems develop-

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88 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE ment, repurposing eliminated the proposal development and evaluation cycle and potential protest delays and allowed requalification by similarity for certain subsystems—all saving time and money for DOD. While software modifications do not come free, upgrades can have significantly less impact on the test and qualification process than new hardware or systems replacements. Finally, with software modifications, impacts to the interface control documents for the plat- form interfaces can be minimized to facilitate deployment. The committee advocates taking this same concept of software modification down to the hard subsystem and component levels. Building in excess capacity in a system will position it for future growth or added capability. Subsystems and components, such as firmware or even power amplifiers, for example, need to be designed with the ability to change functional performance without physical replacement. Using these key critical components as an investment or hedge for future capabilities, they can be leveraged as the building blocks to enable a quick turn to respond to future capability surprises. This represents a change in the existing engineering design philosophies. The challenge will be in determining the proper balance between existing and known requirements and potential requirements down the road. The question to be answered is this: At what point does hedging our future needs with a single system start to drive the overall system development cost to the point where two separate systems may be more cost-effective? This will be the challenge for de- sign teams of the future and will determine how they approach the allocation of resources to achieve system expandability, affordability, and agility in the face of capability surprise. Limitations of Repurposing While the benefits of repurposing can at times be huge, it must also be rec- ognized that not every platform or payload lends itself to repurposing. Inadequate design margins, light scantlings, limited stability, lack of space or capacity, insufficient speed or endurance, and the like, may preclude adapting a platform or payload. “Jumbo-sizing” or major conversions are sometimes a solution, but in many cases, responding to capability surprises by repurposing is not the right solution for reasons of cost and, especially, timeliness. Architectures Concept Several organizations interviewed by the committee described a regulation- burdened acquisition program (Figure 6-7) and said it was an almost insur- mountable barrier to preparation and rapid technology response to any capability

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 89 Requirements (JCIDS) Budgeting (PPBE) FIGURE 6-7 Framework process built for the risk averse. SOURCE: Jacques S. Gansler, University of Maryland, “Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs,” presentation to the com- mittee, Irvine, Calif., June 27, 2012. surprise. The committee recognized an even more foundational issue: that naval surprise normally occurs at the operational and mission level, while naval ac- quisition organizations and processes are centered on platform delivery. Sev- eral promising suggestions were raised during the committee’s investigations. Consciously building capacity and capability reserves (software, hardware, and weapons) into platform payloads could be an effective way to achieve the agil- ity needed to respond to surprise. This approach minimizes the changes to the capital-intensive investments in platforms, while focusing on the packages that actually deliver the mission capabilities, and it emphasizes incremental improve- ments that can be rapidly implemented. Another suggestion presented to the committee explored formalizing and resourcing a mission syndicate composed of (1) platform, sensors, and weapons research; (2) requirements; and (3) resource and acquisition organizations that together provide contributions in delivery of a particular mission’s capability. This is an enhanced version of the OPNAV N95 coordination of a mine warfare enterprise and the naval laboratory warfare center concepts, where the syndicate lead is the holder of resources and “buys” mission platforms, sensors, and weapons from the providers. A mission-focus approach to acquisition may inspire an engineering approach that is more system-of-systems oriented and that could access a broad array of mission resources to anticipate and respond to surprise.

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 101 preciation for commercial practices. While clearly a naval vessel, many aspects of this vessel are common to merchant vessels. The long-term pricing agreements (LTPAs) so prevalent in today’s acquisi- tion processes may be a challenge in an era without strong past performance evaluations due to low volume and competition from the commercial sides. This could very well lead to an environment where one is confronted with going to war with what is available, affordable, and on the shelf today, because the duration of the future conflict may not allow for hardware with new capabilities to mature, then be acquired and deployed. Production Simply developing and then placing a new capability on the shelf and wait- ing for a threat to materialize allows the industrial base and users to go dormant and creates a chasm with respect to future deployment—a challenge for the us- ers and operators alike. It is akin to the setup times associated with a production run—things do not happen overnight, especially when surprise crops up. Our adversaries work this to their advantage operating inside our time line for re- sponse to take off-the-shelf capabilities and deploy them: While we are changing, they change their tactics yet again. The submarine force learned this lesson and kept the submarine design team engaged in the interim before the development of the Seawolf-class and the Virginia-class submarines so as to not lose the tacit knowledge of that community. Our naval forces need to keep our adversaries at bay by constantly changing and showing new capabilities in relatively short periods of time. It may be more appropriate to demonstrate many small changes to capabilities (MRAP) than a few large ones (Aegis). While this will require a paradigm shift relative to how industry operates today, it will lead to a more agile and complex response able to rapidly produce many different capabilities in a much shorter time. Our naval forces are no longer the sole possessor of technology, but to ensure that our systems behave as intended and without surprises, we must be able to trust their manufacturers in a world where the maker of a chip can tamper with its functionality and reliability, putting it beyond the reach of our system integrators and military operators. The United States needs to be exploiting the science from everywhere, leveraging technology development from our allies, and fielding systems from our own industrial base. Our naval forces are a leader in technology development but no longer hold the dominant position they once enjoyed. With the advent of the Internet and the move to global supply chains, technology—and therefore capability development—is within the grasp of even the remote societies of the globe. Adversaries study our open military literature and are quick to devise simple yet effective countermeasures to our systems. Their proactive learning and under- standing allow them to do this within the time frame of our present acquisition

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102 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE cycle. The observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop cycle of our adversaries has been shortened significantly because they no longer have to wait for systems to be used against them to learn how to counter their capabilities. Their reaction time is significantly reduced to well within our capability to react through our acquisition systems. “Rapid cycle of measure/countermeasure/counter-counter- measure will continue to add complexity to hybrid warfare operations, including cyber warfare.”14 Spiral Development The Department of Defense’s conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency mis- sions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. . . . Given the types of situations the United States is likely to face . . . it is time to think hard about how to institutionalize the procurement of [critical] capabilities and get them fielded quickly.15 Spiraling in capabilities is closely aligned with the three key elements of repurposability, described above. The challenge with spiraling in new capabilities is providing the expansion capabilities for the key elements in the original design. It is difficult to predict the future in any environment, and predicting “surprises” is no different. Spiral development requires discipline on the part of both the procuring agent and the contractor in laying down the relevant foundations for these elements based on reasonable expectations at the time. It would be impractical to assume that one will be able to determine the exact amount of processing, memory, or power a future spiral capability will require. However, one can make reasonable estimates of technology progression and capabilities based on current technology and system trends. Providing a reason- able expansion capability based on these trends at both the component and the line-replaceable-unit (LRU) levels is the most important aspect of preparing for future spirals. The focus should be on minimal disruption to the physical aspects of the systems unit that provides the main functionality for the new capability. This approach also calls for releasing incremental capabilities to the field as they become available throughout the development cycle in reasonable time frames. Adopting the model used by aircraft manufacturers to release operational flight programs (OFPs) to the wings on an 18- to 24-month cycle is a good example of spiral capability introduction. Early OFP releases contain fewer ca- pabilities than later releases. However, they contain enough functionality for the 14  Defense Science Board. 2009. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C., July, p. 3. 15  Robert M. Gates. 2009. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88(1):28-40.

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 103 user community to gain valuable operational experience with the proposed new capabilities such that they can improve operational performance against an adver- sary’s tactics and also provide valuable feedback into both the next spiral release and the accompanying TTPs. This enables fighters to more quickly introduce new and valuable (and lifesaving) capabilities to the field. This approach calls for acquisition officials to work with industry to deter- mine the appropriate release points for a spiral capability. In recent years, there has been a tendency to permit acquisition officials to drive the acceptance of a deliverable based on the letter of the contract. If spiraling is to be successful, both acquisition officials and industry will have to identify the point of “good enough,” where sufficient new capability is available and useful to the operators such that it will make a difference in their ability to fight. This “good enough,” capability becomes the basis for the operators to provide feedback to improve system performance and TTPs and to enable us to stay ahead of our adversaries by altering our tactics in a way that allows us to remain inside the adversary’s OODA loop rather than the other way around. This ability to lean forward and retain the initiative rather than react to the enemy’s tactics is a benefit of actively spiraling “good enough” capabilities to our warfighters in a timely manner. The naval forces should deploy not with “deficiencies” but with “known capabilities” and spiral capabilities. The concept of establishing a baseline de- sign and spiraling in upgraded capabilities has been around for decades for large platform systems such as aircraft. Where the platform and weapons system were tightly integrated, spiral upgrades were the best way to employ an initial new capability, even if it was somewhat limited relative to overall objectives, and then gradually improve or add capabilities over an 18-month block cycle. The B-2 aircraft (stealth bomber) is a good example. The aircraft was initially fielded without all the contemplated capability, and the aircraft was upgraded from Block 10 to Blocks 20 and 30 and now the Block 40 configuration is in the operational fleet. Even though the B-2 was a highly integrated design, it was architected to be deployed in incremental block configurations and some flexibility was designed in at the beginning of the program. This worked fine in an era when the United States found itself controlling a particular aspect of the battle space, such as air superiority. What is needed today is to instill this same thinking into the even lower levels of our system develop- ment. As platforms are separated from the payloads, the payload system from the subsystems it comprises, the software from the hardware and further at the subsystem, LRU, SRU, and, finally, the component levels, the question is how to drive an 18-month block cycle (today the blocks last many years) down to several weeks (9-18 months would be a realistic and worthy goal). It also requires one to start thinking about our tactical/payload systems in a more strategic manner. One needs to consider that our weapon systems may have a 50-yr life cycle, given the thinking that has kept the B-52 bomber in the inventory for three gen- erations of pilots. As the naval forces can no longer afford to replace ships and

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104 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE aircraft every 10 to 20 years, this same approach must be brought to our tactical equipment in order to prolong their longevity through continuous spiral upgrades. This approach to thinking about our tactical systems starts with the baseline acceptance: a recognition that the 80 percent solution is often “good enough.” This approach offers two things: first, it allows the timely development of TTPs that will influence future cycle upgrades, and, second, it will allow us to evaluate the new capability’s overall potential effectiveness in a more timely manner. This agility is required to keep the adversary on the defensive rather than to have us react to their threats. We now align our OODA loop more closely with theirs. This flexibility in system development and deployment and agility in responsiveness keeps the adversary guessing about our TTPs and how to react. This change also requires a change on the part of industry. Industry needs to stabilize requirements at the 80 percent level while delivering new capability. It needs to develop flexible, modular system designs down to the component level if possible and demonstrate the ability to deliver on a block cycle lasting months rather than years. Finally, the military and industry need to set the risk/reward points to allow the flexible designs for system “repurposeability.” Rapid response capability will be the avenue taken when surprise happens— and it will happen regardless of one’s planning. Naval forces need to learn how to deploy the 80 percent solution, not with “deficiencies” but rather with known “capabilities,” and then learn how to spiral in capabilities quickly. Examples of Rapid Acquisition Programs The committee has identified several novel initiatives that have attempted to address the challenges of expediency with respect to the acquisition process. These initiatives include the USMC Combat Hunter program and the Navy’s Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) project and the P-8A Poseidon aircraft. It is the intention of the committee that such initiatives to rapidly field new capabilities to counter unanticipated surprises should be separate from the exist- ing process and not just incremental to it. This is necessary if the initiatives are truly going to help us to get new capabilities into the field in a shorter time frame for our warfighters. USMC Hunter Warrior Series The Hunter Warrior series was an outcome of General Krulak’s vision of the future fighting environment that was forecast during his time as Command- ing General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). He referred to the overall concept as Sea Dragon and fully implemented this plan when he became Commandant of the Marine Corps with the standup of the Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory. It consisted of three broad experiments which addressed the future warfighter challenges in the urban environment and

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 105 small dispersed team operations: Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, and Information Warrior. The key elements enabling the delivery of operational capabilities within 24 months were (1) central experiment development, direction, and funding; (2) a small cadre force co-located at the warfighting laboratory; and (3) the use of operational forces to demonstrate the utility of new capabilities. Hunter Warrior developed methods to increase the effectiveness and surviv- ability of small dispersed forces on the modern battlefield. Within 24 months, in- clusive of several intermediary milestones, MCCDC was able to develop, test, and deploy solutions to address mobility and communication challenges of the forces. Specifically they produced an innovative solution for the replacement of the M151 Jeep. A commercial Mercedes was modified and deployed as the replace- ment vehicle and as an interim solution to the long delayed Fast Attack Vehicle (FAV) program, for which users had waited more than 10 years without a product. In the communication area, the program offered an alternative solution to the much delayed JTRS program by integrating small commercial handheld radios within the small units. The Urban Warrior program investigated how to operate in the new urban jungle environment. It addressed the tactics, visibility, and first-respondent capa- bilities for the small unit fighters in this environment. It quantified the operational impact associated with supporting wounded soldiers and the need for improved uniforms and protective gear to improve warfighter protection. Additionally, it improved the MILES (laser tag gear) infantry combat training system with its pre- determined types of combat wounds by introducing chalk rounds that identified the specific location and types of wounds Marines incurred during their combat operational training. Further, the program identified and transitioned immediately available commercial solutions to personal protective gear by adopting best prac- tices for knee, arm, and other body parts, thereby minimizing the impact of cuts, scrapes, and the like on mission execution. The Navy’s ARCI Program The ARCI program for the Navy’s submarine force is an excellent example of how to deploy new capabilities in a short time. The keys to success for this program included a common baseline for combat systems across all submarine platforms in the fleet and the disciplined deployment of hardware and software updates to manage the risks associated with spiral innovations. Furthermore, the program recognized that advanced hardware development needed to be ac- companied by advanced algorithm development. The release of these hardware and software improvements to the fleet in a staggered fashion, taking advantage of commercial practices and disciplined government component systems, and, finally, sea testing on a regular cadence is commendable. The common combat system permits the Navy to leverage the associated costs across a relatively limited number of platforms in the inventory. Industry

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106 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE and junior and senior naval representatives collaborate on the spiral requirements and on determining the level of risk that can be safely managed on a particular spiral release. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware is continuously up- dated on a 2-year cycle lagging the newest generation release in order to enjoy the benefits of observations made by early adopters. One-third of the fleet receives the hardware spiral every 2 years so that the entire fleet is upgraded by the sixth year. Software is updated on a yearly basis and trails any new hardware spirals by 1 year to ease integration challenges. Tightly connected with these spiral capability releases is a contracting pro- cess that provides a steady budget line and allows for flexible contracting methods in support of these activities. Operating within the existing federal acquisition regulations (FARs), contracting officers understand and execute their authorities in support of the acquisition, testing, and deployment of commercial hardware on a time-critical time line that (1) maintains the capability deployment lines and (2) leverages state-of-the-art commercial designs and software updates that dovetail neatly with the fleet’s identified needs. The contracting officers are a critical part of the spiral development team, and their ability to deliver innovative capabilities, within the allowable parameters of the FAR, is a critical part of ensuring a proper defense against capability surprise. ARCI was conducted in a budget-constrained environment much like we are seeing today. In order to ensure contractor cost and schedule performance, the Navy continuously incentivized contractors to perform by leveraging a steady stream of innovation from the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) pro- cess. This prevented one company from enjoying a monopolistic position on the program. Senior leadership provided program management with the fortitude and backing to replace underperformers, both in industry and government, with others who were willing to dispense with overhead and infrastructure for focusing on deliverable product. The flexibility provided by commercial, open-architecture hardware permit- ted alternatives in terms of algorithm or software products. More than once the Navy successfully replaced its software provider and still maintained technical, cost, and schedule performance. When the ARCI program commenced, the Navy acoustic program office had experienced regular program cost and schedule overruns. At the same time it faced a real and growing threat to our undersea acoustic superiority and was operating under a budget 75 percent smaller than our cold war budgets. It was clearly being asked to do more with less. Today, using an 18-month block cycle, the Navy enjoys a 17-year record of on-time, on-budget delivery to the fleet. P-8A Poseidon Aircraft The P-8A Poseidon development is a good example of where the Navy lev- eraged commercial advances and practices to improve military product develop-

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 107 ment times and save cost. The P-8A procurement utilized a traditional top-down Navy requirements process; however, it significantly leveraged the commercial investments in the Boeing 737 platform from which it was derived. This not only saved design and development cost and schedule, but also helped to focus operational test requirements because of demonstrated commercial performance. The P-8A mission packages were significantly different from its 737 com- mercial counterpart, thereby requiring new development and test requirements. Several structural changes were required for bomb bay and bomb rack modifica- tions unique to a military aircraft. These obviously required some development costs, but the ability to utilize the existing 737 structure as a baseline helped to bound the alternative solution set for consideration. These modifications still drove the need for full-scale static and fatigue test assets; however, the available commercial data in other common and mature systems, such as the landing gear and other areas, helped to minimize platform development costs. Areas that experienced a significant leverage of the commercial 737 design included the engines and flight avionics hardware (software was a new develop- ment effort). Several mission systems were leveraged from other military systems to accelerate development efforts. These included electronic support measures (ESM) from the F-18, an acoustics package, and a repackaged radar from the P-3. Savings were realized in terms of both procurement (common supply chains) and the certification process requirements. Leveraging these commercial practices enabled the Navy to save one-third to one-half of the cost of having to develop a new platform from scratch. It is significant that P-8A production is conducted on a third line in parallel with the existing two 737 production lines. This eliminated the start-up costs (in terms of schedule and dollars) associated with a new production line and was critical to controlling costs. This was due to the need to conform to existing practices already in place with the commercial line. The new military aircraft’s development was heavily influenced by the commercial production rate line, which offered “infrastructure” already in place such as change review boards and process controls that drove behavior and thinking on the P-8A such that it did not impact the commercial production lines. Unlike previous military derivatives, the P-8A unique modifications are made in sequence during fabrication and assem- bly. This was difficult at first but later was recognized to accelerate the control and disciplines on the P-8A development, which in turn helped to control cost and schedule performance. Finally, the colocation of the military and the commercial production lines enabled the military to enjoy the benefits of commercial perfor- mance improvements (in connection with the aggressive continuous improvement margin targets) as they became available, further improving system and program performance, at a lower cost than if it had created those improvements itself. The drive to keep the commercial and military production lines as common as possible drove contractor and customer alike to implement these cost-saving measures. In the testing area, the 737 certification data did little to eliminate devel-

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108 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE opmental test and evaluation test points owing to the significant structural and mission package development. However, they did help to inform the test program decision makers, who were able to take advantage of them to focus required test points for the program. In the Navy Structures Group, where data must be created for each new platform, the available commercial data were leveraged to help the group make informed decisions about what to submit to M&S and what to actu- ally test. Most of this leverage is skewed toward the development/requirements part of a program. In the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) portion, mission or operational performance drives the test schedule and must be accomplished for any new class of platform regardless of its commercial heritage. As a multimission platform it was important for growth margins for all systems to be included in the program requirements. Weight, size, power, cool- ing, and processing, among others, all had specific technical performance mea- sures (TPMs) that were set early in the program. As the program progressed, these TPMs were constantly reviewed and system trades were made in order to maintain growth requirements. One such trade involved the weight margin of the platform, where a more efficient engine, leveraged from its commercial 737 counterpart, was incorporated in order to preserve overall system performance (range at full load). The above engine example typified the benefits of leveraging the commer- cial designs. Another involved the leveraging of the technical manuals (TMs) for maintenance and repair as well as operations. While Navy-specific requirements were added to the commercial TMs, the maturity of these documents helped the program accelerate its operational readiness and later enabled the Navy to move from contractor logistics supplied (CLS)-based maintenance to an organic-based logistics function more rapidly than originally envisioned. In summary, the P-8A is a good example of leveraging commercial designs and practices to meet military needs in a timely manner. Utilizing the commercial 737 baseline, the Navy was able to realize cost and schedule savings during de- velopment, test, and maintenance that will reap benefits through the life cycle of the platform. Furthermore, the practices employed here offer lessons to consider when faced with delivering new capabilities in the event of a capability surprise. Test and Initial Training Testing Current test and evaluation practices are not taking full advantage of ad- vancements in modern design, M&S, and coupon-type testing. 16 The earlier the involvement of the OT&E community in the development of requirements, while maintaining the appropriate level of separation required to avoid conflicts of in- 16  “Coupon-type” testing refers to the use of a small piece of material for testing. These results may then be extrapolated into results for a larger, more costly piece of material.

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 109 terest, could reduce the time and cost associated with delivering new systems to the field in the face of capability surprise. With $30 billion of a total $70 billion OSD RDT&E budget dedicated to OT&E activities, including a Navy component of $13 billion, there is the potential for substantial savings that could be lever- aged elsewhere. The hypothesis stands that for incremental or spiral improvements to sys- tems, as well as with new capabilities to address threats presented by surprise, the increased use of commercial data and practices can accelerate the fielding of these new requirements along a shorter time line. There is no longer a require- ment or need to test full system articles until they fail or break completely. Best commercial practices leverage M&S analysis, coupon-type testing, and modern tools that are available to reduce the overall cost of such testing. The Navy has an opportunity to lead the other Services in this area and demonstrate the utility of such testing while enjoying the associated savings in time (and dollars) to operational deployment. Past examples of this type of fielding include the Marine Corps Sea Dragon program, the space community’s Mars Curiosity rover, and the Navy’s P-8 pro- gram. In each of these instances, the use of the commercial data resulted in or offered the opportunity to, in hindsight, realize substantial savings in terms of schedule and dollars. The Marine Corp Sea Dragon program, under the auspices of the Hunter Series of exercises, deployed improvements to mobility and communications capabilities by creating an integrated process team (IPT) of MCCDC, Systems Command (SYSCOM), and OT&E representatives that expedited the test and evaluation of new capabilities to ensure warfighter confidence at deployment. The Mars Curiosity rover is a shining example of a system development and deployment where operational testing was conducted on selected parts in paral- lel with development activities. These practices should be applied to the DOD’s OT&E execution to realize savings without sacrificing confidence associated with traditional verification testing. Finally, in the case of the P-8 it is observed that while a commercial aircraft was modified to perform a military mission, a full-fledged traditional OT&E was still required by program management. While some significant modifications were made to the original design, was full OT&E required? It would be a valuable exercise to compare, with the benefit of hindsight, the original commercial data with data from the OT&E results to identify points where previous commercial testing could have been more effectively leveraged, resulting in schedule and cost savings to the program. Training for Initial Capability Basic proficiency training, not only for OT&E but also for initial operational capability (IOC), occurs well before the specialized training focused on mission

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110 RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE readiness and is confined to core qualifications for basic readiness. Some of this basic training is now delivered in the form of distance-learning, with remote test- ing to validate proficiency. In the commercial and academic sectors, it is common to use adaptive software techniques to introduce variation into tests for engineering and other technical certifications. This technique ensures that people cannot game the test- ing system itself and is also used to introduce surprise elements into the test. The latter technique helps organizations validate that students are not simply drilling and repeating by rote but instead understand underlying principles and are pre- pared to apply what they have learned to unexpected challenges. In moving beyond initial training, naval forces could apply these same low- cost adaptive techniques to existing military distance-learning courses, adding capability surprise to the curriculum and, more important, to the distance-learning qualification tests. Once this testing regime has matured, surprise-related results from these tests could be fed into a broader U.S. Navy system managed by the recommended surprise mitigation office. Training is discussed in more depth in the following chapter. Whereas more modern platforms are being designed for open computing architectures, retrofit of such architecture to legacy ships has been less successful. Some committee members recall that the original Aegis open architecture plan- ning began in the 1990s, yet the transition to open architecture did not occur until late in the aughts (last decade) and then at considerable cost. As new computing platforms such as CANES are planned for combatant systems the committee is concerned that the open architecture of the near past represented by CANES could again become a constraint rather than an open architecture that is readily upgraded, given the long time lags between COTS equipment refreshes. Rapid fielding of systems for naval mission needs was prevalent during the cold war. A program originally known as Battle Group Anti-Aircraft Warfare Coordination (BGAAWC) and then as Force Anti-Air Coordination Technology (FACT) was responsible for field testing prototypes on ships to evaluate such capabilities as radar detection and track automation, tactical link interoperability, and air track identification. Further, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR) would regularly field test capabilities to support C2 and communica- tions connectivity improvements. There were some, however, who held that these systems were difficult to support in operation unless a full tooth-to-tail acquisition program was implemented. This was rarely accomplished because it was very expensive and would have taken a long time to achieve. Rather, rotating pools of equipment were provided and supported, some by contractors and some by in- service agents from the naval centers. By the late 1990s, as fleet systems became more complex and prototypes tended to be not well supported, a substantial slow- down in prototyping occurred that has persisted to this day. However, in this era of reduced acquisition and interest in rapid fielding, the committee believes rapid

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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 111 fielding of prototypes should be reconsidered. A tailored approach to in-service support for such rapidly fielded capabilities would be necessary. Finding and RecommendationS Finding 5b: The Department of the Navy is not extending the full measure of open architecture principles throughout system development and deployment life cycles nor is it making best use of permissible contracting exceptions or best acquisition practices in responding to potential capability surprise in a timely and efficient manner. Recommendation 5b: The Chief of Naval Research (CNR) should invest in discovery and invention (6.1 and early 6.2) research areas that take advantage of the entire payload value chain (i.e., payloads versus platforms; modular- ity versus integration; and reprogrammability), and inclusion of appropriate software and hardware design margins into development requirements. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RDA) should ensure that acquisition and contracting personnel are trained in the development of threshold versus objective requirements, the unique requirements associated with the use of commercial products, and the appropriate use of the waiver process in tailoring responses to potential capability surprise. Recommendation 5c: The surprise mitigation office (see Recommendation 1) should encourage broader cross-organizational pre-planning in anticipa- tion of, and based on previous, black swan events that can cut across U.S. government department responsibilities, and it should also serve as the lead resource officer for the rapid fielding of new capabilities to counter unan- ticipated surprises.