This chapter discusses the challenges associated with implementing and fielding a solution to a capability surprise. Implementation and fielding begin with a program plan and end with the deployment of a new capability. The importance of flexibility, timeliness, and affordability to capability surprise and how the existing acquisition structure can support those needs are discussed. The concept of open architecture is reviewed and how it is important to implementing capability surprise solutions through the concepts of repurposing and spiraling in new capabilities.
Needs
Surprise is difficult to predict, as discussed previously in this report. When it does materialize, the ability of naval forces to react effectively is dependent on three important principles: flexibility, timeliness, and affordability.
Flexibility
Flexibility deals with the ability to redirect and manage existing resources effectively in the face of surprise. Existing processes for acquisition afford us the flexibility to respond effectively, but we fail to take on the challenges of using this built-in flexibility because we are risk averse. The design and development processes have their waiver procedures, but many times programs prefer to manage to 100 percent of the requirements rather than a “good enough” solution that is more timely.
Rapid acquisition procedures have been used effectively during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, based on these experiences, the logistics and support services need improvement and must be adequately addressed in future conflicts.
Finally, more flexibility must be incorporated into the budgeting process to allow for capability surprise. Restrictive budget planning and allocation does not allow for the resources to address unexpected surprises. The development, test, and acquisition communities need to have more flexibility to allocate reserves and/or reallocate existing funding without the delays inherent in the existing programming, planning, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.
Timeliness
Addressing the capability surprise challenge is very similar to addressing the needs that have created the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) process. In both instances one is challenged to provide the operational warfighter with a capability that is lacking in the face of an unexpected adversarial threat and to answer that threat in as short a time period as possible. The JUONS process generally entails looking for a solution to a known enemy capability for which we do not have a response. It is real, immediate, and usually significantly impairs the warfighter’s ability to freely operate. The capability surprise challenge can be categorized into three different elements based on the time horizon of the threat, defined as follows:
• Urgent. 0-2 years response horizon.
• Emergent. 0-5 years response horizon.
• Deliberate. 2-6+ years response horizon.
When it comes to urgent surprises, hostilities are most likely already under way, and solutions to unanticipated threats from our adversary are needed and being pursued. This is very similar to the scenario for the JUONS requests.
Emergent surprises are different from urgent surprises in that they are often proactive responses to estimated threats during peacetime conditions. There is assumed to be some time period in which one can prepare a response before one expects to have to address it under operational conditions. There is a limited time period one has to prepare the new response, test and train with it, and then deploy it in anticipation of the enemy’s threat. In times of active conflict, efforts to prepare for emergent surprises will merge with efforts to prepare for urgent surprises, especially for early-stage initiatives. In this type of scenario one could find oneself both preparing new capabilities to rapidly field against observed surprises (urgent) as well as proactively pushing new capability to the field in anticipation of estimated new capabilities of the enemy (early-stage emergent).
Affordability
Figure 6-1 indicates how the number of acquisition professionals has declined over the last 20 or so years while procurement dollars have increased over the same period, primarily owing to the ongoing wars. Given this trend, a key to improving the rapid acquisition of solutions is the quality and type of the staff in these positions. Simply slashing a workforce already overloaded with demands makes it difficult to apply the innovative thinking necessary to address the acquisition needs for capability surprise. If the staff are focused on work flow, they will become very process driven, impeding the innovative thinking needed for fielding a rapid solution. This will breed bureaucracy, where the letter of the requirement or contract will become the driving factor rather than the time to fielding. A properly balanced workforce is required to ensure that innovative thinking is brought to bear and will provide managed risk solutions in a timely manner to our warfighters.
FIGURE 6-1 DOD acquisition workforce: SOURCE: Jacques S. Gansler, University of Maryland, “Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs,” presentation to the committee, Irvine, Calif., June 27, 2012. Source of workforce data: DOD IG Report D-2000-088, February 29, 2000, and DOD IG Report D-2006-073, April 17, 2006. Source of budget data: Annual Defense Reports, available at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr_intro.xhtml. Procurement supplementals for FY2005 and FY2006 not yet reflected in Annual Defense Reports were obtained from Congressional Research Service Reports (Defense Science Board, 2008).
Using the Acquisition Process to Be Responsive to Capability Surprise
A natural reaction in response to delays in fielding new capabilities is to point at the DOD acquisition system and address changes through an update to the DOD 5000 procedures.1 Traditionally this update has focused on the Federal Acquisition Regulation System/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (FARS/DFARS) procedures with a particular emphasis on the requirements oversight process—for example, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This committee takes a different view of the acquisition challenge in the face of capability surprise. It focuses less on the procurement process and more on the way we ask industry to develop and provide capability. The answers must not only be capable but must also be timely and affordable for the military and industry alike.
Repurposing Platforms—How Repurposing Has Worked in the Past
Repurposing in the naval forces and the military in general is not a new concept. It has been successfully applied in numerous instances and has saved the nation a fortune. It also has permitted rapid and timely redeployment of assets to meet new threats and resulted in incredible longevity for important platforms. In many cases, the repurposed “vehicles” were robust and large enough to accommodate payloads and purposes that were never foreseen or planned when they were first designed.
B-52 Stratofortress
The B-52 (Figure 6-2) was introduced in 1955 as a high-altitude nuclear bomber. It was repurposed during the Vietnam conflict to drop conventional bombs from a high altitude. It was again repurposed during the cold war as a low-altitude conventional bomber (while keeping its original mission as a nuclear bomber). During the 1980s, the B-52s had a stand-off mission when they were equipped with air-launch cruise missiles (ALCMs). During the cold war, they were repurposed to carry other weapons and to deploy mines. During the first night of Desert Storm, two B-52s flew the opening stages at 500 ft. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the B-52s were again repurposed to provide close air support by
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1There have been many reports that have made recommendations to address systemic DOD acquisition issues. For example, see National Research Council, 2010, Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.; National Research Council, 2004, The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.; and http://acquisition.navy.mil/home/policy_and_guidance.
FIGURE 6-2 B-52. SOURCE: U.S. Air Force.
the addition of targeting pods and smart weapons. These remarkable 57-yr-old platforms are expected to remain in service for another 15-30 years, giving us an effective platform for nearly 90 years.
USCG Secretary-Class Cutters
The Coast Guard provides an interesting historical example of repurposing. In 1936, the Treasury Department built seven Secretary-class 327-ft cutters (Figure 6-3) modeled after the Navy’s Erie-class gunboats. Their original purpose, envisaged during Prohibition, evolved into revenue cutters used for the interdiction of narcotics. Shortly thereafter, at the outbreak of the Second World War, they were rearmed and operated very effectively for the Navy in convoy escort duty and amphibious force flag ships. After the war, the USCG became independent again. The cutters were repurposed as weather ships and midocean search and rescue for transoceanic passenger aircraft. After rearming again, they performed coastal gunboat duty in the Vietnam conflict and returned afterward to midocean weather ship duties, until 1986. Because of their initial robustness, sea kindliness, and endurance, and the intentional repurposing, they served for half a century as “the Nation’s maritime workhorses.”2
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2CAPT John M. Waters, Jr., USN (Retired). 1967. Bloody Winter: Critical Months in the Battle of the Atlantic As Seen from the Conning Tower and Bridge, J.D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, N.J.
FIGURE 6-3 USCG Secretary-class cutter. SOURCE: Courtesy of the Historic Naval Ships Association and the U.S. Coast Guard.
USS Enterprise (CVN-65)
The USS Enterprise, ordered from Newport News Shipbuilding in 1957, was the world’s first nuclear aircraft carrier (Figure 6-4). She was in continuous service for over 51 years. From her original role as an anti-Soviet fighter plane platform, over the past half century she has deployed to provide strike support in the Vietnam and Southeast Asian conflicts, humanitarian aid, blockades, show-of-force in critical areas throughout the world, air support in Iraq and Afghanistan, and numerous other missions. To fulfill these roles, the platform has been adapted, reequipped, lengthened, and otherwise modified to meet the needs of new missions with new technology, aircraft, weapons, etc. This second oldest U.S. Navy commissioned vessel (decommissioned in December 2012) was repurposed numerous times because her size, robustness, and endurance capabilities made it possible. She has been able to quickly and effectively respond to surprises.
Spruance-Class Destroyers
The Spruance-class destroyer is another example of repurposing (Figure 6-5). This class was built during the 1970s to replace the Second World War
FIGURE 6-4 USS Enterprise. SOURCE: U.S. Navy.
FIGURE 6-5 Spruance-class destroyer. SOURCE: U.S. Navy.
Gearing and Sumner classes. Its original mission was to provide antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and escort duties for carrier groups. The Spruance class was built in a semimodular manner, and that made repurposing easier. Accordingly, during the 1990s, a large number of these vessels were updated by the addition of 61-cell vertical-launch missile systems and Tomahawk missiles. The USS Cushing, the last of the class, was also fitted with a 21-cell RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launcher on the fantail. While the last Spruance-class destroyer was decommissioned in 2005, it is an example of how a surface ASW/escort vessel could be repurposed to a multipurpose, guided-missile destroyer.
Ohio-Class Submarines
Eighteen nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Ohio class were built starting in 1976 (Figure 6-6). In the 1990s, based on new strategic arms limitation agreements, rather than retire the early Ohio-class SSBNs it was decided to reconfigure some of them as nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs). Starting in 2002, four of the class underwent modifications to their Trident missile launch tubes. They were modified to accommodate large
FIGURE 6-6 Ohio-class submarine. SOURCE: U.S. Navy.
vertical-launch systems (VLSs), whereby the tubes could accommodate clusters of Tomahawk cruise missiles, submarine-launched, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SLIRBMs), submarine-launched, global strike missiles, operating equipment for special operations forces (SOF), countermine warfare packages, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, and a variety of other payloads. The submarines can potentially accommodate future conventional cruise, ballistic, and boost-glide missiles. These reconfigured submarines are also able to deploy and supply SOF.
This highly innovative and cost-effective reconfiguring of the Ohio class has provided the Navy with greatly expanded capabilities at a relatively modest cost. This was possible because the Ohio class was originally built with adequate robustness, the ability to forward deploy for long periods, and with adequate size and space. It is yet another excellent example of the Navy’s successful repurposing efforts.
Repurposing Payloads
The key elements of repurposing an asset to enable new capabilities for new missions include upgrades of data processing capability, guidance and navigation, and energy management. Processing capabilities have been following Moore’s law since the 1970s and have enabled an explosion of products in both the military and commercial sectors from small, smart, precision weapons and unmanned systems to personal mobile communication devices such as smart phones and tablets. Advances in guidance and navigation have allowed miniature weapons with meter-level targeting accuracy and personal location systems tied to advanced schemes using mobile communication devices. Finally, new energy sources and management techniques enable systems to perform longer in stressing environments. Unmanned vehicles, drones, and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) have all greatly benefited from these advances.
Naval forces too have greatly benefited from taking assets with existing capabilities and quickly upgrading them with new capabilities to respond to “surprises” in the operational environments. This was demonstrated with the preprogramming of the SM-3 missile to neutralize a failing satellite in a destabilizing orbit by shooting it down in an operation known as Burnt Frost. Repurposing was responsible for the procurement of air-to-surface missile capabilities using unmanned air vehicles during the Iraq War. In each case, existing platform and payload capabilities were minimally altered to provide significant new capabilities within a short period of time. This saved significant development and testing schedule time by leveraging established system performance capabilities. Furthermore, the appropriate level of regression testing was identified, which appropriately set testing and qualification requirements and focused them on the new capabilities to enable earliest deployment times.
Besides avoiding the usual requirement creep of a new systems develop-
ment, repurposing eliminated the proposal development and evaluation cycle and potential protest delays and allowed requalification by similarity for certain subsystems—all saving time and money for DOD. While software modifications do not come free, upgrades can have significantly less impact on the test and qualification process than new hardware or systems replacements. Finally, with software modifications, impacts to the interface control documents for the platform interfaces can be minimized to facilitate deployment.
The committee advocates taking this same concept of software modification down to the hard subsystem and component levels. Building in excess capacity in a system will position it for future growth or added capability. Subsystems and components, such as firmware or even power amplifiers, for example, need to be designed with the ability to change functional performance without physical replacement. Using these key critical components as an investment or hedge for future capabilities, they can be leveraged as the building blocks to enable a quick turn to respond to future capability surprises.
This represents a change in the existing engineering design philosophies. The challenge will be in determining the proper balance between existing and known requirements and potential requirements down the road. The question to be answered is this: At what point does hedging our future needs with a single system start to drive the overall system development cost to the point where two separate systems may be more cost-effective? This will be the challenge for design teams of the future and will determine how they approach the allocation of resources to achieve system expandability, affordability, and agility in the face of capability surprise.
Limitations of Repurposing
While the benefits of repurposing can at times be huge, it must also be recognized that not every platform or payload lends itself to repurposing. Inadequate design margins, light scantlings, limited stability, lack of space or capacity, insufficient speed or endurance, and the like, may preclude adapting a platform or payload.
“Jumbo-sizing” or major conversions are sometimes a solution, but in many cases, responding to capability surprises by repurposing is not the right solution for reasons of cost and, especially, timeliness.
Concept
Several organizations interviewed by the committee described a regulation-burdened acquisition program (Figure 6-7) and said it was an almost insurmountable barrier to preparation and rapid technology response to any capability
FIGURE 6-7 Framework process built for the risk averse. SOURCE: Jacques S. Gansler, University of Maryland, “Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs,” presentation to the committee, Irvine, Calif., June 27, 2012.
surprise. The committee recognized an even more foundational issue: that naval surprise normally occurs at the operational and mission level, while naval acquisition organizations and processes are centered on platform delivery. Several promising suggestions were raised during the committee’s investigations. Consciously building capacity and capability reserves (software, hardware, and weapons) into platform payloads could be an effective way to achieve the agility needed to respond to surprise. This approach minimizes the changes to the capital-intensive investments in platforms, while focusing on the packages that actually deliver the mission capabilities, and it emphasizes incremental improvements that can be rapidly implemented. Another suggestion presented to the committee explored formalizing and resourcing a mission syndicate composed of (1) platform, sensors, and weapons research; (2) requirements; and (3) resource and acquisition organizations that together provide contributions in delivery of a particular mission’s capability. This is an enhanced version of the OPNAV N95 coordination of a mine warfare enterprise and the naval laboratory warfare center concepts, where the syndicate lead is the holder of resources and “buys” mission platforms, sensors, and weapons from the providers. A mission-focus approach to acquisition may inspire an engineering approach that is more system-of-systems oriented and that could access a broad array of mission resources to anticipate and respond to surprise.
There is a foundational barrier in developing quick technical responses to capability surprise. Whereas most surprises affect capability to execute missions—for example, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and air-to-air (A2A)—the Navy acquisition program is fundamentally whole-platform-centric—that is, the platform and most of its major payload systems are of new design. Separating the payload capability from the platform capability and the payload from their subsystems is an important approach to reducing the time line from development to operational deployment (F/A-18 F developed a major block upgrade of the airframe first and then the main radar sensor with the active array radar upgrade, with good results on cost and schedule). This should encourage innovation through the creation of adaptive solutions, drive down the cost of change orders during development, and shorten the time line for deploying new capabilities. In addition, it will also shorten the time that ships spend in port for maintenance and repair during overhauls.
The drive for solutions that meet 100 percent of a program’s original requirements results in products that do not support the operator’s need in the face of a rapidly changing adversary. The existing process consists of a stove-piped requirements process—stagnant procurement processes, inflexible budget, prohibitive reprogramming restrictions—all in a risk-averse culture that promotes adherence to the letter of a contract at the expense of providing the appropriate capabilities to our service members. A recent CNO article3 supports this message. As discussed earlier in this chapter, separating the development and release of the platforms (or the “trucks”) from the payloads (new capabilities) is key to both repurposability and the spiraling-in of new capabilities. Naval forces’ platforms can be operational for many decades. However, to meet or create surprises, modular payloads are needed that can introduce new capabilities that take advantage of new systems and technologies in a timely manner, which includes test and evaluation as well as development. Repurposing and spiraling permit maximum leverage of previous testing and evaluation, minimizing regression test requirements and time to deployment.
Example: Littoral Combat Ship
There is an increased appreciation for the concept of payloads and platforms in today’s Navy. The recent deployment of the newest littoral combat ship (LCS 2), the USS Independence, is an excellent example of the potential for efficiently, quickly, and economically reconfiguring vessels for urgent and emergent surprises. The LCS 1 and LCS 2 are shown in Figures 6-8 and 6-9, respectively.
While the LCS is not a heavy duty “truck,” its littoral mission (inshore and shallow draft) and its high speed and agility dictate a lightweight hull. However,
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3ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. 2012. “Payloads Over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 138(7):16-23.
FIGURE 6-8 LCS 1: USS Freedom. SOURCE: U.S. Navy.
FIGURE 6-9 LCS 2: USS Independence. SOURCE: U.S. Navy.
its preplanned modularity makes it a versatile and very surprise-responsive combatant. Its mission packages can support ASW, gun mission module (GMM), surface warfare (SUW), mine countermeasures (MCM), maritime security module (MSM), SOF, helicopter operations, vertical launch packages, humanitarian operations, and many other missions. The LCS also demonstrates the discipline required for dimensional standardization, interconnectability and provision of adequate electrical power, coolants, air, computer control interfaces, berthing spaces for mission crews, and other support facilities.
These are starkly contrasted with several examples of elaborately outfitted single-purpose vessels that will be very difficult to reconfigure at a future date for different missions and surprises (e.g., SSBNs, Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships). By separating the platform from the payload, rapidly changing weapon systems and electronics can be readily and more quickly adapted to surprises.
It is not economically feasible, however, to adapt a platform by replacing either it or its embedded systems each time a new mission arises. What is needed instead is to replace only the modular weapons, sensors, and unmanned vehicles payloads. The payload-platform approach has two requirements.4 First, the design of the platforms must anticipate their future role or the fact that it may have to be adapted to some unknown role. The platforms must be generously sized and configured to provide sufficient space and ready accessibility to mission spaces. Second, the platforms should have built-in, sufficient electrical capacity, cooling water, ventilation, and other auxiliary services to support future missions. Main and auxiliary machinery must also be as modular as possible to permit adaptation to technical improvements or future capacity requirements.
The companion to this requirement is to make the mission packages for future weapons and electronics as modular as possible. The interfaces must be standardized to quickly and inexpensively offer as much “plug and play” as possible.
An excellent commercial shipping analogy has been the revolutionary emergence of containerization. Prior to the 1970s, merchant ships were customized to suit the principal cargoes and the trade routes for which they were employed. Today, throughout the world, the platforms, modern container ships, are austere and nearly identical, varying only in size. The payloads, the containers themselves, are standard across the globe. The containers move seamlessly between all modes of transport, from marine to rail to highway. The ubiquitous ISO 20- or 40-ft demountable, van-type container dry boxes are often intermixed with refrigerated containers, tank containers, “cattletainers,” car carriers, foldable and fixed flats, and many other types of units.
The military has adopted modular containers for many missions, including communication units, diesel generator power boxes, communication containers,
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4ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. 2012. “Payloads Over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 138(7):16-23.
hospital operating units, machine shops, office and housing containers, and more. There may also be lessons to be learned from expeditionary force constructs.5
Modularity and Flexibility of Capital Ships
Although the committee has described the advantages of modular design and reserve capacity in ship classes such as LCS and Spruance, it notes that they are not the capital ships (most important warships such as aircraft carriers and battleships) that are able to fight in large-scale conflicts with near peers or in antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) scenarios. The committee also observes that certain other flexible features are presently evident in capital ships.
First considered are the present Aegis cruisers (CGs). The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser is based on a stretch version of the Spruance class, taking advantage of the reserve space and power of the Spruance class. Originally built during the cold war to defend our battle force from large-scale attacks, the sixth ship of that class featured the then-new VLS, a modular design capable of launching a variety of missiles. The class has also featured standard missile (SM) evolutions, whose key features, such as the control link and aerodynamics configuration, were basically unchanged over decades, enabling many upgrades, now including the latest SM-3 Block IB ballistic missile defense (BMD) round, future rounds, and the newest air defense round, SM-6. Primarily from combat system software changes and minor interface changes, the Aegis cruisers have proved extraordinarily flexible in hosting combat system upgrades to meet the threats since the first-in-class initial operating capability (IOC) in 1983. The standard Tomahawk configuration has also enabled relatively straightforward introduction of block upgrades to that weapon. The downside of this class is that, beginning with core-memory-based Navy Standard UYK-7 computers, software capability upgrades through multiple generation computing and programming technologies, often with multiple baseline upgrades in development in parallel, have proven very expensive and time consuming. Efforts to provide open system architecture and standard computing platforms, even while upgrades continue, have proven difficult but are clearly important.6
The same can be said for the Burke-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs). The production line for the latest flight DDGs continues, and the present capabilities are far beyond those of the original ship class, including the recent conversion to BMD capability. Again, the rapid manner in which an Aegis DDG was converted from BMD capability into a temporary antisatellite capability for
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5In an earlier NRC report, it was recommended that “in long-term planning for future amphibious shipping, the Navy should consider the feasibility of a common ship design for assault, prepositioning, and sea-basing missions.” See National Research Council, 1999, Naval Expeditionary Logistics: Enabling Operational Maneuver from the Sea, The National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 31.
6CAPT Dan Meyer, USN, and CAPT John Geary, USN. 1998. “Aegis Computing Enters the 21st Century,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124(1):39-41.
Operation Burnt Frost is impressive and indicative of the inherent flexibility for rapid change under certain circumstances.
Large-deck carriers, especially nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) and amphibious assault ships (LHDs), have also proven very resilient and adaptable. Modularity is basically reflected in the ability to change over to new generation aircraft. The evolution of aircraft operating from these decks has allowed many generations of capability and a wide variety of warfighting, airborne surveillance, antisurface warfare (ASUW), and ASW capabilities.
Clearly, the excess capacity, modular approach can take a variety of forms, from the LCS and Spruance approach to aircraft evolution to software changes and standard weapons configurations. Still, further efforts to provide open software architecture and, perhaps, tailored acquisition processes as a result would strengthen the resilience and capability response time.
Requirements
The concept of open architecture and open systems development needs to be driven down in the design process to include subsystem and component elements. The commercial cell phone industry develops new products on major and minor upgrade cycles, where only one-third of the internal subsystems are new and it takes three minor upgrades before a “totally new” phone is developed, thus saving time and reducing cost and risk. The ability to repurpose a system is driven by the few key critical components that are its building blocks and will drive the degree of modularity (and therefore spiral capability) enabled by the overall system.
The ability of a system to offer the adaptability and flexibility required to neutralize an adversary’s surprise is enabled by its architectural design. Open or adaptive architectures have been in vogue since the 1980s, driven by the rapid growth of software in systems development. The commercial industries, particularly the personal computer (PC) and telecommunications areas, have taken the lead in publishing interface control definitions that govern how anyone would utilize the industries’ capabilities. The PC is a good example of an open and adaptive architecture, where IBM published the standardized PC reference design and interface standards and a whole industry of multiple suppliers, from Dell to Acer to Toshiba to HP, all built their desktop computers to be compatible with this architecture and interface standards. A more recent example is the Google Android smartphone operating system and architecture. The Android-based systems now hold 60 percent of the smartphone market and are used by six manufacturers.
There are examples of open systems in the military as well. Linux software was one of the first commercially open operating systems for computers. This concept was picked up by the military, which favored open interfaces for its weapons systems in such platforms as the LCS and its mission modules. Many system developers will claim their system is “open” as long as you work with
them; however, a true open system has a published set of interface control documentation that any developer can use without going back to the original creator.
Complete interface control documents (ICDs) were essential to the LCS program being able to remain on schedule with the platform delivery when the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) payload was cancelled and a replacement weapon had to be found. This separation of platform from payload architecture allowed the LCS program to meet schedule and avoid cost impact associated with engineering change orders to the platform due to NLOS’s cancellation.
The committee believes that these modular and open systems architecture concepts need to be driven down in the design process, meaning to the subsystem and component element level. The adaptability provided with open systems architectures needs to be considered in system architecture in all software and hardware development potentially including component-level designs. The component and subsystem designs form the crucial building blocks upon which future enhancements to the system can be added with minimal system impact and time out of service.
As existing software functionality/capability can be added without making tangible modifications to the systems today, this same approach needs to be taken with the hardware building blocks. This will require that the appropriate trade-offs be made between (1) software and hardware requirements allocation and (2) a requirement not to be allocated only where it is most easily executed. A balance will need to be struck between the location of the functionality and the ability to most easily modify its functionality in the future. All of this must be done within the appropriate cost and schedule constraints of the existing baseline deliverable and future spiral upgrade capabilities. The DOD customer must participate in the allocation of resources for future contingencies as part of these architecture decisions.
The concept of the payload value chain is one that should be considered in the architecture designs for all types of capabilities development. The degree of integration for any platform with its payload is driven by the class of platform involved. The type of integration can range from tightly integrated systems on satellites to more loosely integrated systems on aircraft, ships, and submarines. The direction taken is often dictated by the mass fraction allocated to the payload as part of the overall system, which is directly related to the size of the platform—larger platforms permit increasing modularity from subsystem-level replacement (F-18 line-replaceable units [LRUs]) to completely stand-alone payload packages (LCS ISO containerization of payloads).
Once the level of modularity is determined, one can go even deeper in the system/subsystem design to compartmentalize the ability to introduce capability changes. Device reprogrammability enables other insertion points for design changes permitting updates to software and firmware loads at the subsystem levels while eliminating impacts on form or fit characteristics and minimizes system downtime.
Finally, there are instances where a payload, such as an antenna, is tightly integrated with the platform because of signature requirements, etc. This can involve significant downtimes to introduce new capability and should be pursued only after modularity and reprogrammability options have been considered as part of the overall capability’s architecture design. The degree of smart modularity is architecture driven and should be a requirement for all new capability developments.
In all cases, it is important to understand the criticality of interface control documents (ICDs) to the ability to introduce new capabilities. Properly designed, extensible, and executable ICDs are the keys to enabling efficient, timely, and affordable introduction of new capabilities to existing fielded systems.
Software disciplines have evolved and enabled the efficient introduction of new capabilities with minimal impact to the hardware systems. Today’s electronic designs have similarly matured to the point where the potential for in-place upgrades to hardware functionality are possible. As software design margins require spare processing and memory for future expansion capabilities, new electronic designs should similarly have (in-place) spare margin requirements to likewise support future capabilities.
Stealth Payloads, an Added Benefit
Clausewitz tells us that surprise is “the universal desire…basic to all [military] operations, for without it superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable.”7 He goes on to say that “the two factors that produce surprise are secrecy and speed.”8 This provides yet another reason for separating the payload from the platform. The prolonged pace of platform development and construction hardly provides the speed necessary for surprise. Ship design and construction programs as currently carried out thwart any attempt to keep them secret. However when payloads can be developed more quickly and can be designed, tested, and produced in a far more confidential environment, the likelihood of being able to produce or counter surprises is greater.
During the recent Iraq and Afghanistan wars, dozens of rapid acquisition organizations were created throughout the Services, including the following:
• Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO),
• Rapid equipping force,
• Quick reaction capabilities,
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7Carl von Clausewitz. 1989. On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., p. 198.
8Ibid.
• Mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) (military vehicle) task force,
• Biometrics task force,
• Navy’s rapid action teams, and
• Navy’s rapid deployment and development process.
Almost 80 percent of the approximate $50 billion JOUNS funding between 2005 and 2009 went to two organizations—JIEDDO and the MRAP task forces.9 Other procurements made by such organizations include unattended ground sensors, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)-protection systems, and ISR assets. Although these organizations were charged with addressing JUONS requirements from the field, the “urgent” in JUONS is relative when one notes that it took the Navy a median total of 391 days when addressing its own JUONS requests.10 This is hardly a time frame that would be considered sustainable for any “rapid” event. While these organizations filled the field requirements called out in JUONS, they often specified products rather than the specific requirement to meet the operational need of the field commander. They did, however, demonstrate the ability to rapidly field new capabilities to the warfighter using existing mature technologies or commercially available capabilities.
The downside of these organizations was that too often products were deployed to the field without the proper sustainment systems associated with training and support services. The tying of these rapid reaction services to supplemental funds further exacerbated the problems of long-term support and planning for these systems. While progress was made in the logistical areas since early in these conflicts as systems were integrated into existing logistical support systems, it did result in several early deployed capabilities not being utilized by the field operators.
In addition, since the early stages of these rapid acquisition organizations, the Services have improved their use of experimentation and operational exercises to better understand new system capabilities and how to develop the necessary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to support their successful deployment, including maintainability requirements.
The dozens of rapid acquisition organizations that have sprouted up over the last decade to serve our needs in the Middle East are not a permanent solution to the acquisition challenge. These models, varied as they are, are not permanently sustainable in the current environment owing to existing laws, their reliance on supplemental funding, and the change of leadership in the executive and legislative branches. The combatant commander’s (COCOM’s) requirement for timely responsiveness to their needs reflects the need for a cultural shift in the acquisition process. For instance,
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9Jacques S. Gansler, University of Maryland, “Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs,” presentation to the committee, Irvine, Calif., June 27, 2012.
10Ibid.
• The 80 percent solution may suffice in time-constrained situations.
• Testing should focus on what the system can and cannot do rather than on the pass/fail criterion of a requirement.
• Risk should be recognized and managed rather than avoided at all cost.
• Funding lines need to allow more flexibility for needs across the Future Years Defense Program.
Congress, DOD, and industry must change their current methods to support these objectives. Congress has to allow more flexibility into the funding profiles to address shortcomings in capabilities in months rather than years. DOD needs to move from a strict requirements-driven evaluation to a more managed-risk approach to providing timely solutions and must be willing to spiral in capabilities as they mature through the development cycle. Industry must be honest regarding its ability to deliver truly mature technology and systems on demanding time lines. Finally, the current unwillingness of the DOD to utilize foreign technologies and solutions, as well as proprietary solutions from industry, should be reconsidered. Given the pace of technology change, it is no longer appropriate for the DOD to assume ownership of technology and systems for which industry assumed the development risk.
The urgent needs of the COCOMs will continue to exist long after the current wars have concluded. In the face of the barriers identified above, there is little likelihood that a reversion to traditional acquisition methods and processes will meet the demands for “rapid” acquisition of solutions. What should be considered is a separate, rather than a parallel, acquisition agent to implement the changes necessary. Consistent with the philosophy expressed in the Clayton M. Christiansen’s Innovator’s Dilemma11 and the recommendations in the Defense Science Board (DSB) report on fulfillment of urgent operational needs,12 a separate acquisition organization should be established to address the barrier to rapid solution fielding. A separate and new environment is necessary to effect the changes necessary and to ensure that change does not become buried in the bureaucracy of traditional institutions.
Once a new organization has been established with flexible funding sources, the final step will be to staff it with the most innovative personnel. These people must be willing to think outside the box, manage (not eliminate) risk, and ensure that innovation is applied to the business and support systems to the same degree it is applied to the delivered product. As with the recent emphasis on foreign affairs officers, this career track must be seen as career enhancing and one that enjoys the commitment and support of senior leadership.
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11Clayton M. Christensen. 2011. The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book That Will Change the Way You Do Business, Reprint Edition, HarperBusiness, New York, N.Y.
12Defense Science Board. 2009. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C., July.
The process illustrated in Figure 6-10 and described in the DSB report supports the needs of both deliberate acquisition and urgent/emergent or “rapid” acquisition. The DSB’s recommendation called for a new agency referred to as the rapid acquisition and fielding agency (RAFA). It should be a small, lean organization, with flexible funding and senior leadership sponsorship focused on speed to market for the warfighter.
Prototyping
Rapid prototyping, while a key component of accelerating technology and capability maturity, does not by itself go far enough to address the acquisition challenge associated with capability surprises. There is a need to take this a step further and deploy some limited numbers of new capabilities in order to allow system developers to engage in real-world experiments with the warfighters, to understand limitations, and create innovations in CONOPS to complement the new technology and to mature them consistent with the needs of the operational warfighters. Limited deployment also exercises the industrial production base and helps the operators to develop and improve the TTPs that are required to use the new capabilities.
FIGURE 6-10 Dual acquisition path. SOURCE: Jacques S. Gansler, University of Maryland, “Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs,” presentation to the committee, Irvine, Calif., June 27, 2012.
Process
Historically in both the Second World War and in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOD has provided relief from the Federal Acquisition Regulation System/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (FARS/DFARS) regulations when the operational need was serious enough, resulting in both innovation and, at times, waste. At the same time industry responded with new developments and capabilities delivered to the warfighter in an expedient and efficient manner. Lessons learned from these experiences may provide the basis for a more timely but still cost-effective acquisition of capabilities in peacetime as well in wartime.
Current naval ship and weapon acquisition methods are not compatible with unanticipated surprises. Until the Second World War, given the robust industrial base and a sense of urgency as well as the benefit of the insulation provided by two oceans and the lower pace of attack, the United States was able to mobilize its industry in its own defense and also act as the arsenal for the world.
A shrinking world and modern technology no longer provide such luxuries. The current pace of naval vessel acquisition, up to 14 years from design to delivery, dictates that the old-fashioned approach of building ships and weapon systems to counter emerging threats no longer suffices.
Clearly, a viable acquisition system must be responsive to anticipated surprises. However, an acquisition system that is in step with unanticipated surprises must itself be versatile and agile. The acquisition of sensors, detectors, and weapons (payload) must be decoupled from the slow pace of ship and aircraft design and construction.
The deliberateness of naval ship acquisition means that “new” ships, from the time of concept design to commissioning, may span many surprises—technological, political, and economic. The usual result is that a ship, when it is finally commissioned, may not address new and emerging threats.
The current acquisition system is often criticized for its lethargy and complexity, fettered by FARS/DFARS procedures and oversight requirements. These in turn are further encumbered by budgetary and political considerations.
The acquisition system cries out to be streamlined to speed up and simplify the process, especially in its ability to be responsive to surprises and urgent needs. Other transaction authorities (OTAs) are moving in this direction. Many methods used in the commercial world for vessel acquisition, which are measured in months rather than decades for Navy acquisitions, are worthy of consideration. If the electronics development mirrors Moore’s law, it suggests that quantum improvements in platform acquisition should be the goal. “We need to move from ‘luxury-car’ platforms with their built-in capabilities toward dependable ‘trucks’ that can handle a changing payload selection.”13
The construction, outfitting, and manning of the LCS 2 also reflect an ap-
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13ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. 2012. “Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 138(7):16-23.
preciation for commercial practices. While clearly a naval vessel, many aspects of this vessel are common to merchant vessels.
The long-term pricing agreements (LTPAs) so prevalent in today’s acquisition processes may be a challenge in an era without strong past performance evaluations due to low volume and competition from the commercial sides. This could very well lead to an environment where one is confronted with going to war with what is available, affordable, and on the shelf today, because the duration of the future conflict may not allow for hardware with new capabilities to mature, then be acquired and deployed.
Production
Simply developing and then placing a new capability on the shelf and waiting for a threat to materialize allows the industrial base and users to go dormant and creates a chasm with respect to future deployment—a challenge for the users and operators alike. It is akin to the setup times associated with a production run—things do not happen overnight, especially when surprise crops up. Our adversaries work this to their advantage operating inside our time line for response to take off-the-shelf capabilities and deploy them: While we are changing, they change their tactics yet again. The submarine force learned this lesson and kept the submarine design team engaged in the interim before the development of the Seawolf-class and the Virginia-class submarines so as to not lose the tacit knowledge of that community.
Our naval forces need to keep our adversaries at bay by constantly changing and showing new capabilities in relatively short periods of time. It may be more appropriate to demonstrate many small changes to capabilities (MRAP) than a few large ones (Aegis). While this will require a paradigm shift relative to how industry operates today, it will lead to a more agile and complex response able to rapidly produce many different capabilities in a much shorter time.
Our naval forces are no longer the sole possessor of technology, but to ensure that our systems behave as intended and without surprises, we must be able to trust their manufacturers in a world where the maker of a chip can tamper with its functionality and reliability, putting it beyond the reach of our system integrators and military operators. The United States needs to be exploiting the science from everywhere, leveraging technology development from our allies, and fielding systems from our own industrial base.
Our naval forces are a leader in technology development but no longer hold the dominant position they once enjoyed. With the advent of the Internet and the move to global supply chains, technology—and therefore capability development—is within the grasp of even the remote societies of the globe. Adversaries study our open military literature and are quick to devise simple yet effective countermeasures to our systems. Their proactive learning and understanding allow them to do this within the time frame of our present acquisition
cycle. The observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop cycle of our adversaries has been shortened significantly because they no longer have to wait for systems to be used against them to learn how to counter their capabilities. Their reaction time is significantly reduced to well within our capability to react through our acquisition systems. “Rapid cycle of measure/countermeasure/counter-countermeasure will continue to add complexity to hybrid warfare operations, including cyber warfare.”14
Spiral Development
The Department of Defense’s conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months…. Given the types of situations the United States is likely to face … it is time to think hard about how to institutionalize the procurement of [critical] capabilities and get them fielded quickly.15
Spiraling in capabilities is closely aligned with the three key elements of repurposability, described above. The challenge with spiraling in new capabilities is providing the expansion capabilities for the key elements in the original design. It is difficult to predict the future in any environment, and predicting “surprises” is no different. Spiral development requires discipline on the part of both the procuring agent and the contractor in laying down the relevant foundations for these elements based on reasonable expectations at the time.
It would be impractical to assume that one will be able to determine the exact amount of processing, memory, or power a future spiral capability will require. However, one can make reasonable estimates of technology progression and capabilities based on current technology and system trends. Providing a reasonable expansion capability based on these trends at both the component and the line-replaceable-unit (LRU) levels is the most important aspect of preparing for future spirals. The focus should be on minimal disruption to the physical aspects of the systems unit that provides the main functionality for the new capability.
This approach also calls for releasing incremental capabilities to the field as they become available throughout the development cycle in reasonable time frames. Adopting the model used by aircraft manufacturers to release operational flight programs (OFPs) to the wings on an 18- to 24-month cycle is a good example of spiral capability introduction. Early OFP releases contain fewer capabilities than later releases. However, they contain enough functionality for the
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14Defense Science Board. 2009. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C., July, p. 3.
15Robert M. Gates. 2009. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88(1):28-40.
user community to gain valuable operational experience with the proposed new capabilities such that they can improve operational performance against an adversary’s tactics and also provide valuable feedback into both the next spiral release and the accompanying TTPs. This enables fighters to more quickly introduce new and valuable (and lifesaving) capabilities to the field.
This approach calls for acquisition officials to work with industry to determine the appropriate release points for a spiral capability. In recent years, there has been a tendency to permit acquisition officials to drive the acceptance of a deliverable based on the letter of the contract. If spiraling is to be successful, both acquisition officials and industry will have to identify the point of “good enough,” where sufficient new capability is available and useful to the operators such that it will make a difference in their ability to fight. This “good enough,” capability becomes the basis for the operators to provide feedback to improve system performance and TTPs and to enable us to stay ahead of our adversaries by altering our tactics in a way that allows us to remain inside the adversary’s OODA loop rather than the other way around. This ability to lean forward and retain the initiative rather than react to the enemy’s tactics is a benefit of actively spiraling “good enough” capabilities to our warfighters in a timely manner.
The naval forces should deploy not with “deficiencies” but with “known capabilities” and spiral capabilities. The concept of establishing a baseline design and spiraling in upgraded capabilities has been around for decades for large platform systems such as aircraft. Where the platform and weapons system were tightly integrated, spiral upgrades were the best way to employ an initial new capability, even if it was somewhat limited relative to overall objectives, and then gradually improve or add capabilities over an 18-month block cycle. The B-2 aircraft (stealth bomber) is a good example. The aircraft was initially fielded without all the contemplated capability, and the aircraft was upgraded from Block 10 to Blocks 20 and 30 and now the Block 40 configuration is in the operational fleet. Even though the B-2 was a highly integrated design, it was architected to be deployed in incremental block configurations and some flexibility was designed in at the beginning of the program.
This worked fine in an era when the United States found itself controlling a particular aspect of the battle space, such as air superiority. What is needed today is to instill this same thinking into the even lower levels of our system development. As platforms are separated from the payloads, the payload system from the subsystems it comprises, the software from the hardware and further at the subsystem, LRU, SRU, and, finally, the component levels, the question is how to drive an 18-month block cycle (today the blocks last many years) down to several weeks (9-18 months would be a realistic and worthy goal). It also requires one to start thinking about our tactical/payload systems in a more strategic manner.
One needs to consider that our weapon systems may have a 50-yr life cycle, given the thinking that has kept the B-52 bomber in the inventory for three generations of pilots. As the naval forces can no longer afford to replace ships and
aircraft every 10 to 20 years, this same approach must be brought to our tactical equipment in order to prolong their longevity through continuous spiral upgrades.
This approach to thinking about our tactical systems starts with the baseline acceptance: a recognition that the 80 percent solution is often “good enough.” This approach offers two things: first, it allows the timely development of TTPs that will influence future cycle upgrades, and, second, it will allow us to evaluate the new capability’s overall potential effectiveness in a more timely manner. This agility is required to keep the adversary on the defensive rather than to have us react to their threats. We now align our OODA loop more closely with theirs. This flexibility in system development and deployment and agility in responsiveness keeps the adversary guessing about our TTPs and how to react.
This change also requires a change on the part of industry. Industry needs to stabilize requirements at the 80 percent level while delivering new capability. It needs to develop flexible, modular system designs down to the component level if possible and demonstrate the ability to deliver on a block cycle lasting months rather than years. Finally, the military and industry need to set the risk/reward points to allow the flexible designs for system “repurposeability.”
Rapid response capability will be the avenue taken when surprise happens—and it will happen regardless of one’s planning. Naval forces need to learn how to deploy the 80 percent solution, not with “deficiencies” but rather with known “capabilities,” and then learn how to spiral in capabilities quickly.
Examples of Rapid Acquisition Programs
The committee has identified several novel initiatives that have attempted to address the challenges of expediency with respect to the acquisition process. These initiatives include the USMC Combat Hunter program and the Navy’s Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) project and the P-8A Poseidon aircraft.
It is the intention of the committee that such initiatives to rapidly field new capabilities to counter unanticipated surprises should be separate from the existing process and not just incremental to it. This is necessary if the initiatives are truly going to help us to get new capabilities into the field in a shorter time frame for our warfighters.
USMC Hunter Warrior Series
The Hunter Warrior series was an outcome of General Krulak’s vision of the future fighting environment that was forecast during his time as Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). He referred to the overall concept as Sea Dragon and fully implemented this plan when he became Commandant of the Marine Corps with the standup of the Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory. It consisted of three broad experiments which addressed the future warfighter challenges in the urban environment and
small dispersed team operations: Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, and Information Warrior. The key elements enabling the delivery of operational capabilities within 24 months were (1) central experiment development, direction, and funding; (2) a small cadre force co-located at the warfighting laboratory; and (3) the use of operational forces to demonstrate the utility of new capabilities.
Hunter Warrior developed methods to increase the effectiveness and survivability of small dispersed forces on the modern battlefield. Within 24 months, inclusive of several intermediary milestones, MCCDC was able to develop, test, and deploy solutions to address mobility and communication challenges of the forces.
Specifically they produced an innovative solution for the replacement of the M151 Jeep. A commercial Mercedes was modified and deployed as the replacement vehicle and as an interim solution to the long delayed Fast Attack Vehicle (FAV) program, for which users had waited more than 10 years without a product. In the communication area, the program offered an alternative solution to the much delayed JTRS program by integrating small commercial handheld radios within the small units.
The Urban Warrior program investigated how to operate in the new urban jungle environment. It addressed the tactics, visibility, and first-respondent capabilities for the small unit fighters in this environment. It quantified the operational impact associated with supporting wounded soldiers and the need for improved uniforms and protective gear to improve warfighter protection. Additionally, it improved the MILES (laser tag gear) infantry combat training system with its predetermined types of combat wounds by introducing chalk rounds that identified the specific location and types of wounds Marines incurred during their combat operational training. Further, the program identified and transitioned immediately available commercial solutions to personal protective gear by adopting best practices for knee, arm, and other body parts, thereby minimizing the impact of cuts, scrapes, and the like on mission execution.
The Navy’s ARCI Program
The ARCI program for the Navy’s submarine force is an excellent example of how to deploy new capabilities in a short time. The keys to success for this program included a common baseline for combat systems across all submarine platforms in the fleet and the disciplined deployment of hardware and software updates to manage the risks associated with spiral innovations. Furthermore, the program recognized that advanced hardware development needed to be accompanied by advanced algorithm development. The release of these hardware and software improvements to the fleet in a staggered fashion, taking advantage of commercial practices and disciplined government component systems, and, finally, sea testing on a regular cadence is commendable.
The common combat system permits the Navy to leverage the associated costs across a relatively limited number of platforms in the inventory. Industry
and junior and senior naval representatives collaborate on the spiral requirements and on determining the level of risk that can be safely managed on a particular spiral release. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware is continuously updated on a 2-year cycle lagging the newest generation release in order to enjoy the benefits of observations made by early adopters. One-third of the fleet receives the hardware spiral every 2 years so that the entire fleet is upgraded by the sixth year. Software is updated on a yearly basis and trails any new hardware spirals by 1 year to ease integration challenges.
Tightly connected with these spiral capability releases is a contracting process that provides a steady budget line and allows for flexible contracting methods in support of these activities. Operating within the existing federal acquisition regulations (FARs), contracting officers understand and execute their authorities in support of the acquisition, testing, and deployment of commercial hardware on a time-critical time line that (1) maintains the capability deployment lines and (2) leverages state-of-the-art commercial designs and software updates that dovetail neatly with the fleet’s identified needs. The contracting officers are a critical part of the spiral development team, and their ability to deliver innovative capabilities, within the allowable parameters of the FAR, is a critical part of ensuring a proper defense against capability surprise.
ARCI was conducted in a budget-constrained environment much like we are seeing today. In order to ensure contractor cost and schedule performance, the Navy continuously incentivized contractors to perform by leveraging a steady stream of innovation from the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) process. This prevented one company from enjoying a monopolistic position on the program. Senior leadership provided program management with the fortitude and backing to replace underperformers, both in industry and government, with others who were willing to dispense with overhead and infrastructure for focusing on deliverable product.
The flexibility provided by commercial, open-architecture hardware permitted alternatives in terms of algorithm or software products. More than once the Navy successfully replaced its software provider and still maintained technical, cost, and schedule performance.
When the ARCI program commenced, the Navy acoustic program office had experienced regular program cost and schedule overruns. At the same time it faced a real and growing threat to our undersea acoustic superiority and was operating under a budget 75 percent smaller than our cold war budgets. It was clearly being asked to do more with less. Today, using an 18-month block cycle, the Navy enjoys a 17-year record of on-time, on-budget delivery to the fleet.
P-8A Poseidon Aircraft
The P-8A Poseidon development is a good example of where the Navy leveraged commercial advances and practices to improve military product develop-
ment times and save cost. The P-8A procurement utilized a traditional top-down Navy requirements process; however, it significantly leveraged the commercial investments in the Boeing 737 platform from which it was derived. This not only saved design and development cost and schedule, but also helped to focus operational test requirements because of demonstrated commercial performance.
The P-8A mission packages were significantly different from its 737 commercial counterpart, thereby requiring new development and test requirements. Several structural changes were required for bomb bay and bomb rack modifications unique to a military aircraft. These obviously required some development costs, but the ability to utilize the existing 737 structure as a baseline helped to bound the alternative solution set for consideration. These modifications still drove the need for full-scale static and fatigue test assets; however, the available commercial data in other common and mature systems, such as the landing gear and other areas, helped to minimize platform development costs.
Areas that experienced a significant leverage of the commercial 737 design included the engines and flight avionics hardware (software was a new development effort). Several mission systems were leveraged from other military systems to accelerate development efforts. These included electronic support measures (ESM) from the F-18, an acoustics package, and a repackaged radar from the P-3. Savings were realized in terms of both procurement (common supply chains) and the certification process requirements. Leveraging these commercial practices enabled the Navy to save one-third to one-half of the cost of having to develop a new platform from scratch.
It is significant that P-8A production is conducted on a third line in parallel with the existing two 737 production lines. This eliminated the start-up costs (in terms of schedule and dollars) associated with a new production line and was critical to controlling costs. This was due to the need to conform to existing practices already in place with the commercial line. The new military aircraft’s development was heavily influenced by the commercial production rate line, which offered “infrastructure” already in place such as change review boards and process controls that drove behavior and thinking on the P-8A such that it did not impact the commercial production lines. Unlike previous military derivatives, the P-8A unique modifications are made in sequence during fabrication and assembly. This was difficult at first but later was recognized to accelerate the control and disciplines on the P-8A development, which in turn helped to control cost and schedule performance. Finally, the colocation of the military and the commercial production lines enabled the military to enjoy the benefits of commercial performance improvements (in connection with the aggressive continuous improvement margin targets) as they became available, further improving system and program performance, at a lower cost than if it had created those improvements itself. The drive to keep the commercial and military production lines as common as possible drove contractor and customer alike to implement these cost-saving measures.
In the testing area, the 737 certification data did little to eliminate devel-
opmental test and evaluation test points owing to the significant structural and mission package development. However, they did help to inform the test program decision makers, who were able to take advantage of them to focus required test points for the program. In the Navy Structures Group, where data must be created for each new platform, the available commercial data were leveraged to help the group make informed decisions about what to submit to M&S and what to actually test. Most of this leverage is skewed toward the development/requirements part of a program. In the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) portion, mission or operational performance drives the test schedule and must be accomplished for any new class of platform regardless of its commercial heritage.
As a multimission platform it was important for growth margins for all systems to be included in the program requirements. Weight, size, power, cooling, and processing, among others, all had specific technical performance measures (TPMs) that were set early in the program. As the program progressed, these TPMs were constantly reviewed and system trades were made in order to maintain growth requirements. One such trade involved the weight margin of the platform, where a more efficient engine, leveraged from its commercial 737 counterpart, was incorporated in order to preserve overall system performance (range at full load).
The above engine example typified the benefits of leveraging the commercial designs. Another involved the leveraging of the technical manuals (TMs) for maintenance and repair as well as operations. While Navy-specific requirements were added to the commercial TMs, the maturity of these documents helped the program accelerate its operational readiness and later enabled the Navy to move from contractor logistics supplied (CLS)-based maintenance to an organic-based logistics function more rapidly than originally envisioned.
In summary, the P-8A is a good example of leveraging commercial designs and practices to meet military needs in a timely manner. Utilizing the commercial 737 baseline, the Navy was able to realize cost and schedule savings during development, test, and maintenance that will reap benefits through the life cycle of the platform. Furthermore, the practices employed here offer lessons to consider when faced with delivering new capabilities in the event of a capability surprise.
Testing
Current test and evaluation practices are not taking full advantage of advancements in modern design, M&S, and coupon-type testing.16 The earlier the involvement of the OT&E community in the development of requirements, while maintaining the appropriate level of separation required to avoid conflicts of in-
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16“Coupon-type” testing refers to the use of a small piece of material for testing. These results may then be extrapolated into results for a larger, more costly piece of material.
terest, could reduce the time and cost associated with delivering new systems to the field in the face of capability surprise. With $30 billion of a total $70 billion OSD RDT&E budget dedicated to OT&E activities, including a Navy component of $13 billion, there is the potential for substantial savings that could be leveraged elsewhere.
The hypothesis stands that for incremental or spiral improvements to systems, as well as with new capabilities to address threats presented by surprise, the increased use of commercial data and practices can accelerate the fielding of these new requirements along a shorter time line. There is no longer a requirement or need to test full system articles until they fail or break completely. Best commercial practices leverage M&S analysis, coupon-type testing, and modern tools that are available to reduce the overall cost of such testing. The Navy has an opportunity to lead the other Services in this area and demonstrate the utility of such testing while enjoying the associated savings in time (and dollars) to operational deployment.
Past examples of this type of fielding include the Marine Corps Sea Dragon program, the space community’s Mars Curiosity rover, and the Navy’s P-8 program. In each of these instances, the use of the commercial data resulted in or offered the opportunity to, in hindsight, realize substantial savings in terms of schedule and dollars.
The Marine Corp Sea Dragon program, under the auspices of the Hunter Series of exercises, deployed improvements to mobility and communications capabilities by creating an integrated process team (IPT) of MCCDC, Systems Command (SYSCOM), and OT&E representatives that expedited the test and evaluation of new capabilities to ensure warfighter confidence at deployment.
The Mars Curiosity rover is a shining example of a system development and deployment where operational testing was conducted on selected parts in parallel with development activities. These practices should be applied to the DOD’s OT&E execution to realize savings without sacrificing confidence associated with traditional verification testing.
Finally, in the case of the P-8 it is observed that while a commercial aircraft was modified to perform a military mission, a full-fledged traditional OT&E was still required by program management. While some significant modifications were made to the original design, was full OT&E required? It would be a valuable exercise to compare, with the benefit of hindsight, the original commercial data with data from the OT&E results to identify points where previous commercial testing could have been more effectively leveraged, resulting in schedule and cost savings to the program.
Training for Initial Capability
Basic proficiency training, not only for OT&E but also for initial operational capability (IOC), occurs well before the specialized training focused on mission
readiness and is confined to core qualifications for basic readiness. Some of this basic training is now delivered in the form of distance-learning, with remote testing to validate proficiency.
In the commercial and academic sectors, it is common to use adaptive software techniques to introduce variation into tests for engineering and other technical certifications. This technique ensures that people cannot game the testing system itself and is also used to introduce surprise elements into the test. The latter technique helps organizations validate that students are not simply drilling and repeating by rote but instead understand underlying principles and are prepared to apply what they have learned to unexpected challenges.
In moving beyond initial training, naval forces could apply these same low-cost adaptive techniques to existing military distance-learning courses, adding capability surprise to the curriculum and, more important, to the distance-learning qualification tests. Once this testing regime has matured, surprise-related results from these tests could be fed into a broader U.S. Navy system managed by the recommended surprise mitigation office. Training is discussed in more depth in the following chapter.
Whereas more modern platforms are being designed for open computing architectures, retrofit of such architecture to legacy ships has been less successful. Some committee members recall that the original Aegis open architecture planning began in the 1990s, yet the transition to open architecture did not occur until late in the aughts (last decade) and then at considerable cost. As new computing platforms such as CANES are planned for combatant systems the committee is concerned that the open architecture of the near past represented by CANES could again become a constraint rather than an open architecture that is readily upgraded, given the long time lags between COTS equipment refreshes.
Rapid fielding of systems for naval mission needs was prevalent during the cold war. A program originally known as Battle Group Anti-Aircraft Warfare Coordination (BGAAWC) and then as Force Anti-Air Coordination Technology (FACT) was responsible for field testing prototypes on ships to evaluate such capabilities as radar detection and track automation, tactical link interoperability, and air track identification. Further, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR) would regularly field test capabilities to support C2 and communications connectivity improvements. There were some, however, who held that these systems were difficult to support in operation unless a full tooth-to-tail acquisition program was implemented. This was rarely accomplished because it was very expensive and would have taken a long time to achieve. Rather, rotating pools of equipment were provided and supported, some by contractors and some by in-service agents from the naval centers. By the late 1990s, as fleet systems became more complex and prototypes tended to be not well supported, a substantial slowdown in prototyping occurred that has persisted to this day. However, in this era of reduced acquisition and interest in rapid fielding, the committee believes rapid
fielding of prototypes should be reconsidered. A tailored approach to in-service support for such rapidly fielded capabilities would be necessary.
Finding 5b: The Department of the Navy is not extending the full measure of open architecture principles throughout system development and deployment life cycles nor is it making best use of permissible contracting exceptions or best acquisition practices in responding to potential capability surprise in a timely and efficient manner.
Recommendation 5b: The Chief of Naval Research (CNR) should invest in discovery and invention (6.1 and early 6.2) research areas that take advantage of the entire payload value chain (i.e., payloads versus platforms; modularity versus integration; and reprogrammability), and inclusion of appropriate software and hardware design margins into development requirements. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RDA) should ensure that acquisition and contracting personnel are trained in the development of threshold versus objective requirements, the unique requirements associated with the use of commercial products, and the appropriate use of the waiver process in tailoring responses to potential capability surprise.
Recommendation 5c: The surprise mitigation office (see Recommendation 1) should encourage broader cross-organizational pre-planning in anticipation of, and based on previous, black swan events that can cut across U.S. government department responsibilities, and it should also serve as the lead resource officer for the rapid fielding of new capabilities to counter unanticipated surprises.
