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1
Climate Change as a
National Security Concern
O
ver the past several years the U.S. intelligence community has en-
gaged with the National Academy of Sciences and National Research
Council (NRC) concerning a range of issues related to climate and
security. A standing Committee on Climate, Energy, and National Security
(CENS) was established in 2008 to facilitate the increased involvement
of scientists in answering questions related to climate and environmental
change, energy, natural disasters, and security. The committee undertakes
activities to bring scientific expertise to bear on questions of importance
to the intelligence community related to climate and environmental change
(see, for example, National Research Council, 2010b, 2010d, 2012b). The
CENS activities led to a request in 2010 for a study to, among other tasks,
“identify ways to increase the ability of the intelligence community to take
climate change into account in assessing political and social stresses with
implications for U.S. national security.” The complete statement of task for
this study appears in Box 1-1.
To carry out this task the NRC created a committee with broad exper
tise in the physical and social sciences and in security matters. The goal was
for the committee to be able to integrate knowledge from across the physi-
cal and social sciences and also to be able to offer advice to the intelligence
community on how to think about the security risks that might arise when
climate change leads to situations for which countries, regions, or human
life-supporting systems are not adequately prepared. Biographies of the
committee members may be found in Appendix A.
This study focuses on some of the ways that climate change might
create or alter risks to U.S. national security, in particular, ways that fall
15
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16 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
BOX 1-1
Statement of Task: Assessing the Impact of Climate
Change on Social and Political Stresses
The National Research Council (NRC) would undertake a study to evaluate
the evidence on possible connections between climate change and U.S. national
security concerns and to identify ways to increase the ability of the intelligence com-
munity to take climate change into account in assessing political and social stresses
with implications for U.S. national security. The study panel would focus on several
broad questions, such as: What are the major social and political factors affecting
the relationship between climate change and outcomes relevant to U.S. national
security? What is the basis for this knowledge and how strong is it? What research
and measurement strategies would strengthen the basis for this knowledge?
The study panel would develop a conceptual framework for addressing such
issues on the basis of two workshops, existing research literature, and relevant
NRC studies. It would produce a report including its conceptual framework and
findings and conclusions regarding the key climate-security connections and
issues of assessment of climate-related security risks examined in the work-
shops and the scientific literature. It would also identify variables that should be
monitored and ways that indicators of climate change, impacts, and vulnerabilities
might be developed and made useful to the intelligence community in assessing
climate-related threats to U.S. national security.
within the mission of the U.S. intelligence community. This mission covers
a broad range of risks. It includes possible military attacks on the United
States, its allies and partners, and American facilities overseas, but it is
much broader. The intelligence community is also responsible for assessing
the likelihood of violent subnational conflicts in countries and regions with
extremist groups, dangerous weapons, critical resources, or other condi-
tions of security concern. It must also anticipate and assess various other
risks to the stability of states and regions and risks of major humanitarian
disasters in key regions of the world, both because of the indirect threats
such risks may pose to the United States or its allies and because of national
commitment to the principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1674,
which proclaims “the responsibility to protect populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”
Given these intelligence mission elements, the central questions moti-
vating this study are: How might climate change lead to new or increased
risks to U.S. national security? Might it, for example, put new stresses
on societies or on systems that support human well-being, such as sup-
ply chains for food or energy, and thus pose or alter security risks to the
United States? Will intelligence and security organizations need to gather
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 17
new kinds of information or synthesize existing information in new ways
in order to assess climate-related security risks? Will they need to develop
new ways to anticipate and assess security risks to address those that are
affected by climate change?
This report is based on current understanding of the state of the cli-
mate system as assessed internationally by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007,
2012), as assessed nationally in reports by the U.S. Global Change Research
Program (USGCRP) and by the NRC within the suite of congressionally
mandated studies known as America’s Climate Choices (National Research
Council, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d) and in subsequent relevant reports
(e.g., National Research Council, 2011a, 2011b, 2012b), and in other rel-
evant literature reviewed by the committee. The committee’s purpose was
not to readdress the science of climate change or to review past assessments,
but to build on this knowledge to address the issues in the statement of task.
POTENTIAL CLIMATE–SECURITY CONNECTIONS
Over the past decade, several groups within the U.S. security policy
community, both within and outside government, have given increasing
attention to the potential risks that climate change could pose for national
as well as international security. In 2008, for example, the intelligence com-
munity produced The National Intelligence Assessment on the National
Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030 (Fingar, 2008).1
Climate issues were included in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010) as well as in the 2010 edition
of the National Security Strategy (White House, 2010).
In addition to the attention from the U.S. government, beginning in
the mid-2000s many foreign and security policy think tanks and research
organizations produced reports on the potential connections between cli-
mate change and security. The reports were generally the work of groups
of security experts, informed by consultations with climate scientists and
regional and country specialists. Some reports also examined evidence from
the social sciences. The groups drew upon this collective expertise to project
a range of scenarios for potential impacts, usually over a 20-year period,
1
The assessment itself is still classified, but the methodology and principal conclusions
of the report were presented in the statement for the record prepared in conjunction with
testimony to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Select
Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming. The National Intelligence Council
also sponsored an extensive set of unclassified reports and conferences on the potential effects
of climate change on key regions and countries; the materials may be found at http://www.
dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-nic-publications (accessed
September 27, 2012).
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18 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
although some also included projections to the end of the century. Given
that these were not academic reports, the basis for the groups’ judgments
and the level of confidence associated with them were usually not specified
in detail. Without attempting a comprehensive review, this section seeks to
provide a summary of frequently occurring themes and arguments about
climate–security connections from major government reports (Fingar, 2008;
U.S. Department of Defense, 2010; White House, 2010; Defense Science
Board, 2011) and from some of the best-known examples in the mainstream
policy literature (Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007; Lennon et
al., 2007; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009; Carmen et al.,
2010; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011; Treverton et al.,
2012). For some key statements from these studies, see Box 1-2.
These government and policy documents reflect a number of important
common elements. Above all, the connections between climate and security
are not presumed to be direct; they are seen as complicated and contingent,
with the effects of climate events felt through their consequences for other
factors that then affect security. For example, the 2010 QDR concludes:
While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an ac-
celerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian
institutions and militaries around the world. In addition, extreme weather
events may lead to increased demands for defense support to civil au-
thorities for humanitarian assistance or disaster response both within the
United States and overseas. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010:85)
The most frequently cited potential climate events include sea-level
rise, the shrinking of glaciers and the Arctic icecap, an increase in extreme
weather events, and increasingly intense droughts, floods, and heat waves.
The scenarios and examples presented in the above reports address broad
consequences for fundamental societal needs such as food, health, and
water and also the likely implications for specific regions and countries.
Although the reports generally agree that future climate events are likely
to increase tensions and political instability within and between states and
perhaps also increase internal conflicts, they do not forecast an increase in
interstate conflict.
Taken together, the most commonly cited climate–security scenarios
in these reports result from failures or shortcomings of human systems in
adapting to a changing climate; that is, they turn on the vulnerabilities of
these systems to climate events. In these scenarios climate events cause harm
to various support systems for human life and well-being by exceeding
the ability of these systems to cope. Depending on other social, economic,
political, and environmental factors, the harm may result in larger-scale
political and social outcomes that are of concern for U.S. national security.
All of the reports include some scenarios of this sort, although different re-
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 19
BOX 1-2
Statements About Climate and Security
Connections from Previous Security Analysis
“Climate change acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most
volatile regions of the world.” (Center for Naval Analysis, 2007:6)
“[T]he United States can expect that climate change will exacerbate already
existing north–south tensions, dramatically increase global migration both inside
and between nations (including into the United States), spur more serious public
health problems, heighten interstate tension and possibly conflict over resources,
challenge the institutions of global governance, cause potentially destabilizing do-
mestic political and social repercussions, and stir unpredictable shifts in the global
balance of power, particularly where China is concerned. The state of humanity
could be altered in ways that create strong moral dilemmas for those charged
with wielding national power, and also in ways that may either erode or enhance
America’s place in the world.” (Lennon et al., 2007:103)
“We assess that climate change alone is unlikely to trigger state failure in any
state out to 2030, but the impacts will worsen existing problems—such as poverty,
social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak politi-
cal institutions. Climate change could threaten domestic stability in some states,
potentially contributing to intra- or, less likely, interstate conflict, particularly over
access to increasingly scarce water resources.” (Fingar, 2008:4–5)
“Since climate change affects the distribution and availability of critical natu-
ral resources, it can act as a ‘threat multiplier’ by causing mass migrations and
exacerbating conditions that can lead to social unrest and armed conflict.” (Center
for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009:1)
“While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an ac-
celerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions
and militaries around the world. In addition, extreme weather events may lead to
increased demands for defense support to civil authorities for humanitarian as-
sistance or disaster response both within the United States and overseas.” (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2010:85)
“Climate change is likely to have the greatest impact on security through its
indirect effects on conflict and vulnerability.” (Defense Science Board, 2011:xi)
“Climate change is not happening in a vacuum: in many areas of the world it
will be accompanied by rapid population growth, resource shortages, and energy
price increases. Analytically, it is difficult to separate the effects of climate change
from other factors, such as food shortages, migration, ethnic tensions and other
issues that could drive violence. However, the potential impacts of climate change
on water, energy, and agriculture will make it a central driver of conflict. The im-
pacts of climate change combine to make it a clear threat to collective security
and global order in the first half of the 21st Century.” (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2011:11)
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20 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
ports emphasize the effects of climate change on different support systems.
Declines in food and water security are among the most frequently cited
kinds of harm (e.g., Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007; Lennon
et al., 2007; Fingar, 2008; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009;
Carmen et al., 2010; U.S. Department of Defense, 2010; Defense Science
Board, 2011; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011; Treverton
et al., 2012), and sub-Saharan Africa is often singled out as the region most
likely to experience the greatest effects on security. For example, Fingar
(2008) wrote:
We judge that sub-Saharan Africa will continue to be the most vulnerable
region to climate change because of multiple environmental, economic, po-
litical, and social stresses. . . . Many African countries already challenged
by persistent poverty, frequent natural disasters, weak governance, and
high dependence on agriculture probably will face a significantly higher
exposure to water stress owing to climate change. (p. 8)
In some of the scenarios increasing food and water insecurity interact
to increase risks to health (e.g., Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis,
2007; Lennon et al., 2007). In others health risks result from changes in
weather patterns that shift the ranges for vector-borne diseases (Center
for Naval Analysis, 2007; Lennon et al., 2007). Several scenarios see such
declines in food or water security or disease outbreaks as likely drivers of
population migrations, both within and across borders, that result in po-
litical or social stress, usually in the countries that receive the immigrant
populations (e.g., Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007; Lennon
et al., 2007; Fingar, 2008; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009;
Treverton et al., 2012). Two of the most-often cited scenarios are increased
flooding or a rise in sea level forcing millions of Bangladeshis into India and
an increasing desertification and drought forcing people from northern and
sub-Saharan Africa into Europe. In both scenarios immigration issues are
already a source of major tension. Energy security also figures prominently
in several projected climate–security scenarios (Lennon et al., 2007; U.S.
Department of Defense, 2010; International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2011), in which climate change is seen not only as yielding potential ben-
efits for natural gas and perhaps biofuels producers but also as increasing
the vulnerability of countries and industrial systems that rely on imported
fuel (Lennon et al., 2007).
The paths envisioned from climate events to specific security conse-
quences are often complicated. For example, tensions could increase over
access to increasingly scarce resources, and that escalation, especially if it
led to overt conflict, could in turn further limit access to resources so that
people who had not previously been affected would now face shortages.
Some scenarios suggest that diminished national capacity or outright state
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 21
failure would create increasing opportunities for extremism or terrorism.
Again, sub-Saharan Africa is often cited as the most vulnerable region.
In addition to these specific scenarios, many of the reports foresee in-
creasingly frequent and increasingly severe natural disasters that will strain
the capacity to cope with the resulting humanitarian emergencies, both in
the United States and overseas (Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis,
2007; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009). This is of particular
concern to the U.S. military, given its expanding role in disaster assistance,
although several of the reports note that helping countries prepare for and
cope with disasters offers important opportunities for positive engagement.
These climate–security analyses raise concerns about several security
issues beyond those of inadequate adaptation leading to humanitarian
disasters, political instability, or violent conflict. One class of scenarios
involves direct threats of climate change to the ability of the U.S. military
to conduct its missions. An example is the threat that sea level rise, possi-
bly in combination with more intense coastal storms, poses to naval bases
in low-lying coastal areas (Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007;
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009; U.S. Department of De-
fense, 2010).2 More generally, analyses foresee climate change having broad
negative effects on military organization, training, and operations—for
example, by exacerbating operational difficulties for troops and equipment
in already difficult locations (Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007;
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009; Carmen et al., 2010; U.S.
Department of Defense, 2010; National Research Council, 2011b). Other
concerns include the vulnerability of U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
fuel supplies to severe weather that disrupts supply lines and the possibil-
ity of droughts restricting access to water for forces and facilities overseas.
Perhaps the most frequently cited security risk from climate change is
the possibility of melting Arctic sea ice leading to increased international
tensions over newly accessible sea routes and natural resources in the Arctic
(Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007; Carmen et al., 2010). A
recent NRC study (National Research Council, 2011b), addresses these and
other security issues of interest to the U.S. naval forces.
INCREASING RISKS OF DISRUPTIVE CLIMATE EVENTS
It is now clear from an accumulation of scientific evidence that the
risks of potentially disruptive climate events are increasing. The scientific
evidence on this point is aptly summarized in this conclusion from a recent
major review of the science by the NRC: “Climate change is occurring, is
2
For examples of the severe damage suffered by U.S. bases in the past from hurricanes, see
Busby (2007:6).
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22 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for—and in
many cases is already affecting—a broad range of human and natural sys-
tems” (National Research Council, 2010a:3). These increased risks will not
be reduced anytime soon: “Human-induced climate change and its impacts
will continue for many decades and in some cases for many centuries. Indi
vidually and collectively, these changes pose risks for a wide range of hu-
man and environmental systems, including . . . national security” (National
Research Council, 2010a:4). Moreover, many of the forces driving an-
thropogenic climate change, chiefly emissions of carbon dioxide and other
“greenhouse gases” and changes in land use that increase net absorption
of energy from the sun, have been increasing at an accelerating rate over
the past century or so (National Research Council, 2010a). Accordingly,
global average temperatures have been increasing substantially over the
past century (NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2012), and, given
the long residence time of carbon dioxide within the atmosphere, further
temperature increases are projected for at least the rest of the current cen-
tury even under scenarios in which past emissions trends are significantly
curtailed (Meehl et al., 2007). As another recent NRC report pointed out,
“Recently experienced climatic events are not likely to serve as guides to
what to expect next” (National Research Council, 2009:14).
In short, it is becoming increasingly likely that the world will experi-
ence climate-related conditions it has not seen before. The frequency of
natural disasters related to weather and climate has been increasing for at
least three decades, as have losses from these events (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2012; Munich Re, 2012). Temperature trends
at the local level show both increasing average temperatures and increas-
ingly frequent occurrences of high temperatures that were quite rare in
the 1951–1981 period (see Figure 1-1). As discussed further in Chapter 3,
temperature increases have implications for the hydrological cycle because
for each 1°C in global mean surface temperature there is a corresponding
7 percent increase in atmospheric water vapor.
These trends indicate that high-temperature extremes are becoming
more common even more rapidly than the average temperature is increas-
ing and that the rate of change is increasing. Such trends in extreme events
and the current understanding of climate change provide ample reason
to expect these weather and climate trends to continue, along with the
considerable spatial and interannual variability that has been experienced
in the recent past. Presently, the ratio of record daily high temperatures to
record low temperatures at U.S. observing stations is 2 to 1, rather than
the 1:1 ratio that would be expected if climate were not warming. For a
mid-range emission scenario, the ratio has been projected to increase to
20 to 1 by mid-century and to roughly 50 to 1 by the end of the century
(Meehl et al., 2009).
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 23
Frequency of Occurrence
Local Standard Deviation
FIGURE 1-1 Frequency of occurrence of local temperature anomalies on the North-
ern Hemisphere (NH) land surface by decades, in units of the local standard
deviation. Anomalies are relative to the 1951–1980 base period. Compared to
1951–1961, the distribution of anomalies has steadily moved in the direction of
warmer temperatures in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, with warm extremes becom-
ing more common in each of these decades. Occurrences of summer temperatures
more than three standard deviations above the mean, which were extremely rare
before 1980, occurred an order of magnitude more frequently in the 2000s and
covered between 4 percent and 13 percent of the world between 2006 and 2011.
SOURCE: Hansen et al. (2012).
The 2009 NRC report appears to have been prescient in making this
observation: “[D]ecision makers must expect to be surprised—probably
with increasing frequency” (National Research Council, 2009:18). An im-
portant reason to expect to be surprised is that Earth’s climate is changing
at a rate that is unprecedented, at least throughout human history. The rate
of carbon dioxide buildup in the atmosphere is now a factor of 10,000
greater than it was during any period on geological record prior to human
civilization, and sea levels during prior interglacial periods with comparable
average surface temperatures were substantially higher than they currently
are (Hansen et al., 2010). The unprecedented rate of carbon dioxide ac-
cumulation means that Earth’s climate system—and likely its ecological
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24 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
system as well—will continue to undergo a very large energy balance adjust-
ment, possibly at an unprecedented rate. One can confidently expect that
there will be significant consequences. Although we do not know the exact
magnitude, timing, or character of all of these consequences, it is prudent
to assume that some of them will appear as surprises in the form of unan-
ticipated events that compel some reaction.
National security decision makers do not like surprises and expect the
intelligence community to provide sufficient warning to make it possible to
avoid, ameliorate, or alter the undesired consequences of emerging develop-
ments. Fundamental knowledge of climate dynamics indicates that many
types of extreme climate events are likely to become more frequent, even
though we do not know enough to predict which extreme events will oc-
cur where or when. Although it is true that old climate averages are not a
good guide to the future, recent experiences of climate-driven surprise are
likely to be a good guide to what to expect next. In Chapter 3 we discuss in
more detail what climate science can and cannot tell us about what events
to expect in the future.
From the standpoint of those who must deal with the consequences of
any specific climate-related event, it may make little difference whether the
event can be reliably attributed to anthropogenic climate change or whether
it instead results from natural climate variation. But from the standpoint of
anyone concerned with the global profile of security risks, it is important to
recognize that such events are expected to become more common because
of anthropogenic climate change. Whether any specific event can be attrib-
uted to anthropogenic climate change is less relevant than the likelihood
of serious climate-related disruptions occurring in places where they might
raise security risks for the United States and the change in that likelihood
over time. Security analysis must be based on an accurate assessment of
the risks, and the risks from climate events are changing. It is also worth
noting that many other countries are contemplating—or taking, or want to
take—steps to address the emerging risks of climate change. This provides
a basis for cooperative action on reducing these risks as well as a reason to
regularly reassess vulnerabilities to the effects of climate change.
What “Climate Change” Means in This Study
Climate change is commonly defined by climate scientists as change in
the mean or variability of a climate property that persists for an extended
period, typically a decade or longer (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2012). In this study we are interested in both climate change and
climate variability. Climate variability refers to variations from the mean
(and other statistical properties) of the climate at all spatial and temporal
scales beyond that of individual weather events. (Definitions adapted from
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 25
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012.) Among the various
types of climate variability we are particularly interested in those variations,
such as the El Niño–Southern Oscillation, the North Atlantic Oscillation,
and others, that have effects for multiple years and for which early warn-
ing is possible.
We include both climate change and climate variability because it will
generally be climate events, particularly events now considered extreme,
which will lead to various security-related issues. Normal climate variability
has in the past led to a few such extreme climate events, but these events
can be expected to become more frequent with climate change. As we
discuss in Chapter 3, the combination of climate change and climate vari-
ability will further alter the frequency of such events. These climate events
can be politically and socially disruptive and may require U.S. government
action independent of whether or not particular events can confidently be
attributed to anthropogenic climate change.
Thinking About Unlikely Extreme Events
Occasions in which climate change may contribute to events requiring
U.S. government action may arise in the context of climate surprises or as
the result of the conjunction of climate events and social or political devel-
opments. The contributing climate events are typically extreme events and
therefore, by definition, have been highly unlikely in the past. They may
either be acute (e.g., a storm) or slowly developing (e.g., a drought). After
such events occur it is often easy to identify the relevant precursors, but
before the event it is often much more difficult to separate the signal from
the noise. When considering the relationships of climate change to national
security before the occurrence of such events, intelligence analysts need
ways to decide which of the many unlikely events that could contribute to
a crisis are most worthy of attention.
It is important to recognize that climate scientists and security policy
makers tend to have very different ways of thinking about unlikely events.
This is particularly the case with extreme climate events, which have been
quite infrequent but can also be highly consequential. Although extreme
events have the greatest potential to disrupt political and social systems
and raise security concerns and are thus the most important events for
security analysts to understand, their low frequency of occurrence makes it
especially difficult to validate scientific predictions about them.
Scientists tend to be conservative in making claims about the future
because of their usual rules of inference. In making projections about the
climate future, especially of unlikely events, scientists develop and validate
complex models and test them by attempting to reproduce documented
climate trends and events. They typically initialize models with obser-
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26 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
vational data beginning at some point in the past and test retrospective
model predictions (i.e., hindcasts) against known observations between
the initial point and the present. To the extent that understanding can be
demonstrated by this method, they then project future climate based on
assumptions of future greenhouse gas concentrations that are predicated
on scenarios of economic growth, energy consumption, and demographic
change, carefully noting the uncertainties in the projections. If projections
using several different models tend to agree, scientists’ confidence in the
results increases.
This approach has certain limitations, particularly in dealing with
highly infrequent and unprecedented events. For such events there are rela-
tively few data with which to build the models and test them against past
experience, and, as a result, models that make slightly different assump-
tions can lead to different projections of the future likelihoods of those
events. When this happens, scientists’ confidence in projections is low, and
they are reluctant to make statements about the future likelihood of such
events. This may not mean that such events can safely be considered to be
highly unlikely, but only that there are not enough data to make a confident
projection of likelihood.
It is in the nature of the scientific enterprise that claims are not made
about the existence of phenomena unless a high level of confidence can be
asserted for such claims. A 95 percent confidence level is a typical cut-off
point: Scientists defer making claims or predictions until they can be highly
confident in them. In short, science requires a high burden of proof for
concluding that a climate phenomenon exists or that a projection of future
climate conditions—especially extreme conditions—is solidly supported.
In security policy the practice for deciding whether to take a hazard
seriously is much different from the practice in making scientific claims.
Security analysts are focused on risk, which is usually understood to be the
likelihood of an event multiplied by the seriousness of the consequences if
it should occur. Thus security analysts become seriously concerned about
very high-consequence negative events even if scientists cannot estimate
the probability of their occurrence with confidence and, indeed, sometimes
even if they are fairly confident that the probability is quite low. During the
Cold War, for example, most people thought that deterrence was robust,
and few thought the likelihood that the Soviet Union would actually initi-
ate a nuclear attack against the United States was anything but minuscule.
But because the consequences would have been so dire, tremendous efforts
were made by the intelligence and national security communities to moni-
tor events that might provide early warning of the possibility of such a
strike. The same is true of threats of terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland
today. Even though there have been few terrorist attacks altogether—and
no major ones on the United States since 2001—substantial resources
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 27
are allocated to identifying threats and reducing risks. The public and
elected officials have consistently supported such risk-based allocations
of resources.
Unlikely Extreme Events in an Unprecedented Climate
From the perspective of security, events that could disrupt the social
and political systems of importance to U.S. national security are particularly
important. Certain climate events—most likely, rare and extreme events—
could meet this criterion. These are, by definition, events on the long tails
of the probability distributions of climate events. Unfortunately, the climate
science community is much less confident in its skill at projecting the rate
of change in the frequency or magnitude of events at the extremes of such
distributions than it is in projecting averages or even the likelihoods of
events in the middle 80 to 90 percent of the distributions. One reason for
caution is, as already noted, that there is a very limited population of such
events to use for validating models. Moreover, the spatial resolution of cli-
mate change models is often coarser than is required to resolve the spatial
structure of many extreme events to the degree needed for security analysis.
Another factor limiting confidence in the projections of extreme climate
events is that the fundamental attributes of Earth’s climate system have
moved or very soon will move beyond the bounds of experience on which
models are based. For example, the concentrations of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) in the atmosphere are now greater than they have been for at least
800,000 years (National Research Council, 2010a), and the current rate of
carbon dioxide accumulation in the atmosphere is at least an order of mag-
nitude greater than the natural rate that prevailed prior to the rise of human
civilizations (see http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/icecore/antarctica/vostok/
vostok_co2.html [accessed November 14, 2012]). As climate moves outside
the range of experience, models of the effects of higher GHG concentra-
tions cannot be validated against the kinds of high-resolution observational
data that provide the most desirable basis for model testing. Global average
temperature already is or soon will be higher than it has been at any time in
recorded human history, and it is increasing at an unprecedented rate (Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; National Research Council,
2009). Moreover, the variance in temperature indicators has been increasing
over the past half century (see Figure 1-1). All of these phenomena—higher
temperatures, higher variation in temperatures, and rapid change—increase
the likelihood of the occurrence of extreme temperature events. In addition,
as the climate moves outside the bounds of the experience on which exist-
ing models are validated regarding the averages and ranges of variation
of climate parameters and their rates of change, scientists may attach less
confidence to projected extremes simulated by the models.
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28 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
Unprecedented rates of change in the global average temperature and in
the GHG concentrations that drive this change are particularly challenging
for the climate modeling enterprise because of the well-known fundamental
properties of complex systems, of which Earth’s climate is a paradigmatic
example. Because of the state and rate of change of Earth’s climate over
recent decades, confident projections of extreme events are especially dif-
ficult to produce. This does not mean that climate science has nothing to
say about the future of extreme events that can be useful to the intelligence
community. What it means is that there are multiple scenarios of the future
of climate events that are each likely enough that they deserve consideration
by the intelligence community. They should not be treated as predictions
but rather as possibilities for evaluation in terms of the social and political
scenarios they might set in motion, the security issues that might ensue, and
the preparedness of the U.S. government to deal with the consequences.
Fundamental climate science provides some useful concepts for think-
ing about the future of climate events despite the limits of predictability of
particular events. Consider, for example, the implications of the fact that
although Earth’s temperature remains well above the long-term average, the
decade beginning in 1998 represented a hiatus in the longer overall global
warming trend (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2012). A
fundamental understanding of Earth’s climate system makes it clear that
global warming has not stopped and that the hiatus will be brief. The past
two years suggest that it may already have ended (Foster and Rahmstorf,
2011; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2012).
The past 130 years or so include periods with strong warming and
p
eriods with little or no warming (e.g., Easterling and Wehner, 2009). As we
discuss further in Chapter 3, even under continuing climate change decades
with no warming can be expected in the future—along with decades with
above average rates of warming. The coupled climate system has naturally
occurring decadal signals, such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation and the
Atlantic Multi-Decadal Oscillation, which can serve to mask or accelerate
the average rate of warming on decadal time-scales. The underlying trends
can be understood in relation to fundamental processes of energy balance:
If the climate system is continuing to absorb more energy from the sun than
it is emitting, as must happen when greenhouse gas concentrations are in-
creasing, then that energy remains in the Earth system and must show itself
sooner or later through increased temperatures along with other changes in
the climate system. Recent research (Meehl et al., 2011) suggests that dur-
ing the hiatus in recent years most of this excess energy has gone into the
deep oceans, where it may show itself through the enhancement of coupled
oceanic-atmospheric phenomena, such as a strong El Niño and warming
ocean temperatures.
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 29
Analyzing Plausible Extreme Event Scenarios
Climate scientists have paid significant attention to some of the ways
that gradual global climate change might lead to abrupt and sometimes irre-
versible large changes at a continental or regional scale (National Research
Council, 2002; Alley et al., 2003; Lenton et al., 2008). None of these possi-
bilities can be projected with a level of confidence that would satisfy climate
scientists. However, from a security analysis standpoint, in which attention
is paid to future scenarios that are of sufficiently high consequence even if
their probabilities are relatively low, this scientific work points to particular
possible extreme event scenarios that are worthy of further analysis.
An example of the kind of process that could lead to surprising and
very extreme events can be drawn from evidence in the paleoclimate records
combined with recognition of enhanced polar temperature variations due
to changes in GHG concentrations. Citing an observation by Bintanja et
al. (2005) that over the past 800,000 years a 1°C increase in global mean
temperature was associated with increased equilibrium sea levels of about
20 meters, Hansen and Sato (2012) have suggested that the sea level rise
in the next century may well be on the order of 5 meters. They argue that
an increase of 3.6°F (2°C) over pre-industrial temperature levels, which
is highly likely to occur in this century, would commit the planet to sea
level rise of many meters. Given the considerable uncertainty in the science
of glaciology about the stability of major ice sheets, it is unclear whether
their contribution to sea level rise over the next century will be linear or
will follow a nonlinear trajectory with an increasing rate of change over
time. If nonlinear processes prevail, then the common projection of up to
1 meter by the end of the century may be a lower bound rather than an
upper bound. The rate at which the sea level rise would occur is critically
important, of course, in terms of the social and political consequences.
To better evaluate the import for U.S. national security of scenarios like
this, which have some scientific plausibility but which extend beyond the
current scientific consensus, the intelligence community might benefit from
several types of knowledge that could be developed in the coming decade
to help analysts anticipate security issues that might arise if such a scenario
is realized. These would include improved measures of rates of change in
temperature and glacier ice cover in the polar regions; the use of existing
climate models to project how this degree of ice melting would affect such
outcomes as coastal inundation, extreme precipitation, and cyclonic storm
severity; and assessments of the exposure, vulnerability, and response ca-
pacity of key countries and regions to these outcomes.
Several other examples of potential rapid-onset extreme climate event
scenarios can readily be found (Lenton et al., 2008). For instance, models
of changes in the Indian summer monsoon indicate that several sharply dif-
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30 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
ferent but potentially dangerous shifts in the intensity of the monsoon are
plausible, with the changes possibly occurring with a transition time of only
a year or so. From a security perspective it may make sense to take each
of the model-projected futures through a what-if scenario mode. Similarly,
projections of the West African monsoon point to a Sahel (the east–west
stretch of Africa south of the Sahara desert and north of the Sudanian
s
avannahs) that is either wetter or drier or else has no average change in
rainfall but has a doubling of the number of anomalously dry years ( enton
L
et al., 2008)—three scenarios that could be examined in terms of their
s
ocial and political implications.
THE FOCUS OF THIS STUDY
The purpose of this study is to help improve the ability of the U.S.
intelligence community and other interested actors to foresee security risks
that may arise from climate change and its interactions with other social,
economic, and political processes. Thus, we are concerned with climate
risks to the extent that they may affect security risks.
Improved foresight can inform several kinds of policy responses: (1)
responses to reduce climate risks (i.e., the risks that potentially harmful
climate events will occur); (2) responses to reduce the exposure of people
or valued assets to potentially harmful climate events; (3) responses to
reduce susceptibility to harm from such events; and (4) responses that as-
sist in the coping, response, and recovery processes after harmful events
occur. We are aware of debates about how such policy responses should
be organized and by whom. These questions are beyond the scope of our
study, as are questions about how best to reduce the risks of occurrence of
harmful climate events. Our focus is on anticipating security risks related
to climate processes, understanding the roles of climatic and other factors
in the dynamics of these risks, and informing decision makers about the
nature of these risks and the opportunities for reducing them. We hope the
study will, by improving understanding of the risks, provide a better basis
for informed debate about which policy responses are most advisable. We
have focused the study in three important ways, as outlined below.
Focus on Vulnerability to Climate Events
Although each of the scenario types that have been mentioned in
c
limate–security studies is potentially significant for national security, this
study focuses on scenarios involving the vulnerability of human popula-
tions, institutions, and life-supporting systems to harm from climate events,
in which the harm has the potential to set events in motion that lead to se-
curity concerns. As discussed above, these scenarios in which climate events
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 31
cause sufficient harm to human well-being to create humanitarian crises,
political violence, or other issues of security concern are among the most
prominently cited in the reports on climate change and security that have
appeared in recent years from U.S. government security agencies and the
foreign and security policy community. Such vulnerability-based scenarios
predominated among the sponsor’s concerns in requesting this study and in
the early deliberations of the committee in open session with the sponsor
present. The committee decided at the outset that these concerns provided
the most appropriate focus for its work, as is discussed in further detail
when the conceptual framework is presented in Chapter 2.
We acknowledge that with this focus, this study sets aside some
c
limate–security connections that could prove highly significant and that
deserve further study and analysis. These include some potential threats
already noted, such as from extreme climate events that may impede the
ability of U.S. military organizations to perform their missions and from
conflict over natural resources and sea lanes in Arctic regions that may
become newly accessible as a result of the melting of sea ice (cf., National
Research Council, 2011b).
Another important class of security risks that are excluded from this
study is those that may arise from policy responses to the anticipation
or experience of disruptive climate events. Several plausible security risk
scenarios begin with policies to limit climate change. For example, the
expanded use of nuclear power in some countries to replace fossil fuels
could increase risks of nuclear proliferation. Some policies to increase
biofuel production could contribute to food price spikes and thus reduce
effective food availability to low-income populations around the world.
A single country’s decision to counter global warming by geoengineering,
perhaps by fertilizing the ocean to grow photosynthetic organisms or by
injecting sulfate particles into the stratosphere, could create conflict with
other countries. Several other policy-based scenarios begin with a country’s
efforts to protect itself from the expected consequences of climate change in
ways that could disrupt international relations. For example, an upstream
country might impound water from a river to guard against drought and
thus reduce water supplies for its downstream neighbors. Or one country
might purchase land in another country to produce food for its domestic
consumption, creating conflict if a future food shortage hits the country
where the food is being produced for export.
A number of threat scenarios of the above types are mentioned in
previous climate–security analyses. Although some of them could have
significant security consequences, they have not been treated as primary
concerns in these reports. We have focused more narrowly on situations in
which direct harm from climate events affecting vulnerable places or criti-
cal life-supporting systems could play a driving role in events of security
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32 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
concern. Policy responses intended to reduce one nation’s vulnerability to
climate events may sometimes increase the vulnerability of other countries.
These kinds of climate-security connections could prove highly significant
and deserve serious attention in security analysis, both by monitoring the
development of such policies and by analyzing their implications for stresses
in other places both when they are put in place and when a stressful climate
event subsequently occurs.
Focus on Disruptions Outside the United States
Our study focuses largely on developments and vulnerabilities exter-
nal to the United States, while recognizing that climate change is a global
phenomenon and that events occurring within the United States can be
disruptive in other countries, and vice versa. We examine some of these con-
nections but not others. For example, a drought in U.S. agricultural areas
that led to a spike in the global price of corn or wheat could lead indirectly
to a humanitarian or political crisis elsewhere that could become a national
security issue for the United States. Our study does examine such scenarios,
but it does not examine the social and political consequences such events
might have within the United States, nor does it examine the social and
political consequences within the United States of climate events occurring
elsewhere that disrupt global systems such as public health or the supply
systems for critical commodities.
We emphasize, however, that such a separation between domestic and
foreign impacts reflects only the division of missions among federal agen-
cies, not the characteristics of climate phenomena or their consequences. In
particular, observations, analyses, and fundamental knowledge that need to
be developed in order to understand changing vulnerabilities to harm from
climate events, which can offer valuable information to the U.S. intelligence
community, are equally important for informing other federal agencies and
decision makers below the national level, particularly including agencies
responsible for domestic security and disaster management. They are also
critical for informing international organizations. In Chapter 6 we discuss
the needs for monitoring and analysis within a whole-of-government ap-
proach to developing an understanding of the effects of the changing risks
of climate events.
Focus on the Next Decade
Given the risks and difficulties of projecting political, economic, and
technical developments more than a decade into the future and the fact that
countries are—and should be—starting now to contemplate steps to reduce
vulnerability to climate change effects, this study focuses primarily on the
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN 33
next decade. In this way the study differs from most past analyses of climate
change and its security implications. We consider policy and intelligence-
gathering actions related to events that might occur in the coming decade as
well as activities that must begin within a decade in order to have adequate
intelligence capacity for anticipating climate–security interactions at later
times. An adequate intelligence capacity in this area must include an im-
proved ability to anticipate changes in climate-related security risks beyond
the decadal time horizon, for at least two reasons: The processes of climate
change already in motion will most likely have their more serious security
impacts beyond the next decade, and actions taken within the decade can
reduce those longer-term risks.
Implications for Security Analysis
Policy makers can pay attention to only so many warnings. The pur-
pose of this report is to help intelligence analysts determine where to focus
and how much attention to pay to the less likely, but potentially significant,
developments for security that might result from climate change. This study
does not offer recommendations on where or when the U.S. government
should act on risks related to climate change. That is a policy choice that
will depend on much more than the risks of climate events—or even the
risks of humanitarian crises, political instability, violent conflict, or other
extreme social or political events that may be influenced by climate change.
Rather, the focus of this study is on offering ways to better assess such risks
and to anticipate changes in them.
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
The next chapter presents the conceptual framework for the project,
laying out the key concepts and relationships that provide the structure for
analysis. It considers risks as resulting from climate events; exposures of
people, places, or important life-supporting systems to these events; vulner-
ability to these events (susceptibility to harm and the likelihood of effective
coping, response, and recovery); and social and political disruptions that
may result from responses to these events that are or are perceived to be
inadequate. That framework is used in the next three chapters to examine
current knowledge about the potential links between climate change and
political and social stresses with implications for U.S. national security.
Chapter 3 focuses on climate events. It considers what kinds of potentially
disruptive climate events can be expected, especially in the coming decade,
as a result of climate change. Chapter 4 examines changing exposure and
vulnerability to potentially disruptive climate events and takes up the ques-
tion of what kinds of connections exist between climate events and vulner-
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34 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
ability as well as examining processes of coping, response, and recovery
after an event. Chapter 5 considers security risks that have been linked to
climate change in previous studies and explores the question of what links,
if any, exist that connect climate change to political and social stresses
and thus to outcomes of obvious security concern, such as violent conflict,
pandemics, or disruptive migration. It addresses a continuing discussion in
the academic literature about direct versus more complex and contingent
relationships. These chapters provide the evidence to support the work in
Chapter 6, which takes up a core task of the project: recommending what
the intelligence community should be monitoring in order to assess climate–
security connections in ways that are useful for policy.