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4
How Climate Events Can Lead
to Social and Political Stresses
T
his chapter examines a number of factors identified in the conceptual
framework in Chapter 2 as affecting whether and how climate events
can lead to significant disruptions in societies or political systems.
Understanding these factors—exposure and susceptibility to harm from haz-
ards plus coping, response, and recovery after disruptive events occur—has
long been a central concern of several communities of scholars and policy
makers. For example, researchers and practitioners concerned with natural
disasters have developed concepts, measurement methods, and data to im-
prove understanding of disaster preparedness and response and of the social
and economic consequences of floods, wildfires, storms, and various other
climate-related events. Researchers and practitioners in such areas as public
health, water management, famine and food insecurity, and humanitarian
relief have also developed knowledge that is relevant for understanding how
climate events may lead to significant social and political consequences.
Knowledge from these fields is critical for understanding how and under
what conditions climate events can disrupt societies. It has also been central
to progress made in understanding vulnerability and adaptation to climate
change in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and
the U.S. Global Change Research Program. In this chapter, we briefly review
knowledge and insights from these fields that are relevant to security analysis
and also review the implications for assessing the potential of climate change
to influence social and political stresses.
75
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76 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
LOCAL AND DISTANT EFFECTS
We begin by noting that climate events can be socially disruptive both
where they occur and elsewhere. The local disruptions are familiar: Storms,
floods, heat waves, droughts, and the like have their most obvious con-
sequences where they occur. However, as we noted in Chapter 2, climate
change can result in events that create shocks to globalized systems that
support human life and well-being and that can therefore affect populations
far from where the climate events occur. Here we discuss the susceptibilities
of several key globalized systems to harm from such shocks.
Global Food Systems
Under normal conditions the globalization of markets, access to hu-
manitarian relief, and public health systems all tend to reduce the suscepti-
bility of countries and their populations to local climate risks. For example,
one of the first responses of governments to expected shortfalls in domestic
production is to secure food imports (Timmer, 2010). Yet these global in-
stitutions have evolved in, and in some sense been calibrated to, a climate
regime that may differ in important ways from the climate of the coming
decades. For example, a key feature of commodity markets is the mainte-
nance of stocks that buffer the impact of short-term fluctuations in supply
or demand. The levels of these stocks are determined by several factors,
including storage costs, interest rates, and the perishability of the commod-
ity, but a key factor is the expected volatility of supply (Wright, 2011). If
climate change were to increase the chance of relatively large shortfalls in
global production, stocks based on historical expectations of supply vari-
ability could be insufficient. Similarly, the capacity of countries to provide
humanitarian or public health assistance is related to historical experience
with the level of aid needed around the world.
Relatively little peer-reviewed literature has focused on how climate
changes in the coming decades and the ability or inability of institutions to
adapt to these changes will affect the likelihood of global systemic shocks
to food systems, such as rapid price increases. There is some basis for ex-
pecting that indicators that aggregate over large areas, such as global food
production or global incidence of humanitarian disasters, will be more af-
fected by global climate trends than outcomes in any single location simply
because the “signal” of climate change relative to natural variability tends
to be clearer at larger spatial scales (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2007). For example, Figure 1-1 in Chapter 1 shows that the total
fraction of land area experiencing extremely warm temperatures (more than
three standard deviations above average) has risen sharply in the past three
decades, even if some individual regions have not seen dramatic warming.
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 77
A shortfall in food supply that arose from multiple bad harvests around
the world and that was large by historical standards would not necessar-
ily result in rapid price increases, given that other important factors affect
price fluctuations. If a sufficient number of preceding good harvests had
helped to build up stocks, if growth in biofuel demand related to energy
policies slowed or reversed, or if a global recession reduced aggregate food
demand, supply shortfalls could have relatively little influence on global
markets. However, when bad harvests occur in an already tight market, this
will generally result in large increases in food prices, as analyses of recent
episodes of high prices in 2007–2008 and 2010–2011 have emphasized
(Abbott et al., 2008, 2011; Wright, 2011). Policy responses to the initial
shortfalls, such as export bans designed to stabilize domestic markets, then
often act to further amplify price changes.
In light of recent food price increases, there has been a renewed interest
in the effects of high international food prices on domestic prices and social
and political stresses. One clear finding is that domestic prices in many
countries change substantially less than global prices, partly because of
exchange rate variability and partly because of policies aimed at stabilizing
domestic prices, such as tariff adjustments, export restrictions, and the use
of government storage (Dawe, 2008; Naylor and Falcon, 2010). Nonethe-
less, in 2008 and 2011 most countries witnessed significant increases in
prices versus historical levels, with consequences for local producers and
consumers.
The susceptibility of national populations to global price increases de-
pends in large part on the countries’ net trade positions: Major importers
will generally be hurt, and exporters will benefit. The MENA (Middle East
and North Africa) region is the main area of the world that relies on food
imports for a large (more than 30 percent) fraction of calories consumed.
Wheat prices are especially important in the MENA, given that nearly half
of all calories consumed in some countries are from wheat (Food and Ag-
riculture Organization of the United Nations, 2012). A recent World Bank
study (Ianchovichina et al., 2012) found that MENA countries are highly
vulnerable to global food price shocks. Sub-Saharan Africa is also relatively
dependent on food imports, with roughly 40 percent of rice and 70 percent
of wheat consumption derived from imports (Naylor and Falcon, 2010).
Because the prices of basic commodities such as bread or flour are often
subsidized, demonstrations and even riots frequently occur in response to
efforts by governments to reduce subsidies, for example as part of structural
adjustment policies. In general these disturbances are contained without an
impact on the regime, even if there may be significant violence or property
damage. The issue with regard to climate change is whether that pattern
could change and that the countries most vulnerable to food price increases
could become vulnerable to severe social and political unrest. Unfortu-
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78 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
nately, there is very little in the peer-reviewed literature concerning the links
between food price increases and political unrest. One notable exception
is a recent working paper (Bellemare, 2012) that presented an econometric
analysis of global data since 1990 and found that high food prices were
significantly correlated with political unrest related to food prices, with the
latter measured by counting the number of news stories with at least five
mentions of terms related to food and riots (or their synonyms).
Interest in the topic has increased in recent years, particularly within
the community concerned with food security, spurred on by the question of
whether rising food prices played a role in sparking the unrest of the “Arab
Spring” of 2011. It is worth noting that the rapid food price increases in the
MENA during this period were not driven by local weather conditions, but
by events around the world including a severe heat wave in Russia. A re-
port by Lagi et al. (2011) notes that clusters of unrest in the MENA region
in 2008 and early 2011 both began immediately after the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization food price index passed a value of 210.
Although they do not identify a causal link between high food prices and
riots, the authors argue that a food price index value of 210 represents a
simple potential predictor of increased unrest in food-importing countries.
Breisinger et al. (2011) find that the unrest was preceded by a drop in food
security across the MENA, and Ciezadlo (2011) emphasizes the role that
food subsidies have played in popular attitudes toward regimes throughout
the region. Johnstone and Mazo (2011) draw connections between climate
events (which reduced global food production in the years preceding 2011)
and the uprisings, describing climate change as a potential “threat multi-
plier” in the case of already unstable situations. All of these analyses are
careful to note that drawing direct causal links between food prices and
political instability is not possible, but they argue that food prices must be
considered along with political and cultural factors in explanations of the
uprisings.
Global Energy Markets
Like the food system, markets for energy commodities have become
increasingly integrated globally over recent decades. In the case of petro-
leum, this integration is essentially complete: There is one global market
that determines prices of crude petroleum, linking producers and con-
sumers around the world (Yergin, 2006). Integration is also increasing,
although lagging significantly behind petroleum, for other energy commodi-
ties such as electricity (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Boëthius, 2012), natural
gas ( iliverstovs et al., 2005), and coal (Wårell, 2006). Thus, possibilities
S
for energy system shocks to have global impacts in the coming decade lie
primarily in the petroleum sector.
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 79
The integration of petroleum markets was stimulated by desires to safe-
guard the supply of oil from manipulation by political actors in the wake
of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries embargoes in the 1970s
(Yergin, 2006). A consequence of this integration was that by the 2000s the
petroleum system had become so complex and interconnected that, as one
study concluded, “a disruption in one part of the infrastructure can easily
cause severe discontinuities elsewhere in the system” (International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 2011:21). Furthermore, the sensitivity of the system
has increased because of a rapid growth in global petroleum consumption
that has not been matched by a corresponding increase in production. The
result has been an extremely tight market, with petroleum supplies not
significantly greater than demand (Gupta, 2008). This “demand shock”
(Yergin, 2006), led by the emerging economies in China and India, has left
global markets volatile and very sensitive to disruptions in supply (Patrick,
2007; Gupta, 2008; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011).
In this tight, sensitive market, climate events that disrupt the produc-
tion or distribution of oil could lead to price spikes across the global energy
market. Several types of climate events could cause such disruptions. Tropi-
cal storms and the increased storm surges that result from sea level rise
and, in some cases, land subsidence, can disrupt production, refining, and
transport of petroleum. For example, one-third of U.S. petroleum refining
and processing facilities are located in coastal areas vulnerable to storms
and flooding (Schaeffer et al., 2012). Similar infrastructure vulnerabilities
exist in Europe and China as well (International Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies, 2011). In addition, because offshore oil and gas platforms are generally
not designed to accommodate a permanent rise in mean sea level, climate-
related sea level rise would disrupt production (Burkett, 2011). The effects
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 illustrate this potential. The storms
disrupted oil and gas production from offshore rigs, refining at facilities in
the coastal zone, and transportation via port facilities and pipelines, causing
a spike in global prices (U.S. Department of Energy, 2005; Yergin, 2006;
Schaeffer et al., 2012). The pattern repeated, although with a smaller mag-
nitude, when Hurricanes Gustav and Ike hit the Gulf Coast region in 2008,
destroying drilling rigs and disrupting refineries (Paskal, 2010).
Other climate events could also affect the global oil market. Oil refining
requires large amounts of water for cooling purposes; hence, reduced water
availability during a drought would reduce refining capacity. If drought is
accompanied by increased temperatures, refineries will require more cool-
ing water to operate, potentially exacerbating the situation (Schaeffer et al.,
2012). Also, Arctic energy infrastructure (pipelines and drilling operations)
is vulnerable to damage from subsidence caused by melting permafrost
(Paskal, 2010; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011).
Climate change thus entails some increased likelihood of petroleum
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80 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
supply disruptions, and such disruptions are likely to affect market prices,
potentially causing price shocks. The likely magnitude and duration of these
price shocks, however, has not been addressed in the research literature.
There has been some analysis of their potential macroeconomic effects.
Hamilton (2003, 2008), reviewing six decades of oil price and macroeco-
nomic data, reported a very strong relationship between oil price shocks
and recessions. To the extent that economic disruptions drive political in-
stability (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 1996), it is plausible that an oil price shock
could increase instability, particularly in a situation that is already politi-
cally sensitive. However, little research to date has directly addressed the
political impacts of energy price shocks, whether caused by climate-related
supply disruptions or other factors. These possibilities deserve more careful
empirical analysis, particularly as energy markets continue to tighten with
increased consumption from Asian nations and as risks increase of climate
events disrupting energy supplies.
Strategic Product Supply Chains
Over the past few decades the globalization of many industries has been
accompanied by a streamlining of their supply chains in order to reduce
costs. However, as a 2012 World Economic Forum publication noted, “the
focus on cost optimization has highlighted the tension between cost elimi-
nation and network robustness—with the removal of traditional buffers
such as safety stock and excess capacity” (p. 10). Climate events can thus be
a source of major disruptions in world markets for critical non-food com-
modities. Such events are counted as one of the major risks to be addressed
in the U.S. National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, released in
January 2012 (White House, 2012).
Although not attributed to the effects of climate change (Peterson et
al., 2011), the floods in Thailand in 2010–2011 illustrate how an extreme
climate event that stresses a government’s ability to respond can have global
consequences. Much of Thailand, including portions of the capital Bangkok
and its surrounding manufacturing districts, was flooded for extended
p
eriods between July 2011 and January 2012. The flooding resulted in more
than 800 deaths, affected 13.6 million people, damaged 7,700 square miles
of farmland, and caused more than $45 billion in economic losses (World
Bank, 2011).
Thailand is a flood-prone country with an extensive system of dams,
drainage canals, levees, and other flood-control systems, but a series of
events in 2011 overwhelmed this system. The most immediate event was
the abnormally high rainfall that year. In March 2011, for example, the
rainfall in northern Thailand was more than three times the mean level.
The abnormally low rainfall of 2010 was another contributing factor. The
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 81
initial response of dam managers to the intense rainfall of early 2011 was
to store the water in the depleted reservoirs, building capacity and pre-
venting early flooding. But when major rains unexpectedly continued, the
reservoirs filled, and the dams had to release the water, resulting in flows
too large for the downstream drainage canals and levees. This overflow was
exacerbated by the many decades of deforestation that have taken place in
northern Thailand, which allowed a greatly increased runoff from the rains
and helped to overwhelm the downstream flood defenses.
The Thai government suffered significant criticism for what many saw
as its mismanagement of the situation. The government was criticized for
its forecasts that underestimated the scale of the flooding, for its manage-
ment of the upstream dams that exacerbated downstream flooding, and for
poor communications. Once the flood waters began to overwhelm the exist-
ing flood defenses, the government launched many emergency responses,
including evacuations, the placing of sandbags, and the diversion of water
from some channels to others. In one case the government placed hundreds
of anchored boats in one river so that their propellers could help push water
toward a second river. As the damages increased, many of these responses
were criticized as inadequate. In addition, resistance appeared in some
localities where flooding had increased due to barriers designed to protect
neighboring communities. Some people ripped down the sandbags that they
saw as unfairly diverting flood waters to their areas.
The floods also caused significant disruption to regional and global sup-
ply chains. Manufacturing parks located near Bangkok supply parts for the
worldwide automobile and electronics industries. One-third of the world’s
hard drives and high percentages of other key computer components are
built there (Connor, 2012). Many of these Thai manufacturing areas were
covered by up to 3 meters of water, causing parts shortages worldwide.
Even the computer firms located elsewhere in Thailand that escaped the
flooding found they could not get critical parts. Production is not expected
to fully recover until 2013 (Mearian, 2011). In the meantime, component
prices rose as suppliers attempted to stockpile what was available and
manufacturers found they could not get the parts they needed. The flooding
of automotive parts production facilities forced Honda and Toyota to slow
production lines in many countries (Fuller, 2011).
Other Global System Effects
Climate events might also put stress on global health systems in various
ways, most of them hard to predict. As discussed in the next chapter, cli-
mate change is expected to alter the ranges of disease vectors or pathogens
in ways that expose large human populations to diseases to which they
have not been previously exposed. This could lead to a rapidly increasing
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82 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
demand for treatments and supplies that may not have been adequately
stockpiled. If such health problems arise in combination with a disruption
of supply chains for critical inoculations or medications, the potential for
a severe health crisis could grow dramatically. Again, the effects might be
felt far from the locations where the climate events occur. Climate events,
especially when they occur in clusters, can also stress the capacity of inter-
national disaster response and humanitarian relief systems and thus cause
harm in places that are not directly affected by the events but that need
international assistance for other reasons.
Such shocks to integrated global social, economic, health, or techno-
logical systems are likely to have different effects in different places. It is
reasonable to expect that they would be most disruptive in countries that
are dependent on imports of the products of the global system that is
shocked and in places or among populations that are particularly suscep-
tible to harm if the availability of the outputs of those systems is restricted
by price or policy.
EXPOSURES
Since the 1980s the number of recorded natural disasters related to
weather and climate events has roughly doubled, while the number of
those related to geophysical events, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and
volcanic eruptions, has neither increased nor decreased (Munich Re, 2012).
Reported losses from global weather- and climate-related disasters also in-
creased over the past few decades, mainly because of monetized direct dam-
ages to assets, with the amounts of losses varying greatly from year to year
and region to region (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012).
Since 1980 annual disaster losses have ranged from a few billion dollars to
more than $200 billion (in 2010 U.S. dollars), with the greatest losses com-
ing in 2005, the year of Hurricane Katrina. Loss estimates are lower bounds
because many impacts, including the loss of human lives, cultural heritage,
and ecosystem services, are difficult to monetize and so are poorly reflected
in these estimates. Middle-income countries with rapidly expanding asset
bases are particularly vulnerable to changes in the frequency, intensity,
geographic range, and duration of extreme events. From 2001 to 2006
disaster losses were about 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for
middle-income countries, 0.3 percent of GDP for low-income countries, and
less than 0.1 percent of GDP for high-income countries (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2012). Most fatalities from extreme weather and
climate events (95 percent) occur in developing countries.
The major causes of the long-term increase in economic losses from
weather- and climate-related disasters have been the increasing exposure of
people and the increased value of economic assets in exposed regions. Cal-
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 83
culations on the long-term trends in economic disaster losses adjusted for
wealth and population increases, which have been conducted in an effort
to separate the effects of change in the frequency or intensity of damaging
climate events from the effects of increased exposure and vulnerability, have
not attributed the increase in losses to climate change alone, but neither
has a role for climate change been excluded (Neumeyer and Barthel, 2011;
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012). These studies have
not accounted well for vulnerability or for adaptation efforts, and they are
limited by poor data availability. Settlement patterns, urbanization, and
changes in socioeconomic conditions have influenced the observed trends
in the exposure and magnitude of harm from climate events (Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change, 2012). In particular, rapid urbanization
and the growth of megacities, especially in low-income countries, have
led to the emergence and growth of highly exposed and highly susceptible
urban communities.
As discussed in Chapter 3, projections for the next few decades indi-
cate that there will likely be a continuation of current trends, with greater
changes in the frequency, intensity, duration, and spatial extent of some ex-
treme events by the end of the century (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2012). Who and what is exposed to an extreme weather or climate
event depends on the event. For example, many regions are susceptible to
flooding following heavy precipitation events, although the flooding and
resulting damage can take a number of forms. The people and places most
susceptible to harm when there are changes in the frequency, intensity, dura-
tion, and spatial extent of extreme events depend on the event and on local
factors. For example, a typhoon coming ashore in the Philippines has very
different consequences from one of similar strength striking Japan (United
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2009b).
It is important to consider the possibility of compound events (see
Chapter 3), such as what occurred in South Australia in January 2009
(Murray et al., 2012). An unprecedented heat wave occurred during a
multi-year drought, exposing the area to some of the highest temperatures
on record. In central Victoria the 12-year rainfall totals were approximately
10 to 20 percent below the 1961–1990 average (Australian Government,
2009). In Victoria, during the week of the heat wave there was a 25 per-
cent increase in total emergency ambulance dispatches and a 46 percent
increase over the three hottest days. There were 980 deaths during the four
days of the heat wave, compared with an average of 606 per year over the
previous five years. A few days after the heat wave, temperatures spiked
again, and the forest fire danger index reached unprecedented levels. High
winds caused a power line to break, sparking a wildfire that became one
of the largest, deadliest, and most intense firestorms in Australia’s history;
173 people died. The bushfires also destroyed almost 1,660 square miles of
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84 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
forests, crops, and pasture as well as 61 businesses. The Victorian Bushfires
Royal Commission conservatively estimated the cost of the fire at AUS$4.4
billion (Parliament of Victoria, 2010).
In sum, the frequency of certain kinds of potentially damaging climate
events has changed over the past half century, with additional changes in
the same direction expected in the coming decade and beyond. The increas-
ing exposure of vulnerable populations to climate and weather hazards has
been the most important reason for the impacts. The exposure of people
and economic assets to some climate and weather hazards (e.g., coastal
storms and valley floods) is expected to continue to increase in coming
decades (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012).
SUSCEPTIBLITY TO HARM FROM CLIMATE EVENTS
As discussed in Chapter 2, susceptibility refers to the likelihood of
harm to a population as the result of either direct or indirect exposure
to a climate event, such as a drought or hurricane. In the climate change
literature susceptibility is sometimes used as a synonym for vulnerabil-
ity (see Kasperson and Kasperson, 2001; Adger, 2006; Eakin and Luers,
2006; Gaillard, 2010). Adger, for example, defines vulnerability as “the
state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with
environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to
adapt” (Adger, 2006:268). We consider susceptibility as one component of
vulnerability that becomes evident when or immediately after an exposed
population experiences an event, and we distinguish it from actions taken
following exposure to an event in order to reduce or alleviate harm, which
we discuss in terms of coping, response, and recovery. We also include in
our definition of susceptibility the likelihood of harm from exposure to the
effects of climatic shocks and stresses that may occur in other regions, such
as exposure to a spike in food or energy prices as the result of a climate-
induced drought or energy supply disruption.
A large body of climate change and hazards literature explores the
characteristics that influence the susceptibility of a population and its life-
supporting systems to both direct and indirect harm from climatic risks
and hazards (e.g., Liverman, 1990; Kasperson and Kasperson, 2001; Adger,
2006; Eakin and Luers, 2006; Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008; Adger et al.,
2009b; Keskitalo, 2009; Gaillard, 2010). Factors that are widely agreed to
influence susceptibility include economic, demographic, social, cultural, and
environmental conditions; the form and quality of the infrastructure and
the built environment; the presence of social capital; the effectiveness of
institutions and governance; and the presence or a recent history of violent
conflict (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, 2012). These
factors, briefly described below, are often correlated and interrelated. Many
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 85
are also directly influenced by ongoing climatic and environmental changes
(Paavola, 2008) as well as by such non-climatic processes as globalization
and urbanization (O’Brien and Leichenko, 2007; Leichenko and O’Brien,
2008). Bensen and Clay (2004), for example, found that extreme storm
events have long-lasting negative impacts on economic growth and devel-
opment and that these effects are particularly acute in poorer regions. A
study by Dell et al. (2012) found that a 1°C rise in temperature in a given
year increased the probability of “irregular” leadership transitions (such
as coups) in poor countries but had no effect on leadership transitions in
rich countries (p. 86). Keskitalo (2009) documented the influence of the
globalization of renewable resource–based industrial sectors, including for-
estry, fishing, and reindeer herding, on local decision making in the area of
climate adaptation within Arctic communities in Finland, northern Norway,
and Sweden. These examples suggest that factors influencing susceptibility
are often in flux and subject to both the direct and indirect effects of other
stresses (O’Brien and Leichenko, 2007).
The types of economic factors associated with increased susceptibil-
ity to harm from climate events generally include low levels of per capita
income, a lack of livelihood assets and opportunities, poor functioning
of ocal markets, and a high degree of dependency on agricultural food
l
imports to meet basic needs (O’Brien et al., 2004; Eakin and Luers, 2006;
Paavola, 2008). As discussed above, dependence on food imports can make
a region susceptible to harm from systemic shocks to global food markets
as the result of climatic events that affect grain-producing regions.
Key social, cultural, and demographic factors associated with increased
susceptibility include low levels of education and low literacy rates within
the population, high degrees of gender inequality, and large shares of elderly
or dependent individuals (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
2007). High rates of population growth, particularly in urban areas, that
are the result of either natural increase or immigration (see the migration
discussion in Chapter 5) also increase susceptibility.
The quality of the infrastructure and the pattern and form of the built
environment play a role in the susceptibility of a population to certain
types of climate hazards. Within arid or semi-arid agricultural regions, the
presence of irrigation and the reliability of irrigation water supply influ-
ence susceptibility to harm from drought. Within urban and coastal areas,
and particularly in cities located in the developing world, poor quality and
maintenance of building stock; inadequacy of water, sanitation, and energy
infrastructure; and the presence of extensive areas of unplanned settlement
contribute to an increased susceptibility to harm from extreme storm events
and flooding (Satterthwaite et al., 2007).The condition of the housing stock
in informal settlements often significantly increases the susceptibility of
populations to disasters. Stories of hillsides denuded by squatter develop-
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86 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
ments collapsing in the event of sudden storms or slow erosion are com-
mon. In 1975, for example, a landslide destroyed one-third of the homes
in the El Agustino district of Lima, Peru; in 2000 a garbage slide in an area
of Manila occupied by urban squatters killed more than 300 people and
destroyed 500 homes (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction, 2009b). While a few coastal cities in high-income countries,
such as London and Rotterdam, have made extensive investments in protec-
tion against coastal storm surge and sea level rise, including construction
of sea walls and barriers (see London Climate Change Partnership, 2006;
De Graaf and Van Der Brugge, 2010), these types of investments are cur-
rently financially infeasible for many cities in low-income countries, most of
which already have significant deficits in basic water infrastructure (Parry
et al., 2009).
Environmental factors affecting susceptibility to various climate-related
hazards include the abundance and quality of natural assets such as forests,
wetlands, and freshwater and also how well ecosystems function, which
affects such things as water supply and quality, flood control, soil con-
servation, and biodiversity. The loss or degradation of natural assets and
ecosystem services, which may occur as the result of climatic events (e.g.,
Carter et al., 2007), increases future susceptibility to extreme climate events
of all types in different regions of the globe.
Other critical facets of susceptibility are associated with governance,
institutions, and social capital. The level of public spending, the quality of
the public health infrastructure, access to health care, the transparency and
legitimacy of governing institutions, the presence of social networks, and
the level of social cohesion all influence preparedness for extreme events
and the coping, response, and recovery capacities following those events
(Adger, 2003, 2006; Adger et al., 2005, 2009b; Brooks et al., 2005; O’Brien
et al., 2009; Termeer et al., 2012; Wamsler and Lawson, 2012).
A final factor that influences susceptibility is the presence of conflict
or political or ethnic strife. Conflict can damage the infrastructure and
life-supporting systems and can undermine the capacity of institutions to
prepare for and respond to climatic hazard events (Barnett, 2006; Barnett
and Adger, 2007; Brklacich et al., 2010). Populations living in regions
where conflict is present are highly susceptible to harm from climate risks
and hazards.
Many of the above factors are generic to all types of climatic shocks
and stresses, while others apply to specific types of climatic hazards, such
as floods or heat waves. For example, a higher level of per capita income
generally means lower susceptibility to all types of climatic stresses, while
the type and quality of housing stock is more relevant to the susceptibility
of coastal populations to hurricanes and other storm events. Some charac-
teristics may increase susceptibility to specific types of climate hazards while
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 87
reducing susceptibility to others. For example, within northern European
and U.S. cities, brick housing stock and the lack of air conditioning have
been implicated in heat wave mortality (Kovats and Hajat, 2008).
As we have already noted, many of these susceptibility factors are cor-
related and interrelated. A wealthier population will typically have higher
levels of education, better quality building stock and infrastructure, better
protection of natural assets, and more effective governing institutions, all
of which reduce susceptibility. One of the main messages is the degree to
which the poor suffer more and recover more slowly. As Kim (2012) re-
cently noted:
Globally, the poor are much more exposed to [and susceptible to the ef-
fects of] natural disasters than the non-poor, regardless of measurement
methods. The poor are almost two times more exposed to natural disasters
than the non-poor when measured in terms of the total number of affected
people per decade. When measured by the number of disasters, the poor
are 20 per cent more exposed to natural disasters than the non-poor. The
time trend varies across regions, with the poor in East Asia and Pacific
being most exposed to natural disasters, followed by those living in South
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The exposure of the poor in East Asia and
Pacific has started to decrease in recent years, whereas it is rising in South
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. (p. 208)
COPING, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
A popular but superficial image of a disaster is that a community, city,
region, or even an entire nation is struck by a highly damaging event more
or less evenly and that the reaction to the event is also a more or less evenly
paced sequence of coping, response, and recovery. The reality is much more
complex (Cannon, 1993, 1994; Wisner et al., 2004). As the United States
learned with Hurricane Katrina, although the storm affected a wide swath
of national territory, not everyone was affected equally, nor did everyone
recover to the same level or at the same rate, for a wide variety of socio-
economic, cultural, political, and geographic reasons (Adams et al., 2006;
Finch et al., 2010; Gotham and Campanella, 2011). Because susceptibilities
and initial coping capacities are not evenly distributed across an affected
area, loss and damage patterns are highly differentiated even within a single
community, with some neighborhoods or sub-areas (or even states for that
matter) devastated, but others only slightly damaged, if at all (Bankoff et
al., 2004; Wisner et al., 2004; Kahn, 2005). All communities have cer-
tain stresses and problems even before a disruptive event occurs, and an
event’s effects will interact in various ways with those pre-existing stresses
(De Sherbinin et al., 2007; Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008; Reser and Swim,
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88 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
2011; Weisbecker, 2011). Box 4-1 illustrates some of these differences with
the impact of cyclones in Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Highly differentiated loss and damage patterns may then be exacer-
bated as some parts of a community cope reasonably well with the damage
and receive timely emergency assistance during response and then support
for recovery, while other parts, with higher loss and damage levels and
lower initial coping capacities, receive less than proportional help during
BOX 4-1
Cyclones in Bangladesh and Myanmar
In 1970, in what was then East Pakistan, between 300,000 and 500,000
people died from the multiple effects of Cyclone Bhola. The disaster contributed
to pre-existing tensions between West Pakistan and East Pakistan and the even-
tual violent attempt at secession by East Pakistan, intervention by India, and the
creation of the new nation of Bangladesh. With lessons learned and an innova-
tive cyclone shelter program combined with improved public awareness, alert
and warning systems, evacuation planning, hazard mitigation measures, and an
understanding of local knowledge and norms, Bangladesh is now widely credited
with having significantly reduced the potential for cyclone-related fatalities (Alam
and Collins, 2010; Collins, 2011; Haque et al., 2012). Although no two storms are
the same and all have different “signatures,” making it necessary to be cautious
when making comparisons, the most recent major cyclone—Sidr in 2007—killed
many fewer people (only about 4,000) than Bhola, which led Haque and col-
leagues to conclude that there had been a 100-fold reduction compared with 1970.
In 2008 Cyclone Nargis caused the worst disaster in Myanmar’s recorded
history, with 130,000 dead or missing. Half of the people living in the affected
areas—2.4 million out of a total of 4.7 million—were severely affected. Because
the people in the region were extremely poor and had few functioning radios able
to hear the only channel available, the warnings that the government issued about
the impending storm were never received by most of the people there. The poor
quality of the housing stock also contributed to the losses; less than 20 percent
of the rural homes were able to withstand even normal monsoon rains. The storm
was so strong that it overcame the local community infrastructure and social capi-
tal that had developed in large measure to compensate for the limited government
presence in the region. The Myanmar government’s initial rejection of numerous
offers of international aid—although it eventually did allow aid into the country—
almost certainly increased the loss of life. In an interview with the New York Times
several years later, Myanmar president and former general U Thein Sein called the
poor government response a “mental trigger” for moving the country from decades
of military rule toward democratization (Fuller, 2012).
SOURCE: Information for these examples comes from United Nations International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction (2009b) except where cited otherwise.
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 89
response and recovery. As recent works on emergency management note,
transitions between disaster phases are never clearly demarcated on the
ground, where it counts; response capacities vary significantly (as the U.S.
federal government saw in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, with state
capabilities in Florida versus those in Louisiana); and recovery is usually
very uneven (Phillips, 2009; Coppola, 2011; Phillips et al., 2011). Develop-
ing countries are particularly prone to sharply different disaster impacts and
then to sharply different coping, response, and recovery patterns, which in
turn can lead to new or exacerbated social and political stresses.
In a recent article that ties susceptibilities to post-impact issues, Wamsler
and Lawson (2012) note that situations are especially problematic when
“poor mechanisms and structures [are] in place for response and recovery
by individual residents, households and communities, or the institutions
serving them” (p. 31). They emphasize location-specific vulnerabilities,
which are important because disasters (except in very small nations) are
almost always local or, at most, affect only a part or parts of a country
directly. Thus, different effects of a disaster and then different coping, re-
sponse, and recovery in affected local areas may have national effects on
social and political stability, either because of the importance of the local
areas or because coping, response, and recovery may reflect or influence
relations among groups or regions within a country.
That the poor suffer more in disasters, both absolutely and in relative
terms, has long been established (e.g., Blaikie et al., 1994; Cannon, 2000;
Juneja, 2008; United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction,
2009b; Kim, 2012), as has been the disproportionately severe impact of
disasters on women (Agarwal, 1995; Enarson, 1998, 2012; Denton, 2002;
Neumayer and Plümper, 2007; Osman-Elasha, 2009; Arora-Jonsson, 2011;
Kim, 2012). Indeed, after a disaster the poor, women, and other disadvan-
taged groups often remain in emergency or “relief” conditions for extended
periods—and sometimes permanently—while the rest of an affected com-
munity or nation moves into recovery; this confounds the simple model of
disasters as following an orderly series of stages from coping to response,
relief, and recovery. Thus a major lesson is that post-impact social stresses
derive not only from the total of disaster losses in a community or nation,
but also—and of more concern—from how those losses are differentially
experienced across groups, classes, races/ethnicities, genders, and other
categories. These stresses are exacerbated if disaster response and recov-
ery efforts are seen as inadequate, inefficient, corrupt, or characterized by
favoritism.
The steps of coping with and then responding to a disaster begin liter-
ally moments after the event starts, particularly in the most affected areas,
and they are multilevel and multiactor. At the earliest stages very little
coping involves the government or formal disaster response institutions.
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90 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
Affected individuals, nuclear families, extended families, and neighbors in
the affected communities react almost immediately, with their effective-
ness largely determined by their levels of training, equipment, and social
capital. Later, designated emergency response personnel arrive, with their
effectiveness largely determined by their numbers, training, equipment, and
logistical capabilities and support.
Initial coping is supplemented by the more formal response by various
and complex combinations of emergency personnel (“first responders”); by
local, subnational, and national agencies, organizations, and institutions,
possibly including military organizations; and by community, religious, and
other local nongovernmental organizations, and civil society in general. If
disaster losses and disruptions are judged to exceed domestic coping capac-
ity and response, the international community (bilateral, international, or
national nongovernmental organizations) offers a potential additional re-
sponse level. Surge capacity, the ability of assistance organizations to move
needed supplies and people to the affected area in time to meet needs, is a
critical factor in determining the effectiveness of the initial and early-stage
response.
The coping and response levels or “waves” are not operationally dis-
tinct, because as the reaction to a hazard event deepens, the levels interact,
with the optimal outcome being efficient synergy across levels and actors.
The least optimal and most socially and politically damaging outcomes
occur when the formal or official response conflicts with the initial cop-
ing efforts and appear to be characterized by misallocation, duplication,
competitiveness, favoritism, and interagency conflict. In extreme cases,
when initial coping with, and popular response to, a disaster is perceived
by the leadership of the state as fundamentally threatening and is met with
repression, the result can be escalating violence, as was captured classically
by Cuny (1983) and recently updated and elaborated upon by Garrard-
Burnett (2009) and Gawronski and Olson (2013). Thus in disaster situa-
tions, public authorities in many countries are faced with three different
types of event-response tasks or challenges. First the government, broadly
defined, is expected in most countries to respond using its own resources;
it is also expected to cooperate with, if not support, initial popular coping
efforts; and, finally, it is expected to coordinate the responses of other ac-
tors, including at times the international community. The extent of specific
group and general public dissatisfaction with government disaster response
or coordination is shaped both by expectations and by the perceived per-
formance deficits in those task areas.
Given that affected and observing populations—and, in many coun-
tries, the mass media—are unusually attentive to the performance and
probity of their leaders and institutions during the immediate aftermath of
disasters and in the response phase, the political stakes are often quite high,
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 91
including the public support or tolerance of authorities, administrations,
governments, and institutions in general. In extreme cases even the legiti-
macy of a regime or the viability of a national society may be brought into
question, a situation that can be a harbinger of possible state breakdown or
failure. The processes by which social and political stresses resulting from
climate events may visibly manifest in political instability or state break-
down, however, are likely to take months or even several years.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2 is useful for organiz-
ing available knowledge on the potential links between climate events and
political and social stresses.
Conclusion 4.1: The overall risk of disruption to a society from a cli-
mate event is determined by the interplay among several factors: event
severity, exposure of people or valued things, and the vulnerability of
those people or things, including susceptibility to harm and the effec-
tiveness of coping, response, and recovery. Exposure and vulnerability
may pertain to the direct effects of a climate event or to effects medi-
ated by globalized systems that support the well-being of the society.
Because risk reflects the interactions among these factors and not only
the magnitude of climate events, events of a magnitude that has not been
disruptive in the past can cause major social and political disruption if ex-
posure and susceptibility are sufficiently great and response is inadequate
or is widely seen as such. The other side of this coin is that unprecedentedly
large climate events do not necessarily lead to security threats if actions
have been taken to reduce exposure or susceptibility or increase coping
capacity and if authorities are seen to be actively responding to events.
Insights About How Climate Events Can Create Stresses
Available knowledge on the factors linking climate events to social
and political stresses supports several general conclusions and points to a
number of needs for further research and analysis. We note first that each
of the nonclimate factors linking climate events to social and political
stresses is changing. Many of these conditions have been changing more
rapidly than climate is changing, and this situation is likely to continue for
at least the next decade or two. This suggests that the net effect of climate
change in the coming decades may be determined in the near term more
by social, economic, and political conditions and their interactions with
climate events than by climate factors alone. In particular, combinations of
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92 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
increased exposure and increased susceptibility are likely to have a multi-
plier effect on risk.
Several social, economic, and political factors that contribute to expo-
sure and susceptibility to harm from climate events can be projected with
some confidence for a decade or more at the country level or below. These
socioeconomic and political factors include total population, population
age distribution, level of social and economic development, land use pat-
terns, compliance with building standards, governance capabilities, corrup-
tion levels, urbanization, certain changes in the physical infrastructure, and
integration with global markets for key commodities.
Many other social, economic, and political factors that connect climate
events to security threats cannot be projected with confidence at this time.
However, the dynamics of climate-induced stress are well enough under-
stood to establish several prudent expectations for anticipating climate-
related security threats1:
1. Many societies will encounter climate-induced disruptions that stress
their capacity to adapt to, cope with, or respond to the disruption.
2. The victim profile for climate events in the next decade will remain
largely as it is: primarily the poor and the socially disadvantaged or
marginalized. The absolute numbers of potential victims of climate
events will increase with increased exposures and static or increasing
susceptibility, particularly in low- to middle-income countries.
3. Harm is likely to be greatest in low- and middle-income countries
characterized by high levels of corruption and weak institutions and
governance, because of high susceptibilities and ineffective response.
4. Harm is likely to be greatest to populations living in countries and
regions where conflict and political or ethnic strife is present or
has recently been present. Such countries are more likely to have
government structures that are intermediate between democratic
and authoritarian and that practice inequitable allocation of public
resources.
5. In some instances of ineffective response and recovery, there will be
impacts on the coherence of affected states.
6. In a few instances, the consequences will be severe enough to compel
international reaction.
7. If global-scale disruption does begin to occur, it is likely to appear
first at especially sensitive locations and in the initial stages is likely
to be interpreted as a local or regional phenomenon.
1
In addition to the evidence discussed in this chapter, the research associated with the inter-
actions of climate with some of these factors may be found Chapter 5.
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 93
8. The consequences of climate change for human societies will interact
with the process of economic globalization. The known features of
both processes give strong reason to expect that the conjunction of
climate change and globalization will increase the risk that climate
events in one location will have adverse impacts in other parts of the
world.
Conclusion 4.2: To understand how climate change may create social
and political stresses with implications for U.S. national security, it is
essential for the intelligence community to understand adaptation and
changes in vulnerability to climate events and their consequences in
places and systems of concern, including susceptibility to harm and
the potential for effective coping, response, and recovery. This under-
standing must be integrated with an understanding of changes in the
likelihoods of occurrence of climate events.
Knowledge from several scientific fields provides useful general insights
about the components of vulnerability and how they shape the effects of
climate events on social and political systems. Much remains to be done,
however, to advance this knowledge and to make it operational for assess-
ing the risks of climate change to social and political systems in particular
places.
A Strategy for Advancing Vulnerability Research
The intelligence and national security communities are not the only
parts of the U.S. government that need to improve understanding of vul-
nerabilities to climate change in order to achieve national goals, and the
U.S. government is not the only actor that needs improved understanding.
Such improved understanding is among the objectives of the many federal
scientific agencies concerned with climate change and will be valuable to the
various federal, state, local, private-sector, and international organizations
concerned with improving adaptation to climate change, reducing potential
damage from climate events, and exploiting potential opportunities related
to climate change. These shared needs for knowledge suggest that knowl-
edge development is best pursued as a cooperative activity involving many
organizations.
A recent report of the Defense Science Board (Defense Science Board,
2011) emphasized the need for federal interagency cooperation in dealing
with issues of adaptation to climate change. The report notes the need
for sustained attention by many federal agencies to “assisting vulnerable
regions in adapting to climate change” (Defense Science Board, 2011:xiv)
and calls for “a structure and process for coordination to more effectively
leverage the efforts to address global problems” (pp. xiv–xv). It recom-
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94 CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS
mends that “the President’s National Security Advisor, in conjunction with
the Council on Environmental Quality, should establish an interagency
working group to develop . . . a whole of government approach on regional
climate change adaptation with a focus on promoting climate change resil-
ience and maintaining regional stability” (p. vxii). The report emphasizes
the need for information systems, including the translation of information
into societal benefit metrics.
The analysis in this chapter clearly indicates that effective U.S. govern-
ment efforts to facilitate adaptation to climate change in important regions
will require knowledge about changing regional vulnerabilities as well as
about climate trends. Developing fundamental knowledge about climate
vulnerabilities is a major objective of the U.S. Global Change Research
Program (USGCRP), which leads federal efforts to develop scientific under-
standing of climate change and its implications for humanity. One of the
five scientific objectives in the USGCRP’s strategic plan for 2012–2021 is to
“[a]dvance understanding of the vulnerability and resilience of integrated
human–natural systems and enhance the usability of scientific knowledge
in supporting responses to global change” (U.S. Global Change Research
Program, 2012:29). The intelligence community is an obvious potential
beneficiary of this effort.
The USGCRP, however, faces significant challenges in advancing this
research area, as noted in a recent review of the strategic plan by the Na-
tional Research Council (National Research Council, 2012a). These include
expanding it within a declining budget and dealing with the limited capac-
ity of many USGCRP agencies to integrate the social sciences with climate
science. Historically, the USGCRP has devoted the vast majority of its
resources to understanding climate processes and only a very small portion
to understanding the “human dimensions” of climate change, including vul-
nerability and response to disruptive climate events. This weakness of the
program has been identified repeatedly in program reviews by the National
Research Council (e.g., National Research Council, 1992, 1999, 2009), but
the challenge remains. It might be addressed in part by improved collabo-
ration between the USGCRP and agencies in the intelligence and national
security communities that have not previously been engaged in its efforts in
the domains of vulnerability and adaptation but that need the knowledge
that such efforts could provide.
Conclusion 4.3: Many of the scientific needs of the intelligence commu-
nity regarding climate change adaptation and vulnerability are congru-
ent with those of the USGCRP and various individual federal agencies.
Intelligence agencies and the USGCRP can benefit by joining forces in
appropriate ways to advance needed knowledge of vulnerability and
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HOW CLIMATE EVENTS CAN LEAD TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRESSES 95
adaptation to climate change and of the potential of climate change to
create social and political stresses.
A whole-of-government approach to understanding adaptation and
vulnerability to climate change can advance the objectives of multiple agen-
cies, avoid duplication of effort, and make better use of scarce resources.
Recommendation 4.1: The intelligence community should participate
in a whole-of-government effort to inform choices about adapting to
and reducing vulnerability to climate change. It should, along with the
U
SGCRP and other relevant science and mission agencies, develop
priorities for research on climate vulnerability and adaptation and
consider strategies for providing appropriate research support. The
interagency effort on vulnerability and adaptation should include agen-
cies responsible for community resilience and disaster preparedness and
response domestically and internationally.
Engagement of the security and intelligence communities could bring
considerable additional resources to this effort. Establishing such an inter-
agency process does not imply that climate change should be defined as a
security issue. Rather, it indicates that security issues are among those that
should be considered in developing and executing a research agenda on
climate change adaptation and vulnerability.
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