9

Achieving Reform

During the past two decades, major reform efforts in juvenile justice have focused on reducing the use of detention and secure confinement; improving conditions of confinement; closing large institutions and reinvesting in community-based programs; providing high-quality, evidence-based services for youth in the juvenile justice system; reducing racial/ethnic disparities; retaining most offending juveniles in the juvenile justice system rather than transferring them to the criminal justice system; improving delivery of defense services; and developing system-wide juvenile justice planning and collaboration (see Box 9-1).

These reform efforts have been frequently driven by the need to remediate harmful conditions of confinement, improve poor quality programs and services, and reduce costs—problems that are not mutually exclusive. More often than not, they exist simultaneously in a jurisdiction. Sometimes we found that innovations were initially focused on one particular aspect of the juvenile justice system, such as reduction in the use of detention, but in the process of addressing a particular problem, the initiative took on a larger focus and was scaled up geographically or was broadened to address other issues (e.g., reducing racial/ethnic disparities) and components of the system. Sometimes the reform was intended to address a fiscal crisis or some specific element of unfairness or program quality. And for some, the effort was targeted from the beginning at system-wide reform changes to the juvenile justice system.

The changes in public policy that have occurred are the result of a complicated interaction among government agencies, policy makers, and the particular characteristics of the policy itself. With this complicated



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9 Achieving Reform During the past two decades, major reform efforts in juvenile justice have focused on reducing the use of detention and secure confinement; improving conditions of confinement; closing large institutions and rein- vesting in community-based programs; providing high-quality, evidence- based services for youth in the juvenile justice system; reducing racial/ethnic disparities; retaining most offending juveniles in the juvenile justice system rather than transferring them to the criminal justice system; improving delivery of defense services; and developing system-wide juvenile justice planning and collaboration (see Box 9-1). These reform efforts have been frequently driven by the need to reme- diate harmful conditions of confinement, improve poor quality programs and services, and reduce costs—problems that are not mutually exclusive. More often than not, they exist simultaneously in a jurisdiction. Sometimes we found that innovations were initially focused on one particular aspect of the juvenile justice system, such as reduction in the use of detention, but in the process of addressing a particular problem, the initiative took on a larger focus and was scaled up geographically or was broadened to address other issues (e.g., reducing racial/ethnic disparities) and components of the system. Sometimes the reform was intended to address a fiscal crisis or some specific element of unfairness or program quality. And for some, the effort was targeted from the beginning at system-wide reform changes to the juvenile justice system. The changes in public policy that have occurred are the result of a complicated interaction among government agencies, policy makers, and the particular characteristics of the policy itself. With this complicated 241

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242 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE BOX 9-1 Typology of Reform Activities Developing system-wide juvenile justice planning and collaboration— Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vir- ginia, and Washington. Reducing detention—By the end of 2012, the Juvenile Detention Alter- natives Initiative will be active in 40 states plus the District of Columbia and 150 jurisdictions. Improving conditions of confinement—Over the past four decades, as a result of 57 lawsuits in 33 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, states have initiated court-sanctioned remedies in response to ­ lleged abuse or otherwise unconstitutional conditions in juvenile a facilities (Mendel, 2011); 198 facilities in 27 states subscribe to the performance-based standards process (PbS Learning Institute, 2011). Closing large institutions and reinvesting in community-based ­programs—These kinds of efforts may involve a shift to a network of small regional facilities (Massachusetts, Missouri, Utah) or a transfer of responsibility from the state to the counties (California, Illinois, Ohio). Retaining juveniles in the juvenile justice system—Some states have raised the age of exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction (Connecticut, Il- linois, Mississippi); 10 states have made changes to their transfer laws that keep more youth in the juvenile justice system (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, Utah, Virginia, Wash- ington) (Campaign for Youth Justice, 2011). Utilizing evidence-based programs that reduce recidivism—Several states have passed legislation or promoted state policies that require funded programs for youth be assessed for effectiveness (Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington) and/or that programs be evidence based (North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington). Improving access to and quality of mental health services—Reforms include statewide mental health screening for all youth (Minnesota) and for all youth on probation (Texas); special mental health courts (Wash- ington); omnibus mental health legislation (Washington); and statewide multijurisdictional crisis intervention teams (Colorado). Colorado, Con- necticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington are pursuing mental health reforms as members of the MacArthur Mental Health Action Network.

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ACHIEVING REFORM 243 Providing quality defense services—Reforms to improve access to and quality of defense services are under way in California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington—model sites in the MacArthur Indigent Defense Action Network. The National Juvenile Defender Center is working to promote a variety of reforms, such as standardizing indigence determination and statewide resource center (Pennsylvania), creation of a statewide system of defender offices (Massachusetts), and development of competency protocols and draft legislation (California). Providing access to educational programs in detention and post release—Colorado requires local school districts to provide educational services during the school year to juveniles held in adult jails and to comply with the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for all jailed juveniles with disabilities. Reducing racial disparities—More than 40 jurisdictions have worked directly with the W. Haywood Burns Institute to undertake community- wide planning around reducing racial disparities. Specific initiatives have included reducing detention by developing alternatives to secure deten- tion, reducing failure-to-appear rates, developing disciplinary policies that reduce referrals to law enforcement, and focusing on Latino youth initially detained by probation, available: http://www.burnsinstitute.org/ article.php?id=56 [May 2013]. Modifying harsh sentencing laws for youth—Four states (Colorado, Georgia, Texas, Washington) have modified their sentencing laws. C ­ olorado adjusted maximum sentences without parole that youth could receive; Georgia posed exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences for sex offenders; Texas abolished juvenile life without parole; and Wash- ington eliminated mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles tried as adults (Arya and Ward, 2011). Building multisystem approaches in child welfare and juvenile ­justice—Approximately 40 counties across the country are advancing the Crossover Youth Practice Model, developed by Casey Family Pro- grams and the Center for Juvenile Justice Reform at the Georgetown University Public Policy Institute. The model is designed to reduce the flow of youth between the child welfare system and the juvenile justice system, the number of youth entering and reentering care, and the length of stay in out-of-home care (Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, available: http://cjrr.georgetow.edu/pm/practicemodel.htm [August 2012]).

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244 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE interaction in mind, the committee was interested in identifying juvenile justice reforms that reflect a developmentally appropriate approach and in ascertaining how they had come about and what they had accomplished. We were interested in the lessons one might draw from these reforms— lessons that could be applied to future efforts to promote and sustain a developmental approach by the juvenile justice system. We have focused on innovations that have been described in the lit- erature or have made some effort to document their progress in moving the juvenile justice system from a punitive corrections model to a develop- mentally appropriate services model. See Box 9-1 for a broad typology of reform activities identified by the committee. DRIVERS OF REFORM A variety of organizations have provided the impetus for reform. We have organized the sequence of reform initiatives in a roughly chronological fashion. In identifying them and describing the changes they influenced, we are not suggesting that any driver by itself was the sole force for the par- ticular change being described. Usually an innovation is affected by multiple forces, sometimes occurring concurrently and at other times sequentially. However, we think important lessons can be derived from this account. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention The federal government’s interest in preventing and addressing juvenile crime and juvenile offenders is vested in the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Its mandate is to provide the resources, leadership, and coordination to improve the quality of juvenile justice (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, P.L. 93-415). OJJDP dollars have provided a strong incentive for communities to under- take several far-reaching juvenile justice reforms on a national scale. Pri- mary among them are certain core requirements that states must fulfill if they are to receive funding. But as federal expenditures for domestic programs decline in the coming years, OJJDP’s approach for promoting juvenile justice reforms is likely to be weakened and may disappear alto- gether. Organizations and stakeholders supporting the re-authorization of OJJDP strongly advocate for its continued role in promoting reform and an increase in grant support to the states to carry out OJJDP’s mandated reform activities (Coalition for Juvenile Justice, 2008; National Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Coalition, 2011a, 2011b). These issues are described in detail in Chapter 10. OJJDP also offers a different financial incentive through its sponsorship of community-wide initiatives. During the 1990s, it sponsored several large

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ACHIEVING REFORM 245 multisite demonstration programs that provided resources to communities willing to tackle large problems, such as school safety, exposure of children to violence, gang prevention and intervention, and delinquency prevention. Along with programmatic support, the agency offered communities exten- sive training and technical assistance (TTA). In return for federal dollars, communities were required to develop a matrix of services and to match youth to those services through the use of risk/need assessments. Some cur- rent state reform efforts (Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania) and local ones (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and San Diego, California) also trace their beginnings to the partnerships established to implement this comprehensive strategy (Wilson and Howell, 1993; Howell, 1995a, 2003b). OJJDP’s capacity to impact the juvenile justice field through support of large-scale demonstrations has dramatically declined. With this decline, state and local governments, foundations, and other youth-serving and advocacy organizations have taken on the challenge of reform. Transformational State Models Some statewide innovations originate and are propelled by state policy makers rather than by outside change agents. In two widely touted exam- ples of major statewide innovations, in Massachusetts and Missouri, the impetus for change came from elected officials and state administrators with juvenile justice oversight. The Massachusetts Experiment During the early 1970s, Jerome Miller, director of youth services in Massachusetts, conceived and led an effort to close the state’s correc- tional training schools1 and replace them with a network of decentralized c ­ ommunity-based services and several small, secure units for violent juve- nile offenders. His accomplishment has been described as “the most sweep- ing reform in youth corrections in the United States since the establishment of juvenile reformatories in the 19th century and juvenile courts in the 20th century” (Howell, 2003b, p. 200). In a retrospective account of his experiences in Massachusetts, Miller freely admits that at first he had only hazy ideas about how to improve the harsh conditions (Miller, 1991). His effort to close the training schools grew out of the realization that his veteran staff, many of whom had received 1  The term “training school” is one of several used to refer to facilities that house youthful offenders, usually those adjudicated for serious crimes. Originally these facilities were con- ceived of as places where youth would be educated or trained to be model citizens, hence the name “training” school.

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246 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE their jobs through a patronage system, would vehemently oppose any steps to change the status quo. But as the notion of closing the schools began to take hold, he began to work in a more systematic way to bring a “therapeu- tic community” philosophy to one institution at a time, expanding training, structuring new kinds of programs, and setting up community-based alter- natives. He gained the support of influential people and groups, including the League of Women Voters and the Massachusetts Council on Crime and Delinquency, gradually finding allies among the staff. Within a two-year period, he succeeded in closing all seven training schools, which housed approximately 1,000 youth, and replaced them with two 30-bed facilities, in-home services, group homes, and residential placements (Krisberg and Austin, 1998). The Missouri Model The Missouri model is a therapeutic treatment model for all youth in institutional placement. Its key elements include • continuous case management, from postarrest processing to aftercare; • small, decentralized residential facilities (no more than 50 youth with an average population of 20) within 50-75 miles of their homes; • peer-led services for small groups of 10-12 youth who remain together for all activities, meals, and treatment throughout their stay; and • a rehabilitative treatment approach in which no specific treatment model is used but each youth has his or her own treatment plan that stresses group processes. The Missouri model has had a long history of acceptance and support by the Missouri legislature. Small-group staffing of residential facilities was piloted during the late 1950s and early 1960s. After the Department of Youth Services, a free-standing agency within the Department of Social Services, was established, the idea of regional treatment was expanded and two large training schools were closed during the 1970s and 1980s. A major milestone occurred in 1987, when the legislature created a bipartisan Youth Services Advisory Board composed of local and state lawmakers and experts with responsibility for planning the state’s juvenile treatment and placement services. Credit for refining and sustaining the Missouri model also goes to its unusually stable leadership. Mark Steward led the Depart- ment of Youth Services from 1988 to 2005, and its current director, Tim

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ACHIEVING REFORM 247 Decker, worked under Steward for nine years prior to returning to the agency to assume the directorship in 2007. More than two dozen states have visited Missouri to learn about the model, and Louisiana, New Mexico, two counties in California, New York, and the District of Columbia, are actively engaged in adopting the model to their jurisdictions. Despite the public attention given to the Missouri model and many replication efforts, the committee found little scientific evidence supporting the model’s effectiveness. Recidivism data, on which many claims are based, are purely descriptive and correlational in nature. An outside assessment of the Missouri model (Mendel, 2010), which com- pared Missouri’s recidivism rates to those of other states, was also flawed methodologically. (See Appendix B for a detailed description of the method- ological issues.) Similarly, there has been no systematic process evaluation to determine which aspects of the model contribute to its success. Key elements of the Missouri model reflect a developmental perspec- tive. Its strong and stable leadership, as well as legislative and stakeholder support, appear to be important strategic conditions for transformative changes. In the absence of better documented models, it has been embraced by the juvenile justice field.2 But the case for its adoption would be strength- ened if the model and its elements were systematically and rigorously evaluated. Civil Rights Litigation Traditionally, litigation has been a major tool for ameliorating unfair and harmful conditions of confinement. As the first step in what later may become a broader systemic effort, litigation or even the threat of litigation often serves as a powerful incentive for states and local jurisdictions to make significant changes in their juvenile justice systems. During the early 1970s and 1980s, litigation was primarily brought by juvenile law centers supported by private foundations, such as the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. From 1979 to 1981, OJJDP also provided start-up funding to juvenile law centers. Two current legal centers funded during this period 2  The committee acknowledges that there may be other statewide juvenile justice reform e ­ fforts that are more extensive or have had a greater impact than that of the Missouri model. We chose to highlight this reform because of the amount of documentation that exists, the favor­ ble support it has received from the juvenile justice field and the efforts to widely repli- a cate it. We note, however, that the model has not been objectively and independently supported with empirical research. Appendix B provides a review of the research to date and describes the requisites of a rigorous process and outcome evaluation.

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248 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE are the Youth Law Center in San Francisco and the Juvenile Law Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.3 The Youth Law Center Established in 1978, the Youth Law Center has brought more than a dozen lawsuits aimed at removing youth from jails and improving condi- tions of confinement. The lawsuits are based on constitutional requirements relating to provision of health, mental health, and education services to youth in confinement. They were also aimed at excessive use of force, restraining devices, and other safety issues. Through the early 1990s, the Youth Law Center worked in close conjunction with OJJDP. After the cen- ter filed a suit, OJJDP would provide technical assistance and guidance as to how the defendant facilities and agencies could improve conditions and meet the demands of any settlement eventually negotiated. This partnership resulted in removing youth from jails and in several cases closing public training schools that had abusive practices (Soler, personal communication, South Dakota case).4 Its work also has impacted private training schools (Milonas v. Williams, 1982), with the court ruling that even private facilities require state oversight and involvement. Two recent cases involving the Youth Law Center demonstrate the broad impact a case can have on a state’s juvenile justice system. L.H. v. Schwarzenegger (2007) was brought against the California Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for its practice of routinely imposing, without proper or timely notice, lengthy parole periods when juveniles violated their initial paroles. The suit also alleged that juveniles were not allowed to have wit- nesses testify on their behalf, to present evidence, or to have an attorney. As a result of the settlement, DJJ was required to hold timely parole hear- ings, to desist from holding youth in “temporary detention” if they were continued on parole, to provide accommodations for mental and physical disabilities, to allow youth to present evidence and witnesses at their prob- 3  There are numerous organizations throughout the country that litigate on behalf of youth who come in contact with the juvenile justice system. Some, like the National Youth Law Center in Oakland, California, receive support from their state bars; others are funded pri- vately and work primarily within their own states. The Prison Law Office in San Francisco was responsible for bringing the Margaret Farrell v. Mathew Cate lawsuit, which resulted in a far-reaching consent decree requiring the state to implement six different remedial plans. The work of the Juvenile Law Center and the Youth Law Center is highlighted in this report because of their longevity and the scope of their activities. 4  Telephone interview with Mark Soler, former executive director of the Youth Law Center and now current executive director, Center for Children’s Law and Policy, June 13, 2011. Information on the Youth Law Center’s legal activities is available from http://www.ylc.org [April 2013].

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ACHIEVING REFORM 249 able cause and revocation hearings, and to provide a prompt administrative appeal process.5 The second case, S.H. v. Reed (2011) (formerly S.H. v. Taft), against the Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS) charged the department with abusive, inhuman, and illegal conditions, policies, and practices. According to the Youth Law Center’s website, the settlement creates a long term investment in Ohio youth by infusing new resources into DYS operations, overseeing reform in the process for determin- ing when youth should be released from DYS custody, and supporting e ­vidence-based community programs for low-risk offenders. Changes i ­ncluded hiring up to 115 juvenile correctional officers. The agreement also supports improved mental health services, enhanced educational, medical and dental services and a capacity goal on the youth population.6,7 Juvenile Law Center The Juvenile Law Center was established in 1975 to deal with issues affecting juveniles and dependent children.8 Originally a walk-in clinic for any youth up to age 21 needing a lawyer, over the years it has broadened its scope to include not only on the juvenile justice system but also on the dependency and foster care systems, with a particular emphasis on youth aging out of foster care. Like the Youth Law Center, its litigation has addressed detention of youth (Youth Study Center, 1976; A.M. v. Luzerne County Detention Center, 2001); conditions of confinement (D.B. v. Casey, 1991); loss of liberty (Coleman v. Stanziana, 1981; T.B. v. City of Philadel- phia, 1988); and access to such services as education (D.C. v. School Dis- trict of Philadelphia, 2004) and health and mental health services (Scott v. Snider, 1991). Several cases have set important precedents regarding the use of isolation and lack of access to counsel and other postdispositional due process issues for incarcerated youth (Troy D. and O’Neill S. v. Mickens et al., 2010). Most recently, its strong advocacy paid off in a class action suit brought on behalf of children and families of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania (H.T. et al. v. Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr. et al., 2009) who were involved in the “kids-for-cash” corruption scheme. Judge Ciavarela was one of two judges who sentenced about 2,500 children during 2003-2008. Many were sent 5  Available: http://www.ylc.org/viewDetails.php?id=69 [September 2011]. 6  Available: http://www.ylc.org/viewDetails.php?id=63 [June 2012]. 7  Ohio is an interesting example of a state that has been sued for poor conditions of con- finement while at the same time it has been engaged in statewide efforts to lower the number of youth in state facilities and to provide quality community-based alternatives for them. See Box 9-4. 8  Available: http://www.jlc.org [April 2013].

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250 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE to a privately run juvenile facility in return for cash kickbacks. More than half of the youth lacked counsel, and 60 percent of them were removed from their homes. In December 2011, the plaintiffs were awarded partial settlement of more than $17 million subject to the court’s approval.9 The Juvenile Law Center regards its most importance contribution to be the attention it has brought to the need for systemic change.10 Prison Litigation Reform Act Since the mid-1990s, privately funded juvenile law centers have found it more difficult to sue on behalf of their youthful clients (Mendel, 2011). In 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was passed. This law amends and supplements the U.S. Code in a number of ways that restrict and discourage litigation by prisoners. Detained and adjudicated delin- quents held in both public and private juvenile facilities are considered prisoners under the act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c)) (Boston, 2004). According to Mark Soler, the 1995 act makes it more difficult to sue and to negotiate agreements.11 Parties must have exhausted all administrative remedies before bringing the suit and must agree to the least restrictive measures that can be used to resolve the problems. The act also sets very low limits on fees for attorneys and expert witnesses, thus discouraging attorneys from taking on cases. CRIPA Litigation Starting in the mid-1990s, the special litigation division in the civil rights division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) began stepping up its investigations of juvenile facilities. Its authority to litigate is derived from the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA), Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994, and Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Advocates point to U.S. v. Georgia (1998) as a par- ticularly significant investigation that reflected a more activist role for the Department of Justice. It addressed systemic practices as well as specific conditions of confinement. A total of 16 remedial measures were proposed to address the lack of health, dental, mental health, suicide prevention, and 9  Available:http://www.jlc.org/current-initiatives/promoting-fairness-courts/luzerne-kids-cash- scandal [April 2013]. 10  Telephone interview on June 12, 2011, with Robert Schwartz, executive director of the Juvenile Law Center. Information on the Juvenile Law Center’s activities is available from http://www.jlc.org [April 2013]. 11  Telephone interview with Mark Soler, former executive director of the Youth Law Center and now current executive director, Center for Children’s Law and Policy, June 13, 2011. 12  Available: http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/cripa.php [September 2011].

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ACHIEVING REFORM 251 education services; harsh disciplinary practices; poor access to recreation and visitation; and lack of training and supervision of staff. According to a recent analysis of monitoring or enforcement actions pending as of September 1, 2010, juvenile facilities in 35 states have been investigated or sued by the Department of Justice since 1971. Eight distinct categories reflect the kinds of problems that the responsible states or facili- ties have agreed (or been ordered) to improve. In addition, these categories include problems documented in a federal CRIPA investigation whether or not a case settlement has been reached: • abuse or excessive use of force; • excessive use of restraint and/or isolation; • failure to protect youth from harm; • failure to provide therapeutic environment and rehabilitative treatment; • failure to provide required services (education, mental health, health); • inadequate staffing or staff training; • environmental safety issues (fire safety, crowding); and • failure to provide opportunity for communication (mail, attorney, telephone). Of these categories, failure to provide required services and excessive use of restraint and use of force were the most common problems. Although some lawsuits deal with specific facilities, others target the statewide juve- nile justice system (e.g., Georgia, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, and Puerto Rico).13 Impact of Litigation Depending on the timing, litigation can spark system reform or lend additional support to changes that are already under way. A DOJ investiga- tion of two training schools in Louisiana in 1996 sparked the beginning of an effort to address the high rates of confinement of juveniles in Louisiana and the violent conditions under which they were held (U.S. v. Louisi- ana, 1998). Through several settlement agreements, the state addressed numerous safety, education, and medical remedial measures.14 Of great 13 From information compiled by the Youth Law Center in May 2011 and made available to the committee in July 2011. Similar information is contained in Mendel (2011, p. 7) 14 Settlement agreement (education) filed November 1, 1999; U.S. Jena Agreement filed April 1, 2000; settlement agreement for medical, dental, mental health, rehabilitation, and juvenile justice issues filed August 8, 2000; settlement agreement filed December 31, 2003; settlement agreement filed January 1, 2004. (Information provided to the committee by the Youth Law Center, May 2011.)

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270 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE who can take charge and has the necessary clout to call other youth-serving agencies to the table. Changing institutional culture is difficult and can take a long time. A Models for Change assessment team noted that, even after four years, veteran staff remained ambivalent about the transition from an adult cor- rections model to a juvenile-centered and rehabilitation model and unclear about their roles (Illinois Models for Change Behavioral Health Assessment Team, 2010). Missouri officials credit the transparency of their programs and their activities as a critical ingredient in keeping the support of the leg- islature and the public (see Appendix B). They also attribute the longevity of the Missouri model to stable leadership, an unusual occurrence in the United States, where a juvenile corrections administrator serves an average of 2.8 years.45 One common feature of many successfully implemented reforms is a significant investment in TTA to address organizational culture and to smooth the way for implementation by teaching specific operational skills and techniques essential to implementing reforms. Missouri estimates that it spends approximately $500,000 annually in training its staff (see Appen- dix B). Training was viewed by JDAI as critical to retaining support among stakeholders and by Models for Change to ensure that new personnel have the knowledge and orientation to perform their new roles (Schwartz, 2001; Wiig et al., 2010). Technical assistance also continues to be an important component of reform activities. Both Models for Change and JDAI make heavy use of peers and consultants who offer technical assistance and allow for the sharing of experiences among the sites. Peer-to-peer technical assis- tance, as opposed to traditional technical assistance and training models, appears to be the more favored approach (Lubow, 2011). Structural Barriers Structural differences may exacerbate the difficulties of establishing and sustaining collaboration between the juvenile justice agency and the courts and among the courts, juvenile justice agency, and the family/welfare/ schools/health agencies. We have already mentioned the difficulties associ- ated with housing a juvenile justice agency within the adult corrections department. Key structural barriers can also arise from differences in mis- sion, mandates, and goals among various youth-serving agencies (Osher, 2002). These differences have been particularly noted in the fields of edu- cation (Leone, Quinn, and Osher, 2002), mental health (Shufelt, Cocozza, and Skowyra, 2010), and child welfare (Siegel and Lord, 2004; Herz and 45  E-mail from Darlene Conroy, Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, April 18, 2012.

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ACHIEVING REFORM 271 Ryan, 2008a; Wiig and Tuell, 2008). Achieving buy-in from different agen- cies often requires structural changes and the recognition that collaboration not only will further each agency’s mandate but also should contribute to a shared set of goals and vision (Shufelt, Cocozza, and Skowyra, 2010; Herz et al., 2012). Some states have attempted to reform their systems by making struc- tural changes. Texas passed legislation in 2011 combining two separate agencies, the Texas Youth Commission and the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission, into a unified state juvenile justice agency that has direct responsibility for youth committed to the state agency as well as responsi- bility to establish regulations and to pass through state funding to support youth who come to the attention of local juvenile justice agencies (Senate Bill 653, 82nd Regular Legislative Session [TX2007]). Finally, structural issues also arise from the separation of legislative and executive powers. Even if reformers are able to establish new juvenile justice policies and missions, keeping all the agencies on board and collabo- rating are very difficult in light of these structural problems. Accommodating Resistant Stakeholders A more substantial impediment is to overcome the resistance of the staff of juvenile corrections agencies, who are concerned about the loss of job security that is inevitably associated with transitions from an institution-based model to a community-based services model, for which they have not been trained. (See the earlier description of Jerome Miller’s experience in Massachusetts.) The opposition may arise from local gov- ernments, particularly in small communities that are dependent on facility jobs. Well-organized opposition tends to come from the unions that rep- resent juvenile justice staff and from legislators who support the unions. The difficulty of closing state juvenile justice facilities is analogous to the well-documented problems associated with closing state prisons and mental health facilities. Union response to closing state juvenile justice facilities in New York is an illustration of this fierce opposition. In 2006, the unions in New York were successful in getting the legislature to statutorily impose a 12-month advance notice provision of a significant service reduction before any facil- ity could be closed. Although there is no longer a need for a facility, unless the governor is able to secure a waiver from the legislature, the state is required to keep the facility open and fully staffed for a year after its announced closing. Efforts to minimize the impact of facility closings failed to appease the union or dampen its opposition. Since 2007, fewer than 300

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272 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE people have been terminated from state service due to the rightsizing of the juvenile justice system.46 According to New York officials, one key to reducing union influence and power was a media campaign that exposed the shortcomings of the sys- tem and highlighted the huge cost of incarcerating each youth and the poor system outcomes. A second factor was the influence of a strong advocacy community, which mobilized quickly and was strategic in engaging diverse constituencies and targeting the legislature. Finally, the commissioner’s willingness to operate in a more transparent manner and share information about the youth in care, conditions, and costs generated support among a diverse group of stakeholders. Costs of Restructuring Even when the reform promises to save money in the long run, added costs are often associated with implementing change in the short run, par- ticularly when the change calls for creating a new agency or establishing new programs. It is a challenge to manage and mobilize the necessary finan- cial resources to pay for salaries, training, and the costs associated with new programs as well as for transitional costs associated with layoffs or retrain- ing displaced personnel. During the past two decades, states have attempted to meet the economic challenges caused by rising costs by offering financial incentives to counties for prevention programs and community-based treat- ment for adjudicated youth. In return, the counties agree to reduce their juvenile commitments to state facilities and intervene with youth locally. This “reinvestment” strategy was tried in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin in the 1970s and 1980s, and in the past 15 years it has gained popularity as state governments have become increasingly strapped for funds. Today, California, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Deschutes County, Oregon, all have legislative programs calling for state reimbursement to counties for youth maintained in the local community (see Box 9-4 for a description of Ohio’s reforms). Wayne County, Michigan, has moved fur- ther: in 2000 it abolished its county probation agency and replaced it with a private juvenile case management system. The private provider is now responsible for all juvenile services, including residential placement, with the state matching funds that the county spends on juvenile services (Butts and Evans, 2011). 46  E-mail correspondence from Gladys Carrión, commissioner, New York Office of Children and Family Services, March 16, 2012.

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ACHIEVING REFORM 273 Building and Sustaining Program Capacity The desire to provide high-quality community programs is a driving force for many juvenile justice reform activities. This certainly is the case in states that are shifting the numbers of youth held in state institutions to community programs. It is also a key focus of states, including Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington, that have passed legislation requiring evidence-based programs and practices (see Box 9-5). Committing funding sources to evidence-based programs is one part of the challenge. But an equal challenge is identifying programs at the local level capable of providing the needed services. This was a huge problem for youth services director Jerome Miller in the 1970s in Massachusetts, who admits to having gambled on community-based programs that were not very experienced (Miller, 1991). One approach used in Missouri is the creation of community liaison councils in program sites. These councils have responsibility for managing the community-based treatment programs. In addition to providing treatment, they offer peer support and a general home base in the community (see Appendix B). Replication and Scaling Up Replicating and scaling up successful innovations requires documenta- tion of the innovation itself and the contextual and organizational elements that contribute to its successful implementation. As Berman and Nelson point out, “A model that produces desirable outcomes in some locations by changing the organization is likely to require organizational change in another setting. . . . Knowing that a model produces desirable outcomes in one location is not the same as knowing what makes the model work” (Berman and Nelson, 1997, p. 329). Berman and Nelson (1997) believe that it is not even possible to replicate with any fidelity; instead, replication should be regarded as an effort to stimulate a process of adaptation whose results are most likely to produce effective outcomes. Increasingly, however, this view is being challenged (Fagan et al., 2008; Hawkins et al., 2008). The Annie E. Casey Foundation has acknowledged that rigorous repli- cation of its JDAI model has been a challenge and attributes the difficulty to the demands of the model itself and the lack of a single dedicated funding source. A 2008 survey of its 54 sites revealed that almost all had formed leadership collaborations, had site coordinators and annual work plans with measurable outcomes, and had developed a data capacity. But sites had much more difficulty implementing case processing reforms, reduc- ing confinement of some kinds of detention cases, and identifying factors contributing to DMC. Furthermore, few sites had been able to monitor

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274 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE BOX 9-4 Ohio’s Reforms Since 1995, the Ohio legislature and the state’s juvenile justice leader- ship have undertaken far-reaching statewide reforms that include highly incentivized reinvestment strategies, e.g., RECLAIM OHIO and Targeted RECLAIM, which allow youthful offenders to be served in their local communities; an expansion of community-based alternatives; an expan- sion of evidence-based programs in its state institutions; a focus on the behavioral and health needs of its most serious juvenile offenders; efforts to reduce collateral sanctions; and capacity-building components related to the support of evidence-based programs and workforce capacity. The results to date are impressive: •  etween 2002 and 2011, Ohio decreased its annual commitments B to state facilities from 2,336 to 633 youth (felonies and revoca- tions). Source: Felony Commitments and Revocations of Parole for FY2002-FY2011 spreadsheet provided in e-mail correspondence from Ryan Gies, deputy director, Courts and Community Services, Ohio Department of Youth Services, August 24, 2012. •  etween April 2009 and July 2012, Ohio more than halved the B average daily population of its state facilities. Source: Ryan Gies, deputy director, Courts and Community Services, Ohio Depart- ment of Youth Services. and improve conditions of confinement for youth in secure confinement (Schwartz, 2001). The Missouri model has also presented great challenges to jurisdictions attempting to replicate it. Part of the challenge arises from the fact that some jurisdictions find themselves unable to adopt the model in its entirety. Another challenge is the inadequacy of documentation of the Missouri model. New York’s Office of Children and Family Services found it neces- sary to commission a detailed set of written policies and procedures for use with its own developing program (New York State Office of Children and Family Services, Vera Institute of Justice, and the Missouri Services Insti- tute, 2011). In Louisiana, replication of the model has become a political issue with the youth advocacy group, FFLIC, sharply criticizing the inad- equacy of the state’s efforts to replicate the model (Families and Friends of Louisiana’s Incarcerated Children, 2011).

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ACHIEVING REFORM 275 •  ince 2010, Targeted Reclaim (the six counties that have histori- S cally committed the most youth to ODYS as well as an additional 8 counties added in 2012) has funded evidence-based treatment programs in their counties and now participates in an extensive evaluation. •  etween 2006 and 2011, Ohio treated 1,758 charged or adjudi- B cated youth with substantial mental health impairments as part of its Behavioral Health/Juvenile Justice Initiative (BHJJI). Operating in the largest urban counties, the program diverts youth from local and state detention centers who are primarily (76%) moderate or high-risk youth into community-based mental and behavioral health treatment. Nearly 62% of the youth terminated from the program were identified locally as successful treatment completers. One year after termination, 10% of successful completers and 19% of unsuccessful completers had a new felony charge. The average cost to the state of youth enrolled in BHJJI was $4,778 compared to $167,960, the estimated costs of housing the average youth at a state facility (Kretschmar, Flannery, and Butcher, 2012). •  he Collateral Sanctions Bill, S.B. 337, signed June 26, 2012, re- T duces those barriers that further impact juveniles, including breach of confidentiality involving juvenile records, educational hindrances for youth returning to their communities, and laws or administrative codes that impede a youth’s ability to get a job (Ohio Department of Youth Services, 2012). JDAI is now working to achieve state-scale replication of its model. New Jersey is serving as a learning laboratory for other JDAI states. The Annie E. Casey Foundation has indicated that it hopes JDAI can be repli- cated in jurisdictions serving at least three-fourths of the nation’s youth by 2015. Expanding to additional states and localities, sustaining detention reform in existing sites, and doing both during difficult financial times remain difficult challenges (Mendel, 2009). The committee thinks that scientifically valid evaluations could contrib- ute to replication efforts by providing solid evidence of the impact of reform activities and identifying effective elements of any reform model. Research aimed at examining the quality of implementation efforts across many sites can also shed important light on the factors affecting the implementation process (Durlak and DuPre, 2008; Liberman, 2011).

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276 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE BOX 9-5 Legislative Commitments to Evidence-Based, Developmentally Appropriate Policies Illinois—House Bill 83, signed by Governor Pat Quinn, directs judges to consider whether treatment in a youth’s community would be a better option than sentencing to incarceration in a state juvenile prison. HB 83 was signed on August 15, 2011, and took effect on January 1, 2011. It is an amendment to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. Advocates said it is intended to make certain that judges determine what sentence is best for the youth and the community. Under Public Act 95-1031 (January, 2010), 17-year-olds charged with misdemeanors will now have access to the juvenile court’s mental health, drug treatment, and community-based services. In 2005, Illinois voted unanimously to repeal an “adult time for adult crime” law that required youth accused of drug crimes in or around public schools or housing projects to be transferred to the adult system. Mississippi—Under S.B. 2969, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010), most 17-year-olds are removed from the adult criminal court. The new law, which went into effect on July 1, 2011, allows juveniles charged with arson, drug offenses, robbery, and child abuse to remain under the original jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system. Sustaining Reforms Sustaining juvenile justice reforms is regarded by at least one founda- tion as “the most challenging issue facing new and innovative juvenile justice programs today” (Wiig et al., 2010, p. 3). Some efforts have been made to document the factors influencing sustainability, but the research is limited and does not appear to be very rigorous (Wiig et al., 2010). Sustainability certainly arose as an issue 40 years ago, following the closing of the facilities in Massachusetts by Jerome Miller. Miller experi- enced enormous pushback from the Massachusetts legislators, who were not able to find their constituents jobs. Miller’s own peers, the National Conference of State Training School Superintendents, voted to censure him, and by November 1972 he was forced to vacate his position. During the next decade, commitments to institutions continued to fall, but by the beginning of the 1990s, the number of young people in secure care in Mas- sachusetts had risen (Miller, 1991).

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ACHIEVING REFORM 277 North Carolina—The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998 called for adoption of Office of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s Comprehensive Strategy framework. It was preceded by North Carolina General Statute, Chapter 143B, Executive Organization Act of 1973, which called for programs and services to be planned and organized at the community level in partnership with the state. It also established the ­ uvenile Crime Prevention Council at the local level to undertake J planning. Ohio—HB 86 and HB 153, signed into law in 2011, provide for the invest- ment of funds from closed facilities into local services; enhance research- based practices; extend juvenile court authority to permit judicial release throughout a youth’s term of commitment; review mandatory sentencing to allow young people to be tried in juvenile court; and adopt uniform competency standards. Tennessee—The Evidence-Based Law, signed by Governor Bredesen on July 1, 2007 (Public Chapter 585), provides for a five-year implemen- tation timeline for all dollars spent on juvenile justice to go to evidence- based practices. The state is conducting a review of programs’ ability to generate data elements to determine effectiveness of evidence-based practices. The Annie E. Casey and MacArthur Foundations have recognized the importance of providing guidance to their sites regarding sustainabil- ity. Each has produced a publication that specifically addresses the issue (Schwartz, 2001; Wiig et al., 2010). Both reflect the view that strategies to sustain innovations should be part of every genuine reform effort from the very beginning. They also emphasize the importance of building an infrastructure to support long-term change. Among the elements of such an infrastructure that they both cite are: strong leadership and collaborative bodies; communication and marketing strategies; data systems that can be used, not only to highlight problems, but also to provide critical information about the impact of policies and programs as well as their cost-­ ffectiveness; e and administrative practices that include an emphasis on training and skill development. As described earlier, the reforms in Missouri have been sus- tained by four factors: stable leadership, organizational change, treatment strategies, and constituency buy-in. Critical to its political success has been a bipartisan Youth Services Advisory Board (see Appendix B). Created by

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278 REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE the legislature, it is a collaborative advisory body with policy responsibility, oversight, and clout. As Decker (2010) has noted, constituency building is a key element to any successful program, particularly for long-term initiatives that span legislative cycles. Stakeholder advocacy organizations can play a vital role to ensure that the pressure for sustaining the reformist vision and commitment is main- tained through leadership changes. As shown in California, Connecticut, and Louisiana, commitment and single-mindedness have helped sustain the efforts in all the diverse ways that are necessary. Foundation priorities come and go. Good inspirational leaders come and go. But these advocacy groups remain. SUMMARY During the past 15 years, substantial progress has been made by numer- ous states and local jurisdictions in embracing and implementing a more developmentally appropriate way of handling youth in the juvenile justice system. Sometimes jurisdictions have been driven to make these changes by the threat of litigation or by cuts in funding that make current practices and policies untenable. Others have responded to incentives offered by the fed- eral government and to financial, training, and technical support provided by foundations. Juvenile justice watchdog groups and stakeholder organi- zations (at the local, state, and national levels) have played an increasingly important role in building consensus around the need for reform and bring- ing reform activities to fruition. Collaboration among the foundations and reform-minded stakeholder organizations is urgently needed if the reforms achieved during the past decade are to be sustained. A major impediment to reform has been the lack of critical data on youth characteristics, particularly racial/ethnic data, offense data, and pro- cess data. Data on program outcomes are also urgently needed both for individual programs and larger system-wide efforts involving major jurisdic- tions. Both the Annie E. Casey and MacArthur Foundations acknowledge the difficulties they have had in quantifying the impact of their programs, particularly in light of other forces at work at the same time (Mendel, 2009) and the broad and flexible range of system reform models (Griffin, 2011). The Missouri model is being replicated, but its policies and practices have not been thoroughly documented and outcomes have not been assessed with scientific rigor. Resources are clearly required to conduct such assess- ments, but first and foremost there needs to be a commitment to undertak- ing this work. The committee is disappointed with the efforts to date to define goals and specify quantified outcomes. We could find no evidence of well-­ constructed, scientifically valid evaluations that present the underlying

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ACHIEVING REFORM 279 theories about expected program outcomes to guide the assessment. Despite the fact that the use of logic models has gained broad acceptance as a tool for constructing and conducting evaluations, and there have been examples of well-constructed multisite evaluations with jurisdictions as the unit of analysis, these methods have not been widely employed to assess the juve- nile justice reforms described in this chapter. The committee is puzzled about why systematic evaluation has not been undertaken and can only theorize that it has not been a priority given its expense and the practical difficulty of conducting them in sites that lack adequate research expertise and an infrastructure to conduct them suc- cessfully. The federal government can play an important role in facilitating efforts to improve data collection and analysis and supporting evaluations that will promote the adoption of developmentally appropriate policies and practices.

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