Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 81
6
Modernization of the Complex
Most of the physical plant of the nuclear weapons complex is, in a word, old;
many of the processes employed, generally dating from the 1940s and 1950s, are
old-fashioned. Consequently, opportunities and challenges—exist not only for
refurbishing the plant but also for introducing alternative processes that could
improve overall efficiency and facilitate the attainment of health, safety,
environmental, and production goals.
In this chapter, we review selected modernization issues and describe some
technological opportunities for improving current and future operations, including
remediation of existing waste sites. We recognize, however, that modernization
explants and methods costs money. Decisions to decommission existing buildings,
to build new production facilities, to rebuild existing ones or to take advantage of
new technologies must take account of the benefits to be gained for the costs
incurred, including opportunity costs.
THE DOE MODERNIZATION REPORT
At the request of Congress, DOE (1988) prepared a report on the modernization
of the complex, projecting its configuration to the year 2010. Congress asked that
the study consider '`. . . the overall size, productive capacity, technology base, and
investment strategy necessary to support long-term national security objectives."
The DOE study emphasizes that the mission of the complex is to supply the DOD
stockpile requirements and, at the same time, to maintain technological superiority
and comply with health, safety, and environmental requirements. The Department
81
OCR for page 82
82
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX
also considers flexibility in the production capability of the complex to be another
important requirement.
The Department's report, while not necessarily adopted as guidance by the
current administration, is the only available planning document with a long-term
focus. The report recommends changes for the complex in three categories, in
order of phony (see Figure 6.1~. The first category includes acii`'iDes considered
essential that must be accomplished in the near term. In this category are
remediation of existing inactive waste sites, as well as compliance with applicable
regulations at currently active waste disposal sites, refurbishment of plutonium
recovery capacity in Building 371 at the Rocky Flats Plant, construction of new
production reactors and processing facilities at the SRS and INEL, and construction
of an SIS facility at DUEL for the enrichment of fuel-grade plutonium into
weapons-grade plutonium.
The second category~eemed essential but not urgent includes upgrading
facilities for processing virgin plutonium at SRS; upgrading the Y-12 Plant
facilities for processing uraniums; upgrading, renovating, and modernizing facilities
and laboratories throughout the complex; and establishing facilities at SRS,
INEL, and the Hanford Nuclear Reservation for vitrifying mixed hazardous and
radioactive wastes for eventual permanent storage.
The third priority includes objectives considered optimal for the future, although
their phasing would have to depend on the availability of funds. This category
includes permanently closing the Feed Materials Production Center (FMPC) at
Fernald; eliminating the weapons programs at Hanford; relocating the activities
currently performed at Rocky Flats; and relocating the materials operations at the
Mound Facility. Without specifically commenting on each of the proposed
changes in the renovation and modernization report, we focus on two broad
issues: the capacity for processing plutonium and the need for maintenance.
Capacity for Processing Plutonium
Most of the activities of the complex focus on the production, separation, and
preparation of plutonium and tritium. Obviously, the expected future demand for
the production of these materials thus must be evaluated in order to guide the
modernization of the complex. Indeed, because the projection of demand provides
the foundation for long-term planning, it is important that DOE and the Congress
obtain the best and most objective advice that is available on this point.
We have no special information or expertise that enables us to assess the
content or future requirements that are or might be imposed by the President's
Stockpile Memorandum. Nonetheless, some general observations can be made.
Given a level of demand for new or refurbished weapons, the production capacity
for tritium is the more problematic because tritium is a highly perishable isotope
(i.e., it has a short half-life, 12.3 years). The situation is different regarding
OCR for page 83
MODERNIZATION OF THE COMPlEX
Note: Lines indicate ti TO from
Project start to completion
Priority 1 Time Critical & Essential:
Environmental, Satety and Health Corrective Action
Upgrade Plutonium Recovery (Rocky Flats)
New Production Reactor Capability
Special Isotope Separation for Weapon-Grade
Plutonium
Priority 2 Essential:
Upgrade Virgin Plutonium Infrastructure at Savannah River
Upgrade Uranium Facilities at Y-12
Nuclear Weapons Production Complex - Existing Plant
Modernization
Nuclear Materials Production Complex - Upgrade and
Renovate Facilities
Research, Development and Testing Complex -
Modernization
Vitrification Facilities for Waste Packaging:
Savannah
Hanford
· Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Priority 3 Optimal Funding for the Future:
(Phasing Dependent on Funding)
Close Out Feed Materials Production Center (Fernald)
Phase Out Weapons Programs at Hanford
Relocate Activities of Rocky Flats Plant
Relocate Mound Nuclear Materials Operations
HWR - Heavy-Water Reactor
HTGR - High- Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor
83
199: ·,~ ~:0 :~ ~, ~
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing
OR ~ odub ~ n~ob'ed
To Common
FIGURE 6.1 Priority and schedule of key moderTiizaiion actions.
OCR for page 84
84
THE NUCI~:AR WEAPONS COMPLEX
plutonium; its current supply in the stockpile of weapons, scrap, and spent reactor
fuel is large and its half-life is very long, about 24,000 years.
Conclusion The current supply of plutonium and the current capacity to process
both virgin and recycled plutonium from retired weapons or scrap are adequate
to meet the dernandfor maintaining a stockpile sinular to the current one.
The national stockpile currently contains several tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons. The plutonium in these devices, plus that in the supply chain, is
obviously sufficient to supply a nuclear deterrent of the existing size or even
greater. Because plutonium is long-lived and toxic and must be carefully
safeguarded for reasons of national security, the production of additional, virgin
plutonium implies additional costs to society for maintaining safeguards and
protecting public health and the environment. These costs must be borne for an
indefinite time, and hence, other things being equal, it is not sensible to produce
more plutonium than we need.
The Department plans to obtain additional capacity to process weapons-grade
plutonium by using both chemical and isotope separation methods to recover it
from scrap and recycled weapons and by laser isotope separation of reactor-grade
plutonium produced in the N-Reactor at Hanford (see Appendix B).
The Department proposes to add to its capacity to process plutonium scrap by
renovating Building 371 at Rocky Flats at an estimated cost of $400 million.
Serious questions exist about the cost-effectiveness of this renovation if DOE
concludes, as the modernization report urges, that all operations now at Rocky
Flats should be moved elsewhere. Moreover, the need for additional scrap
recovery capacity is doubtful. The $90 million New Special Recovery (NSR)
facility, also designed for plutonium scrap processing, is already in an advanced
stage of construction at SRS. And the Plutonium Facility (Building TA-55) at
LANL is an efficient and productive operation for scrap recovery. This facility,
operating for the most part on a one-shift, 5^y schedule, can process almost half
as much plutonium as Rocky Flats can (even if Building 371 were to be renovated)
and turn out a purer product. If additional capacity beyond NSR is desired,
institution of a three- or four-shift operation at the LANL facility should be more
than adequate to handle the complex's plutonium recycling needs. Although there
may be resistance at LANL to converting Building TA-55 into a full-scale
production facility, an administrative solution should be possible. In any case,
more extensive use could be made of this efficient operation with its exemplary
operating history and its strong technical staff.
The development of isotope separation technology is approaching the pilot
plant stage at LLNL. DOE proposes to construct a production-scale SIS facility at
INEL at an estimated cost of $600 million. Plutonium containing concentrations
of plutonium-240 greater than 7 percent is undesirable for use in weapons (see
Appendix E). Plutonium containing more than 7 percent but less Han 13 percent
OCR for page 85
MODERNIZATION OF THE COMPI=X
85
plutonium-240 can be converted to weapons-grade material by blending it with
plutonium containing much smaller concentrations of plutonium-240 obtained
from Savannah River. Thus SIS would be used to process plutonium having more
than 13 percent plutonium-240 to obtain purer material to be used in blending.
The weapons complex inventory of reactor-grade plutonium containing more
than 13 percent plutonium-240 is located at Hanford and amounts to about 7 or 8
tonnes. But, to our knowledge, no compelling need for this material has been
demonstrated, nor are there currently forseen uses for the SIS facility after the
reactor-grade plutonium has been processed.
Special isotope separation also introduces important new considerations relating
to safety and safeguards. First, SIS is the first process that involves the vaporization
of plutonium in a high-vacuum system. We have no reason to believe that this
process will create a major new hazard that cannot be managed; but the new
technology raises environmental controversies, and considerable effort is required
to demonstrate that concerns about human health and the environment can be
satisfied. Second, SIS introduces a potentially undesirable precedent with respect
to nonproliferation goals (NAS 1985~. By introducing technology for converting
reactor-grade to weapons-grade plutonium, it forms a potential bridge between
the civilian fuel cycle and weapons production. Spent civilian power reactor fuel
contains substantial quantities of plutonium, but this fuel contains concentrations
of plutonium-240 sufficiently high that, in the absence of SIS, it would be
undesirable for use in weapons. Federal law prohibits the use of spent civilian
reactor fuel for nuclear explosive purposes (42 U.S.C. 2077~. Once developed,
the SIS technology could be applied in other countnes, including those not now
possessing such weapons, greatly increasing the quantity and improving the
quality of materials from which nuclear weapons could be built (NAS 1985~. Any
decision to proceed with the SIS facility should explicitly consider the implications
of the technology for nuclear proliferation.
Recommendation The Department of Energy should concentrate on malting
better use of the existing plutonium processing capacity as required and postpone
plans to construct additional capabilities.
Renovation and Modernization
The Deparanent's modernization report calls for an annual outlay of 4 percent
of the replacement value of the physical plant per year for renovation and
modernization. The allocation is evidently based on a rule of thumb that is
applied in industry to estimate maintenance expenses. Without clearer
understanding of how the renovation and modernization activities envisioned in
the report relate to maintenance, we find it difficult to comment on the adequacy
or the basis of this allocation.
As discussed in Chapter 2, we found the level of attention paid ~ maintenance
OCR for page 86
86
T~ENUCl~AR WEAPONS COMPLEX
in the past to have Men generally inadequate, and we support the improvement of
efforts in this area. We also noted that, given the special nature of the complex,
common rules of thumb may not apply. Determining the level of funding needed
for maintenance and the allocation of resources for the purpose varies wad
circumstances and should be determined as the result of the usual budgeting
process. Although increased maintenance does impose costs, the benefits can
include greater safer, as well as improved reliability and availability of equipment
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
The Department's 5-year plan for environmental remedial action and waste
minimization includes a research and development program that is aimed at the
demonstration of new technology for these purposes. We strongly concur with
the emphasis in this plan on the need for advanced technology in waste management
and remediation, and we agree that the research and development necessary to
achieve it is vitally important
The Department and its contractors should also be alert to opportunities from
other sources to introduce new technology or to employ more benign materials,
thereby improving the effectiveness of the complex in meeting production goals
in a way that is consistent with health, safety, and environmental objectives. Over
the past decade or two, private industry has increasingly recognized the importance
of using technology that meets these multiple objectives, particularly in minimizing
the generation of wastes. Developing or taking advantage of advanced technology
is an essential ingredient in the success of private industry, and it can be no less
valuable in improving the efficiency of the complex.
For example, the complex generally employs costly, old-fashioned metal-
forming processes typical of foundries and machine shops, perhaps because these
were the only processes available when the complex was originally designed.
Unfortunately, foundry and machine-shop processes typically create significant
quantities of scrap and substantial problems of waste management. Indeed, a
substantial portion of DOE's processing efforts is dedicated to recycling the scrap
materials generated in these processes. Moreover, the scrap and waste problems
are exacerbated in the case of weapons production by requirements for safeguards
and by the hazards of radioactive and toxic materials. Perhaps alternative processes
exist that could increase both efficiency and safety in the use of special nuclear
materials and, at the same time, minimize problems of maintaining safeguards
and managing waste. Perhaps significant long-term savings might in fact be
realized by using more modern and efficient processing technologies.
We have not made a comprehensive survey of the technology opportunities
that are available to the complex. That task is a daunting one, particularly if
undertaken from the outside and from the top down. In the course of our review,
however, we considered several particularly important opportunities that can
serve as examples.
OCR for page 87
l~ODERNIZATlON OF THE COMPl=X
Upgrading the Chemical Processing of Plutonium
87
Conclusion When the weapons complex was originally designed, chemical
processes for the separation of plutonium were based on fluoride cherrustry.
These processes create substaniial problems of toxicity, corrosion of equipment,
and exposure of workers to radiation hazards. Safer alternative processes are
now available.
Historically, the conversion of plutonium solutions to metal has involved a
multistep process based on fluoride chemistry (see Appendix D). The process,
which is based on extractive metallurgical procedures in use for many years, has
been used to recover plutonium since the days of the Manhattan Project in World
War II. It has the advantages of reliability and relative ease of operation.
Unfortunately, it also has disadvantages.
Gaseous hydrogen fluoride and aqueous hydrofluoric acid are exceptionally
corrosive. Both are also highly toxic and have properties that exacerbate the
problem: hydrogen fluoride, being a gas, is readily mobile, and hydrofluoric acid
has the ability to penetrate the skin, causing systemic poisoning. Moreover,
plutonium fluorides emit copious neurons from alpha-e reactions approximately
200 times as much as is emitted from plutonium oxides. Neutron exposure can be
reduced by shielding enclosures and equipment, but effective shielding often
impedes operations because of its clumsiness. It is better to remove the source of
radiation than to try to shield against it.
Viable alternatives to fluoride-based plutonium processing exist Frequently,
for example, plutonium in recycled weapons can be subjected to molten-salt
extraction to remove americium (the main contaminant of concern) and then
refabricated for reuse. Less pure plutonium requires more extensive chemical
processing, but the fluorination step can be bypassed by direct oxide reduction
(DOR), in which plutonium oxide (PuO2) is reduced directly to metal with
calcium. Yields from DOR are lower than those from plutonium fluoride (PuF4)
reduction (but in either case the sludge must be reprocessed), and the product may
require electrorefining to achieve the desired purity. The reduced yields, however,
may be offset by the lower costs associated with reduced herds and lower
maintenance requirements so that the net result may be a the lower total cost per
unit of plutonium produced.
Even if not all the steps in its multistep production are replaced, the total use of
fluoride processing can be reduced. Specifically, replacement of the fluonnanon
steps in existing peroxide and oxalate precipitation-based processes appears to
offer net advantages.
Such a drastic process modification would take time and money to introduce at
some facilities in the complex, and alternative processes may require additional
development effort before they can be made suitable for full-scale application to
production. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that these processes can become
OCR for page 88
88
TIlENUCl~AR WEAPONS COMPLEX
effective replacements for the existing fluonde-based technology. The capability
already exists at LANL.
Recommendation As it proceeds in its modernization Forts, DOE should give
priority to replacing any needed capacity for plutonium conversion processing
that currently is based on fluoride chemistry with technology based on safer, less
corrosive materials that may offer lower total costs when proper maintenance,
health, safety, and environmentalfactors are taken into account.
Computing and Communications Technology
Conclusion The Department ~ Energy nuclear weapons complex can make
better use of computing and communication technologies to improve performance,
particularly in operational areas like training, safety, process control, and
management.
Within the weapons complex, computing and communication technologies are
actively used in a diversity of applications, although such use is inconsistent and
less than optimal when viewed across the complex as a whole. Some of the best
expertise in scientific computing in the world resides in the laboratones. Notable
examples of success imported from outside sources exist at the facilities in
obvious areas such as accounting, management, inventory control, and
documentation. Successes are less visible in operational areas such as process
control, training, and event or status logging. The potential for application of
computer technology spans virtually all aspects and levels of operations across
the complex and constitutes an opportunity for significant, sustained improvement
in performance and safety.
The world's base of computing technology continues to grow, driven by
advances in very large scale integration, data storage and systems, and most
significantly, accessible computers, networking, and application software. While
the DOE laboratories are among the leaders in scientific computing, which they
pioneered for studies in such areas as reaction physics, thermomechanical behavior,
and scientific data analysis, the production facilities lag behind the state of the art
in applying computing tools to field operations.
Opportunities for broad exploitation include the following.
· Simulators for training operators. Training resources and techniques vary
widely across the complex: most of the installations rely on classroom training
and operations manuals. At SRS, training of chemical process operators, as well
as reactor operators, incorporates computers, simulators, and full-scale replicas.
These advanced techniques are extremely effective in giving operators detailed
OCR for page 89
MODERNIZAT70N OF THE COMPLY
89
understanding of processes and operations and should be adopted across the
complex.
· Operational monitoring of tank transfers. The use of computers has
significantly reduced errors that occur in this common operation at some facilities,
but the use is not widespread in the complex.
· Event logging. Records ranging from shift activities to logging of field
status reports are now prepared mechanically for the most part. Such logging
could be extensively computerized with obvious benefits for identifying outliers
immediately, reconstructing events, establishing trends, and other tasks.
· Schedules and planning. Using- computers to optimize factory processing
would allow flexibility in production practices in a modernized complex. The Y-
12 Plant has apparently been applying computers for such tasks successfully.
· Medical data. Collection of data on the health of workers and records of
exposure using automated data systems that are available commercially would
facilitate data access and analysis.
Some groups within the complex have in fact been developing software
applications to improve the performance of the weapons complex, and we envision
that computing will inevitably play an ever more critical role in its safe and
environmentally sound operation.
Recommendation The Deparonent of Energy should encourage and facilitate
computer use as it Affects operations, health, safety, and the environment throughout
the complex. The Department should promote local aru' complexwide networking
to archive and disseminate successful practices. Specifically, DOE should develop
and apply computing technologies of critical and specific relevance to the weapons
complex, such as training simulators, process controllers, and event loggers.
Robotics
Conclusion The Department of Energy can make better use of robotics and
remote technology in perforrrung the work of the weapons complex.
Robots refer here to electronically controlled mechanisms that perform useful
work. The weapons complex has special needs for robotic devices of many types.
They include mobile work systems of the kind used at Chernobyl and Three Mile
Island, stationary devices that service hot cells and package waste, automated
excavators that can exhume buried waste, matenal-handling robots for repositories,
and automated machining and processing robots of the kind appropriate for the
modernized complex of the year 2010.
The application of robots within the complex should depend on the nature of
the task, risk, robotic competence, and cost. While the most universal motivation
OCR for page 90
go
THE NUCI~AR WEAPONS COMPLEX
behind the use of robots is the escalating cost of manual operations, another
impetus is the effort to cope with conditions that are threatening to humans, such
as acute exposure to radiation during emergencies, exposure to contamination in
waste-handling operations, and activities in constricted work spaces. In such
circumstances, robots can have great advantages over manual alternatives. Robots
are also obviously useful for repetitive tasks that demand high precision but that
workers may find boring.
The application of robotics or even an awareness of the robotics state of the art
varies significantly throughout DOE. Most of the sins have at least fledgling
programs in robotics or experience with components that could become the
building blocks for more complicated applications. But overall, the weapons
complex has generally not taken advantage of more recent advances in robotics.
Although the earliest remote manipulators were pioneered for nuclear hot-cell
work, subsequent technological evolution was driven more by advances in subsea
activities and by missions of the military, the manufacturing community, and
most recently, the space program.
Numerous opportunities exist now for applying robotics throughout the complex,
but certain targets emerge at specific sites. Of course, successful demonstrations
anywhere can always be made more broadly applicable. Examples of opportunities
include the following.
· Emergency response. To our knowledge, the complex does not have a
viable fast-response force with expertise, devices, personnel, and transportation at
the ready in the event of emergencies that limit human response. The responses at
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl were hampered by just such a lack of remote
equipment, and they focused the world's attention on the need for it.
· Buried tanks (single- and double-walled). Aged, faulty, and contaminated
tanks are a generic problem throughout the complex. Robots could play a
significant role here in inspection, remedial action, and as necessary,
decommissioning. Constricted spaces like the annulus of double-walled tanks
also preclude human entry and call for the use of robots.
· Excavation. Buried wastes, such as those in trenches at the Y-12 Plant, are
candidates for unmanned excavation, but the most visible, voluminous, and
imminent application is the exhumation of acres of transuranic and mixed wastes
at INEL. Robotics is clearly the technology of choice in such applications.
Other opportunities include inspection; characterization and cleanup of
ductwork; subsurface mapping, particularly prior to excavation; maintenance of
hot cells and repositories without human entry; facility decontamination and
decommissioning; and unmanned production processing.
Robotics has the potential to reduce costs and risks significantly, but cost
projections must be examined with care: the use of robots involves large front
investments in engineering and equipment Opportunities may exist for DOE to
OCR for page 91
MODERNIZATION OF THE COMPLEX
91
incorporate existing robotic capabilities developed for other applications, but in
certain cases, the conditions under which robots might work in the complex may
place special requirements on the systems. Examples affecting design include the
need for radiation-tolerant components and consideration of decontamination for
· ~
servicing or replacement.
Recommendation The Department of Energy should expand its use of robotics
technologies wherever they can be applied to fulfilling the critical and specific
needs of the mission of the weapons complex cost electively.
OCR for page 92
Representative terms from entire chapter:
rocky flats
