Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 47
NATIONAL LEADERS IN INTERDEPENDENT Sll~lJATIONS
Interdependence in a Crisis Situation:
Simulating the Caribbean Crisis
. . .
VIKTOR M. SERGEEV, V.P. AKIMOV,
VADIM B. LUKOV, AND PAVEL B. PARSHIN
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The paper summarized below follows what the authors would describe
as an "empirical cognitive modeling" approach. That is, in flying to elu-
cidate the problem of interdependence in crisis situations, we first turn to
concrete historical analysis, specifically, the paradigmatic, well-documented
case of the Caribbean crisis of 1962. Second, we join a tradition of coun-
terfactual modeling which allows us to remove an event from its historical
context and to ascribe to it certain "coordinates." By changing the coor-
dinates, we may conduct quasi-experimental tests of hypotheses about the
event, thereby identifying typical features of crisis situations and explaining
them. Third, we assume that anyone who is going to design a model of
crisis interdependence should be allowed to refer to such entities as world
models, goals, plans, values, intentions, desires, and so on, as well as rela-
tions, both static and dynamic, among them. In particular, we claim that
the principal feature of the political crisis is a rapid mental restructuring of
participants' beliefs. 1b handle such entities, we turn to '~weak" cognitive
models of the type elaborated in the fields of artificial intelligence and
cognitive science (see Sergeev and Parshin, 1987~. What such models do
is (1) transform large masses of data about the modeled system's behavior
into a more convenient and observable form (the reconstructive stage, or
modeling proper), and (2) create and use research tools to simulate the
modeled system's behavior (simulation stage).
The study is based on two different bodies of empirical data. One
consists of texts per se, that is, verbal records; the other is the set of events
A more detailed version has been recently published (Sergeev et al., 1989~.
47
OCR for page 48
48
SOYIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
during the crisis, which can also be considered as a text sui genesis an
action text. Making use of a computer algorithm, we constructed game-
theoretic matrices from the set of events in order to describe the structure
of the interaction. The strategic matrix approach, however, does not allow
us to make situational representations that are detailed enough to study
how actors achieve their concrete goals; neither does it allow us to evaluate
the intensity of the crisis. Therefore, the strategic matrix model of the
crisis should be supplemented by modelers) of the actors' perceptions of the
situation.
The knowledge representation technique used in our perception model
goes back to the ideas of cognitive mapping. Once a model of perception is
constructed, it is possible to simulate the process of decision making. The
most natural way to do so is to transform the perception structure into a
dynamic system that is able to react to changes in the situation.
AN ACTION PERSPECTIVE: EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS
1b construct a strategic 2x2 matrix (each side has two strategic
choices—either conflictual or cooperative behavior), one needs to Mow
the preference structure that links the conflictual or cooperative strategies
of the actors to payoffs. In essence, the construction of a strategic matrix
is the construction of an interdependence structure, not on the grounds
of normative beliefs about actors' priorities and their modes of thinking,
but on the grounds of actual actions. A set of conflict or crisis events
may be thought of as a chronologically ordered description of participants'
actions in a process of conflict or crisis development. We considered a set
of 34 actions of the two main participants in the crisis (the USSR and the
United States). The time covered is July 1962 to January 1963. Since every
action of the participants could be regarded as the outcome of a choice
between cooperative and conflictual strategies based on their evaluation
of the alternatives, inferring these evaluations from their actions defines a
special class of mathematical tasks the inverse problem of conventional
game theory, in which the values of the alternatives are given.
The flow of events may be represented as multiple plays of a 2x 2 matrix
game. Supposing that both players are rational (that is, that they are guided
by strict systems of preferences that are defined on matrix elements), we
can define, with the help of logical procedures and a Bayesian approach, the
likelihood that the given sequence of moves is produced by one or another
game-theoretic matrix. By analyzing event-row segments of varying length,
we can identify variations of the situation structure, represented as a game-
theoretic matrix, over time. The distributions of likelihoods defined on the
OCR for page 49
NATIONAL LEADERS IN INTERDEPENDENT SITUATIONS
49
set of 576 strategic matrices were calculated) for the segments of the event
sequences, at cut points in time corresponding to the basic events.
As the participants advance to crisis regulation, we see decreasing
uncertainty in their interpretations of the situation. Up to October 22,
possible developments of the situation were considered by the participants
to be rather uncertain (more than 160 strategical matrices were equally
possible). At the moment of final crisis resolution (January 7, 1963),
analysis shows the presence of only one substantially possible variant of the
participants' perception of the situation, represented in the matrix below:
USSR
Cooperation Conflict
United States:
Cooperation 3,3 2,4
Conflict 4,2 1,1
At the same time, well-known facts and eye-witnesses' accounts indicate
that there was one more "peak of certainty" in the course of the crisis
just at the moment of maximal aggravation (October 26-27~. Our analysis
reveals this peculiarity also: for the segment marked by the October 26
cutting point the program gives two not-very-different matrices, each having
a rather substantial likelihood:
USSR
Cooperation Conflict
United States:
Cooperation 1,4 3,3
Conflict 4,2 - 2,1
USSR
Cooperation Conflict
United States:
Cooperation 1,3 3,4
Conflict 4,2 2,1
The peaks of certainty are of different natures: the matrices for
October 26-27 presuppose conflict escalation on the part of the United
States, while for January 7 we see the well-lmown Chicken matrix.
The analysis of the Caribbean crisis shows that by no means all con-
flicts associated with global strategical problems should be described by
matrices of the Prisoner's Dilemma type. In fact, a very different type of
interdependence occurred in the Caribbean crisis.
1An algorithm has been described by Akimov and Sergeev (1987~. An English translation is
available from Scripta Technica, Inc., New York, NY.
OCR for page 50
so
SOKIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
- Let us return~to the Chicken matrix. If we restrict ourselves to the
traditional criteria clef the game theory approach, consideration of the
estimated matrices' dynamics can lead to rather pessimistic conclusions.
The last matrix is characterized by a sharply conflictual correlation of
priorities; that is, the participants, at least outwardly, "didn't learn any
lessons." Is that true? To answer this question, we turn to the model of the
participants' thinking, confining ourselves for the time being to an analysis
of the U.S. leadership.2
AN INTENTIONAL PERSPECTIVE:
COGNITIVE MAPPING ANALYSIS
Cognitive maps were made from the following documents by John F.
Kennedy: a speech in the U.S. Senate on June 14, 1960; statements on the
situation in the Caribbean area at news conferences of September 5 and
13, 1962; a television address to the people on October 22, 1962, and a
statement at the news conference of November 22, 1962. Our main research
goals were to display Kennedy's perception of the strategic situation before
the crisis; to reproduce his perception of the sequence of tactical situations
of September-November 1962, in order to shed light on the restructuring of
his thinking and to identify trends in its evolution; and to implement (using
computer devices at our disposal) the model of Kennedv's nercention of
one tactical situation, namely that of October 22, 1962.
~ r ---~-
We found in Kennedy's cognitive maps the following evidences of
entering the crisis (and hence, of an evolving crisis pattern of thinking) (see
Lukov and Sergeev, 1982~:
1. An apparent move from a favorable (due to prepared "victorious"
strategies) to a rather unfavorable (1:2.5) ratio of controlled to uncontrolled
factors perceived in the situation: an environment acquires a developmental
logic of its own.
2. An emergence of mature crisis tangles that is, structures formed
by multiple negative effects of the environment on U.S. goals. Viewed
through the lens of U.S. interests, the main crisis tangles are represented
by the substructures centering around the "urgent transformation of Cuba
into an important strategic base" and the "insincerity of the Soviet leader-
ship." Both are out of U.S. control; they can be resisted, but not unilaterally
manipulated, canceled, or ignored. The former factor, with its multiple neg-
ative effects, reflects an overlapping of two principal dangers to the security
21be fist version of the analysis of the Soviet position was presented at the 2nd NASUSSR
Workshop by Sergeev and Parshin [1989~.
OCR for page 51
NATIONAL LEADERS IN INTERDEPENDENT SllUATIONS
51
of the United States the "domestic instability in the underdeveloped coun-
try" and the "Soviet nuclear threat." Those dangers were anticipated by
Kennedy; however, earlier he had seen them separately, and their melding
contributed much to his perception of the situation surrounding Cuba as a
. .
crisis.
3. A distinctly more careful (although rather biased regarding the
motives of Soviet actions) analysis of the situation, including the goals of the
USSR, its capabilities, the situation in Cuba, and consequences of various
U.S. options for action. Interdependence makes a powerful breakthrough
into Kennedy's belief system.
AN INTENTIONAL PERSPECTIVE:
COMPUTER SIMULATION
There are many models of decision making. In this study we simulate
only one of the subprocesses postulated by the easiest rational decision
model, namely, that of a comparative assessment of options available to a
decision maker in a concrete situation. We treat a cognitive map as a set
of interconnected states of the world, which can be activated to a certain
degree. Quasi-causal relation is interpreted as a relation of activation,
coded as positive, negative, or zero. By discretely changing (to 1 or 0) the
activation of input nodes (the switching-on of factors), one can produce
different "waves of activation" and analyze how this or that combination of
input possibilities influences the system of interest of the text's author.
Our simulation made it possible to infer that the crisis dynamic was
perceived by the U.S. leadership in the form of two scenarios: (1) when
"sincerity" and "restraint" are absent from the pattern of Soviet actions and
(2) when the Soviets display sincerity and restraint. In the second scenario,
the effectiveness of the control measures instituted by Kennedy increases
significantly: the measures secure a 98 percent attainment of U.S. goals.
Besides, the heretofore "secondary" measures of the first scenario acquire
greater significance (their sum total increases from 0 to 38 percent). Under
the second scenario it is no longer necessary to escalate the crisis beyond
measures declared already by the White House.
We conclude from our study that interdependence transforms sincerity
into an important resource in promoting one's goals. In addition, in a
conflict situation, political actions that are considered quite natural and
not very significant by one side can be extremely dangerous if they change
entirely the other side's perception of the situation. In other words, a way
of thinking that recognizes interdependence presupposes not only sincerity,
but also a great deal of reflection.
OCR for page 52
52
SOVIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
REFERENCES
Akimov, V.P., and V.M. Sergeev
1987 Determination of preferences on the basis of post-game analysis of events
(in Russian). TeAhnicheskay Kibemetika 2:188-193.
Lukov, V.B, and V.M. Sergeev
1982 Patterns of crisis thinking. An analysis of the governing circles in Germany,
1866-1914. In Managing; Intemational Cnses, D. Frei, ed.,pp. 47~0. Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage.
Sergeev, V.M., V.P. Akimov, V.B. Lukov, and P.B. Parshin
1989 Modelling the Caribbean crisis- An essay. USA: Econonucs, Politics, Ideology
5:36-49.
Sergeev, V.M., and P.B. Parshin
1987 Ideas and methods of artificial intelligence in the study of political thinking
(in Russian). Yearbook of the Soviet Association of the Political Sciences.
Political Sciences and the Scientist and Technological Revolution, pp. 206-221.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
national leaders
