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-3
Avalanche Management Policy in the United States
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Not until the westward expansion did avalanches become a hazard in the United States.
Mormon settlers moving into Utah, railroad workers laying track across California's Sierra
Nevada, and prospectors and miners exploring the mountains of the Rockies all quickly
learned of the dangers of snow avalanches. On a single day in 1898 on the Chilkoot Trail in
Alaska, 70 gold rushers were killed hi. Fredston, Alaska Mountain Safety Center, personal
communication, 1986~.
Avalanches became a fact of life in the late nineteenth century mining communities.
Inhabitants were forced to recognize avalanche hazards and consider legal measures to pro-
tect themselves and their property. After a devastating avalanche destroyed the newly built
Sampson Mine buildings in southwestern Colorado, killing one man, the local newspaper
suggested that expert advice be sought when locating buildings in potential avalanche ter-
rain. Another avalanche, which destroyed the 13-year-old buildings of the nearby Highland
Mary Mine, prompted the following (B. Armstrong, 1976~:
Again, buildings should not be put up where there is . . . danger of slides, and we believe that the
Colorado legislature should pass a law making it a penal offense for mining superintendents who
have buildings put up in dangerous places or where there is the possibility of a slide sweeping them
away. Until such a law is passed, there will be lots of chances taken in the erections of buildings
(January 27, 1887, San Juan newspaper).
This was one of the earliest public calls for government to enact avalanche hazard legislation.
Following the disastrous 1905-1906 winter in Colorado's San Juan Mountains, with
dozens of fatalities and extensive property loss due to avalanches, the editor of the Silverton
Standard proposed a full-scale zoning plan for the area, with three different types of
protective controls: the power to issue or withhold building permits or licenses based on
the location of a building, the gathering of statistics on avalanche location and frequency,
and the actual forecasting of avalanche events so that buildings could be evacuated. These
goals would eventually be met but not for more than half a century (B. Armstrong, 1976~.
20
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In the twentieth century, mining cleclined throughout the west and the population in
mountain communities was much reduced. As a result, avalanche threats to life and property
also decreased. Not until the late 1930s was there a resurgence of concern about avalanche
danger. The impetus was the development of downhill or alpine skiing. Faced with the fact
that the recreational ski areas being developed were on U.S. Forest Service (USFS) land
and that avalanches posed a hazard, the USFS took action. Before the ski lifts were built at
the Alta area in Utah, the USFS established the country's first avalanche study center and
assigned C. D. Wadsworth as a snow ranger (Kalatowski, 19~. This was the beginning of
federal involvement in the avalanche problem.
Development of instruments and techniques for avalanche management began in 1946
(LaChapelle, 1962~. In an effort to address the growing number of avalanche accidents,
the National Ski Patrol System (NSPS), in 1949, sponsored a visit by the Swiss avalanche
expert Andre Roch. Roch investigated avalanche sites and trained USFS rangers, highway
workers, and ski patrollers in snowcraft and avalanche management. He was the first to
identity the complexity of U.S. avalanche problems due to the different snow climates of the
maritime, intermountain, end centralregions (Roch, 1949; cf. LaChapelle, 1966; Armstrong
and Armstrong, 1987; Mears, 1984~.
Following Roch's visit, the USFS took the lead role in avalanche forecasting, con-
trol, research, rescue, and education in the United States, and by 1955 it had established
avalanche centers at Berthoud Pass, Colorado; Alta, Utah; and Stevens Pass, Washington.
These were operational centers whose purpose was to monitor avalanches in their different
climatic areas, supervise control work, and administer efforts to learn and teach more about
avalanches.
,
The Alta Avalanche Study Center took the lead role, guiding the activities of the
other two centers and establishing pioneering experiments on explosive control measures
(Atwater, 1968; L~aChapelle, 1962; Kalatowski, 1988; Hoagland, 1988; see also M. M.
Atwater Collection, University of Oregon Library). The center also established the first
training programs in avalanche forecasting and control as part of the USFS's snow ranger
training, so that avalanche problems in ski areas and along highways on USFS land could be
resolved by local snow rangers. In 1971 this training was formalized into the USFS National
Avalanche School.
In the 1960s the national focus for avalanche problems began to shift from Alta to the
USFS Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station in Fort Collins, Colorado. In
1961 this station provided assistance for Colorado State University to invite Hans Frutiger,
another Swiss avalanche specialist, to spend a year as a guest researcher (Frutiger, 1964~.
After Frutiger's visit, USFS research on snow and avalanches accelerated, and federal funds
were made available for avalanche research. By the mid-1960s the research initiated and
carried out at the Alta Avalanche Study Center under the auspices of administrative studies
was transferred to the research branch of the USFS and assigned to the Alpine Snow
and Avalanche Project of the Fort Collins Station (U.S. Department of Agriculture/Forest
Service, 1971~. The long-term records of mountain weather and avalanche occurrence,
begun at Alta, Stevens Pass, and Berthoud Pass, were continued, and additional reporting
sites were established throughout the western United States.
Alpine snow and avalanche research continued at Fort Collins throughout the 1970s
and early 1980s, and a broad range of snow and avalanche problems were investigated.
Data were collected on avalanche accidents, avalanche frequency, and mountain weather
throughout the western United States, a regional avalanche forecast center was established,
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a three-phase National Avalanche School was developed, and an international exchange
program was set up with the Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research.
The Alpine Snow and Avalanche Project also funded university research and produced
technical and lay publications. Avalanche bulletins for Colorado were issued by the USFS
regional forecast center in the early 1970s, and subsequently the USFS helped establish
other regional avalanche forecast centers in Utah, Washington, and Alaska to provide daily
public forecasts of backcountry avalanche conditions on USFS lands.
An internal USFS document reviewed the program in 1973 and reported the following
(Martinelli, 1973~:
In the United States, the Forest Service program has displayed professional leadership for the
~ . _ ~ ~ ~ ~
nest ~ decades The no for cnntin,'~1 re.~.~rrh ~nr1 the ~n~rtllmitiPc tm Onnl`~ the Unpin nc
r~ - - - ^~ &~ EVA All—~~ 1~11 ~11— Lll~ V~1 L~lilLl~O LO apply Lll~ 1lil~lil8~
to operational problems are enough to justify the existing program.... If the Forest Service
relinquishes its leadership, avalanche work in this country will probably dwindle to a series of
unrelated, short-term studies centered at two or three university research groups that are highly
dependent on government grants. This is likely to result in a decline in snow safety.
CURRENT STATUS
After 1981 the USFS made a conscious effort to move away from its role in avalanche
affairs. In 1982 it helped establish the National Avalanche Foundation, a private nonprofit
foundation, to aid the transition of responsibility for snow avalanches from the USFS
to other agencies. At present, the foundation is controlled by representatives of USFS
recreational management, the ski industry, and the NSPS. Until 1987 its primary function
was to administer the National Avalanche School, a task previously undertaken by the USFS.
In 1987 the NSPS assumed responsibility for this school.
In 1985 the USFS terminated the Alpine Snow and Avalanche Project at Fort Collins,
thus ending its funding and direct involvement in avalanche research. No other government
agency has assumed this role. The USFS has also reduced or relinquisher] its involvement
in avalanche work with some regional centers.
After the USFS relinquished administration, the Alaska Avalanche Center was funclect
by the State of Alaska and administered by the University of Alaska's Arctic Environmental
Information Data Center (Hackett and Fester, 1980~. However, the center lost its funding
after the 1985-1986 winter because of the state's economic problems and has not resumed
operations. The Colorado Avalanche Information Center, which forecasts for all areas
of the state, continues to receive some financial support from the USFS; however, it
is administered by the Colorado State Department of Natural Resources and must rely
on a broad group of organizations for essential financial support. The Utah Avalanche
Forecast Center, serving the northern Wasatch Range, is solely supported by the USFS.
The Northwest Avalanche Center, forecasting for the Cascades in Washington and Oregon
and the Olympic Mountains in Washington, is administered by the USFS with financial
support from the National Park Service, the Utah State Park Service, the Northwest Ski
Area Association, and the Washington State Highway Department. The National Weather
Service provides housing and cooperates with all the centers.
USFS snow rangers in California, Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho provide some services
similar to those of the larger regional centers, but their forecast areas are small and involve
less use. In these states daily information about snow and avalanche conditions in avalanche-
prone backcountry areas is issued as part of the snow rangers' other duties.
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Because avalanches occur or originate in large part on lands administered by the USFS,
the National Park Service, or the Bureau of Land Management, some responsibility for
avalanche mitigation falls on the federal government to assure protection of the general
public and private enterprises on federal lands. A similar argument supports the involvement
of the U.S. Geological Survey and the USFS in volcano hazards (Bailey et al., 1983; Brown,
1982~. At many locations, such as Mono County, California, avalanches that threaten private
property originate on federal lands (S. Burns, Planning Director, Mono County, written
communication, 1987; M. Martinelli, Jr., U.S. Forest Service, written communication, 1989~.
The justification for USFS involvement in avalanche problems is in part related to winter
backcountry use, since federal lands~specially national forests—are designed to provide
opportunities for unconfined outdoor recreation. USFS policy is to "enhance recreation
experiences through a minimum of regulation and law enforcement" (USFS Manual 2303,
Item 7) and "regulate users only to the extent necessary for user safety" (USFS Manual
2350, 3, Item 5~. A 1987 review of existing policies carried out by Colorado's White River
National Forest, prompted by Il avalanche-caused deaths in the state during the winter of
1986-1987, stated that the USFS should review its level of financial support for the Colorado
Avalanche Information Center to ensure that the USFS is providing its fair share, since such
centers provide "a very valuable service to users of the National Forests" (Woodrow, 1986~.
The federal government retains specific though limited responsibilities, as defined by
Public Law 93-2S, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. This law authorizes federal agencies to
be prepared to issue disaster warnings to state and local officials (Sec. 202) and to provable
technical assistance to states in developing preparedness plans and programs, including
h ~ 7~ rA rmA ~ ~ rtinn a`'niA ~ n rat ~ n A m iti n~ titan f For on 1 ~ for " ~ no
`~1~ I ~ ~ ~JA~A~' BALM AAAA~4,~%JA~ aft- ~^' ~^ ~~ · · . landsilde, mUdSlide'
snowstorm . . . or other catastrophe in any part of the United States" (U.S. Department
of Agriculture/Forest Service, 1983, pp. 340-348~. Although it is clear that snow avalanches
may be included under this umbrella listing of natural hazards, ambiguity exists for purposes
of response as to whether to group avalanches under the category of landslide, snowstorm,
or other. Such ambiguity may contribute to the present lack of federal agency involvement.
Policy on avalanche matters has generally been lacking at the state level. Few states
have enacted legislation that applies unambiguously to avalanche mitigation. In 1973 the
State of Washington enacted the Land Development Act, which requires the disclosure of
any natural hazard on or around a development. This law applies only to developments of
10 or more lots, with smaller ones exempt from the requirement. This legislation is a direct
result of the Yodelin avalanche accident, in which 7 cabins were damaged and 13 people
were buried, 4 of whom were injured and 4 killed. The residents of the Yodelin development
sued the State of Washington, the developer of the Yodelin homesites, and the real estate
agency that represented the developer. The appellate court decision acknowledged that the
state could be tried for negligence if it could be shown that it had assumed the common law
duty to warn the appellants and had either done it improperly or had not done it at all, thus
acknowledging in limited fashion the state's "duty to warn" fBrown v. MacPherson's. Inc.
1975; Gerdes, 1988~.
In 1974 the Colorado Legislature passed House Bill 1041, which made avalanches a
matter of state concern and required individual counties to consider assessment of natural
hazards for land-use decisions. As a result of this legislation and with financial support from
the state, many of the mountainous counties in Colorado now have some type of natural
hazards plan that includes a specific avalanche hazard section (Ives and Plam, 1980; Mears,
19801-
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Further, as part of the responsibility of the Colorado Geological Survey under House
Bill 1041 (C.R.S. 1973, 24-65.~-10l, et seq.), and when the need seemed most urgent, snow
avalanche hazards were identified at several areas where development was contemplated
(Mears, 1976, 1979~.
In Utah, where avalanches have resulted in more fatalities than has any other natu-
ral hazard, the Geologic Hazards Information Act 1984 HB-28 specifically identified snow
avalanches as a significant hazard to public safety and property (UGMS, 1983~. The leg-
islation required that hazard maps be prepared and made available to the public. Utah's
governor, S. M. Matheson, has expressed his commitment to the concept of disclosure of
known hazards to potential property buyers (UGMS, 1983~.
On the local or municipal level, avalanche hazard policy is highly variable. In Ketchum,
Idaho, the municipal government passed an avalanche zoning ordinance that pays particular
attention to the "duty to warn" by providing that the public be notified of avalanche
potential within all designated avalanche areas, as determined by detailed studies (Mears,
1980~. Ordinances and restrictions for development are currently under study in Mono
County, California (S. Burns, Planning Director, Mono County, written communication,
1987~. In Alaska municipal governments continue to ignore studies and recommendations
for avalanche zoning. In the 1950s a proposed school site in Juneau was relocated because of
avalanche hazard, in response to an effort involving the U.S. Geological Survey (Twenhofel
et al., 1949; LaChapelle, 1972~. But faced with a precise definition of this serious hazard
(Hart, 1972; I-aChapelle, 1972; Frutiger, 1972; Hackett and Santeford, 1980), Juneau
has for almost 20 years refused to enact an avalanche zoning ordinance. In May 1985 the
Anchorage Assembly voted down a proposal to establish avalanche hazard zones (Armstrong
and Williams, 1986~. The law would have identified potentially dangerous avalanche areas
on maps assembled by avalanche experts, required landowners to notions prospective buyers
or lessors of the hazard, restricted development in the zones, and imposed strict building
standards.
COMMENTS
1. Throughout U.S. history, government policy toward avalanche hazard has been one
of laissez-faire. In most cases, policy was formulated only when individual government
agencies were directly involved and a policy was required. Public policy evolved in response
to problems a reactive approach that tackles each problem on an individual basis, rather
than establishing broad national policies. The USFS's involvement with avalanches, for
example, came about as a result of avalanche problems at ski-area developments on national
forest lands.
2. Currently, there is no national management of avalanche information, research,
forecasting, zoning, or education. Nor is there any formal coordination of avalanche-related
activities at other levels of government. The USES has retreated from avalanche hazard
management by withdrawing its financial support for education, research, and general
management of its centralized repository for avalanche data and information. Policies for
avalanche hazard zoning exist mainly at the local level, among municipalities and counties.
Only a few states have land-use policies that specifically refer to avalanches.
3. The problem of fragmentation is repeated with avalanche forecasting. Many agen-
cies are involved in forecasting avalanches the USES, National Park Service, state de-
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partments of natural resources, state highway departments, and local public and private
organizations—yet no unifying policy exists and financial support is insecure. Similarly, the
administration of avalanche education and forecasting programs is fragmented by state,
region, and agency.
4. The states' role should lie between that of the federal government and the local
government: to determine priorities, guide efforts, and coordinate statewide the results of
federal, university, and private work. If its role as middleman is done well, the state can
free the local governments through enabling legislation for the work they are best suited to
do (see, e.g., Jochim et al., 198S, for an excellent example of a state response to landslide
mitigation).
5. The private sector has been slow to take responsibility, partly because of the high
costs and federal restrictions on established avalanche control procedures. State and federal
agencies have been equally slow to assume leadership in avalanche mitigation, since many
avalanche accidents occur on USES lands. It should be noted that research and development
to defray some of the rising costs of avalanche mitigation is not being supported by any
organization.
6. Yet in regard to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, legitimate arguments can be
summoned to include snow avalanches under the aegis of snowstorms or landslides, which
after all is merely a popular term to encompass the variety of styles of slope failure in
a variety of materials (Varnes, 1978; Voight, 1978~. Landslides are accepted as a serious
national problem, and although federal funding has been insufficient to allow full compliance
with the responsibilities indicated by the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, the need for a national
landslide hazard reduction effort is recognized (National Research Council, 1985~. The
U.S. Geological Survey's landslide research program, which has responsibility for important
parts of this effort (U.S. Geological Survey, 1977, 1981, 1982), had peak funding of about
$4 million in the 1980s (including Geologic and Water Resources Division activities; G.
Wieczorek, U.S. Geological Survey, personal communication, 1988~. In comparison, funding
for (now-defunct) snow avalanche research by the USES amounted to about $250,000 during
the peak year.
When comparing snow avalanche and landslide programs, it should be recognized that
many types of slope failure exist, not all of which are hazardous to life or cause severe
economic loss. Instead, different kinds may prevail in different regions, at different times,
or under different climatological conditions. One cannot therefore speak of a national
problem involving rock avalanches, debris avalanches, or debris flows individually. It is only
when all these examples are grouped together that the cumulative severity of the slope
failure problem can be appreciated. In this respect, snow avalanches appear at only slight
disadvantage when compared to the cumulative effects of all other types of slope failure.
Snow avalanches kill about 17 persons each year, compared to perhaps 12 on average for all
other types of slope failure and about 25 in peak years (Iahns, 1978; Schuster and Fleming,
19~.
With some federal attention to the avalanche problem warranted, and with snow
avalanches recognized as a type of slope failure, a possibility that should be further explorer}
is the incorporation of some snow avalanche process and hazard-delineation research into
the U.S. Geological Survey's slope failure program. Such a linkage could be accomplished
to the mutual benefit of both the national snow avalanche hazard-mitigation effort arid
the U.S. Geological Survey's capability to exercise leadership in slope failure research. No
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addle federal agency carries out r~earcb iD dope stabibV, the responsibUiV being Debark
by the u.s. Geological Sumac the USES, the Agricultural R~earcb Service, the Bureau of
~damaboD, and the u.s. gamy Carps of Engineers among other Similarly it should not
be assume that one agency must n~essarOy card out aU federal responsibUides for SD~
act.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
snow avalanches
