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THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND RESEARCH
Roger L. Geiger
The Pennsylvania State University
INVENTING THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Higher education began in this country just over 350 years ago when instruction
commenced at Harvard College (1636). For the next 250 years, however, such education was
largely confined to the collegiate level. The United States lacked places of higher learning
that deserved to be called universities-institutions where teaching would reach the existing
limits of knowledge, where future scholars could be formed, and where contributions to the
advancement of knowledge would be encouraged. For the last century of this span, at least
a few Americans were conscious of this lack. Benjamin Rush in 1787 called for this lacuna
to be filled by a "national university"; and George Washington was sufficiently inspired by
this notion to leave a bequest to this conjectural entity. Another founding father, Thomas
Jefferson, dedicated his last years to designing an ambitious plan for the University of
Virginia (1824). But the realities of this creation soon belied its founder's enlightened hopes.
Still later, Henry Tappan made great progress in attempting to develop a university in
Michigan (1852-1863). He established, among other things, an observatory and a genuine
Master's Degree; but the backlash attending his efforts caused him to be fired and further
progress was postponed. Before the Civil War no lasting organic connections were made
between the higher learning and American collegiate education.
The generation that stretched from the Civil War to 1890 was a transitional one for
American higher education, which witnessed the protodevelopment of universities as well as
the establishment of other new institutional forms. Numerous possibilities for linking
collegiate and advanced studies were tried during these years, but none was yet able to become
dominant. The first American Ph.D.s were awarded at Yale in 1861 for work done within the
Sheffield Scientific School. This unit had developed in order to accommodate applied sciences
and advanced studies in a separate setting where it would not disturb the pedagogy and social
relations of Yale College. The following year Congress passed the Morrill Land Grant Act,
which specified that agriculture and the mechanic arts would be taught in conjunction with
liberal studies-in effect, the antithesis of the segregation practiced at Yale (even though
Sheffield, paradoxically, was the Connecticut recipient of Land-Grant funds). In New York
State the combination of philanthropy and Morrill Act funds produced in Cornell University
an early prototype of the land-grant university. Utilitarian and liberal education were offered
on the same level, and before long research was cultivated there as well.
A more radical experiment was begun in Baltimore in the following decade. Impressed by
the prestige and accomplishments of German universities, the trustees of the will of Johns
Hopkins endeavored to create a German-style university in the United States, one that would
for the first time institutionalize research and graduate education. The president designated
to implement this design, Daniel Colt Oilman, chose only scholars as the first professors-
three Americans with German Ph.D.s and three foreigners. It admitted relatively few, well
prepared undergraduates, and conducted them to an advanced level of study in just a
three-year course. Most of its students were post-graduates, some supported by university
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Roger L. Geiger
fellowships. Johns Hopkins University burst into a void in American higher education. Its
teachers organized the disciplinary associations for history, modern languages, and economics;
they also founded the major disciplinary journals in chemistry, mathematics, philology,
archaeology, psychology, and modern languages. By 1889 it-had conferred almost as many
Ph.D.s as Harvard and Yale combined. In that time it had done more than any other
institution to shape an American academic profession. But Johns Hopkins could not fill the
void. It remained a small and circumscribed institution. After 1884 its available resources
were devoted to establishing a medical school an equally remarkable innovation. The
university proper, however, found few means for augmenting its activities. For others,
moreover, it was unclear whether or not Johns Hopkins represented the pattern of the
American university. Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard, remained skeptical: "as yet we
have no university in America- only aspirants to that eminence," he opined in 1885.3
Within a short time, aspirants and experiments proliferated. Both Clark ( 1889) and
Catholic (1887) universities attempted to follow the Hopkins model, only in purer form, by
opening as all graduate institutions. Stanford University (1891), on the other hand, adapted
the Cornell model, which meant offering liberal, professional, and utilitarian curricula with
a smattering of graduate work. In Chicago, William Rainey Harper beguiled John D.
Rockefeller into bankrolling an elaborate university enterprise (lS92), dedicated primarily to
advancing knowledge, but also designed to bring instruction and edification to a broad slice
of the population. Established institutions also experimented in search of a formula for true
university work. The Columbia School of Political Science was founded by John Burgess on
the assumption that the American college was outmoded. The school recruited students at the
senior year of college and led them to the Ph.D. in three years of study.4
These different institutional innovations had different destinies. The dream of a purely
graduate university at Clark under G. Stanley Hall proved ephemeral: it failed to hold the
backing of its principal benefactor, nor did it win support elsewhere. It persisted as a
truncated institution on the income from its initial gift. Catholic University abandoned this
chimera and soon admitted undergraduates. Chicago was the most spectacular success as an
institution, catapulting into the forefront of American universities. Certain of Harper's many
innovations were rapidly copied particularly summer schools and academic departments; but
the University of Chicago as a whole remained an idiosyncrasy, its eccentricity made possible
by Rockefeller philanthropy. At Columbia, the School of Political Science reverted to the
normal pattern. Instead of new departures, the evolutionary path proved in the long run most
compelling.
At Harvard, Charles Eliot had experimented unsuccessfully with special graduate lectures
at the beginning of his tenure. Abandoning that approach, he organized a graduate
department (1873~; however, since it offered no separate courses, students were still largely left
on their own. Not until the success of Johns Hopkins became apparent did the inadequacy of
Harvard's ad hoc arrangements force a change. The faculties of Harvard College and the
Lawrence Scientific School were combined, and this new entity, Faculty of Arts and Sciences,
became responsible for the reorganized Graduate School (1890~. A set of courses "primarily
for graduates" was now offered. For the first time, the immense resources of Harvard were
organized and available for graduate work.5
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United States
A graduate school superimposed upon a vigorous undergraduate college had several
inherent strengths. A large body of undergraduates permitted the maintenance of a numerous
and specialized faculty. It was such a faculty, in turn, that made graduate education and the
conduct of research possible. Moreover, it was principally the college that attracted support
from American society whether from state legislatures, alumni, or philanthropists-to finance
this costly enterprise.
Graduate education in the United States remained a modest industry prior to the First
World War. Some 300 Ph.D.s were graduated annually by the end of the 1890s, and that figure
rose to over 400 a decade later. But undergraduate enrollments boomed after 1890, and the
research universities grew even more rapidly than the system as a whole. During this era
bigger was better for universities, and both public and private research universities followed
this course. From 1905 to 1915 the fourteen universities that Edwin Slosson called the "Great
American Universities" enrolled one of every five students in American higher education.
These institutions had the resource base to sustain to varying degrees a research capacity.6
The characteristic American pattern that crystallized after 1890 was that of a multipurpose
university which combined liberal and professional education with graduate education and
_ _ __ O
t I . . ~ ~
research. it was the size and tile wealth ot the enterprise as a whole that allowed these
institutions to afford the critical and costly inputs to the latter activities eminent and highly
paid professors with time for research, libraries, laboratories, and other types of support.
Conversely, it was the inability to afford these inputs in sufficient amounts that prevented
numerous other aspiring institutions from participating meaningfully in the university
research system at this time. The American university research system was thus steeply and
inherently stratified. But even among successful institutions, this pattern of the American
university had one serious limitation. Because most university revenues were associated with
its other activities, there were few resources available for the direct costs of research per se.
After 1900 this became an increasing problem because of the rising costs of research in the
natural sciences. Previously, American universities had relied upon gifts and endowments to
support their purely scientific work in separate observatories and museums, but philanthropy
could not be relied upon to support the ongoing investigations within university departments.
The American university prior to World War One lacked external backers for its considerable
research ambitions.8
THE INTERWAR YEARS: EMERGENCE OF A RESEARCH ECONOMY
The most momentous change of the interwar years was the emergence of regular, recurrent
sources of funding explicitly for research-a university research economy. These funds came
from private sources, primarily from foundations and to a lesser extent from industry. The
sums involved were not large in relation to the entire university enterprise, but their effects
upon university research were profound.9
The great foundations of the era, essentially the repositories for major portions of the
wealth of Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, moved haltingly into the role of patrons
for academic research. Immediately after the war the giant Rockefeller Foundation
envisioned founding an independent research institute for the natural sciences. When the
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Roger L. Geiger
scientific community could not come to agreement about this plan, it decided instead to create
a program of postdoctoral fellowships that would be administered by scientists through the
National Research Council (affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences).
At the same time, the General Education Board undertook a program of assisting private
colleges with matching grants for endowment. It soon became disillusioned, however, with the
prospect of significantly bolstering the financial underpinnings of the nations private sector.
In 1923 several of the Rockefeller trusts embraced the mission of advancing knowledge
through assistance to universities.
Beardsley Ruml, new director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, undertook to
build knowledge of society by promoting social science research and graduate training. From
1924 to 1928 he committed $20 million to these efforts, most of which went directly or
indirectly to the research universities. Almost simultaneous with the arrival of Ruml,
Wickliffe Rose became head of the General Education Board and an especially created
counterpart, the International Education Board. He embraced the advancement of basic
science, and also focused on furthering research, for the most part within universities. Rose
committed $30 million to American science before his retirement in 1929, and almost all of
that flowed to the research universities.
Both Ruml and Rose sought to advance knowledge by strengthening institutions, and for
that reason they concentrated their support upon the best existing science programs "to make
the peaks higher', was the apt phrase associated with Rose's approach. Their efforts
consequently redounded to the benefit of the established research universities. With few staff
to assist them, they parcelled out support in rather large grants to university programs that
possessed their confidence. Some grants provided research capital for buildings, endowed
institutes, or endowments earmarked for research-related purposes. Other large grants created
multi-year support for research at a university in broadly defined areas. In such cases
university scientists would themselves determine how the f unds would be scent. The
oundat~ons also supported intermediary organizations like the Social Science Research
Council and the National Research Council. Such funds were spread more widely through
small grants-in-aid and fellowships. Only in the 1930s, when foundation assets were squeezed
by the Depression, would they attempt to target their research support more narrowly through
individual project grants.~°
~ . . . . . . . .
In the interwar period support from industry for university research was less salient (and
somewhat less respectable), but it nevertheless played an important role in certain fields.
Dupont exhibited the postwar spirit of cooperation with academe by establishing fellowships
for graduate work in chemistry. This was the field in which ties with industry were most
readily made. A number of universities with strong engineering departments established
"engineering research centers" specifically to perform work for industry. Food companies and
later pharmaceutical firms also turned to university scientists to investigate specific topics.
For the research universities, the 1920s began in dismal fashion with high inflation and
a postwar recession; but the last half of the decade brought their greatest prosperity to date.
In place of a single strategy for building research capacity, two tracks emerged. For the state
universities, bigger was still better. They expanded enrollments, called upon a larger
contingent of graduate students to teach introductory courses, and were rewarded by their
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legislatures with larger appropriations. The private universities, however, faced with a
shortage of capital early in the decade, restricted their enrollments and concentrated their
resources. When prosperity returned, in the form of generous gifts from alumni and the
foundations, they were able (again, to varying degrees) to augment substantially their
investment in each of their students. This affluence allowed the hiring of eminent scholars
and scientists who would carry comparatively light teaching loads.
The existence of a privately funded research economy profoundly affected the university
research system. The most immediate impact of the capital grants was to create thriving
pockets of research at the most favored institutions and in chosen fields. The leading private
research universities gained the most, with Chicago easily topping the list. State universities
received few large grants during the 1920s. The overall effect, then, was to enhance the
stratification of American research universities. The funds that were distributed through the
Social Science Research Council and the National Research Council were diffused more widely
throughout the university community. In particular, the institution of postdoctoral fellowships
made a vital contribution by firmly directing the most promising young scientists into research
at the start of their academic careers. In general, foundation support for research had its
intended effect in terms of institution building and in raising the stature of American science.
The indirect effects of the research economy were nevertheless also important. The
stratified nature of the university research system did not seem to produce discouragement
among the less favored, but rather inspired emulation. One important factor in the pattern
of the American university had been changed. Research was no longer simply a fiscal burden;
it was potentially a source of support as well. Foundation giving, in particular, had the effect
of raising the priority of research in relation to the university's several other roles. Research
and graduate education thus became ingrained aspirations of the nation's leading institutions
and indelibly associated with university prestige.
As the relationship between universities, with their intramural research capacity, and the
extramural research economy were developed during the interwar years, the full consequences
of dependence on external funders were not yet realized. Academic science was largely
directed by a tacit oligarchy of eminent scientists who shared a number of ideological
convictions: university research should be supported by society because of the unforeseen
benefits that basic scientific discoveries would bring; funding should be directed to the best
scientists, who would produce the most fruitful results; only scientists of established reputation
could determine who the best scientists might be; and, private support was preferable to that
from government in order to preclude the taint of politics in these delicate decisions. During
the Ruml-Rose era, it suited the purposes of the foundations to operate in a manner consistent
with these values. They placed their trust in the membership of the research councils or other
individual scientists in whom they had confidence. But afterward, it proved difficult to
expand support for research under those conditions. An attempt to enlist industry to finance
a National Research Fund, which would have been distributed by scientists, failed to elicit the
needed backing. Later, during the New Deal, an attempt to induce the federal government to
support university research under similar arrangements also failed. By the end of the 1930s
it was becoming evident that the privately funded university research economy was not
generating adequate resources for the expanding capacity of universities to perform research.
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Roger L. Geiger
Yet there was no appreciation In the research system of how the interests of the funders of
research might be accommodated with those of the performers of research.
THE POSTWAR ERA: FEDERAL SUPPORT AND PROGRAMMATIC RESEARCH
Academic science demonstrated its usefulness to the country during World War Two, and
it was continued usefulness that was demanded from universities by the federal government
in the years following the war. Prior to 1940, the only significant amounts of federal
support for university research were directed to the agricultural extension stations.
Afterward, this form of aid was joined by four other distinct channels to comprise the federal
component of the university research economy: 1) military research continued to be supported
on a broad range of subjects, with the largest amounts going toward research related to radar,
fuses, and rocket propulsion; 2) the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) assumed the mantle of
the Manhattan Project, and with it control over all research involving radioactive materials;
3) the Public Health Service assumed the outstanding contracts of the wartime Committee on
Medical Research and began building the National Institutes of Health (NIH) empire, and 4)
last and certainly least was the implicit government responsibility to support basic university
research for the advancement of knowledge. This was to be the function of Vannevar Bush's
~_ 1 ~ _ ~ _ . · _ ~. ~ · ~. ~. ~· ~. . .
national research foundation; out, unllice the other channels, Congress trailed to pass the
enabling legislation during the crucial months of 1946. Instead, the Office of Naval Research
(ONR), with far more funds and fewer constraints, became the patron of much basic research
until the early 1950s.~3
Quite apparent from the configuration of the 1954 university research economy (see
Table l) is the applied cast of university research, even though it was somewhat less so in 1954
than immediately after the war. Federal contract research centers claimed almost half of
federal research funds, and the Department of Defense provided almost 50 percent of the
funds for university research. This state of affairs was disturbing to many scientists and
university leaders. Harvard's James B. Conant, for one, argued that the distinction between
basic and applied research was not really the crucial issue, rather, the system had become
dominated by programmatic research- "a research program aimed at a specific goal"- to the
neglect of `'uncommitted'? or disinterested research, aimed at advancing knowledge without
respect to ulterior goals.~4 The problem facing the university research system was that, while
all applied research was programmatic in nature, much of the basic research being supported
was as well. The principal federal supporters of basic research NIH, AEC, and even the
much-lauded ONR all had practical missions. There seemed to be comparatively little
support for the kind of unfettered investigations that had long been regarded as the true
mission of the university.
The dominant presence of the federal government in the postwar research economy
produced a research system that was heavily skewed toward programmatic ends. Some fields
flourished, particularly physics and engineering; while in others research funds remained
act to obtain. Funds were also lacking to 'grease the wheels of science"-by supporting
fellowships, exchanges, meetings, and publications. Probably most serious was the absence of
programs to support the strengthening of the research capacities of universities.
~ · ~ ~ - ~ . . . . · ~
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TABLE 1
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ECONOMY, 1954
University Expenditures for Separate~-Budgeted Research by Source of Funds ($ Millions)
TOTAL UNIVERSITY R&D
Total Federal
Defense
HEW (largely NIH)
AEC
NSF
Other Federal
Institu tion/State/Local
Foundations
Industry
Private gifts & other
Not included above:
Agriculture
Federal
State & Local
lEKI)Cs t20 centers]
205.5
141.7
101.2
19.2
16.6
1.4
3.4
17.5
22.7
18.6
5.0
74.2
13.5
60.7
130.0
SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Scienapc Research and Development in Colleges and Universiizes:
Expenditures and Manpower, 1954.
In the immediate postwar era the universities were tossed by some confusing cross-currents.
The influx of students as a result of the &.I. Bill partially revitalized institutional finances
after the ravages of the Great Depression and the deprivations of the war years. This forced
overenrollment pushed real per-student spending figures to extremely low figures. For
universities in general, the decades of the 1930s and 1940s were ones of low investment in
physical capital. The l950s brought first the uncertainties of the Korean War, accompanied
by renewed inflation. Not until the mid-19SOs was higher education able to benefit from a
strong economy and ~ normal financial environment.
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Roger L. Geiger
State and private universities were affected somewhat differently by these conditions. The
research-oriented state universities expanded their budgets in order to accommodate the
veterans, and then largely retained these gains as enrollments subsided. By 1955 they had
considerably increased their instructional spending (and expanded their faculties). Private
universities generally suffered from the diminished purchasing power of their endowment
income and from a dearth of capital for improvements and additions. Voluntary support, on
which they depended for capital, did not surpass the peak levels of 1928-1931 until after 1955.
Improvements in research capacity prior to 1955 were made from exceedingly low levels,
except perhaps at the most favored centers of research. Thus, even in the mid-1950s faculty
were generally underpaid and virtually every university had a long wish list of badly needed
facilities.
The situation was epitomized in the medical schools, where there was an abundance of
research funding, while the schools themselves were on the brink of insolvency. This financial
weakness at the institutional level, together with the concentrated nature of the research
economy, combined to produce the characteristic qualities of the university research system
in the postwar era.
Immediately after the war there was an intense, and not altogether healthy, competition
for the services of scientists, especially atomic physicists. They naturally tended to cluster
at the leading universities which offered them the most propitious conditions for research.
At the same time, the continuation of wartime laboratories assured that certain fields would
be dominated by the institutions at which they were located. These two factors alone were
sufficient to account for the high concentration of postwar research. In fact, the
concentration of research funding declined rather steadily from the postwar years to the
present. (See Table 2. ~ In 1952, ten universities received 43.4 percent of federal research
TABLE 2
CONCENTRATION OF FUNDING
Federal R&D Obligations to Top Ten Research Universities
as a Percent of Total Federal Obligations for University R&D
1952
1958
1968
1975
1987
43.4% 37.0% 27.7% 25.8% 21.9%
NOTE: Top-ten universities defined as the ten universities with largest expenditures for
separately-budgeted R&D derived from federal government sources.
SOURCE: National Science Foundation
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funds (not including Federally-funded Research and Development Centers [FFRDCs]~; whereas
their share currently is close to half that figure. Even in 1955, when FFRDCs are excluded,
only perhaps six universities were expending m-ore than $10 million on organized research
MIT, Chicago, UC Berkeley, Michigan, Illinois, and Columbia.
,,
Agencies that supported Little Science through modest, short-term grants ONR, NIH, and
later the National Science Foundation (NSF)- distributed their funds fairly widely, even
considering the concentration of research talent. Elsewhere, however, the system was
characterized by quasi-permanent relationships between large university laboratories (and
especially FFRDCs) and their mission-agency patrons. These latter relationships accounted
for the vast bulk of funds. There was a fair degree of pluralism in the postwar research
economy if one took into account the several federal patrons; however, the funding
possibilities for individual fields were often quite circumscribed. The postwar statesmen of
science Bush, Conant, and Karl Compton, among others had been concerned to preserve the
pluralism of American university research by maintaining viable private alternatives to
federal funding. In the natural sciences, though, just what they had feared came to pass. The
overweening presence of federal support caused private foundations to withdraw from the
field. In the life sciences the picture was more mixed. The foundations committed to this area
were gradually overshadowed by the growth of NIH, but private funders remained and sought
out unfilled niches. Only the social sciences continued to rely upon the private foundations
f or research f unding, although the Ford Foundation came to dominate this area by the
mid- 1 950s.
Universities responded to the expanding research economy with exasperation and
apprehension, but in hindsight their adaptations reflected pragmatism and flexibility. The
arrangements for accounting for organized research, which had been quite casual before the
war, had to be regularized and eventually confided to a separate administrative unit. The
most prominent organizational difficulty was created by the hypertrophy of research in
selected areas of the university. As research became an end in itself, with its own continuing
financing, the complementarily of teaching and research, upon which the academic
departments were predicated, was superseded. Three kinds of adaptations were evident. In
medical schools and sometimes in physics departments regular faculty positions were decoupled
from departmental finances: permanent faculty were hired on "soft" money. In other areas
the demands of research were often met by creating Organized Research Units [ORUs]. Such
units were not new to American universities, but the extensive reliance upon them was.is The
universities that had the largest amounts of research funding notably MIT and Berkeley
also had the most ORUs. The federal contract research centers were a direct outgrowth of
the war. For at least a decade a sorting process took place which tended to isolate some types
of research in this kind of institutional quarantine (e.g. Lawrence Livermore). For a time
federal funding for FFRDCs nearly equaled all federal support for university research proper,
they exhibited much slower growth. The dynamics of FFRDCs reflected
the state of the particular fields in which they operated, as well as the prosperity of their
patrons. Their relationship with their respective universities, however, was in most cases
tenuous.
but after the 1950s
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Roger L. Geiger
THE SPUTNIK ERA, 1957-1967
The transformation of the un
~. ~e be, ~
.
adversity research system began in the mid-1950s. Prosperity
brought a marked expansion ot the research economy: expenditures for research in universities
proper grew by 60 percent from 1954 to 195S, that is, before the effects of Sputnik were felt.
Increases were roughly comparable in both federal and nonfederal funding, but within the
federal component two opposed tendencies were evident. Funding from the armed services
became decidedly more pragmatic as military budgets came under some unaccustomed pressure.
The result seems to have been greater use of FFRDCs in preference to research in universities
proper. Elsewhere, funding was increased considerably by the NIH and the AEC, while the
NSF finally became a significant funder of university research. With these changes the
proportion of basic research in the university totals rose from 62 percent to 70 percent. The
growth of research funds was greatest in the life sciences (+114 percent), reflecting the
prosperity of NIH and private funders. The physical sciences also did well (+76 percent), as
the AEC expanded its on-campus support. Engineering (+6 percent) reflected the armed
services' preference for FFRDCs.
These years also witnessed a dramatic improvement in university research capacity,
particularly at the major private institutions. In general, public research universities made
greater improvements in per-student expenditures before 1955 (partly because of enrollment
growth thereafter), and private universities, capitalizing on propitious financial conditions
and considerably higher levels of voluntary support, generally registered their greatest
increases in the decade after 1955. Because of changes in the research economy, university
research became less concentrated. Whereas in 1954 only 11 universities expended more than
$5 million on separately budgeted research (not including agriculture and FFRDCs3 by 1958
20 institutions had crossed that threshold. The ten leading recipients of federal research funds
in 1954 received 46 percent of the total (again, excluding agriculture and FFRDCs), but in
1958 their share had dropped to 37 percent. [N.B. these exclusions reflect NSF bookkeeping]
In the years prior to Sputnik, the university research system was evolving away from the
cast that it had taken immediately after the war. It was encouraged in this respect by a
campaign extolling the virtues of basic research that was orchestrated by NSF, and conducted
by university scientists and administrators. This trend was impeded by the frugality of the
Eisenhower Administration and the increasingly pragmatic orientation of the armed services.
Sputnik resolved this debate in favor of basic research. Within a few Tears the system was
transformed into the antithesis of what it had been in the postwar era.i The U.S. responded
to Sputnik with new and substantial commitments to Space, Science, and Education. New
programs in each of these areas redounded to the benefit of the research universities. The
preoccupations with space resulted in the creation of NASA. Although the ultimate thrust of
NASA was toward Big Science and engineering, it forged numerous links with university
research during the 1960s. As a newcomer agency, eager to build a network with academic
science, it was in a position analogous to ONR in the late 1940s. It provided generous funding
on liberal terms to selected groups of scientists at many institutions. By 1966 NASA was
supplying almost 10 percent of federal funds for academic R&D; and some 36 universities
were receiving more than $1 million from the agency.
The National Defense Education Act (1958) was the beginning of regular federal support
for graduate students, foreign languages and area studies. The federal government thus
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United States
undertook to support the research role of universities in ways other than the funding of
research.
The most spectacular gains were nevertheless made in precisely this last area. The federal
government committed itself unequivocally to supporting basic research in the universities for
the sake of advancing knowledge (and also besting the Soviets). From 1958 to 1968 federal
funds for basic university research rose from $178 million to $1,251 million-a seven-fold
increase during ~ decade of relatively stable prices. This was by far the most significant
component of growth in an expanding research economy. Moreover, it tilted the balance of
basic research into university laboratories: the national budget for basic research grew by
$2,400 million during these years; university-based research accounted for $1,400 million of
this increase; and federal funds comprised $1,100 million of that. Whereas universities
expended 32 percent of the funds for basic research in 1958, they spent 57 percent of the total
in 1968. This was a golden age for academic science. (See Table 3.)
TABLE 3
INDICATORS OF CHANGE IN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ROLE
Gross National Total Basic Percent Percent
National Basic Percent Univ. Percent Univ. Nat. Univ.
Product Research1 GNP R&D2 GNP Research3 Basic4 ResearchS
Year ($ Mill.) .($ Mill.) ~1 ($ Mill! ~($ Mill.]
1953 364,900 441 .12 255 .07 1 10 25 43
1960 506,500 1,197 .24 646 .12 433 36 67
1964 637,700 2,289 .36 1,275 .20 1,003 44 79
1968 873,400 3,296 38 2,149 .25 1,649 50 77
1986 4,291,000 14,163 .33 10,600 .24 7,100 50 67
I Separate~-budgeted expenditures for basic research within government, industry, universities, and non-profit laboratones.
2 Separately-budgeted expenditures for basic research, applied research, and development within institutions of higher
education, excluding t~XDCs.
3 Separately-budgeted expenditures for basic research within institutions of higher education, excluding t~KDCs.
4 Separately-budgeted expenditures for basic research within institutions of higher education, excluding th~DCs, as a
percent of total national basic research expenditures.
5 Separately-budgeted expenditures for basic research within institutions of higher education, excluding t~KDCs, as a
percent of total research e~nditllr~-for heir r~~^rrh ^~1;~ In. Ha ~,~1~ ~ ~ lo:_ :__.:. .:~ ¢ do- hi_
education.
_ ~^w ^_^ ~v-~ &_v ~All ~- &~1~t Ells ~1~1~11~1tllll1 1llVlttUtl~IlS 01 nlglle~
SOURCE: National Science Foundation
25
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Roger [. G~f,~r
fl~ure of $447 miOlon in 1967, but s100d at only $185 minion ~ decade 1~1er. Unlversldes wore
asked to do more on 1hcir own 10 sustain 1holr rcscarch roles, and they ~cre bard-pressed 10
meet this challenge.
lhese years ~cre dlfflcul1 ones for unlverslty fluanccs. lbo prlvste unlvcrsltlcs, ln
~cnerat had teDded to overcommlt themselves durlog thc lstc 1 960s, sud ss s result
concentrstcd on putdDg tholr budgets bsck ln10 the black durlDg 1he early 1970s. Stste
research unlvcrsltles came uDder lDcrcsslag pressure durlog the esrly 1970s to justify thclr
high costs to egalltsclan-mlnded leglslator~ From sbout 1968 lt ~ss vlrtuslly tskon for
grsutcd ths1 s major new federal progrsm would have to bc lnl11ated ln order to rectlEy thc
flnancla1 condldons prcvalUng 1n blghcr cducstlon. Wben ~ came ln 1972, however, Congrcss
provldcd c~panded forms of ~udcat flasoclal ald lostead of lnshtutlonsl ald that would have
bccD of lmmcdlste succor to tbe research unlversltles. under thcsc condltlons, fc~ lastltutlons
~crc able to sugmcnt thclr research capacldes during thc 1968-1977 pcrlod. Ibclr problems
~^~_~
growth ln noD-lnstructlonal demands, sucb as energy cost~ admlolstrs11vc rcqulremcnt~ and
1hc neccsslty of mcctlng federal regula110ns. Research ~ss ln fact severely crowded ss sn
lnstltutlona1 prlorlty by other concerns.
Deccntrallzatlon ncverthcless continued ss tbe proportion of federal resesrcb funds
rccclvcd by the top ten unlversldes decHned from 29 1 porcen1 ln 196710 25.8 percon1 ln 1973.
It sccmcd, however, 1hat thc sts~natlon ln research funding and thc persktent flnanclal
dlfficul11cs facing unlvcrsldcs would now favor thc lesdlng lnstltutlons/9 As thc competltlon
for rcscarch funds bccamc more lnicusc, the advantage of those unlvcrsldes ~lth the hlghcst
pccr-rstcd faculdcs ought to have become more pronounced. Sustalning s rcscarch
commllmcnt sho sccmcd to demand s larger investment of lnshtutlona1 funds. ^t the
sccond-tlcr rcscarch unlvcrsldcs, howcvcr, ~ dc-cmphas~ of research sccmcd sppsrcnt. Insofar
as lnslbuilons ~crc adap11ng 10 1hls ~1usilon, they appcarcd to be contcmplatlng ~ ~lthdrswal
from rcscarch commltmcnts cithcr to turn towsrd undcrgrsdusic sud profcsslonsl 1cschlng,
or 10 sbandon brosd rcscarch/grsdustc programs for more speclaHzcd undcrtsklngs. It
conscqucntly sppcarcd 1hst 1hc country could not sustain ss rcscarch unlvcrshlcs thc number
of lns1Rutlons 1hst had ssplrcd 10 thst ststus ln thc 1960s snd tha1 1hc secular trend toward
dcccntrallzatlon of unlvcrslty rcscarch ~ss sbou1 to be rcvcrsed.
~E C~ E~ 1978-1988
In actuality, 1hC univcrslty rcscarch system nelthcr contlnucd 10 stagnate nor contracted
10~ard 1hc peak lnstitutlons. Instcad, 1hc system renc~ed lts secular oxpanslon bcglnnlng
abou1 J978. In 1cn yesrs (1977-19B7) i1 grew 56~ pcrccot 1n rca1 terms not ~ bad showing for
msturc system thst expcrlcnccd UtOc growth ln studcn1s or faculty. h4orcovcr, ln a largely
unforcsccn devclopmcnt, suppor1 for thc lucrcssc ln rcscarch came dlspropor110nstely from
nonfcdcral sources. Fcdcra1 funds for unlvcrslty R&D lncrcssed by 10 pcrceD1agc points less
than thc svcra~c, whuc nonfcdcral sources grc~ by t~cnly points more. The [sstest growing
single sou[cc of unlvcrslty rcscarch supporl ~ss private industry, whlcb funded ~ pcrccn1 of
thc 198 7 10taL Tha1 sl~-pcrccn1 flgurc, in fac1, undcrststcs 1hC rlslng lmportancc of
unlvcrslty-lndustry ties. A good par1 of nonprofl1 support of scademlc rcsesrch (perhaps
anolhcr ~ pcrcc~t of 1hC totsp probably comes fro m corporate or lndustry-rclatcd founds1lons;
~e
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United States
and some state support is now directed toward subsidizing university-industry linkages. The
expansion of research support from nongovernmental sources has increased the actual and
perceived pluralism of the system. No longer are the research universities considered to be
wards of the federal government: When Robert Rosenzweig and Barbara Turlington wrote of
this in 1982 they deliberately referred to "The Research Universities and Their Patrons."20
The decade of the 1980s was reasonably prosperous for the research universities generally;
their instructional budgets grew by roughly 30 percent in real terms (1974-76 to 1984-86~.
This figure most likely understates the improvement that has taken place in their financial
positions. The privatization of university income has almost certainly been more pronounced
than that for just research funds. The great gains of the 1980s for universities have come
from increased tuition (the delayed payoff from the expansion of student aid) and voluntary
support. Without a doubt, many universities have used these funds to enhance research
capacity; but it has also been common to bolster those aspects of the university that most
directly affect its ability to attract students and raise money admissions, development,
student aid, and perhaps those structures that most appeal to students and alumni. Unlike the
1960s, universities have acted conservatively toward creating new faculty lines.
The financial conditions of the 1 980s have been especially beneficial to the leading
research universities. They have well established channels for raising voluntary support and
a surplus of applicants with little sensitivity to price. Despite these factors, and despite the
continued stiff competition for federal research funds, the leading research universities have
by-and-large not kept pace with the growth of total R&D expenditures. The proportion of
federal R&D funds received by the ten largest recipients declined to 22 percent in 1987; their
share of total R&D expenditures was even less-19 percent.
Smaller research universities, or at least some of them, have been increasing their share of
research funding. (See Tables 5 and 6.) It is difficult to characterize these advancing
institutions with any precision. They include many state institutions from Sunbelt states
where, at least until recently, economic growth has provided the underpinning for increases
in enrollment and state support. Also prominent are public and private universities with close
ties to industry, especially engineering schools. For the former group, the old formula of more
students and higher appropriations seems to have translated into greater research capacity.
For the latter group, links with the fastest growing segment of the research economy have
produced above average growth. More generally, this pattern would indicate that the growth
in the research economy during the 1980s has been due substantially to the initiative and
adaptation of individual institutions.
CONCLUSION
The university research system of the United States has retained its fundamental features
despite a century of growth and the superimposition of significant additional components.
Most importantly, the research capacity continues to depend in large measure on the vigor of
individual universities, while the amount of research performed depends upon funding from
the extramural research economy. Secondly, these external funds represent a shifting balance
between support for disinterested basic research in the academic disciplines and programmatic
research in keeping with the interests of funders. The dynamics of the university research
system, past and present, can be portrayed in terms of these two dichotomies.
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Roger L. Geiger
TABLE 5
RELATIVE SHIFT IN R&D EXPENDITURE SHARE: 1974-76 TO 1984~6
Slightly Increased Slightly Decreased Decreased
Research Share Research Share Research Share
Cornell MIT Michigan
Stanford Yale UC Berkeley
Texas Illinois Princeton
Caltech UCLA Wisconsin
Minnesota Harvard
Penn
Columbia
Chicago
SOURCE: National Science Foundation
TABLE 6
CHANGE IN R&D SHARE OF LARGE RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES
1974-76 TO 1984 86
Positive Change
>20% 10 to 20% 0 to 10%
Universities
Performing
~ 2.0% in
1974-1976
Universities
Performing
1.0-2.0% in
1974-1976
0 2 1
SOURCE: National Science Foundation
Negative Change
0 to -10% -10 to -20% <-20%
2
8
5
o
2
4
30
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United States
The dependence for research capacity upon the resources of individual universities has in
one sense been a traditional weakness of the American system. Only in the decade after
Sputnik did the federal government assume the responsibility to enhance research capacities
across a wide range of universities. Today, when the litany of problems confronting research
universities is recited, most of the items can be associated with this issue: the lack of support
for infrastructure, including instrumentation; and the impossible demands upon research
university libraries. The inadequate support for graduate students, and the consequent
concern about the pipeline for future scientists, would also belong partly with this list. ~ In
addition, the heterodox efforts of a few universities to lobby Congress for special
appropriations would seem to be a pathological expression of these university needs and
university aspirations.
In another sense, the continued decentralization of university research conveys a different
message. A growing number of research universities are clearly managing to expand their
research capacities. The decentralization of university research is not a result of federal
pressures to spread research funding more widely: total expenditures for research are more
decentralized than expenditures from just federal funds. Research has increased as a
university priority since the stagnant years of the 1970s. The result, despite relatively little
assistance from the federal government, has been to augment the research capacity of
American universities. The research economy has grown moderately during the 1980s, but the
current fear is that federal budgetary restrictions will preclude a continuation of this
expansion, which is necessary to maintain the overall health of the university research system.
The positive side of this situation is that the system has been growing less dependent upon
federal funds. Decentralization has tended to increase the pluralism of funding sources. Most
likely, advancing research universities have been able to tap local sources of support for their
research. By and large, however, this has meant a greater proportion of programmatic funding.
There can be little doubt that the 1 980s has witnessed a disproportionate growth in
programmatic support for academic research. Not only has funding from industry been the
fastest growing component, but it has been supplemented by numerous federal and state
programs designed to promote technology transfer and closer links between universities and
industry. In one respect this trend represents an overdue correction to the attitude of disdain
for applications and business that reigned during the post-Sputnik decade. But it has not been
an unmixed blessing. Critics have worried, much as they did in the postwar era, about the
diversion of scientists from basic research and about the possible perversion of essential
elements of scientific communications. In addition, programmatic support cannot substitute
in most fields for disinterested disciplinary research. Above all, it is necessary to maintain
the vigor of the basic research goose if the golden eggs of technology are going to be gathered.
On the whole, though, the current balance may be a healthy one. The research universities
today may be more responsive to the needs of American society than any time in the past. If
so, this happy state is not the result of any particular policy. Rather, it stems from the habits
of flexibility and adaptability that have well served American universities throughout the
first century of their history.
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Roger L. Geiger
NOTES
1. D. Madsen, 17ze National University: Enduring Dream of the USA, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966; P.
Bruce, History of the University of Virginia, 1819-1919: The Lengthening Shadow of One Man, New York, 1920;
H. H. Peckham, The Making of the University of Michigan, 1817-1967, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967.
2. B. M. Kelley, Yale: A History, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974; E. D. Eddy, Jr., Colleges for Our Land
and Time: The Land-Grant Idea in American Education, New York: Harper, 1957; M. Bishop, A History of Comell,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962.
3. H. Hawkins, Pioneer: a History of the Johns Hopkins University, 18741889' Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960;
C. W. Eliot, "Liberty in Education," American Higher Education: a Documentary History, edited by R. Hofstadter
and W. Smith, (eds.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 712.
4.
5.
W. C. Ryan, Studies in Early Graduate Education: The Johns Hopkins University, Clark University, and the University
of Chicago, New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1939; O. E. Elliott, Stanford
University: the First Twenty-Five Years, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1937; R. J. Storr, Harper's University: the
Beginnings-a History of the University of Chicago, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966; J. W. Burgess,
Reminiscences of an American Scholar, New York: Columbia University Press, 1934, pp. 191-244.
S. E. Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard, 163~1936, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936; H. James, C
W. Eliot: President of Harvard University, 1869-1909, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930, Vol. 2, pp. 3-28; H. Hawkins,
Between Harvard and America: the Educational Leadership of Charles W. Eliot, New York: Oxford University Press,
1972, pp. 45-79.
6. R. L. Geiger, "Research, Graduate Education, and the Ecology of American Universities: an Interpretive History,"
The Three Missions, edited by S. Rothblatt and B. Wittrock, (in press); R. L. Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: the
Growth of American Research Universities, 1900 1940, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; E. E. Slosson, Great
American Universities. New York: Macmillan, 1910.
7. The classic account remains L. R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American Unc~ersi~, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965.
8. Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, pp. 67-93.
9.
The material in this section draws chiefly upon Geiger, To Advance Knowledge.
10. J. Bulmer and M. Bulmer, "Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Laura Spelman
Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-1929," Minerva, Vol. 19 (1981), pp. 347-407; R. E. Kohler, Science and Philanthropy:
Wickliffe Rose and the International Education Board, Minerva' Vol. 23 (1985), pp. 75-95; R. E. Kohler, "The
Management of Science: the Experience of Warren Weaver and the Rockefeller Foundation Programme in Molecular
Biology," Minerva, Vol. 14 (1976), pp. 279-306.
11. J. W. Servos, "The Industrial Relations of Science: Chemical Engineering at MIT, 1900-1939," Isis, Vol. 71 (1980),
pp. 531~9; ~ 1hackray, "University-Industry Connections and Chemical Research: a Historical Perspective",
University-Industry Research Relationships: Selected Studies, Washington, D.C.: National Science Board, 1982; D.
Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism, New York: Oxford University
Press 1977; J. P. Swann, Academic Scientists and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Cooperative Research in Twentieth-
Century America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
12. We material which follows draws from R. L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research
Universities Since World War II, New York: Oxford University Press, (in progress).
32
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United States
13. ~ H. Dupree, Federal Support of Basic Research in Institutions of Higher Lead, Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, 1964; H. M. Sapolsky, "Academic Science and the Military: the Years Since World War Hero",
The Sciences in the Amencan Contest: New Perspectives, edited by N. Reingold, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Press,
1979, pp. 379-99; V. Bush, Science-the Endless Frontier, Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1960
[reprint].
14. J. B. Conant, "Forward" in National Science Foundation,Annual Report> 195~1951, viii.
15. R. L. Geiger, "Organized Research Units: Their Role in the Development of University Research," Journal of
Higher Education, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1990~: pp. 1-19.
16. R. L. Geiger, "What Happened after Sputnik Reassessing the Federal Impact on University Research 1958-1968,"
Science and the Federal Patron: Post-World War II Government Support for American Science, edited by N. Reingold
and D. Van Keuren, (forthcoming).
17. President's Science Advisory Committee, Scientific Progress, the Universities, arid the Federal Goverrunent, Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960.
18. D. S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science, New York: New American Library, 1967; K Kofmehl, "COSEPUP,
Congress and Scientific Advice," 28: (1966), pp. 100-120.
19. B. L. Smith and J. Karlesky, We State of Academic Science, Volumes I and II, New York: Change Magazine Press,
1977-78.
20. R. M. Rosenzweig, with B. Turlington, The Research Universities and Their Patrons, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982.
21. Ibid; Research Universities and the National Interest: A Report of Fifteen University Presidents. New York: Lee Ford
Foundation, 1978.; American Society for Engineering Education, Size Qualify of Engineering Education Washington,
D.C., 1986; D. Fuqua, American Science and Science Policy Issues: Chairman's Report to the Committee on Science
and Technology, Washington, D.C., 1986; B. L. Smith, editor, The State of Graduate Education, Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1985.
33
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Roger L. Geiger
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Bruce, P.N History of the Ur~iversi~ of Virginia, 1819-1919: The Lengthening Shadow of One Man New York, 1920.
Bulmer, J. and M. Bulmer. "Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Aura Spelman
Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-1929." Minerva. Vol. 19 (1981), pp. 347407.
Burgess, J. W. Reminiscences of an American Scholar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1934.
Bush, V. Science-the Endless Frontier. Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1960. [reprint]
Dupree, A H. Federal Support of Basic Research in Institutions of Higher Learning. Washington, D.C.: National Academy
of Sciences, 1964.
Eddy, E. D., Jr. Colleges for Our Land and Time: The Land-Grant Idea in American Education. New York: Harper, 1957.
Eliot, C. W. "Liberty in Education." American Higher Education: A Documentary History. Edited by R. Hofstadter and
W. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
Elliott, O. E. Stanford University: the First Twenty-Five Years. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1937.
Geiger, R. L. "Organized Research Units: Their Role in the Development of University Research." Journal of Higher
Education, Vol. 61. No. 1. (1990~: pp. 1-19.
Geiger, R. L. "Research, Graduate Education, and the Ecology of American Universities: An Interpretive History." 17ze
Three Missions. Edited by S. Rothblatt and B. Wittrock. (Forthcoming)
Geiger, R. L. Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991. (In progress)
Geiger, R. L. To Advance Knowledge: the Growth of American Research Universities, 1900-1940. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
Geiger, R. L. "What Happened after Sputnik: Reassessing the Federal Impact on University Research 1958-1968."
Science and the Federal Patron: Post-World War II Govemment Support for American Science. Edited by N. Reingold
and D. Van Keuren. (Forthcoming)
Greenberg, D. S. The Politics of Pure Science. New York: New American Library, 1967.
Hawkins, H. Between Harvard and America: the Educational Leadership of Charles W. Eliot. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1972.
Hawkins, H. Pioneer: A History of the Johns Hopkins University, 1874-1889. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960.
James, H. C. ~ Eliot: President of Harvard University, 1869-1909. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930.
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OCR for page 35
United States
Kelley, B. M. Yale: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
Kohler, R. E. "Science and Philanthropy: Wickliffe Rose and the International Education Board." Minerals Vol. 23 (1985),
pp. 75-95.
Kohler, R. E. "The Management of Science: the Experience of Warren Weaver and the Rockefeller Foundation
Programme in Molecular Biology." Minerva. Vol. 14 (1976), pp. 279-306.
Madsen, D. 17ze National University: Enduring Dream of the USA. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966.
Morison, S. E. Three Centuries ofHarvard, 163~1936. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936.
Noble, D. America by Design: Science, Technology, arid the Rise of Corporate Capitalism. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1977.
Peckham, H. H. The Making of the University of Michigan', 1817-1967. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967
President's Science Advisory Committee. Scientific Progress, the Universities, and the Federal Government Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960.
Rosenzweig, R. M. with B. Turlington. The Research Universities and Their Patrons. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982.
Ryan, W. C. Studies in Early Graduate Education: The Johns Hopkins University, Clark University, arid the University of
Chicago. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1939.
Sapolsky, H. M. "Academic Science and the Military: the Years Since World War Two." The Sciences in the American
Contest: New Perspectives. Edited by N. Reingold. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Press, 1979.
Servos, J. W. "The Industrial Relations of Science: Chemical Engineering at MIT, 1900-1939." Isis. Vol. 71 (1980), pp.
53149
Slo~sson, S. E. Great American Universities. New York: Macmillan, 1910.
Smith, B. L. and J. Karlesky. The State of Academic Science. Volumes I and II. New York: Change Magazine Press,
1977-78.
Storr, R. J. Harper's University: the Beginnings-a History of the University of Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1966.
Swann, J. P. Acadenuc Scientists and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Cooperative Research in Twenneth-Cen~y America
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
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Research Relationships: Selected Studies. Washington, D.C.: National Science Board, 1982.
Veysey, L. R. The Emergence of the American University. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
35
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JAPAN
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
research capacity