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THE UNIVERSITY, INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH IN JAPAN James R. Bartholomew The Ohio State University Over the past several decades, Japan has created a substantially different type of research system from that which exists in the United States today. The Japanese system links basic research more closely with industry. It relies far more heavily on private financing, but with government interventions in critical fields. And it displays a prominent inclination to change fundamental elements of the academic system in ways that will hopefully be beneficial to research. It is a matter of opinion whether one national system is superior to the other: such judgments must depend partly on the objectives defined. The point is simply that Japanese procedures and experience can be instructive for Americans who seek alternatives to elements of current practice here and are thus worth considering in a framework of comparison. Current rethinking of research organization in the United States and the place of teaching in it could certainly benefit from the experience of Japan. In all Japanese universities from the most prestigious to those of lowest stature, professors have traditionally been expected to teach as well as do research. Prior to 1918 there were no exceptions to this pattern at all; and in the period since 1945 even university presidents have only been exempted from teaching on a temporary basis. Much has been written about the institutional innovativeness of Tsukuba University and its attached Science City (created in 1973. But here as elsewhere teaching is deemed essential to the professorial role.2 Nevertheless, in special circumstances the Japanese have created academic (i.e. university affiliated) roles exclusively for research without any teaching. This happened for the first time in 1918 when, as a result of difficult adjustments linked to World War One, the research professorship was established at Tokyo University. The conditions surrounding this event are instructive. Prior to 1914 Japan had relied very heavily on foreign (especially German) sources of supply for scientific knowledge and technical products pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals, scientific instruments. However, the Anglo-French naval blockade of Imperial Germany made such imports impossible; and the country was entirely thrown back on its own resources. The years 1914-1919 thus witnessed significant intellectual and institutional initiatives in science, including a small number of research professorships established for engineering and physics in connection with the University's Aeronautics Institute (founded 1918).3 More recently there have been other initiatives which ultimately seem linked to a similar motivation. Beginning in the early 1970s, the Ministry of Education began to establish what are rather inelegantly known in English as National Research Institutes for Joint Use by Universities. These facilities, which now number six, carry on research in high energy physics (at the well known KKK laboratory at Tsukuba), polar studies, molecular science, physiology and biolo~v. As their collective name implies the Arc anon to r~r~hPrc front ~ - ~ - ~ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A ~ ~ any academic Institution. State members hold academic titles (professor and the rest) but are not required to do any teaching. There are variations on this pattern as illustrated by the Research Institute for Fundamental Physics of Kyoto University where professors may free themselves of teaching under shorter term arrangements of up to five years.4 In all of these cases such arrangements seem to reflect a sense among decision-makers either that independent research capability is essential or that Japan itself holds a leadership position in the particular 39
James R. Bartholomew specialty. But one cannot extrapolate from the experience of these specialties to the research system as a whole. A combination of research and teaching is still very much the norm. Relations between universities and private industry in Japan have shown nothing like the consistency of thinking about the academic role of the teacher-researcher. Prior to 1914 Japanese companies had little interest in developing research capabilities either alone or in conjunction with universities. But they did employ university professors as ad hoc consultants regarding foreign technology so often as to generate allegations that professors were neglecting students and their own research. These criticisms intensified when the war broke out, but the wartime need for indigenous research brought, if anything, a more (not less) intimate relationship between firms and the academy as cooperation not only continued but assumed a higher level. Establishment of the prestigious Research Institute for Physics and Chemistry in 1917 was accomplished by a formal partnership between academics and firms and in many ways set the tone for such relations in the interwar period.5 Kotaro Honda's Institute for Metals Research at Tohoku University, for example, relied heavily for its financial support on the Sumitomo group of business enterprises.6 A pattern of considerable (though never total) estrangement between firms and universities developed after 1945. Many academic scientists became hostile to business on the (mostly incorrect) Marxist assumption that Japanese capitalism had encouraged Japanese militarism, while many firms were so interested in acquiring Western technology as to give short shrift to domestic research. One can see the negative consequences of this partial estrangement both for research and the general welfare in Japan's efforts to develop a nuclear power industry during the period 1953-1980. Following President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the U. N. General Assembly in December 1953, business and political circles in Japan became captivated by the notion that atomic power offered the solution to Japan's energy needs and decided to import nuclear reactors from Britain. Prominent members of the scientific community-especially Nobel physics laureate Hideki Yukawa cautioned against this excess of optimism and reminded all concerned of the pitfalls involved. The scientists emphasized that atomic energy was not at that time a "proven" technology and that to import it successfully would require more research, a point which was widely accepted in Europe, even among groups which were planning the sale. But political and business leaders rejected further research, claimed that the technology was safe and dismissed the scientists' views as self interested and alarmist. The result was an inefficient nuclear industry and numerous power plant breakdowns through the end of the 1970s.7 The latter half of the 1970s saw the emergence of a different, more cooperative pattern between firms and universities, which has continued to the present and in many respects revives the pre-war pattern. Firms in recent years have sold or leased research equipment to universities at very low prices and have in some cases given laboratory access to professors and graduate students.8 Most importantly, academic scientists are increasingly being named to head large scale research programs partly funded by government but extensively carried out in industrial laboratories. Dr. Tohru Mototoka, professor of electrical engineering at Tokyo University, has served as director of the 5th Generation Computer Project since 1981; while a colleague, Dr. Shoji Tanaka, professor of applied physics at the same institution, is heading up a major project in superconductivity. 40
Japan Even while acknowledging academic scientists' renewed prominence in major research projects, it must be stressed that industry has been the major player in Japanese research for all o f the postwar period. About two-thirds of all Japanese research and development expenditures have been contributed by private firms.9 While this pattern varies sharply from that of other leading industrial democracies where government funding is prominent, it is readily explicable in the Japanese context. Between 1880 and 1920 nearly all research funding was provided by the government. However, the 1920s saw a significant shift of funding away from the purely academic setting toward a mixture of corporate laboratories (a new phenomenon in Japan at that time) and mission laboratories attached to government ministries. This was a worldwide trend, but it also derived in Japan from a widespread belief that university research was seriously constrained by factional infighting, professional favoritism and an unfavorable climate generally.~° In the 1930s and early 1940s academic researchers were heavily co-opted by the military for war-related work through the Japan Society for the Advancement of Science, a pattern which later encouraged estrangement between society and the academy and led industry to go its own way in research. Then during the Occupation years of the late 1940s, American policy actively encouraged Japanese decision-makers to emphasize applied research at which industry excelled at the expense of basic research (where universities were active) as a basic strategy for rebuilding the country. The American physicist H. C. Kelly, who was particularly influential in developing this posture, actually called basic research in 1948 a "luxury in the light of existing conditions. Industry's influence has also been great in the realm of education. Following a 1954 initiative from the Ministry of Education, the Nikkeiren (Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations) issued a formal report in 1956 which criticized the law-liberal arts biases in the selection of university students and demanded more emphasis on science and engineering. In 1961, the cabinet of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda acted on this recommendation by increasing dramatically the number of university places reserved for students in science and engineering. Whereas matriculation slots for such students were 28 percent of the total in 1952, by 1968 they constituted 46 percent. A comparison between Kyoto University and Stanford University (which are comparable universities and sister institutions) illustrates the result of this policy at present. Some 34 percent of Kyoto University undergraduates are currently majoring in engineering; at Stanford the figure is 7 percent. Once we take into account the particular career patterns of Ikeda and most of the postwar Japanese prime ministers, who have generally been involved in business and government, it will be readily apparent that industry has played a very large role in formulating both research policies and those for education. Historically, however, it was the Japanese government that played the greater role. Prior to World War One industry was rarely willing to spend money on research on the assumption either that it would cost too much or that imported knowledge was sufficient for its needs. Over 90 percent of research was concentrated in university and government laboratories and the national government paid most of the bill. The first indication that private industry might support research came in 1900 with establishment of the Industrial Experiment Laboratory in Tokyo. This government facility was established to perform contract research on a fee-for-service basis for the emerging chemical industry. The Laboratory did well enough that its technical staff even doubled to about two dozen investigators and assistants after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. However, the significance of this venture at the time should not 41
James R. Bartholomew be overstated. A member of parliament who made a formal inquiry in 1913 noted that the Laboratory was poorly located, largely unknown to potential customers and had to face competition from a nearby Commercial Exhibitions Hall (supported by the government) where foreign machinery and technical apparatus was displayed for the edification and enrichment of private manufacturers!~3 Until 1918 Japan had a centrally controlled, more or less unitary system for scientific and technical research and education. The Ministry of Education supervised a national network of so-called imperial universities and professional schools of lesser stature where undergraduate instruction in basic science and certain applied fields was available. At the graduate level, instruction and training were only available at the four imperial universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Tohoku and Kyushu). Significantly, work in engineering was only available at the imperial universities. In medicine, however, degree programs and research facilities were available at a number of prefectural government medical colleges and two proprietary medical academies. The monopoly of scientific and technical education and research by a small number of government institutions was for many years a matter of policy, though rarely articulated in so blatant a form. Between -1877 and 1914 there were several attempts to establish degree programs in technical disciplines at private institutions (Keio, Doshisha and Waseda). But in every case the Ministry of Education refused to grant equivalency status to the diplomas awarded their graduates and by doing this brought about the desired result, which was the formal demise of these programs.~4 Ultimately, however, the policy could not last. Technical education was expensive and public funds were simply insufficient to sustain the monopoly, particularly at a time when private industry was demanding more engineers and even scientists than the government institutions could provide. With the coming of World War One in 1914 the monopoly began to dissolve, though it was only in 1918 that the Ministry of Education was finally willing to allow private institutions like Kelo, Doshisha and Waseda to use the term "university" in their names and confer degrees which were legally equivalent to those awarded by the imperial universities.is It should also be noted that once the system of monopoly control fell apart, there was never again an attempt to reimpose it. Any attempt to label the government's control system for science and engineering in this early period a "unitary system" should be qualified in another way, too. While the Ministry of Education had an effective monopoly over scientific and technical education, it never had such control over scientific and technical research. The Ministry of Home Affairs was very active in medical research, particularly the domain of infectious diseases and microbiology where Shibasaburo Kitasato (who died in 1931) directed one of the world's three leading research facilities in his field at that time. Similarly, the Ministry of Communications sponsored important work in electrical engineering and applied physics. And the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce supervised and paid for a range of research activities in several fields of engineering, agriculture and (after 1917) even basic science. In fact, it was the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry which exercised control over the prestigious Research Institute for Physics and Chemistry between 1917 and 1945 where two physicists who later received Nobel prizes were affiliated for some time. 4z
Japan This plurality of government sponsors and funding agencies (which has continued to the present) has had significant benefits for the scientific community and the research establishment. In the earlier part of this century, it allowed scientists to play one government agency off against another and even to bargain for the "best" affiliation. Kitasato successfully opposed for twenty years ( 1893-1914) persistent efforts by the Ministry of Education to gain control of his laboratory.~7 In 1918 two professors of physics at Tokyo University, formally under the control of the Education Ministry, maneuvered control of the budget for the University's Aeronautics Institute away from the Ministry to constrain unwelcome interference in its affairs from that source. And members of the Faculty of Science and of the Faculty of Engineering at Tokyo University built important bridges to private industry between 1917 and 1922 and supported an affiliation with the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce which allowed them freedom to maneuver between it and the Ministry of Education. There are, however, some indications that Japanese scientists since 1945 have not been able to manipulate the bureaucracy with this same degree of success. If this is so, it would likely be owing to three factors: a) the political estrangement between the scientific community and the government which developed after the war, b) the diffusion of formerly scarce scientific and technical knowledge to a greater number of experts and their wider deployment throughout the research system, and c) the widespread concern among officials and private industry for catching up with foreign achievements and corresponding tendency until recently to overlook or ignore domestic capabilities. On the benefit side, one should note that private universities today usually offer degree programs in technical fields and manage to support far more substantial research efforts (either in absolute terms or relative to the efforts of public institutions) than was true in the years before World War Two.~9 Organizational forms in research and education have been a persisting topic of debate among Japanese observers and increasingly among foreigners with particular attention being given to the so-called university "chair system." Unfortunately the subject is rarely discussed with real clarity by either group, the objective instead being to score political or ideological "points" against perceived opponents. Briefly stated, its critics have held that an organization headed by a single full professor with professional responsibility for, and supervisory authority over a laboratory group including junior faculty and graduate students cannot be trusted to act responsibly. Allegations have varied according to time and place, but usually charge senior professors with suppressing critical, creative impulses by younger people, perpetuating favoritism and obstructing many forms of collaboration among different laboratory groups. This is not the place to discuss whether these charges are true or not, though I have addressed this issue elsewhere.20 What I would like to do instead is comment on the origins of the chair system and other important organizational features of the academic system in which the research enterprise is today, and has been, imbedded. When the modern academic system was first organized in the late 19th century, responsible decision-makers paid closest attention, as one might expect, to the nations perceived to be leading in the academic enterprise. At the time this primarily (but not exclusively) meant Germany; and the chair system as an organizational form is essentially that of the nineteenth century German university. However, neither at that time nor any other did Japan adopt foreign organizational forms uncritically. The German pattern called for representing every 43
James R. Bartholomew field of knowledge by a single chair headed by a single full professor. Japanese leaders rejected this so-called "one chair rule" from the very beginning in favor of the French chair system which allowed the creation of multiple chairs per discipline at a given university based loosely on enrollment or perceived societal, including academic need. Nor were the Japanese very impressed by another prominent feature of the German academic system, namely the privatdozenten or unsalaried private lecturers who for a time offered some competition to the salaried academics. Despite many appeals to adopt the practice, the Ministry of Education persistently (and wisely) rejected private lecturers. The Ministry of Education showed equally good judgment in some other critical decisions about how to organize teaching and research. Basically it insisted that agriculture and especially engineering should be integral parts of the university system from the start. From its inception in 1877 Tokyo University had an engineering program; and in 1886 a full fledged Faculty of Engineering was created by combining it with an institution known as the Imperial College of Engineering (established in 1870~. Agriculture for its part was taught at the Komaba Agricultural College (also founded in 1870) in Tokyo but came to constitute a Faculty of Agriculture in 1890. These initiatives were quite daring by the standards of nineteenth century European universities since only a few German institutions included agriculture and none whatsoever included engineering. The models or precedents for them were eclectic indeed. The American land grant universities authorized by the 1863 Morrill Act were one important inspiration for the decision to include applied science in Japan's imperial uni- versity system, while Switzerland's Zurich Polytechnic Institute was the primary model for Tokyo University's Faculty of Engineering. Interestingly enough, the young engineer who did the major organizational work and planning for what became the Faculty of Engineering and selected its Swiss model came from a country (Britain) which had no comparable institution. It is worth making the point also that as a result of these remarkable initiatives, Japan deserves to be recognized as one of the world's pioneers in engineering education! There can be little doubt that these and other organizational models have significantly shaped the course of Japanese research. The multiple chair system provided more prestigious positions for academic scientists than the German one-chair system would ever have allowed, while strong patterns of competition beneficial to research were set in motion and maintained by the system of chairs as a whole. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries one can see this most clearly in medicine; there is every reason to believe that in recent decades one can see it in every major field of research activity. Similarly, the development of engineering research has almost certainly benefited from its association with the university despite the relative estrangement that typified relations between firms and the academy after World War Two. Kotaro Honda's program of research on metals at Tohoku University was able to benefit not only from financial support from Sumitomo Industries but equally from affiliation with a prestigious university whose administrators were unusually attentive to his requests for independence and financial support. Hitachi's successful efforts to manufacture giant turbines for generating hydroelectric power during World War One were attributed by company engineers at the time to the close cooperation they enjoyed with academic engineers at Tokyo University. And work at the University's Aeronautics Research Institute was important-to the success of aircraft manufacturing in Japan during the 1930s and early 1940s. As these and other examples may indicate, the estrangement between Japanese universities and 44
Japan industry which typified the years between 1945 and 1974 was an historical aberration unlikely to be repeated in the future. In fact, developments like the Fifth Generation Computer Project and the newer project on superconductivity in which industry and university are partners indicate quite clearly that the effects of World War Two have largely subsided as newer issues emerge on the scene. Current topics of discussion include the need to enhance "basic research', of the kind that will win more Nobel prizes, and how to promote international cooperation in research, that is how to attract foreign scientists to Japanese laboratories.22 Both issues have complex facets and cannot be dealt with by any single strategy. The entire peer review system allegedly used in making research grants has come under attack and one again hears attacks on senior academic scientists to the effect that their allegedly visceral conservatism impedes the creative impulses of younger scientists working under them.23 While some of these criticisms may on occasion be justified, it is important for American scientists, corporate managers and government officials to understand that there is very little about any of them which is actually new. Professors at imperial universities, for example, were bitterly criticized during World War One and even before for putative dereliction of professional responsibility; and in 1918 it became mandatory for them to retire at the age of sixty. The idea was that their removal from the academy would allow younger, presumably less "conservative" elements to rise to the fore and thus improve the quality of Japanese research. Significantly, this policy remains in effect today, even though hard proof of its efficacy has never to my knowledge been presented by anyone. Similarly, the current, widely publicized discussions about peer review seem curiously ill informed and out of context. The principal claim is that under the so-called "basic support system" funds are guaranteed to researchers at a minimal level irrespective of prior accomplishment or merit. Critics, for example, decry the possibility that a professor at a major institution like Tokyo University might receive the same research stipend from these general funds as a scientist who has worked for the same amount of time at a less prestigious school. While this is not the place for extended discussion of the peer review system, it might be noted: a) that exactly this debate began in 1918 when the Ministry of Education launched its Science Research Grants Program, and by that the criticisms about it over the years have been mutually contradictory and lacking in balance. How to attract more foreign researchers to Japanese laboratories for extended periods of time, I believe, constitutes a more substantial challenge to the Japanese research community than any need or effort to change details of the scientific research funding system. Historically Japan has been relatively isolated from leading centers of science despite elaborate programs of overseas study, systematic journal translation efforts and other kinds of science reconnaissance. Sophisticated electronic information systems and modern air travel since World War Two have alleviated this problem in part but have hardly eliminated it. An NSF official once remarked to me that whenever NSF sponsors a scientific meeting with Japanese participants, the American organizers are urged to engage the Japanese in discussion within the first few hours of the gathering. "Otherwise," he stated, "they will sit there for three or four days without saying anything."24 Another aspect of the same problem is the growing realization among Japanese scientists that Nobel prize winners have often been the pupils and colleagues of previous Nobel recipients.25 There is thus a growing (and I think 45 .
James R. Bartholomew well founded) belief in Japan that unless their scientists can somehow become a more intimate part of this elite human network, they are destined to remain at a second class level. While the Japanese have been poorly served by their isolation from the international research community, they have been well served by their sensitivity to, and flexibility regarding, the organizational and institutional frameworks most suitable to the research enterprise at the various stages of its worldwide evolution. European countries (as the late Joseph Ben-David argued in a noted study for the OECD) have been remarkably hidebound in their organizational conservatism.26 Superficial impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Japanese have displayed a remarkable openness to new organizational forms. They avoided the trap of the "one chair rule" and the privatclozent system in the 19th century. They established research professorships when these seemed desirable. They were able to change the retirement age for professors in 1918 when that seemed essential. And they developed elaborate patterns of university and industry cooperation in the 1930s and 1940s and again since about 1975. To the extent that their current problems or future challenges can, or need to be, solved through institutional changes, one can be confident of their long-term success. NOTES 1. J. L. Bloom and S. Asano, "Tsukuba Science City: Japan Tries Planned Innovation," Science, Vol. 212 (12 June 1981), pp. 1239-1247. ~ M. Anderson, Science and Technology in Japan, London: Longman, 1984, pp. 88-89. 3. J. R. Bartholomew, The Formation of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 199-237. 4. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 88-101. 5. On the founding of the Research Institute, see Bartholomew, op. cit., pp. 212-217. Interwar relations are discussed by M. ~ Cusumano, " 'Scientific Industry': Strategy, Technology, and Management in the Riken Industrial Group, 1917 to 1945," ManagingIndustrialEnterprise:Casesirom Japan 'sPrewa~E~perience, edited by W. Wray, Cambridge: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989, pp. 269-315. N. Kawamiya, "Kotaro Honda: Founder of the Science of Metals in Japan," Japanese Studies in the History of Science, No. 15 (1976), p. 151. 7. Details can be found in Hideo Sato's seminal paper "The Politics of Technology Importation in Japan: Lee Case of Atomic Power Reactors," pp. 7, 16, 22, 25, 48-49. The paper was prepared for the Conference on Technological Innovation and Diffusion in Japan sponsored by the Social Sciences Research Council and held in Kona, Hawaii, February 7-11, 1978. The arguments are also summarized in Bartholomew, op. cit., pp. 278-279. 8. Anderson, op. cit., p. 107. 9. Ibid., p. 104. 10. Bartholomew, op. cit., pp. 276-277. 46
Japan 11. Quoted in S. Nakayama, "The American Occupation and the Science Council of Japan," Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences, edited by E. Mendelsohn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 357-358. 12. For additional details on Kyoto University, see Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 83. 13. Bartholomew, op. cit., pp. 119-120. 14. Ibid., p. 103. 15. Ibid.,p.201. 16. J. B. Blake, "Scientific Institutions Since Lee Renaissance: Their Role In Medical Research," American Philosophical Society, Vol. 101, No. 1 (February 15, 1957), pp. 31-62. Proceedings Of The 17. For details, see J. Bartholomew, "Japanese Culture and the Problem of Modern Science," Science and Values, edited by E. Mendelsohn and A. Thackray, New York: Humanities Press, 1974, pp. 109-155. 18. Bartholomew, op. cit., p. 223. 19. For details, see Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 82-89. 20. See Note 17 above for details. 21. Bartholomew, Op. Cit., pp. 89-124. 22. In 1988, Dr. Enrique Marcatili of Bell Laboratories, a leading specialist in optical communications, accepted a chair at Tokyo University endowed by Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC), the first event of its kind in Japan. Japanese officials and scientists hope this appointment will constitute a trend. For details, see the remarks of Dr. Hiroshi Inose in "Discussion: Scientific Exchange, Getting the Word Out," Look Japan, (March 1988), p. 32. 23 See, for example, the views on the peer review system of Dr. Susumu Tonegawa, Nobel laureate in medicine for 1987, as reported by Stephen Kreider Yoder, "Native Son's Nobel Award Is Japan's Loss," The Wall Street Journal, Vol. CCX, No. 75 (Wednesday, October 14, 1987), p 26. 24. Private conversation, January 26, 1983, at Dedham, Massachusetts. 25. Dr. Yoneichiro Sakaki, Professor of Electrical Engineering Emeritus at Nagoya University, makes this point in "Kenlyusha no aide no ningen kankei no taisetsusa," Ga~jutsu Geppo, Vol. 40, No. 12 (December 15, 1987), p. 918. 26. J. Ben-David, Fundamental Research and the Universities, Development, 1968. 47 Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and
James R. Bartholomew BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, ~ M. Science and Technology in Japan London: Longman, 1984. Bartholomew, J. R. The Fonrzaizon of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989. Bartholomew, J. R. "Japanese Culture and the Problem of Modern Science." Science and Values. Edited bar E. Mendelsohn and ~ Thackray. New York: Humanities Press, 1974. Ben-David, J. Fundamental Research and the Universities. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1968. Blake, J. B. "Scientific Institutions Since Lee Renaissance: Their Role In Medical Research." Proceedings Of Me American Philosophical Society, Vol. 101, No. 1 (February 15, 1957), pp. 31-62. Bloom, J. L. and S. Asano. "Tsukuba Science City: Japan Tries Planned Innovation." Science, Vol. 212 (12 June 1981), pp. 1239-1247. Cusumano, M. A. " 'Scientif c Industry': Strategy, Technology, and Management in the Riken Industrial Group, 1917 to 1945. '' Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases from Japan's Prewar Experience. Edited by W. Wray. Cambridge: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989. Inose, H. "Discussion: Scientific Exchange, Getting the Word Out." Look Japan, (March 1988), p. 32. Kawamiya, N. "Kotaro Honda: Founder of the Science of Metals in Japan." Japanese Studies in the History of Science, No. 15 (1976), p. 151. Nakayama, S. "The American Occupation and the Science Council of Japan." Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences. Edited by E. Mendelsohn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Sakaki, Y. "Kenkyusha no aide no ningen kankei no taisetsusa." Gakujutsu Geppo, Vol. 40, No. 12 (December 15, 1987), p. 918. Sato, H. "The Politics of Technology Importation in Japan: The Case of Atomic Power Reactors." Paper presented at Conference on Technological Innovation and Diffusion in Japan, Social Sciences Research Council, Kona, Hawaii, February 7-11, 1978. Yoder, S. K "Native Son's Nobel Award Is Japan's Loss." Wall Street Journal, Vol. CCX, No. 75 (Wednesday, October 14, 1987), p. 26. 48
SOVIET UNION
