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OCR for page 39
THE UNIVERSITY, INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH IN JAPAN
James R. Bartholomew
The Ohio State University
Over the past several decades, Japan has created a substantially different type of research
system from that which exists in the United States today. The Japanese system links basic
research more closely with industry. It relies far more heavily on private financing, but with
government interventions in critical fields. And it displays a prominent inclination to change
fundamental elements of the academic system in ways that will hopefully be beneficial to
research. It is a matter of opinion whether one national system is superior to the other: such
judgments must depend partly on the objectives defined. The point is simply that Japanese
procedures and experience can be instructive for Americans who seek alternatives to elements
of current practice here and are thus worth considering in a framework of comparison.
Current rethinking of research organization in the United States and the place of teaching
in it could certainly benefit from the experience of Japan. In all Japanese universities from
the most prestigious to those of lowest stature, professors have traditionally been expected to
teach as well as do research. Prior to 1918 there were no exceptions to this pattern at all; and
in the period since 1945 even university presidents have only been exempted from teaching
on a temporary basis. Much has been written about the institutional innovativeness of
Tsukuba University and its attached Science City (created in 1973. But here as elsewhere
teaching is deemed essential to the professorial role.2
Nevertheless, in special circumstances the Japanese have created academic (i.e. university
affiliated) roles exclusively for research without any teaching. This happened for the first
time in 1918 when, as a result of difficult adjustments linked to World War One, the research
professorship was established at Tokyo University. The conditions surrounding this event are
instructive. Prior to 1914 Japan had relied very heavily on foreign (especially German)
sources of supply for scientific knowledge and technical products pharmaceuticals, industrial
chemicals, scientific instruments. However, the Anglo-French naval blockade of Imperial
Germany made such imports impossible; and the country was entirely thrown back on its own
resources. The years 1914-1919 thus witnessed significant intellectual and institutional
initiatives in science, including a small number of research professorships established for
engineering and physics in connection with the University's Aeronautics Institute (founded
1918).3 More recently there have been other initiatives which ultimately seem linked to a
similar motivation. Beginning in the early 1970s, the Ministry of Education began to establish
what are rather inelegantly known in English as National Research Institutes for Joint Use
by Universities. These facilities, which now number six, carry on research in high energy
physics (at the well known KKK laboratory at Tsukuba), polar studies, molecular science,
physiology and biolo~v. As their collective name implies the Arc anon to r~r~hPrc front
~ - ~ - ~ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A ~ ~
any academic Institution. State members hold academic titles (professor and the rest) but are
not required to do any teaching. There are variations on this pattern as illustrated by the
Research Institute for Fundamental Physics of Kyoto University where professors may free
themselves of teaching under shorter term arrangements of up to five years.4 In all of these
cases such arrangements seem to reflect a sense among decision-makers either that independent
research capability is essential or that Japan itself holds a leadership position in the particular
39
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James R. Bartholomew
specialty. But one cannot extrapolate from the experience of these specialties to the research
system as a whole. A combination of research and teaching is still very much the norm.
Relations between universities and private industry in Japan have shown nothing like the
consistency of thinking about the academic role of the teacher-researcher. Prior to 1914
Japanese companies had little interest in developing research capabilities either alone or in
conjunction with universities. But they did employ university professors as ad hoc consultants
regarding foreign technology so often as to generate allegations that professors were neglecting
students and their own research. These criticisms intensified when the war broke out, but the
wartime need for indigenous research brought, if anything, a more (not less) intimate
relationship between firms and the academy as cooperation not only continued but assumed
a higher level. Establishment of the prestigious Research Institute for Physics and Chemistry
in 1917 was accomplished by a formal partnership between academics and firms and in many
ways set the tone for such relations in the interwar period.5 Kotaro Honda's Institute for
Metals Research at Tohoku University, for example, relied heavily for its financial support
on the Sumitomo group of business enterprises.6
A pattern of considerable (though never total) estrangement between firms and universities
developed after 1945. Many academic scientists became hostile to business on the (mostly
incorrect) Marxist assumption that Japanese capitalism had encouraged Japanese militarism,
while many firms were so interested in acquiring Western technology as to give short shrift
to domestic research. One can see the negative consequences of this partial estrangement both
for research and the general welfare in Japan's efforts to develop a nuclear power industry
during the period 1953-1980. Following President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address
to the U. N. General Assembly in December 1953, business and political circles in Japan
became captivated by the notion that atomic power offered the solution to Japan's energy
needs and decided to import nuclear reactors from Britain. Prominent members of the
scientific community-especially Nobel physics laureate Hideki Yukawa cautioned against
this excess of optimism and reminded all concerned of the pitfalls involved. The scientists
emphasized that atomic energy was not at that time a "proven" technology and that to import
it successfully would require more research, a point which was widely accepted in Europe,
even among groups which were planning the sale. But political and business leaders rejected
further research, claimed that the technology was safe and dismissed the scientists' views as
self interested and alarmist. The result was an inefficient nuclear industry and numerous
power plant breakdowns through the end of the 1970s.7
The latter half of the 1970s saw the emergence of a different, more cooperative pattern
between firms and universities, which has continued to the present and in many respects
revives the pre-war pattern. Firms in recent years have sold or leased research equipment to
universities at very low prices and have in some cases given laboratory access to professors and
graduate students.8 Most importantly, academic scientists are increasingly being named to
head large scale research programs partly funded by government but extensively carried out
in industrial laboratories. Dr. Tohru Mototoka, professor of electrical engineering at Tokyo
University, has served as director of the 5th Generation Computer Project since 1981; while
a colleague, Dr. Shoji Tanaka, professor of applied physics at the same institution, is heading
up a major project in superconductivity.
40
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Japan
Even while acknowledging academic scientists' renewed prominence in major research
projects, it must be stressed that industry has been the major player in Japanese research for
all o f the postwar period. About two-thirds of all Japanese research and development
expenditures have been contributed by private firms.9 While this pattern varies sharply from
that of other leading industrial democracies where government funding is prominent, it is
readily explicable in the Japanese context. Between 1880 and 1920 nearly all research funding
was provided by the government. However, the 1920s saw a significant shift of funding away
from the purely academic setting toward a mixture of corporate laboratories (a new
phenomenon in Japan at that time) and mission laboratories attached to government ministries.
This was a worldwide trend, but it also derived in Japan from a widespread belief that
university research was seriously constrained by factional infighting, professional favoritism
and an unfavorable climate generally.~° In the 1930s and early 1940s academic researchers
were heavily co-opted by the military for war-related work through the Japan Society for the
Advancement of Science, a pattern which later encouraged estrangement between society and
the academy and led industry to go its own way in research. Then during the Occupation
years of the late 1940s, American policy actively encouraged Japanese decision-makers to
emphasize applied research at which industry excelled at the expense of basic research (where
universities were active) as a basic strategy for rebuilding the country. The American
physicist H. C. Kelly, who was particularly influential in developing this posture, actually
called basic research in 1948 a "luxury in the light of existing conditions.
Industry's influence has also been great in the realm of education. Following a 1954
initiative from the Ministry of Education, the Nikkeiren (Japanese Federation of Economic
Organizations) issued a formal report in 1956 which criticized the law-liberal arts biases in
the selection of university students and demanded more emphasis on science and engineering.
In 1961, the cabinet of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda acted on this recommendation by
increasing dramatically the number of university places reserved for students in science and
engineering. Whereas matriculation slots for such students were 28 percent of the total in
1952, by 1968 they constituted 46 percent. A comparison between Kyoto University and
Stanford University (which are comparable universities and sister institutions) illustrates the
result of this policy at present. Some 34 percent of Kyoto University undergraduates are
currently majoring in engineering; at Stanford the figure is 7 percent. Once we take into
account the particular career patterns of Ikeda and most of the postwar Japanese prime
ministers, who have generally been involved in business and government, it will be readily
apparent that industry has played a very large role in formulating both research policies and
those for education.
Historically, however, it was the Japanese government that played the greater role. Prior
to World War One industry was rarely willing to spend money on research on the assumption
either that it would cost too much or that imported knowledge was sufficient for its needs.
Over 90 percent of research was concentrated in university and government laboratories and
the national government paid most of the bill. The first indication that private industry might
support research came in 1900 with establishment of the Industrial Experiment Laboratory in
Tokyo. This government facility was established to perform contract research on a
fee-for-service basis for the emerging chemical industry. The Laboratory did well enough that
its technical staff even doubled to about two dozen investigators and assistants after the
Russo-Japanese War in 1905. However, the significance of this venture at the time should not
41
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James R. Bartholomew
be overstated. A member of parliament who made a formal inquiry in 1913 noted that the
Laboratory was poorly located, largely unknown to potential customers and had to face
competition from a nearby Commercial Exhibitions Hall (supported by the government) where
foreign machinery and technical apparatus was displayed for the edification and enrichment
of private manufacturers!~3
Until 1918 Japan had a centrally controlled, more or less unitary system for scientific
and technical research and education. The Ministry of Education supervised a national
network of so-called imperial universities and professional schools of lesser stature where
undergraduate instruction in basic science and certain applied fields was available. At the
graduate level, instruction and training were only available at the four imperial universities
(Tokyo, Kyoto, Tohoku and Kyushu). Significantly, work in engineering was only available
at the imperial universities. In medicine, however, degree programs and research facilities
were available at a number of prefectural government medical colleges and two proprietary
medical academies.
The monopoly of scientific and technical education and research by a small number of
government institutions was for many years a matter of policy, though rarely articulated in
so blatant a form. Between -1877 and 1914 there were several attempts to establish degree
programs in technical disciplines at private institutions (Keio, Doshisha and Waseda). But in
every case the Ministry of Education refused to grant equivalency status to the diplomas
awarded their graduates and by doing this brought about the desired result, which was the
formal demise of these programs.~4 Ultimately, however, the policy could not last. Technical
education was expensive and public funds were simply insufficient to sustain the monopoly,
particularly at a time when private industry was demanding more engineers and even scientists
than the government institutions could provide. With the coming of World War One in 1914
the monopoly began to dissolve, though it was only in 1918 that the Ministry of Education was
finally willing to allow private institutions like Kelo, Doshisha and Waseda to use the term
"university" in their names and confer degrees which were legally equivalent to those awarded
by the imperial universities.is It should also be noted that once the system of monopoly
control fell apart, there was never again an attempt to reimpose it.
Any attempt to label the government's control system for science and engineering in this
early period a "unitary system" should be qualified in another way, too. While the Ministry
of Education had an effective monopoly over scientific and technical education, it never had
such control over scientific and technical research. The Ministry of Home Affairs was very
active in medical research, particularly the domain of infectious diseases and microbiology
where Shibasaburo Kitasato (who died in 1931) directed one of the world's three leading
research facilities in his field at that time. Similarly, the Ministry of Communications
sponsored important work in electrical engineering and applied physics. And the Ministry of
Agriculture and Commerce supervised and paid for a range of research activities in several
fields of engineering, agriculture and (after 1917) even basic science. In fact, it was the
Agriculture and Commerce Ministry which exercised control over the prestigious Research
Institute for Physics and Chemistry between 1917 and 1945 where two physicists who later
received Nobel prizes were affiliated for some time.
4z
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Japan
This plurality of government sponsors and funding agencies (which has continued to the
present) has had significant benefits for the scientific community and the research
establishment. In the earlier part of this century, it allowed scientists to play one government
agency off against another and even to bargain for the "best" affiliation. Kitasato
successfully opposed for twenty years ( 1893-1914) persistent efforts by the Ministry of
Education to gain control of his laboratory.~7 In 1918 two professors of physics at Tokyo
University, formally under the control of the Education Ministry, maneuvered control of the
budget for the University's Aeronautics Institute away from the Ministry to constrain
unwelcome interference in its affairs from that source. And members of the Faculty of Science
and of the Faculty of Engineering at Tokyo University built important bridges to private
industry between 1917 and 1922 and supported an affiliation with the Ministry of Agriculture
and Commerce which allowed them freedom to maneuver between it and the Ministry of
Education.
There are, however, some indications that Japanese scientists since 1945 have not been
able to manipulate the bureaucracy with this same degree of success. If this is so, it would
likely be owing to three factors: a) the political estrangement between the scientific
community and the government which developed after the war, b) the diffusion of formerly
scarce scientific and technical knowledge to a greater number of experts and their wider
deployment throughout the research system, and c) the widespread concern among officials
and private industry for catching up with foreign achievements and corresponding tendency
until recently to overlook or ignore domestic capabilities. On the benefit side, one should note
that private universities today usually offer degree programs in technical fields and manage
to support far more substantial research efforts (either in absolute terms or relative to the
efforts of public institutions) than was true in the years before World War Two.~9
Organizational forms in research and education have been a persisting topic of debate
among Japanese observers and increasingly among foreigners with particular attention being
given to the so-called university "chair system." Unfortunately the subject is rarely discussed
with real clarity by either group, the objective instead being to score political or ideological
"points" against perceived opponents. Briefly stated, its critics have held that an organization
headed by a single full professor with professional responsibility for, and supervisory
authority over a laboratory group including junior faculty and graduate students cannot be
trusted to act responsibly. Allegations have varied according to time and place, but usually
charge senior professors with suppressing critical, creative impulses by younger people,
perpetuating favoritism and obstructing many forms of collaboration among different
laboratory groups. This is not the place to discuss whether these charges are true or not,
though I have addressed this issue elsewhere.20 What I would like to do instead is comment on
the origins of the chair system and other important organizational features of the academic
system in which the research enterprise is today, and has been, imbedded.
When the modern academic system was first organized in the late 19th century, responsible
decision-makers paid closest attention, as one might expect, to the nations perceived to be
leading in the academic enterprise. At the time this primarily (but not exclusively) meant
Germany; and the chair system as an organizational form is essentially that of the nineteenth
century German university. However, neither at that time nor any other did Japan adopt
foreign organizational forms uncritically. The German pattern called for representing every
43
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James R. Bartholomew
field of knowledge by a single chair headed by a single full professor. Japanese leaders
rejected this so-called "one chair rule" from the very beginning in favor of the French chair
system which allowed the creation of multiple chairs per discipline at a given university based
loosely on enrollment or perceived societal, including academic need. Nor were the Japanese
very impressed by another prominent feature of the German academic system, namely the
privatdozenten or unsalaried private lecturers who for a time offered some competition to the
salaried academics. Despite many appeals to adopt the practice, the Ministry of Education
persistently (and wisely) rejected private lecturers.
The Ministry of Education showed equally good judgment in some other critical decisions
about how to organize teaching and research. Basically it insisted that agriculture and
especially engineering should be integral parts of the university system from the start. From
its inception in 1877 Tokyo University had an engineering program; and in 1886 a full fledged
Faculty of Engineering was created by combining it with an institution known as the Imperial
College of Engineering (established in 1870~. Agriculture for its part was taught at the
Komaba Agricultural College (also founded in 1870) in Tokyo but came to constitute a Faculty
of Agriculture in 1890. These initiatives were quite daring by the standards of nineteenth
century European universities since only a few German institutions included agriculture and
none whatsoever included engineering. The models or precedents for them were eclectic
indeed. The American land grant universities authorized by the 1863 Morrill Act were one
important inspiration for the decision to include applied science in Japan's imperial uni-
versity system, while Switzerland's Zurich Polytechnic Institute was the primary model for
Tokyo University's Faculty of Engineering. Interestingly enough, the young engineer who did
the major organizational work and planning for what became the Faculty of Engineering and
selected its Swiss model came from a country (Britain) which had no comparable institution.
It is worth making the point also that as a result of these remarkable initiatives, Japan
deserves to be recognized as one of the world's pioneers in engineering education!
There can be little doubt that these and other organizational models have significantly
shaped the course of Japanese research. The multiple chair system provided more prestigious
positions for academic scientists than the German one-chair system would ever have allowed,
while strong patterns of competition beneficial to research were set in motion and maintained
by the system of chairs as a whole. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries one
can see this most clearly in medicine; there is every reason to believe that in recent decades
one can see it in every major field of research activity. Similarly, the development of
engineering research has almost certainly benefited from its association with the university
despite the relative estrangement that typified relations between firms and the academy after
World War Two. Kotaro Honda's program of research on metals at Tohoku University was able
to benefit not only from financial support from Sumitomo Industries but equally from
affiliation with a prestigious university whose administrators were unusually attentive to his
requests for independence and financial support. Hitachi's successful efforts to manufacture
giant turbines for generating hydroelectric power during World War One were attributed by
company engineers at the time to the close cooperation they enjoyed with academic engineers
at Tokyo University. And work at the University's Aeronautics Research Institute was
important-to the success of aircraft manufacturing in Japan during the 1930s and early 1940s.
As these and other examples may indicate, the estrangement between Japanese universities and
44
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Japan
industry which typified the years between 1945 and 1974 was an historical aberration unlikely
to be repeated in the future.
In fact, developments like the Fifth Generation Computer Project and the newer project
on superconductivity in which industry and university are partners indicate quite clearly
that the effects of World War Two have largely subsided as newer issues emerge on the scene.
Current topics of discussion include the need to enhance "basic research', of the kind that will
win more Nobel prizes, and how to promote international cooperation in research, that is how
to attract foreign scientists to Japanese laboratories.22 Both issues have complex facets and
cannot be dealt with by any single strategy. The entire peer review system allegedly used in
making research grants has come under attack and one again hears attacks on senior academic
scientists to the effect that their allegedly visceral conservatism impedes the creative impulses
of younger scientists working under them.23 While some of these criticisms may on occasion
be justified, it is important for American scientists, corporate managers and government
officials to understand that there is very little about any of them which is actually new.
Professors at imperial universities, for example, were bitterly criticized during World War One
and even before for putative dereliction of professional responsibility; and in 1918 it became
mandatory for them to retire at the age of sixty. The idea was that their removal from the
academy would allow younger, presumably less "conservative" elements to rise to the fore and
thus improve the quality of Japanese research. Significantly, this policy remains in effect
today, even though hard proof of its efficacy has never to my knowledge been presented by
anyone.
Similarly, the current, widely publicized discussions about peer review seem curiously ill
informed and out of context. The principal claim is that under the so-called "basic support
system" funds are guaranteed to researchers at a minimal level irrespective of prior
accomplishment or merit. Critics, for example, decry the possibility that a professor at a major
institution like Tokyo University might receive the same research stipend from these general
funds as a scientist who has worked for the same amount of time at a less prestigious school.
While this is not the place for extended discussion of the peer review system, it might be noted:
a) that exactly this debate began in 1918 when the Ministry of Education launched its Science
Research Grants Program, and by that the criticisms about it over the years have been mutually
contradictory and lacking in balance.
How to attract more foreign researchers to Japanese laboratories for extended periods of
time, I believe, constitutes a more substantial challenge to the Japanese research community
than any need or effort to change details of the scientific research funding system.
Historically Japan has been relatively isolated from leading centers of science despite
elaborate programs of overseas study, systematic journal translation efforts and other kinds
of science reconnaissance. Sophisticated electronic information systems and modern air travel
since World War Two have alleviated this problem in part but have hardly eliminated it. An
NSF official once remarked to me that whenever NSF sponsors a scientific meeting with
Japanese participants, the American organizers are urged to engage the Japanese in discussion
within the first few hours of the gathering. "Otherwise," he stated, "they will sit there for
three or four days without saying anything."24 Another aspect of the same problem is the
growing realization among Japanese scientists that Nobel prize winners have often been the
pupils and colleagues of previous Nobel recipients.25 There is thus a growing (and I think
45
.
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James R. Bartholomew
well founded) belief in Japan that unless their scientists can somehow become a more intimate
part of this elite human network, they are destined to remain at a second class level.
While the Japanese have been poorly served by their isolation from the international
research community, they have been well served by their sensitivity to, and flexibility
regarding, the organizational and institutional frameworks most suitable to the research
enterprise at the various stages of its worldwide evolution. European countries (as the late
Joseph Ben-David argued in a noted study for the OECD) have been remarkably hidebound
in their organizational conservatism.26
Superficial impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Japanese have displayed a
remarkable openness to new organizational forms. They avoided the trap of the "one chair
rule" and the privatclozent system in the 19th century. They established research professorships
when these seemed desirable. They were able to change the retirement age for professors in
1918 when that seemed essential. And they developed elaborate patterns of university and
industry cooperation in the 1930s and 1940s and again since about 1975. To the extent that
their current problems or future challenges can, or need to be, solved through institutional
changes, one can be confident of their long-term success.
NOTES
1. J. L. Bloom and S. Asano, "Tsukuba Science City: Japan Tries Planned Innovation," Science, Vol. 212 (12 June 1981),
pp. 1239-1247.
~ M. Anderson, Science and Technology in Japan, London: Longman, 1984, pp. 88-89.
3. J. R. Bartholomew, The Formation of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition, New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1989, pp. 199-237.
4. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 88-101.
5. On the founding of the Research Institute, see Bartholomew, op. cit., pp. 212-217. Interwar relations are discussed
by M. ~ Cusumano, " 'Scientific Industry': Strategy, Technology, and Management in the Riken Industrial Group,
1917 to 1945," ManagingIndustrialEnterprise:Casesirom Japan 'sPrewa~E~perience, edited by W. Wray, Cambridge:
Harvard Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989, pp. 269-315.
N. Kawamiya, "Kotaro Honda: Founder of the Science of Metals in Japan," Japanese Studies in the History of Science,
No. 15 (1976), p. 151.
7. Details can be found in Hideo Sato's seminal paper "The Politics of Technology Importation in Japan: Lee Case of
Atomic Power Reactors," pp. 7, 16, 22, 25, 48-49. The paper was prepared for the Conference on Technological
Innovation and Diffusion in Japan sponsored by the Social Sciences Research Council and held in Kona, Hawaii,
February 7-11, 1978. The arguments are also summarized in Bartholomew, op. cit., pp. 278-279.
8. Anderson, op. cit., p. 107.
9. Ibid., p. 104.
10. Bartholomew, op. cit., pp. 276-277.
46
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Japan
11. Quoted in S. Nakayama, "The American Occupation and the Science Council of Japan," Transformation and Tradition
in the Sciences, edited by E. Mendelsohn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 357-358.
12. For additional details on Kyoto University, see Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 83.
13. Bartholomew, op. cit., pp. 119-120.
14. Ibid., p. 103.
15. Ibid.,p.201.
16. J. B. Blake, "Scientific Institutions Since Lee Renaissance: Their Role In Medical Research,"
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 101, No. 1 (February 15, 1957), pp. 31-62.
Proceedings Of The
17. For details, see J. Bartholomew, "Japanese Culture and the Problem of Modern Science," Science and Values, edited
by E. Mendelsohn and A. Thackray, New York: Humanities Press, 1974, pp. 109-155.
18. Bartholomew, op. cit., p. 223.
19. For details, see Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 82-89.
20. See Note 17 above for details.
21. Bartholomew, Op. Cit., pp. 89-124.
22. In 1988, Dr. Enrique Marcatili of Bell Laboratories, a leading specialist in optical communications, accepted a chair
at Tokyo University endowed by Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC), the first event of its kind in Japan. Japanese
officials and scientists hope this appointment will constitute a trend. For details, see the remarks of Dr. Hiroshi Inose
in "Discussion: Scientific Exchange, Getting the Word Out," Look Japan, (March 1988), p. 32.
23 See, for example, the views on the peer review system of Dr. Susumu Tonegawa, Nobel laureate in medicine for
1987, as reported by Stephen Kreider Yoder, "Native Son's Nobel Award Is Japan's Loss," The Wall Street Journal,
Vol. CCX, No. 75 (Wednesday, October 14, 1987), p 26.
24. Private conversation, January 26, 1983, at Dedham, Massachusetts.
25. Dr. Yoneichiro Sakaki, Professor of Electrical Engineering Emeritus at Nagoya University, makes this point in
"Kenlyusha no aide no ningen kankei no taisetsusa," Ga~jutsu Geppo, Vol. 40, No. 12 (December 15, 1987), p. 918.
26. J. Ben-David, Fundamental Research and the Universities,
Development, 1968.
47
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James R. Bartholomew
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, ~ M. Science and Technology in Japan London: Longman, 1984.
Bartholomew, J. R. The Fonrzaizon of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1989.
Bartholomew, J. R. "Japanese Culture and the Problem of Modern Science." Science and Values. Edited bar E.
Mendelsohn and ~ Thackray. New York: Humanities Press, 1974.
Ben-David, J. Fundamental Research and the Universities. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 1968.
Blake, J. B. "Scientific Institutions Since Lee Renaissance: Their Role In Medical Research." Proceedings Of Me American
Philosophical Society, Vol. 101, No. 1 (February 15, 1957), pp. 31-62.
Bloom, J. L. and S. Asano. "Tsukuba Science City: Japan Tries Planned Innovation." Science, Vol. 212 (12 June 1981),
pp. 1239-1247.
Cusumano, M. A. " 'Scientif c Industry': Strategy, Technology, and Management in the Riken Industrial Group, 1917 to 1945. ''
Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases from Japan's Prewar Experience. Edited by W. Wray. Cambridge: Harvard
Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989.
Inose, H. "Discussion: Scientific Exchange, Getting the Word Out." Look Japan, (March 1988), p. 32.
Kawamiya, N. "Kotaro Honda: Founder of the Science of Metals in Japan." Japanese Studies in the History of Science, No.
15 (1976), p. 151.
Nakayama, S. "The American Occupation and the Science Council of Japan." Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences.
Edited by E. Mendelsohn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Sakaki, Y. "Kenkyusha no aide no ningen kankei no taisetsusa." Gakujutsu Geppo, Vol. 40, No. 12 (December 15, 1987),
p. 918.
Sato, H. "The Politics of Technology Importation in Japan: The Case of Atomic Power Reactors." Paper presented at
Conference on Technological Innovation and Diffusion in Japan, Social Sciences Research Council, Kona, Hawaii,
February 7-11, 1978.
Yoder, S. K "Native Son's Nobel Award Is Japan's Loss." Wall Street Journal, Vol. CCX, No. 75 (Wednesday, October
14, 1987), p. 26.
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SOVIET UNION
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
imperial universities
