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APPENDIX C
WORKSHOP ON RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND UTILIZATION
OF FEDERAL SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
Agenda
Participants
Proceedings
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145
147
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Agenda
Workshop on the Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization
of Federal Scientists and Engineers
National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C.
February 23, 1990
8:00 Continental breakfast
8:30 Opening Remarks and Findings of Previous Studies*
Alan K Campbell, chairman, Committee on Scientists and Engineers in the
Federal Govemment
9:30 Quantitative Inputs to Federal Technical Personnel Management*
Charles Falk retired director, Science Resources Shies, National Science
Foundation
10:30 Break
10:45 Organizational and Decision-Making Processes Affecting Recruitment, Retention,
and Utilization
.
11:30 Lunch, NAS Refectory
The Role of OPM in Meeting Federal Work Force Needs with
Regard to Scientists and Engineers*
John M. Paiguta, deputy director, Office of Policy and Evaluation, U.S.
Merit Systems Protection Board
1:00 Differences in Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization Processes:
A Comparison of Traditionally Operated Federal Laboratories,
GOCOs, and Demonstration Projects*
Sheldon B. Clark senior research scientist, Labor and Policy Studies
Program, Oak Ridge Associated Universities
i:45 The Effects of the Political Appointment Process on Recruitment
and Retention of Scientists and Engineers*
lames P. Puffer, professor of government and politics, George Mason
University
2:30 Break
3:15 General Discussion: Changes in organizational and decision-making processes
that might improve the recruitment, retention, and utilization of scientists and
engineers Alan K Campbell
5:00 Adjournment
*Discussion will follow each 15-~runute presentation.
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Participants
Workshop on the Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization
of Federal Scientists and Engineers
National Academy of Sciences-Washington, D.C.
- February 23, 1990
Federal Agencies
U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Essex Finney, acting director, Beltsville Area Agricultural Research Service
Department of Commerce:
John Lyons, director designate, National Institute of Standards and Technology
Robert Mahler, deputy director, Environmental Research Laboratories, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Defense:
Larry Lacy, head, Civilian Personnel Policy and Requirements
Susan Numrich, Office of Strategic Planning, Naval Research Laboratory
William B. Porter, technical director, Naval Weapons Center
Karl Steinbach, chief scientist, U.S. Army Belvoir Research and Development Center
Department of Energy:
Norman L. Howton, director, Organization and Personnel Division, Morgantown Energy
Technology Center
Mary Parramore, assistant to the director, Argonne National Laboratory
Department of Health and Human Services:
Phillip Chen, associate director for intramural affairs, National Institutes of Health
James Eagen, director, Public Health Service
Mary Guinan, assistant director for science, Centers for Disease Control
Sharon Holston, Food and Drug Administration
Department of the Interior:
Stephen E. Ragone, acting assistant director for research, U.S. Geological Survey
Department of Transportation:
Brian Andrews, supervisory computer scientist, Federal Aviation Administration
Nancy Mowry, supervisory personnel management specialist
Environmental Protection Agency:
Clarence Hardy, deputy director, Office of Human Resources Management
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Dale Compton, acting director, Ames Research Center
Robert E. Sutherland, manager, Human Resources Division, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
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Merit Systems Protection Board:
Paul van Rijn, research psychologist
National Science Foundation:
Margaret Grucza, director, Governanent Studies Group
Margaret Windus, head, Division of Personnel Management
Office of Personnel Management:
Jack Curnow, chief, Statistical Analysis and Service Division
Leonard Klein, acting associate director, Career Entry and Employee Development
Group
Paul Thompson, project head, Research and Demonstration Division
Dona Wolf, director of policy
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
Jesse Ausube]
David Robinson
NAS/NRC/IOM
William D. Carey, chairman, Office of Scientific and Engineering Personnel (OSEP)
Claudia Dissel, associate executive director, OSEP
Alan Fechter, executive director, OSEP
Michael Finn, director of studies and surveys, OSEP
Steve Merrill, director, Office of Government Affairs
Lawrence E. McCray, executive director, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public
Policy
Others
Mark Abramson, executive director, Council for Excellence in Government
Barbara Bailar, executive director, American Statistical Association
Sandra Fiske, director, Federal Government Service Task Force
Ray Kline, president, National Academy for Public Administration
L. Bruce Laingen, executive director, National Commission on the Public Service
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Proceedings
Workshop on the Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization
of Federal Scientists and Engineers
National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C.
February 23, 1990
Opening Remarks and Review of Previous Studies
Dr. CAMPBELL opened the session by explaining that the task of the Committee
on Scientists and Engineers in the Federal Government assigned to the Office of
Scientific and Engineering Personnel by the Carnegie Commission that is examining
major issues concerning scientists, engineers, and technology and the general capability
of the United States in those areas- is to look at the issues of recruitment, retention,
and utilization of scientists and engineers as they relate to the federal government with
an emphasis on organizational and procedural mechanisms. The purpose of this
workshop is for the Committee to gather as much information as it can in preparation of
a report due to the Carnegie Commission in early summer. He noted that the
commissioned papers reveal a lack of consensus in specific matters- for example,
evidence that scientists and engineers are overpaid or that they are substantially
underpaid in the federal government. The basic issue relates to inadequate
disaggregation of the data. Among other matters of interest are the following:
"inflexibility" of the civil service system and experimentation in the area of
personnel management in the federal government, particularly contrasts between
those labs directly operated by the federal government and those to which
services are contracted;
ethics, an area of counter forces: one dealing with issues that relate to people
taking advantage of their federal positions and another advocating enough
flexibility so that regulations and laws don't discourage prospective employees;
differences in pay based on geographic location (Dr. CAMPBELL noted that, in
the private sector, much of this is handled by up-front payments such as bonus
sign-one and special bonus opportunities rather than trying to deal with base pay
issues);
ownership of intellectual property;
the quality of the working environment, which varies substantially from lab to lab;
and
the increase in the number of noncareer appointees in the federal government
and their effects on the quality of people that are attracted to federal service and
institutional memory.
Quantitative Inputs
to Federal Technical Personnel Management
Dr. FALK opened by asserting, 'Jo say that effective management requires good
information input is almost a truism. Nevertheless, that one facet of management
frequently does not get the type of attention it should." His presentation was divided
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into three parts: (~) a description of the types of data needed and sources of relevant
data, (2) an analysis as to the extent to which the data are being used, and (3) findings
from the data. He divided the relevant data into two broad categories, descriptive and
dynamic. Descriptive data provide information on the characteristics of the work force
at a given point in time: demography (age, sex, and race); education (highest degree);
work activity (occupation, type of work, its relevance to special national interests such as
defense or environment, and salary); and quality of the work force. Dynamic data are
important to assess what is happening to the work force. providing insights about whv
----rid err , ~ _--- force, providing Insights about why
people leave, whether those who stay are satisfied with their jobs, and what is likely to
happen in the future.
Do Needed Data Exist?
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regularly gets data from federal
agencies about characteristics of their personnel; excepted agencies are the U.S. Postal
Service, security agencies such as the National Security Council and the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the uniformed services. Data from the Tennessee Valley
Authority is not reported regularly to OPM but at certain intervals. OPM's Central
Personnel Data File (CPDF) includes most of the descriptive elements and some
dynamic ones, primarily those related to acquisitions and separations of personnel, as
well as administrative data such as individual pay schedules. The data are compiled
quarterly but published only every two years in Occupation of Federal White and Blue
Collar Workers, which essentially presents descriptive data (mostly on sex, salary,
occupation, and grade) but only in aggregated form by occupational codes.
Annual aggregated data are published by the National Science Foundation (NSF)
by compiling the OPM data into occupational groups and subgroups-for example, the
physical sciences in the sciences and mechanical engineering or electrical engineering in
the engineering groups. NSF provides data in 13 different types of tables in its annual
Federal Scientists and Engineers. In addition, NSF provides data on the whole national
science and engineering labor force, including the federal sector, facilitating comparisons
across sectors of employment. For sectors other than the federal government, the NSF
data are obtained from the individual 5.5 million scientists and engineers themselves, on
a sampling basis. NSF also obtains data from recent graduates, baccalaureates and
master's recipients, about a year after they graduate; and the National Research Council
maintains a data base on the entire U.S. doctorate population, based on responses to the
annual Survey of Earned Doctorates.
The NSF numbers and the OPM data vary considerably because different
definitions for "scientist" and "engineer" are used by the two organizations. OPM reports
data on individuals who are classified in a science or engineering occupation. Based on
individual responses to its surveys, NSF classifies as scientists and engineers those who
meet two out of three criteria: (~) a degree in a science or engineering field, (2) a job in
a science or engineering occupation, and (3) self-cIassification. As a result, NSF data
include individuals who are not necessarily working in a science or engineering
occupation at the time surveyed for example, an engineer who is now in a
nonengineering job but who considers himself or herself an engineer and holds an
engineering degree. Discrepancies between OPM and NSF data are inevitable because
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they come from different sources: OPM data from employers and NSF data from
individuals.
Two agencies in Washington, D.C., regularly provide projections about the entire
scientific and engineering work force: the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BES) and the NSF.
A number of BES publications deal with projections, one being the Occupational
Outlook Handbook NSF publishes projections of supply and demand both for doctoral
scientists and engineers and for all scientists and engineers, showing what would happen
· ~
unc er various scenarios.
OPM data are primarily used by the central management agencies of the
government-OMB and OPM, for example but the dynamic data are not published by
OPM. Under those conditions, do the agencies ask for compilations to see how they
compare to other agencies? According to OPM staff, this seldom occurs. Therefore,
one wonders whether the agencies themselves will use the data that they provide to
OPM to analyze their own performance.
Findings
.
.
.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest employer of federal scientists
and engineers, about 50 percent of them, followed by the Department of
Agriculture (USDA, 13 percent) and the Department of the Interior (7 percent).
In essentially all major occupational subgroups, DoD is the largest employer with
two exceptions: USDA is the largest employer of life scientists and the Veterans
Administration employs the most psychologists.
Only 25 percent of all federal scientists and engineers are actually engaged in
R&D, with the rest employed in design, natural resource operation, management,
and a host of other occupations.
In the federal government, 58 percent of the doctorates in science are in R&D, in
contrast to the national Ph.D. total of about one-third.
Not all scientists and engineers working on a particular mission are employed in
one agency. For example, although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is only the seventh largest employer of scientists and engineers in the federal
government, environmental issues are the second largest focus of work activities
of federal scientists and engineers.
An examination of scientists and engineers by their age group reveals that only 14
percent of federal scientists and engineers fall in the "over 55" group, as
compared to 19 percent in the total U.S. work force.
Information from a survey by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
indicates that members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) leave the
government for four main reasons: ceilings on salary, changes in the retirement
system, politicization of their organization, and inadequate use of their knowledge
and skills.
Because salary data are usually presented in terms of median or average salaries,
comparisons assume that the distributions in each sector are identical with respect
to age, occupation, and highest academic degree, but they are not.
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Recommendations
An examination should be made to determine when data available from OPM
and other places are being utilized by the individuals agencies in the management
of their science and engineering work forces.
There ought to be an evaluation as to whether the dynamic data, those on
separations and hires collected by OPM, should be more widely available in
published form, at least to other federal agencies.
Data on satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the job, as well as on the quality of the
federal science and engineering work force similar to that recently compiled by
the DoD~hould be generated on a regular periodic basis and made publicly
available.
Agencies should use projections about the future supply of scientists and
engineers in the total U.S. work force to make projections of their own future
demand for scientists and engineers.
There should be a central body in the federal government that explicitly has the
sole responsibility to evaluate the adequacy of the federal science and engineering
work force.
Discussion
Dr. CAMPBELL said that this is a fascinating issue because aggregate turnover
numbers are very low: in much of the private sector, turnover rates of 2 percent would
be considered too low. He asked the agency representatives whether there would be
ways to make the aggregate data more useful to them, or whether the current system of
an agency building its own data base for its own management purposes (with the
aggregated base being used essentially for broader policy questions) is more preferable.
He noted that the Committee will address whether there should be changes in the
nature of the federal data-collecting system and the character of what is being collected.
Reliability of the Data
Inconsistent Definitions: Dr. NORWOOD felt that the basic question really should not
be 'why are the data not being used?" but rather 'Mow good are the data?" Having
responsibility for the measurement of occupational employment at all levels, BES
examined salary data for engineers-learning that those engineers who earn top salaries
are managers of engineering work; thus, in the standard occupational classification
structure, they are considered to be managers. Yet they are still engineers: they are
trained as engineers and many of them are still doing engineering research, but they also
are managing. Similarly, she noted that many SES people have to be classified as
managers: they manage groups and cannot be classified as experts in a particular area if
they are going to reach the higher salary classifications.
One also must take into account differences in the people and their skills. At
BES, for instance, there are statisticians and mathematical statisticians, each having
different kinds of training. For example, although BLS employs three kinds of scientists,
data on them is combined with data on scientists in other parts of the Department of
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Labor (DOL); thus, the picture drawn from OPM data alight reflect what is happening
in DOL overall but totally miss what is happening in BES.
Other problems arise when terms such as "turnover" are not clearly defined. For
example, BES may have a 16-17 percent turnover rate, but if BES employees merely
move to other parts of the DOL, the turnover rate for DOL is not affected. Mr.
RAGONE commented on the 4 percent turnover rate cited in OPM data for
hydrologists: of the 2,170 federally employed hydrologists, less than 200 work in the
research program of the U.S. Geological Survev's Water Resources Division: thus. the
aggregated data do not reflect the turnover rate in USGS. In addition, he noted that all
employees in the Water Resources Division are considered to be hydrologists, even
though their degrees may be in different fields, such as geochemistry.
The nature of the discussion pointed out that (~) dealing with the personnel
system in the federal government is a very complex undertaking and (2) a main
underlying problem is definitions and coverages- for instance, whether turnover just
involves quits, includes separations, or recognizes transfers and whether the data deal
with permanent staff, temporary staff, or seasonal employment. In the aggregate, one
cannot deal with the multitude and myriad of problems that are unique to particular
areas. That is why, according to Mr. CURNOW, the agencies themselves should
conduct self-studies of turnover, separations, and quits. Using its aggregate data base,
OPM looks at organizational supplements but not at program offices in any particular
area. Furthermore, because the occupational classification that the government uses
stays with an individual if he or she moves into a managerial or supervisory position,
another definitional problem exists with respect to how managers are classified in the
public sector as opposed to the federal sector.
Comparability of Data Sets: Mr. FECHTER said that information collected on
individuals is good for tracking career trajectories. However, firm-based data, which is
based on occupational classes, will not provide very reliable information about
movement of individuals. Instead the issues of promotion and of moving into
management, which are part of the dynamics of the system, need to be looked at very
carefully.
Dr. VAN REIN advocated the use of aggregated data available from the CPDF
because various agencies have their own data bases, which may be incompatible and
based on different definitions for key terminology. Using CPDF data, researchers can
present the turnover rate for all occupations and show variations by length of service
and from agency to agency. Although agency-specific data will always be more
sophisticated and more detailed, based on the agency's purposes, aggregate data are
necessary to determine the baseline. He pointed out that once definitional problems are
resolved, agency data appear more similar to CPDF data. In fact, people in the
agencies are using the aggregate data to stimulate their own internal research and
definition of the problem of turnover.
Mr. RAGONE cited the danger of using national statistics, which do not reflect
what is happening in significant but small parts of the work force. For instance, USGS
has difficulty recruiting individuals at GS-12-15 levels for its national research program:
it cannot compete with private industry at those levels. He emphasized that national
statistics do not reflect the situation adequately; one must look at the agencies, their
specific kinds of expertise, and what they are trying to accomplish.
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OMB: when the President says we are going to put the government on a diet but the
result is not fewer people, it becomes a political issue.
Dr. MESSNER offered two other relevant points: (1) OMB has become less
aggressive about setting arbitrary numbers as controls, focusing mainly on a guarantee
that the demonstration project not exceed its funding level set by OMB; and (2) it takes
a long time for Congress to move.
Dr. KLINE said that when he attended Cabinet meetings during the 1980s,
support for demonstration projects that would enhance the recruitment and retention of
scientists and engineers was not forthcoming because the data showed an attrition rate
of only 5 percent for scientists and engineers, half of the government-wide rate in
general. He felt that instead the focus should be on how a demonstration project can
enhance the performance of government laboratories. However, Dr. AMBLER
mentioned the lack of a productivity measure for an R&D institution.
M&O Facilities
For the management-and-operating-contractor (M&O) facilities, the DOE
operations offices negotiate personnel policies and salaries with the contractors at each
lab. Although salaries vary from one lab to another, the contractor itself must conduct
market survey to Justin the proposed salary schedules. On the other hand, because
DOE has final approval authority, staff in the operations offices are aware of the
relationships between the salary schedules of their contracted facilities and the GS
schedules.
Mr. HOWTON said that DOE does operate two GOGO (government-owned,
government-operated) research laboratories, one in Morgantown, W.Va., and one in
Pittsburgh, Pa., as well as the on-site M&O contractors. In a broad sense, the
contractors' salaries are significantly (10-15 percent) above the federal salaries, although
the GOGOs and M&Os are almost mirror organizations. There are differences,
however, in the deferred compensation costs associated with each type of facility; such
costs for the M&Os show up in contract costs to DOE, not in base salary. M&Os also
have stock ownership plans and other benefits not offered by the government.
Dr. SUTHERLAND described the strong working relationship between the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and Cal Tech, whose faculty serve as principal scientists or
investigators on JPL projects and whose students are involved in the lab's research
projects. All of JPL's policies and procedures are Cal Tech policies, not federal ones.
JPL advises NASA of planned changes, and NASA can object within a certain period of
time, but the relationship with NASA is superb. In fact, many JPL staff are detailees to
NASA headquarters on a non-conflict-of-interest basis, and some Cal Tech faculty are
on loan to NASA through JPL.
Other Possible Solutions
Dr. COMPTON said that the NASA Ames Laboratory had two options to the
civil service system: to fix it or to get out. The use of demonstration projects is an
example of fixing the problem. Becoming an FFRDC or an M&O is a way of moving
out of the civil service system; JPL is a fulfillment of that option. He described the
difficulty in acquiring university sponsorship of Ames activities. Respected universities
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were not interested in picking up a federal research center as part of their institution for
two reasons: Ames was too big an operation, and universities want more control over
the lab's activities, particularly because of adverse publicity that might occur if
something went wrong in the lab's operations. Dr. COMPTON observed that to
establish a strong relationship, a university and a federal agency must "grow up
together": they are difficult marriages to make once two mature institutions are
involved.
Mr. CAREY, mentioning his membership on the University of Chicago's Board of
Governors for Argonne National Laboratory, agreed that the university places a high
value on its relationship with the laboratory. They have established a positive, mutual
relationship, although the inevitable tensions between the parent government
department, DOE for example, and the laboratory are sometimes difficult for the
trustees of the university to accept. In other words, constraints exist, even in the flow of
appropriation funding to the laboratories.
Mr. HARDY observed that some federal organizations such as the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) offer a number of the flexibilities associated with the
demonstration experiments. However, the AEC opted for contractor-operated labs
because of the frustrations associated with hiring and the desire to use their work force
effectively.
Dr. CAMPBELL asked whether managing a contractor requires special skills,
whether it is more difficult or easier to manage a contractor than it is a federal work
force. Mr. HOWTON replied that comparisons are inappropriate because each involves
an entirely different set of laws and procurement regulations; management problems
that do arise tend to be legal and liability issues associated with nuclear energy: people
are scared of what the costs will be for them. However, Mr. HARDY noted that in the
Clinch River Breeder Reactor project, which involved both contractor and federal
employees, dealing with the federal part of the system was more frustrating and more
difficult, having more "traps" and rules.
Responding to Compensation Concerns
Entry Level: Dr. VAN RIIN was concerned about morale problems that may arise
when scientists working in different divisions receive different entry-level pay because
they have different managers. Dr. LYONS did not consider that a serious problem: the
NIST demonstration project resembles an industrial personnel system.
Dr. STEINBACH pointed out that the entry pay in the government is low. For
example, hiring a physicist in the area of electromagnetics is difficult not only because
there are so few available but also because their initial pay is less than that of a
secretary in the Washington area. He also observed that the median salaries indicate
insufficient flexibility in the government: just about everybody gets the same pay.
Mr. FECHTER noted that a recent review of DoD's science and engineering
work force reinforces the impressions that the salary disparity is quite large at the entry
level but narrows dramatically after four to five years of employment. Promotion is a
mechanism for managing one's work force, although it may not be the right mechanism.
The DoD study also examined movements of individuals within the federal government,
between positions and across grades.
Dr. NUMRICH presented data based on the national Hay Survey of R&D
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organizations contracted by DOE. On a maturity curve basis, NRL lags about 40
percent at the 90th percentile for entry-level engineers (special rates are included in the
NRL figures). At the higher experience levels, the differences are about 20 percent for
nonsupervisory positions. However, when the comparison is based on a comparable
private-sector organization, salaries for all types of degree recipients (B.S., M.S., Ph.D.)
working in either supervisory or nonsupelvisory roles lag by a figure closer to 25 percent,
representing dollar lags of as much as $25,000 for lead researchers. Fully aggregated
data show only a 2-5 percent lag. She emphasized that analyses of data relating to
federal recruitment and retention should include examinations of private-sector
organizations doing similar work.
Mid-Career and Senior Levels: Agencies-particularly demonstration projects-have
devised special provisions to address issues dealing with supervisors and senior scientists.
At NIST these included higher salary offers, a program of NBS fellows, and supervisor
differentials of 3 percent for group leaders and 6 percent for division chiefs (NIST has
no employees in the super grades GS-16 to -18, about two dozen on the ST salary
schedule, and slightly more than 100 in the SES).
Dr. MAHLER noted that although both NIST and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have facilities in Boulder, Colo., the initial
concern-that the higher salaries offered by NIST would encourage NOAA employees
to transfer to NIST-has not been realized. He felt that NOAA was able to retain its
staff because salary is not the only issue: nonsalary items such as the work performed
are important, too.
CDC has no trouble recruiting young scientists, both because of the bonus pay
option and because of its research orientation: the excitement of research institutions in
the federal government is a lure for young scientists, who are willing to put up with a lot
of things to work in an exciting environment. However, Dr. GUINAN noted CDC's
difficulty in recruiting at the middle and upper levels because the excitement of the
environment is overshadowed by prospective employees' concerns about money and
sending their kids to college. A middle-level scientist with two children in college
cannot survive on a federal salary.
In spite of the difficulty of recruiting at the mid-level, Dr. GUINAN felt there is
not enough turnover once career scientists reach the upper levels: the lack of new
blood coming into the upper strata could lead CDC away from the cutting edge. She
concurred that there is a particular shortage of scientists in any emerging field: CDC
needs molecular biologists to conduct research on retroviruses but cannot compete with
the higher salaries paid in the private sector.
Mr. RAGONE found it difficult to justify noncompetitive salaries at a time when
the research work force is aging dramatically. At GS-5-9, the U.S. Geological Survey is
being "eaten alive" by the consulting firms that offer hydrologists much higher salaries.
He also noted the lack of discretionary funds that would enable federal employees to
attend professional meetings.
Pay for Performance: The criteria for evaluating performance is based on comparing an
individual with his or her peers in the scientific area-how many papers they write and
how much basic research they do. In general, scientists seem satisfied with these
criteria. Mr. PORTER said that China Lake has been able to establish a link between
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pay and performance that works better than the old system; although there is not
universal satisfaction with the new system, external studies indicate that, in general, it is
accepted and people are happier with the system now than they were before.
According to Dr. AMBLER, pay for performance was implemented at NIST
before the demonstration project; it is a lot of work but is considered to be much better
than the alternative. In fact, NIST hesitates to give retention bonuses because the whole
system is based on pay for performance, and it is better to give employees permanent
adjustment to base salary. Dr. AMBLER also clarified that its authorizing statute says
nothing about revenue neutrality, but the NIST administration wanted it. (After the
authorizing act was passed, NIST was told to be budget neutral and not to exceed the
civil service pay cap. However, because half of NIST's income comes from other federal
agencies, Dr. LYONS wondered whether anybody knows what "budget neutral" is.) He
concurred with Dr. CAMPBELL that, in order for a pay-for-performance system to
work, there must be clearly established objectives to be achieved in a particular time
period.
Responding to a question of Dr. Numrich, Mr. THOMPSON said that OPM
considers the Performance Management Recognition System (PMRS), established in
1984 by Congress, to be a system based on pay for performance. However, he noted
two important distinctions between pay for performance in the Navy and NIST
demonstration experiments and the PMRS: (1) the potential for large rewards under the
demo systems has been much greater because of greater funding, and (2) the
demonstration project systems have won greater employee acceptance because of the
way they were implemented, beginning with communication of objectives and follow-
through dialogue between employee and supervisor.
Dr. CAMPBELL questioned whether promotions in the federal government are a
result of performance or simply a way of catching up and making the government
competitive. Dr. NORWOOD responded that federal scientists almost automatically
progress from GS-S to GS-11; after reaching GS-11, it becomes harder to get a
promotion.
Dr. CAMPBELL said that a variety of gain-sharing programs exist in private
industry but are primarily restricted to mid-level management as opposed to being total-
employee programs. Dr. MAHLER cited the inequities in the federal government's
bonus systems: A scientist could receive a bonus under the PMRS, while the bonus
system for nonmanagers is the General Workforce Performance Appraisal System
(GWPAS). The PMRS has a finite pool of money that can be used for bonuses,
whereas GWPAS has limitations only on the size of each individual award. Thus an
outstanding manager might receive an $800 bonus while an outstanding performer under
GWPAS could receive $2,000. Dr. CAMPBELL contrasted this policy with that in the
private sector: companies want everybody to maximize their bonus because if that is
true, the corporation is doing great.
Dr. GINZBERG said that this awkward, inflexible, complicated system of
personnel management in the federal government is closely connected with less-than-
optimal performance. That fact should be the basis of any case for greater agency
discretion. In response, Dr. NUMRICH declared that NRL has historically performed
excellent research and continues to do so: '~e are in a situation of diminishing returns
and maintain our influx of talent only because of heroic efforts in recruitment and
retention and the presence of excellent scientific leadership." The real issue is that in 10
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years the federal government can expect catastrophic failure because senior leadership
will be eligible for retirement, and new employees (those under FERS), although they
may be well-trained and have sound scientific reputations, will leave because of being in
high demand and facing the financial problem of meeting college tuition payments: the
federal government Will be like a university without sernor professors.
Dr. NORWOOD asked whether demonstration projects have been tried in an
atmosphere where at least the m~ddle-level employees are unionized. Dr. CLARK
responded that Tennessee Valley Authority used a pay-for-performance system for its
nonmanagerial, white-collar workers for seven years but abandoned it because of
perceived inequities, both individually and across organizational units.
The Political Appointments Process
and the Recruitment of Scientists and Engineers
Dr. CAMPBELL said that certain facts and observations prompted the
Committee to consider the relative significance of noncareer appointments to the
recruitment, retention, and utilization of scientists and engineers. Of concern were the
increase in the number of political appointments; the number of vacancies in those
positions; their influences on the culture, performance, and productivity of the federal
organizations that make extensive use of scientists and engineers; and the slowness of
the appointment process.
Dr. PFIFFNER began by describing the pressures of a Presidential transition: at
a time when policy, power, and position are "up in the air," one must handle personnel
recruitment, likened by some to "trying to take a sip from a fire hydrant." Of about 550
PAS positions (Presidential appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate) in
the executive branch, the subset of scientists, engineers, and people that supervise them
equals about 250 (according to National Research Council calculations). These numbers
exclude noncareer SES and Schedule C appointments. Recruiting the best and brightest
people for these positions is not difficult at the Cabinet level because of the prestige and
power associated with Executive Level I appointments. However, recruitment of the
subcabinet-that is, Executive Levels II through V and noncareer SES is difficult for a
number of reasons: noncompetitive pay, ethics requirements, financial disclosure, post-
employment restrictions, the short tenure in office, and the daily risk of being dismissed
(because one serves at the pleasure of the President).
Determining how the increased numbers of political appointees affect the career
force may be difficult, but the size of the increase is significant: PAS positions increased
from 152 in 1965 to 527 in 1985; the number of noncareer SES rose from 582 in 1980 to
658 in 1986; and Schedule Cs increased from 911 in 1976 to 1,665 in 1986. These
increases reflect a deeper penetration of political appointees into the career
bureaucracy. In addition, control of political appointments has been centralized in the
White House. Although PAS's are all presidential appointments, in the 1950s and
1960s, most sub-Cabinet appointments were determined by Cabinet Secretaries. But
beginning in the Nixon administration, Presidents have felt that they gave away too
much of their appointment power, leading the Reagan administration to centralize all
political appointments, including noncareer SES and Schedule C, in the White House.
The potential implication is that agency heads and cabinet secretaries might have
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J
different criteria in mind than the White House staff Certainly an agency head watt
Took for somebody who has expertise and competence in management because that
person watt make the agency work or not work. The White House, on the other hand,
may very well have a different perspective and be especially sensitive to political
pressures for rewarding the party faithful and appointing those with certain ideological
values. Dr. PFIFFNER agreed with a VoIcker Commission task force chaired by Elliott
Richardson: the problem is systemic such that higher numbers in combination with
deeper penetration and centralization do have some relationship to the diminishing
quality of political appointees.
Also important to scientists is the leadership and vision of the President. In
addition, the President's science adviser plays an important symbolic role: if it appears
that person has to compromise his or her professional ideals to do something political,
fewer scientists watt be welling to enter public service, even for a few years. Scientists
and engineers said that it is important that they be able to respect the technical
competence of their boss and fee] comfortable with his or her ability to evaluate their
work. Finally, scientists and engineers expect political appointees to duly consider their
work and to buffer these technical people from the whims of the political wind.
Discussion
Dr. CAMPBELL asked for comments on the degree to which it makes any differ-
ence whether assistant secretary or deoutv assistant secretary appointments which have
, ~,
. · · ~ · · ~. ~ ~ ~^~ ~
some supervisory responsibility In relation to the K~L' sloe or government, t1) are Ellen
or left vacant and (2) affect the quality and tenure of people appointed to those jobs.
Problems Associated with Unfilled Positions
Dr. CHEN pointed out that the NTH director was not a presidential appointee
until passage of the National Cancer Act in 1972. Since that time the job has become
quite political, to the point that for the last six months, NTH has not had a director,
resulting in a certain loss of momentum, morale, and overall sense of purpose. A search
committee suggested individuals to serve as NIH director, but there were sufficient
political ramifications that none of those candidates were interested in the job. The
secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services has convened a second
high-level committee to determine how to make the job more attractive. Once issues
such as salary and authority are worked out with the Secretary, it is hoped that the job
can be made sufficiently attractive to initiate a second search. Dr. CHEN felt that such
situations would be less prevalent if the position were not a political appointment.
Dr. ROBINSON believed that having an assistant secretary for health who can override
decisions of NIH staff, including the director, is a problem as is the fact that the
director is many levels removed from the actual running of a $6 billion agency.
Quality of Presidential Appointees
Many participants said that having a boss who has a reputation in his or her
respective field is important, even more important than salary levels, all the way down
the line, even in hiring decisions.
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Dr. NUMRICH felt that having both political appointees and vacant positions at
the top leads to less stable funding. When department heads lack institutional memory
and knowledge of what ought to be going on, particularly in the administration of
funding, fewer risks are taken. She said that R&D labs perform risk-oriented work that
is possibly high gain, but such work is not now regarded as primary.
Another issue brought to the Committee's attention is the inadequate
management preparation of career executives and career managers. More than once, a
newly appointed SES member admitted to attending his or her first management
training session after being appointed. Dr. PFIFFNER said that the uniformed services
develop their executive talent by sending them to special schools, but less is done on the
civilian side. Dr. CAMPBELL agreed that moving people from technical specializations
into managerial positions has always created problems; he prefers to take a specialist
and give him or her managerial training rather than assume that a manager can manage
anything.
Tenure of Presidential Appointees
Dr. MESSNER stressed that the engineering and scientific community in the
government cannot exist separate from the political process; it would not be a realistic
goal to build a wall around the scientific engineering community, treating it differently
from other government employee groups. Without political participation, however, there
is no way to prevent the erosion of the attributes of the scientific and engineering
existence in the federal workplace. If an agency does not have an advocate at the table
when budgets are reviewed, an agency not only will not get training money, but also
probably will not get facility money, parking places, or health care for its occupational
safety program.
MS. MOWRY said that the current system makes a big impact. During the first
year political appointees must develop loyalties with the career employees. A PAS
member must develop a better image of the federal employee and be open-minded and
willing to cooperate with the career staff. Since the average stay of a political appointee
is 18-24 months, there is constant change at the top, with subsequent change in loyalty
as well as much reorganization.
Dr. AMBLER said that when Presidential appointees are not allowed to do the
job they are supposed to do, they start to micromanage. They are appointed because,
presumably, they are of the same opinion as the President on political affairs; however,
scientists and engineers become nervous by the implication that ideology would
overwhelm scientific objectivity. Advocacy, in the budgetary sense, will go to agencies
whose programs fit what the President is trying to do.
Fixed Term of Office
Workshop participants offered several insights and suggestions:
(~) According to Dr. KLINE, a fixed term is not a bad feature but does not
guarantee that the appointee will hold the position for the entire term.
(2) Dr. ROBINSON advocated a fixed term for the directors of NSF and NTH so that
when the time comes for appointment, consideration can be given to reappoint
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ment of the person in a technical position who has done a good job. Some
thought that fixed terms established SO as not to expire around the time of a
presidential election would be beneficial. While not disputing this point, other
participants considered having the confidence of the Administration more
important to agency staff: if an appointee has a s~x-year term but not that
confidence, he or she has little besides an office.
There are inconsistencies within the system: the commissioner of Labor Statistics
has a four-year term, but the director of the Bureau of the Census does not:
therefore, the latter position is considered a political appointment.
(3)
Designated Positions
Dr. CAMPBELL asked where political appointees should be in the system. The
civil service Reform Act, which eliminated the designation of positions as either political
or career and specified that no more than 10 percent of the SES appointments could be
noncareer, attempted to open up higher level positions to career people, thereby making
it possible for them to be appointed to assistant secretary positions and the like. He
wondered whether the government should return to a system of designated positions,
rather than leaving the classifications open. According to Dr. PFIFFNER, after lengthy
examination, the head of personnel at the Department of Health and Human Services
has concluded that we might as well use the former system, because as soon as a
political appointee is placed in a job that was formerly a career position, the job
becomes politicized; the next administration thinks that is its slot. Dr. CAMPBELL said
that, if that occurs, career people can never aspire to become assistant or deputy
assistant secretaries: taking a political appointment would eliminate their rights back
into the civil service system.
Mr. CAREY said it is important to give career people the opportunity to accept
political appointments with some falIback protection. Dr. NORWOOD said that during
her long tenure in a PAS position, even though it has a fixed term of office? she has
seen a continuing erosion: many positions that could be filled by either a careerist or a
presidential appointee have been designated PAS unless a career position has been
clearly protected. The 10 percent limit on the number of PAS positions has been
· ~
maxlmlzec ..
Dr. MESSNER observed, based on personal experience with the White House
personnel office under five different administrations, that the political appointment
process as it regards scientists and engineers is nonexistent. He wondered, if one really
cannot resolve this issue by designating jobs as political or career, if a solution might be
to advocate identifying positions that should have professional criteria, limiting the
President's appointment power.
Dr. ABRAMSON added that staff in the White House personnel office
complained that they did not have enough names of scientists and engineers for PAS
positions. He suggested that national groups supply the personnel office with names of
qualified people in the scientific community. In addition, the personnel office staff find
that the individuals whom they do contact think the pay offered is not worthwhile and
the ethical requirements are bothersome.
Based on his own experience, Dr. CAMPBELL said that the White House
personnel office does not try to identify and recruit people except for the Secretary
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positions. Dr. MESSNER agreed and added that the source of the name that is sent to
them is screened by the personnel process; one must have certain political prerequisites
to have his or her suggested nominee even considered. Mr. HOWTON agreed that a
long-term civil servant with the right political connections will not get through the
personnel office because the Hatch Act prohibits such contacts. He said that political
appointees can be good or bad, but if an agency has no political appointees, it will
instead have a congressional oversight committee a situation that creates its own set of
complications.
General Discussion
Dr. MESSNER opened this session by saying that in a buyer's market, one can
afford to be much more sloppy in dealing with human resource issues, but in a shortage
situation, one can get in trouble quickly. The engineering community is concerned
about the potential lack of human resources in the near future partly because of the
changing demography:
There are fewer young people.
During the next 15 years, 85 percent of the entering work force will be women
and minorities, but historically the engineering profession has been unsuccessful
in attracting women and even less successful in attracting minorities.
Enrollment in engineering schools is down, even for women, who for a short
time were enrolling in engineering schools in greater numbers; 50 percent of the
students now in U.S. engineering schools are foreign and could be a resource if
they choose not to return to their own countries.
Statistics show that the United States will have a shortage of about 400,000
engineers as we enter the 2Ist century.
Dr. MESSNER questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. education system, stating
that some scientific and engineering specialties are more successful in preparing students
for the work force. As an employer, he is concerned about investments in the
engineering person power and felt the federal government must engage in forward
thinking about the human resource pool and how it will attract that pool to its programs.
Dr. NORWOOD asked whether the supply of scientists and engineers is actually
a bigger problem for the federal government than for the private sector. In response,
Dr. FALK said that his industry contacts say they can get the people they want, as long
as the pay is high enough. Mr. RAGONE said that federal agencies provide a training
ground for industry, hindering the agencies' abilities to fulfill their missions, but the loss
of small groups of highly trained scientists and engineers is not reflected in aggregated
statistics. Mr. ANDREWS said that he had had the same experience: the Federal
Aviation Administration hires engineers who, after a training period of three to four
years, take positions in industry at salaries $10,000 higher. Dr. STEINBACH noted
similar problems in the fields of electromagnetics and computer software and predicted
that the current national shortage will get worse. Dr. NORWOOD concurred that many
agencies face similar problems: scientists and engineers come in, get valuable
experience, and then go on.
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Dr. MESSNER said the federal government must plan with greater because its
infrastructure causes the government to move so slowly. Industry can move more
quickly because firms can operate without adjusting to the labor market, either through
pricing or, more importantly, through strategies to recruit from underparticipating
groups. For instance, industry can attract more women by responding to special
problems that women have in the work place.
Constraints
Mr. FECHTER asked participants to define the real constraints. He noted that
mechanisms are being used to get around pay caps, and promotion is a mechanism to
get around pay inequities. However, what other constraints exist and what are the
mechanisms for getting around them? Dr. CAMPBELL pointed out that today OPM
may delegate most personnel authorities other than pay caps and some other limitations.
Dr. CHEN said that NIH, because of the Public Health Service Act and some of
its special authorities, does not have the same constraints as many agencies about hiring
foreigners. As a result, about one-third of its doctorates are foreign. In ensuing
discussion, participants suggested that language in appropriation acts might be changed
so that other agencies could hire foreign nationals.
Two other points raised by Mr. ANDREWS are that technology now has a more
international focus, and the rate of technology changes so quickly that engineers must
spend much time to even keep pace with it.
Past Initiatives To Recruit
Scientists and Engineers
Dr. NUMRICH suggested looking at various initiatives, including DoD's attempt
to extend the Naval Ocean Systems Center/Naval Weapons Center demonstration
project to the rest of the department's laboratories, and evaluating why they have failed.
To move forward we must understand how and why those failures happened so they will
not recur.
Dr. CAMPBELL said that some initiatives fail because of opposition based on
the proposition that they should be made government-we rather department-specific.
He surmised that legislation now before Congress to grant special salary pay rights to
specific departments and agencies may, in fact, be attractive but lead to further
fragmentation of the total federal employment system. Dr. CHEN cited an example to
support that belief: NTH developed a legislative proposal for higher salaries for its
scientific faculty (equating its scientists with comparable ranks in medical school faculty)
based on an annual salary survey conducted by the Association of American Medical
Schools. Another aspect of the proposal was to link the retirement system to the TIAA-
CREF, allowing faculty from medical schools to come into the government for a brief
period, remain in the same retirement system, and then maybe move out of government.
The proposal was not successful because of objections by OMB and by other sectors that
wanted to have similar special legislation.
Dr. MAHLER mentioned NOAA's Environmental Research Laboratories' use of
a large part of its global change money to finance six joint institutes done cooperatively
with universities and co-Iocated in its laboratories. ERL does not pay the principal
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investigators' salaries but does pay postdocs' and graduate students' salaries, thus
promoting the study of science and engineering by providing monetary support. There
are not many environmental scientists, and the supply has been going down. Thus
NOAA is trying to encourage potential environmental scientists by putting more money
into the universities, where the training is available and these cooperative institutes
work. NOAA hopes not only to encourage undergraduate students but also to broaden
the spectrum of new entrants.
This discussion led Dr. GINZBERG to ask: To what extent does the goverrunent
really get in its own way in terms of attraction, retention, and utilization of people by
underinvesting in the continuing education of its scientific people? Participants
described the effective programs of DOE, NRL, and CDC but noted that training money
is being cut back for 1991, and providing such training does not ensure that those in
agency-sponsored education programs will not use that training to acquire higher paying
jobs in industry or academe.
Future Initiatives
Dr. MAHLER believes there is a new mode of operations whereby the
government runs programs across agencies, not through agencies. An intergovernmental
committee on earth sciences, for instance, is advocating the global change program now:
. . . . .
c;~11 a'~t;ll`;y 1~lVulVea naS agreed on ltS ContrlOUtlon to the program and the ~nmmitt~
^~- It ~1..~4 ~_~ ~_~1 _ :~ '1~ . _ .1
has created realistic budgets and is selling the program to Congress. Such programs are
more salable, but they take some control from the agency heads and put it in the
program areas. These interagency committees have broad scientific and management
support of attempts to find solutions across the board, a far more effective mechanism
than single-agency programs.
Dr. FALK said that although such committees could be effective, the real
solution is establishing one central organization responsible not only for the welfare of
science but also for the effectiveness of the federal science and engineering work force;
such an organization could be the one to fight the political battle.
.
r ~--, ~_
179
Representative terms from entire chapter:
federal scientists
