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Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers (1990)

Chapter: APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS

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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Suggested Citation:"APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED PAPERS." National Research Council. 1990. Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Federal Scientists and Engineers. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1603.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

APPENDIX B COMMISSIONED PAPERS Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers in the Federal Govemment: Results of a Literature Review by Linda S. DO 77 . . . Quantitative Inputs to Federal Technical Personnel Management by Charles E. Falk 95 Meeting Federal Work Force Needs with Regard to Scientists and Engineers: The Role of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management by John M. Paiguta 111 Differences in Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization Processes: A Companson of Traditionally Operated Federal Laboratones, M&O Facilities, and Demonstration Projects by Sheldon B. Clark 121 The Political Appointments Process and the Recruitment of Scientists and Engineers by James P. Pfiffner 75 133

RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND UTILIZATION OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS IN DIE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: Results of a Literature Review Linda 5. DO Staff Officer Office of Scientific and Engineering Personnel Introduction One activity to be undertaken under the aegis of the Committee on Scientists and Engineers in the Federal Government was a literature review to determine what earlier research had revealed about the ability of the federal government to recruit, retain, and utilize scientific and engineering talent effectively. The following summarizes information compiled from sources listed in the bibliography. The most recent studies of this issue, focusing on specific agencies, are the 1988 examination of the intramural program at the National Institutes of Health (Institute of Medicine, Committee to Study Strategies, 1988) and a three-year effort conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), studying 25,000 scientists and engineers in 66 Department of Defense (DoD) laboratories. Although the DoD data are still being analyzed, preliminary findings are included here (see also IDA, 1989a and 1989b; Millburn, 1989a and 1989b). Furthermore, the usefulness of data collected in that study has led the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to design a survey questionnaire to be mailed to a representative sample of scientists and engineers in all other federal agencies. In spite of efforts of the past two decades to encourage U.S. scientists and engineers to consider federal employment, some federal agencies have been unable to employ the numbers considered essential for completion of their missions, leading some within the science policy community to conclude: The federal system plods along for the most part, fostering mediocrity and lacking the means to attract or encourage the genius needed for technical inspiration and organizational leadership. (Packard, 1986) A recent General Accounting Office (GAO, 1989a) study found that federal operations are so affected bv serious human re.c.Ollrce nrohlP.mc that the onvPrnmpnt rennet mart r ~--- ad,-AIL ~~A=L 1416_~ . ~ ~ ~ · ~ the needs ot its citizens. Prom surveys of installation heads, personnel directors, personnel officers, and OPM in 1989, GAO found that 40-71 percent had greater difficulty in hiring good employees than in 1984 and 40-77 percent said that retention had worsened. (In contrast, only 2-20 percent of those interviewed felt recruitment and retention had improved between 1984 and 1989.) This is particularly true in technical fields and seems to occur at all civil service levels. But of particular concern is the fact that many experienced and competent senior executives are leaving federal service for employment in the private sector. In fact, 77

Among the very best those who have won presidential merit awards- the average quit rate in 1986 and 1987 ran at 24% annually, with 75% of the departees going to industry. (Norton, 1989) A similar assessment was made by federal lab directors. Less than 10 percent "think that salaries or bonuses are good enough. One half of the directors say that pay is too low and is not competitive with industry, and one half say that bonuses are too small" (IDA, 1989a). As a result, GAO has delineated specific areas that federal agencies should examine closely to encourage more scientists and engineers to engage in federal employment: (~) recruitment and staffing practices, (2) salary and benefits, and (3) planning for the types and numbers of people needed. Perhaps the major problem facing those who pursue federal employment, at least in Washington, D.C., is that they must put their lives and finances "on public display in the fishbowI-on-the-Potomac" (Norton, 1989~. Recruitment of Scientists and Engineers Both the number of vacancies and the level of recruitment difficulty vary within . . and between federal agencies, (e.g., see Frascinelia, 1989~. For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has "experienced problems hiring and retaining sufficient numbers of technical personnel to implement the Superfund program" (GAO, 1989a) because of high employee turnover, inadequate pay, and insufficient training of staff. Recruitment difficulties have also been experienced at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which has been "unable to hire a single senior biomedical research scientist from industry or academe in the past ten years" (Norton, 1989~. Similar problems have been reported by the following agencies (GAO, 1987 and 1989b): Social Security Administration Internal Revenue Service National Science Foundation, particularly in scientific and engineering occupations, since 1985 Department of the Army (electronics engineers, general engineers, physicists, computer scientists, and research psychologists) Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, Department of State National Institute of Standards and Technology Office of Energy Research, Department of Energy National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Department of Health and Human Services National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) However, other federal agencies fill vacancies in scientific and engineering disciplines quite easily or encounter problems sporadically. When directed by an executive order of the President (December 1985) to provide information about problems that they have encountered in recruiting and retaining scientists and engineers, three agencies (the U.S. Geological Survey, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of 78

Transportation) noted no significant problems. In addition, within a federal organization, the significance of the difficulty of recruiting qualified scientists and engineers sometimes varies; the Department of the Army was cited to illustrate this point. In its 1982 study, the Laboratory Management Task Force noted that [DoD] departure rates seem to be reasonable. Because of the substantial populations of GS-12 and -13, the majority of attrition occurs at these levels. As a result, there are significant losses at these critical levels which are hard to replace. That study further showed that in 1981 the 7.4 percent increase in the number of DoD scientists and engineers at GS-5-15 almost balanced the 6.4 percentage who left. However, a more recent study shows serious shortages in five fields at DoD labs-artificial intelligence, computer engineering, computer networking, signal processing, and systems engineering- with recruitment difficulties also experienced in acoustics, biomechanics, ceramics, control system engineering, digital communications, fiber optics, human factors, robotics, and weapons design (IDA, 1989a). Thus, GAO (1987) has concluded that "some agencies are experiencing difficulty in recruiting and retaining scientists and engineers while others are not." Nonetheless, it has been shown that "weaknesses in the government's recruitment and hiring processes have been major impediments to obtaining quality people" (GAO, 1989a) and often result in agencies having "to choose between accepting a less qualified candidate or leaving a position vacant" (Packard, 1986~. Retention of Scientists and Engineers Attrition of scientists and engineers from the federal government has been a major issue of the 19SOs. For instance, between 1981 and 1984 the Air Force TABLE 1: Quit Rates for DoD Engineers (in percent) Fiscal Year Quit Rate Fiscal Year Quit Rate 1975 1.8 1981 2.3 1976 1.5 1982 2.2 1977 2.0 1983 3.2 1978 2.4 1984 3.3 1979 2.5 1985 3.6 1980 2.4 SOURCE: General Accounting Office, Federal Work Force: Pay, Recruitment, and Retention of Federal Employees (GAO/GGD-87-37), Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1987. 79

experienced a 164 percent increase in the number of resignations of civilian scientists and engineers, with resignations occurring at all grade levels (Packard, 1986~. This is compounded by the fact that in a recent year only 1,792 of 2,445 vacant engineering positions in the Air Force were filled, after 2,737 job offers were made for them (recruitment success rate of 73.3 percent) (GAO, 1987~. The overall quit rate for engineers in DoD averaged 2.47 percent for the period 1975-1985 (see Table 1~. Although the average annual DoD quit rate was 2.1 percent for the 1975-1982 period, it has remained around 3.4 percent since then, but staff have found no reason for this Jump. Factors Affecting Recruitment and Retention of Scientists and Engineers Several organizational, personal, and economic factors influence one's decision not to work for a federal agency or to leave federal employment: noncompetitive federal salaries, advancement opportunities, the nature of the work, geographic location of work, etc. In addition, exogenous factors affect attrition: "the state of the labor market, the particular occupation, and the age, sex, and education of employees" (GAO, 1987~. Several of the studies examined revealed that the changing demography of the U.S. work force, together with competition from the private sector for high-quality scientists and engineers, hinders the ability of the federal government to recruit and retain the quality needed to be effective. Several other reasons have been given for the current situation: Restrictions imposed not only by budgetary constraints but also by personnel · ~ cell .lngs Salary increases determined more by length of service rather than by quality of one's performance Noncompetitive federal salaries for scientists and engineers. (Packard, 1986) These factors received regular attention in studies that zeroed in on the inflexibility of the civil service system, as shown in the report following a comprehensive examination of the Army laboratories: The personnel policies and procedures of a laboratory and its parent organization are important in attracting and retaining good scientists and engineers and in providing them rewarding careers. Undue bureaucratic complications and delays in recruiting, for example, can put a laboratory at a serious disadvantage in competing for talented science and engineering graduates. Uncompetitive salaries and benefits, of course, also impede recruiting and retaining good personnel. Laboratories must provide opportunities for advancement and increased responsibilities. Similarly, their promotion and termination procedures and practices must be regarded as straightforward and fair. (Committee on Army Manpower, 1983) 80

Further, the 1983 White House Science Council, report (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1983) concurred on the widespread nature of the problem: Almost all of the Federal laboratories . . . suffer serious disadvantages in their abilities to attract, retain, and motivate scientific and technical personnel required to fulfill their niissions. The principal disadvantage is the inability of the Federal laboratories, particularly those under the Civil Service system, to provide scientists and engineers with competitive compensation. . . . Furthermore, cumbersome procedures for hiring new staff make it hard to bring in new talent even when other obstacles have been overcome. The rigidity of the Civil Service promotion and salary system limits rewards for outstanding scientists and engineers. . . . Promotion is linked to management responsibilities, and current rules do not allow for adequate recognition of scientific performance alone. Recent personnel ceilings imposed strictly on a numerical basis without distinguishing among types of staff have adversely affected the laboratories' R&D activities. . . . This personnel situation leaves the Federal laboratories vulnerable to weak scientific leadership if senior qualified personnel cannot be replaced and to declining quality of research because of inadequate infusion of young talent. Thus it was not surprising to read the conclusion of a report assessing the ability of NIH to recruit and retain scientists: The combination of increasingly burdensome and unnecessary constraints along with lower salaries and less flexible administrative policies creates justified concern about NTH's ability to continue its past successes in building the staff necessary to sustain the quality and vitality of the intramural program. (Committee to Study Strategies, 1988) Personnel Ceilings The 1979 GAO study of federal laboratories reports that "the directors were concerned over the adverse effect of personnel ceilings on their operations, [advocating for themselves] more personnel control, including hire and fire authority." Although 51 percent of the managers surveyed had control over the type of people hired and in what disciplines, the other 49 percent said that they must Beget approval or operate within parameters set by higher organizational levels.' Following close on the heels of the GAO study, DoD's Laboratory Management Task Force (1980) focused two of its five major recommendations on the issue of personnel ceilings: stabilize laboratory personnel ceilings and repeal high grade ceilings. Similar recommendations came from both the U.S. Defense Research and Engineering Independent Review of DoD ~ A 1983 panel of distinguished scientists, chaired by David Packard, studied five aspects of federal laboratories admission; personnel; funding; management; and interaction with universities, industry, and users of research results operated by the six agencies receiving the largest portion of federal R&D funding (NASA and the departments of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and Health and Human Services). 81

Laboratories (Hermann, 1982) and the Laboratory Management Task Force's 1982 study of scientists and engineers in DoD laboratories, the latter finding that Ceilings by themselves are not an intrinsic barrier to maintenance of an effective S&E [science and engineering] work force beyond a critical mass required to operate a laboratory. What does appear to be important is the maintenance of a stable ceiling consistent with workload to facilitate planning and management within the DoD labs. . . . The majority of Technical Directors did report significant adverse impacts of . . . total ceilings including reduced ability to meet mission requirements, deletion of specific technologies that should be addressed, reduced ability to hire and promote experienced and deserving personnel as well as overall reduced quality of work. Still other adverse effects of personnel ceilings that hinder recruitment of scientists and engineers include inadequate staffing levels, increased contracting out of agency work and subsequent reduction of in-house expertise, inability to respond to requests for work, increased S&E workload, and increased use of temporaries (IDA, 1989a). Noncompetitive Salaries Among the stipulations of Section 5305 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations is the requirement that unless the President and Congress agree on alternative pay rates, Federal white-collar employees' salaries under the General Schedule are to be adjusted each year to maintain comparability with private sector salaries for similar levels of work. (GAO, 1987) However, beginning in 1979, such adjustments have not been made. The result is that by 1987, federal employees received salaries averaging 23.S percent less than their counterparts in private industry (GAO, 1987~. In fact, the salaries for federal employees in the upper echelons "have sunk far below the norms of corporate America" (Norton, 1989) during the past decade. Data obtained in 1987 by GAO from OPM as well as from the two federal agencies employing the most scientists and engineers DoD and NASA- show that scientists and engineers, like many other employees in the federal government, are paid lower salaries than their counterparts in the private sector. Of the seven occupations examined by GAO (1987), three are relevant to this study of scientists and engineers in the federal government: chemists, engineers, and computer specialists (Table 2~. However, these data show no relationship between the pay gap and quit rate in these occupations. In a later report, GAO (1989) noted that the differences in salary for federal employees and their private-sector counterparts ranged from 26 percent on the General Schedule of Salaries to 65 percent for senior executives. Salary discrepancies are particularly prevalent for scientists and engineers, but such discrepancies depend on one's place of employment. In general, a federal scientist earns about $3,000 more than his counterpart in business and industry, whereas a federal engineer earns $700 less than 82

TABLE 2: 1985 Pay Gaps and Quit Rates (in percent) Occupation Pay Gap Range Quit Rate Chemist 27.9-50.7 2.3 Accountant 27.2-46.0 2.3 Engineer 19.4-46.0 3.3 Buyer 24.7-34.9 3.2 Computer specialist 5.9-29.1 2.8 Clerk-typist 10.1-11.1 13.8 Secretary 4.0-9.3 6.9 All General Schedule workers 19.2 5.2 SOURCE: General Accounting Office, Federal Work Force: Pay, Recruitment, and Retention of Federal Employees (GAO/GGD-87-37), Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1987. his peer in the private sector (IDA, 1989b). However, at EPA salaries for chemists and engineers "trailed private sector pay by $7~800 to $41~300, or 25 to 68 percent' (GAO, 1989a). In addition, a recent comparison of salaries found that a DoD scientist earns an average of $5,000 more than the national average but a DoD engineer earns about $1,000 less than the national average (IDA, 1989b). In 1986, when federal laboratories received $18 billion (or one-third) of the federal R&D budget and employed about one- sixth of all U.S. research scientist and engineers, David Packard, chairman of Hewlett- Packard Company, warned: At the heart of the problem is pay, with rigidity and inertia of the personnel administration system being a less important but contributing factor. . . . The [pay] problem is particularly acute in the scientific and engineering fields, where industrial pay scales have risen faster than the rest. [Because Congress links congressional and civil service pay and hesitates to raise its own pay], the result is not only lower federal salaries but also severe salary compression at the senior levels. (Packard, 1986) From information provided by 13 federal organizations in response to a December 1985 executive order of the President, GAO (1987) reported that 11 of these organizations experienced recruitment and retention problems because of the noncompetitive nature of federal salaries. Such problems tended to be agency-specific: . The U.S. Geological Survey noted its inability to hire about 10 percent of their "prime candidates" in engineering positions (3-4 from a vacancy pool of 40) each year. The Department of Transportation cited recruitment difficulty only for entry- level 83

technician positions in the Boston area, where competition with high-technology industry is great. Both the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology) and NASA cited noncompetitive salaries as a major contributor to the loss of technical, scientific, and engineering candidates. NASA noted that from FYi983 to FYl985, its scientist and engineer losses, other than retirement, increased from 294 to 361 employees. The salaries that B.S. engineers can draw from industry particularly affect NASA's ability to recruit them: Top pay for a beginning engineer at NASA is $25,000-that includes a 30% premium for hard-to-fi~} jobs like those in engineering and medicine. Top graduates . . . can command up to $40,000 in business. (Norton, 1989) Similarly, the effect of the federal pay schedule on the retention of high-level talent was keenly noted in a study of the 118 doctoral scientists and engineers at the U.S. Army's Waterways Experiment Station in Vicksburg, Miss. During the period January 1980 to June 1987, 32 doctorates (or 27 percent) left WES: Those who left did so primarily for a higher salary. The private sector attracted 41 percent, universities 22 percent, and other Federal agencies 16 percent. (Vincent, 1987) GAO's 1989(b) study, which looked at all scientists and engineers (as opposed to the 1987 examination of chemists, engineers, and computer specialists), found that "noncompetitive compensation further exacerbates the problem by creating higher rates of turnover, which, in turn, create the need for more recruiting by federal agencies." Because low salaries were making recruitment and retention of highly capable scientists and engineers difficult for the national labs, the Committee on Army Manpower (1983) recommended higher starting salaries for "new graduates possessing unique and needed skills so that these salaries are competitive," and Packard (1986) urged Congress "to act quickly to halt the erosion of scientific talent before the vitality of the laboratories is seriously undermined." Thus it was with much backing of the scientific community that adjustments were made to the General Schedule of Salaries to enable supervisors to hire engineers in entry and mid-level grades at "rates which exceed normal General Schedule salaries for other employees at the same grades" (GAO, 1987~. Nonetheless, it is felt by many that our Jack ot pay comparan~ty with the private sector means that we are becoming less able to compete for the shrinking pool of citizen S&E graduates" (MilIburn, 1989b). In fact, the Committee to Study Strategies to Strengthen the Scientific Excellence of the National Institutes of Health Intramural Research Program (1988) urged increasing NTH's flexibility in pay . . . so that it may compete more effectively for people critical to the continued success of the various programs and otherwise to adrn~nister more effectively its public responsibilities. 84

The committee also noted that although "there is merit in the claim that an unfavorable pay disparity exists and is growing," the magnitude of the problem may be overstated. Inadequate Fringe Benefits Several studies of federal compensation have shown that "the federal government's pay and benefits structure has serious implications for the quality of the federal workforce" (GAO, 1989b). The low level of fringe benefits provided by federal employers contributes to a number of resignations by scientists and engineers, particularly at grades GS-13 and above (Laboratory Management Task Force, 1982~. In fact, Packard (1986) stated, "Federal health and life insurance provisions and annual and sick leave allowances are far less generous than those offered by many private companies and universities." Furthermore, the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget urged "legislative action to permit continuity of pension plans for scientists and engineers who move between Federal laboratories and universities" (OSTP, 1984a). On the other hand, some attribute low attrition among federal employees in general to this very "lack of portability of civil service retirement benefits" (GAO, 1987), implying that the loss of federal scientists and engineers could be compounded by a change in retirement programs. Other Factors Still other factors influencing federal recruitment and retention of scientists and engineers have been noted not only in earlier studies but also recently by the press, including weak leadership within federal agencies, ownership of intellectual property, and ethics laws. Weak Agency Leadership: Several studies have focused on the leadership in national laboratories, but in some instances the assessment of problems encountered by the labs can apply more broadly to other federal agencies. Me Committee on Army Manpower (1983) noted that The quality and stability of its own leadership over the years is a primary factor in determining the laboratory's reputation in its field. It is also a primary factor in maintaining talented and productive scientific and · . . engineering personne .. But for one to lead an agency effectively-that is, use employees effectively and efficiently he or she must thoroughly understand the mission of the agency, a task complicated by several factors. First, the missions of agencies frequently change: The great national research centers financed by the government utilize large numbers of scientists and engineers. The missions of some of them, especially of those related to defense, have changed since their establishment. It is important that their present and future missions be clear-cut and of high priority, and that their use of scientists and engineers be unmistakably in the national interest. In maintaining these major 85

can be considerations of manpower, the government has a special responsibility to appraise them in terms of both their contributions to urgent government needs and their impact on the overall utilization of scientists and engineers, taking into consideration the needs of the private sector of the economy. (Committee on Utilization of Scientific and Engineering Manpower, 1964) As agency missions change, thing to effect the change is a large task. For instance, in 1989 EPA's Science Advisory Board suggested that the agency beef up its research program . . . by doubling its funding of environmental research in the next 5 years, putting more emphasis on investigator- initiated projects, and creating a new institute for environmental research which would focus on novel, preventive, and anticipatory research. (Marshall, 1989a) Second, the mission statements are sometimes unclear. In such cases the result lack of overall technical objectives and guidance for the laboratories. Without explicit policy direction and commitments, even with the management autonomy the directors appear to have, it is difficult to asset that the projects selected are part of an integrated program or that program progress is being attained. It is even more difficult to prevent short-term influences from controlling the laboratory agenda. . . . if the Federal laboratory role is to continue and be an effective use of resources, close scrutiny of the policy framework and resource support is warranted now. (GAO, 1979) 'l_Ire Thus the Committee on Army Manpower (1983) recommended that each federal agency should provide its directors, as well as its scientists and engineers, with consistent objectives that are both achievable and specific . . . and delegate the necessary responsibility to allow them to perform the creative and innovative research and development required to meet these goals. Another problem contributing to weak leadership and inadequate management is increased politicization. Agency leadership is increasingly determined by political appointments, a policy that can not only hinder mission accomplishment but also make it difficult to maintain competent and stable leadership. One way of strengthening agency leadership, according to GAO (1987), is participation in the training prescribed for Senior Executive Service (SES) candidates and incumbents. However, GAO found that only 48 percent of all SES members had received annual training for the two previous years and that the average annual training time per executive was only 52 hours. Earlier studies also have shown that agency leadership is strengthened when Federal managers . . . know how many and what types of people they need 86

to accomplish their programs' objectives. Linking mission accomplishment with personnel requirements requires good planning systems and sound workforce information. (GAO, 1989b) Ethics Laws: The possibility of conflicts of interest arises when scientists and engineers are privy to certain information because of their employment by the federal government. As a result, Congress has been most interested in this issue in recent years, leading to reports by GAO on how the postemployment provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-521) have been implemented. GAO (1989b) found that "application of the Ethics Act's postemployment conflict of interest provisions is governed in large part by how a former employee's agency has been compartmental- ized."2 To make DoD managers and employees aware and knowledgeable of ethical issues, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney has proposed creation of an ethics council composed of top agency leaders that would develop an ethics program (Moore, 1989~. Numerous senior executives have recently quit, reportedly because of tighter interpretations of P.~. 100-679, passed by Congress in 1988 (Norton, 1989; Marshall, 1989b). Among the senior executives who recently left federal employment after as much as IS years of service are William BalIhaus, Ir., director of NASA's Ames Research Center; Noel W. Hinners, NASA's associate deputy administrator and chief scientist; H. Robert Heller, former Federal Reserve Board governor; and 18 other senior technical employees at NASA, including Robert Aller, chief of the office of space operation; E. Ray Tanner, deputy director of space station operations; John Thomas, director of the shuttle booster redesign program; and lames Odom, associate administrator, and Thomas Moser, acting associate administrator, for the space station. Had these senior executives remained with the government, the new ethics code would have forced them to sell stock in companies in which their employing agencies did business, to sever "professional and social as well as financial connections with their past" (Norton, 1989), and to resign from business and even nonprofit directorships. Richard Truly, NASA administrator, feels that the new ethics code will have a strong negative impact on that agency: "When ten senior executive service people leave you, they take with them 250 to 300 years of government leadership and experience" (Marshall, 1989b). Although P.~. 100-679 permits federal employees to provide scientific advice, as long as it is not used on contract negotiations, Norman R. Augustine, CEO of Martin Marietta, has concluded: There's no way ~ can serve in the government. [The conflict-of-interest laws are] sufficiently vague and subject to ex post facto interpretation. They've got criminal sanctions. No one wants to be the test case ten years down the road. ~ certainly don't. (Norton, 1989) 2 Compartmentalization is The process by which agencies are divided into designated subunits for application of the 1-year no-contact restriction contained in the Ethics Act. The restriction prohibits former senior-level employees from contacting their former agencies on particular matters either before the agency or in which the agency has a direct and substantial interests (GAO, 1989b). 87

DoD also experienced resignations upon passage of P.L. 100-679. If proposed legislation passes, further limiting postemployment activities (e.g., banning work for any major defense contractor until at least two years after working for DoD), other DoD employees may resign. Congressman Les AuCoin has said that the proposed legislation is designed to attract managers "who are more interested in the national interest than their own career interest" (Norton, 1989~. However, the problem of retaining senior employees is so significant that it threatens to affect the continuity and institutional memory needed to resolve various administrative and programmatic problems. . . . In fiscal year 1985, 615, or 9.9 percent, of career SES members left SES. The majority . . . took another paid position in business, industry, or consulting. Nearly half reported increases in their salaries. (GAO, 1989b) Conflicts of interest can have different effects on scientific productivity. A recent case in point was the controversy centering around accusations that "a top-secret Star Wars project was hyped to key people in government by famed physicist Edward Teller and a young protege" (Dworkin, 1988~. According to Dworkin, because of the action taken by Teller, Roy Woodruff, associate director of that laboratory for defense systems, "resigned in protest." Ownership of Intellectual Property: A fundamental question encountered not only by scientists and engineers employed by the federal government, but also by their counterparts in other sectors is "Who has rights of ownership in science, under what circumstances, and how free are they to convey the 'owned' intellectual property to others?" This unresolved question has been perceived by many as a deterrent to federal employment: Goverrunent controls on the communication of scientific and technical information involve the collision of basic First Amendment issues and government's rights to limit access, where that is deemed in the national interest. In practice, governmental agencies have at times overcIassified such information ostensibly to protect national security or national economic competitiveness and have also leaked such information when that was thought useful. . . . It may be that the U.S. government has recently become particularly intent on using legislation, designed originally for other purposes, to control the flow of scientific information. (Zuckerman, 1988) Thus Congress considered legislation whereby scientists and engineers working in federal laboratories and cooperating with private industry could market their inventions that did not apply directly to the mission of the particular lab. This legislation was viewed as necessary because few federal scientists and engineers patent their work, yet they often publish their research. As a result, "the Soviets and Japanese take best advantage of federal research," according to Eugene Stark, industrial initiatives officer at Los Alamos National Laboratory (Hyatt, 1986~. Hyatt reported that many felt that passage of this legislation would enable labs focusing on areas such as health, agriculture, and defense 88

to be "a seedbed for innovative products and new companies." He cited Oak Ridge National Laboratory as an example of one federal laboratory where such commercialization has been in effect for some time; in 1985 "the lab spent about $250,000 polishing up eight new technologies for private industry . . . and spawned four start-ups." However, other researchers have noted that recent laws and decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have examined but not satisfactorily answered the question "What are appropriate controls on the dissemination of scientific and technical information?" Furthermore, a number of government actions have curtailed dissemination of scientific and technical information: Government initiatives include moves to expand the government classification system; to require prepublication review agreements from government grantees, contractees, and employees; and to invoke statutes such as the Espionage Act, the Invention Secrecy Act, and Export Control Laws to prevent or punish disclosure of scientific and technical information. Government actions invoking the Export Laws have interfered with presentations of papers at scientific society meetings and personal contacts between foreign scholars and American scientists. Under the Espionage Act, a government employee has been prosecuted for disclosing classified information, an action ordinarily not punishable as a crime. (Well, 1988) Such restrictions have negative impacts on both the individual scientist or engineer and the general public. According to WeiT, scientists tend to avoid controversy "that may deflect them from scientific work" or lead to "loss of access to information or Toss of grants or employment." Thus scientific inquiry may be stymied. Furthermore, "when government employees, contractees, or grantees give up the right to inform the public, the public is the loser" (DuVal, 1986~. Two of the factors often cited as affecting the federal government's ability to recruit scientists and engineers are more tangible than others but appear to be just as difficult to correct: the geographic location of employment and quality of the working environment. Geographic Location of Employment: In considering whether to work for a federal agency, it is not unusual for an individual to consider the cost of living near the place of employment. Recruiting new hires as well as replacements for employees who leave can be quite difficult. For instance, NASA has encountered problems in replacing its senior employees: Potential candidates to manage the space station program are balking at the high cost of living in Washington, D.C. As a result, the agency is having a hard time selling its openings.... Without some special action of Congress, moreover, the government has no legal way to offer a bonus to people who make the move. (Waldrop, 1989) 89

Although the government does provide pay differentials in some regions of the country, the findings of a recent study of locality pay indicate that these differentials may be insufficient to entice individuals to work for the federal government rather than universities or private industry (Wyatt, 1989~. Quality of Working Environment: The impact of the working environment on one's productivity and performance has been assessed many times. In fact, 26 years ago, a committee of the National Academy of Sciences recommended that this issue not be ignored: The Civil Service Commission should . . . carefully review government personnel policies to determine which ones have or can have a significant effect on the environment in which research and development is carried out in government laboratories. Where changes in such policies seem advisable, authority to make them should be promptly sought. At the same time, the commission should aid and encourage agency heads and lab directors fully to use all existing authority to improve working environments. (Committee on Utilization of Scientific and Engineering Manpower, 1964) Nonetheless, a later survey of 192 laboratories directed by 8 federal agencies found that "deteriorating facilities and equipment" was one of five major problem areas affecting recruitment and retention of scientists and engineers (GAO, 1979~. This was subsequently confirmed in the Committee on Army Manpower's 1983 study of "shops, libraries, laboratory supplies and equipment, computer facilities, and other resources." Other aspects of the work environment, besides the physical, are program content, stability, and impact. The Committee on Army Manpower found that Laboratory scientists and engineers are highly motivated by challenging and important work. If they feel that their work is irrelevant to their clients or that their clients fail to take full advantage of the laboratory's results, they may seek other employment. This applies particularly to more talented and highly motivated individuals whom the Army can least afford to lose. Negative Public Image of Federal Service: Added together, the many factors cited above contribute to a negative public image of federal service, and at the same time the public has a poor image of scientists and engineers (Office of Scientific and Engineering Personnel, 1989~. The National Commission on the Public Service (1989) stated this succinctly: It is evident that public service is neither as attractive as it once was nor as effective in meeting perceived needs. No doubt, opposition to specific policies of government has contributed to a lack of respect for the public servants who struggle to make the policies work. This drives away much of our best talent which can only make the situation worse. 90

As noted in recent survey of selected college and university deans and placement officers, 75 percent considered the negative image of federal service a significant obstacle to the ability of federal agencies to recruit college graduates (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 1988~. This has, in turn, "demoralized federal employees and hindered recruitment" to the extent that, in one survey of Senior Executive Service members, only 13 percent reported that they would advise someone to pursue a career in public service. The National Commission on the Public Service (1989) cautioned, One need not search far to see grounds for concern. Crippled nuclear weapons plants, defense procurement scandals, leaking hazardous waste dumps, near-m~sses in air traffic control, and the costly collapse of so many savings and loans have multiple causes. But each such storer carries some similar refrains about government's inability to recruit and retain- a talented work force: the Department of Defense is losing its top procurement specialists to contractors who can pay much more; the FAA is unable to hold skilled traffic controllers because of stress and working conditions; the EPA is unable to fill key engineering jobs because the brightest students simply are not interested. Summary During the past 25 years, numerous studies of the federal scientific and technical work force have been conducted. Some have been narrowly focused on a particular agency while others have examined a specific issue across agencies. Although consensus is apparent on some issues, for others the study findings offer conflicting data. For example, most studies of the overall federal S&E work force note that recruitment and retention are adversely affected by such factors as personnel ceilings, salaries confined by civil service regulations, fringe benefit packages less attractive than those offered by other employment sectors, weak agency leadership, ethics laws, regulations governing ownership of intellectual property, geographic location of employment, quality of working environment, and the negative public image of federal service. However, there is often disagreement about the magnitude of the effects that these factors have on .. . ~ . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^~e ~ ~ ~ . . . . . . recruitment and retention. the degree ot dlitlculty in recruiting and retaining scientists and engineers is usually agency- and discipline-specific. Furthermore, differences in degree often occur within agencies. Many steps have been taken to facilitate recruitment and retention of scientists and engineers by federal agencies. For instance, personnel demonstration projects, now at 10 sites, have been shown to have positive effects on recruitment and retention. Other mechanisms to encourage federal employment and to lower turnover rates among scientists and engineers include special rates for certain position classifications and pay schedules based on locality of employment. However, studies indicate that other organizational and decision-making processes within the federal goverrunent sometimes outweigh the mechanisms designed especially to enhance recruitment and retention. 91

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National Commission on the Public Service. 1989. Leadership for America Rebuilding the Public Service. Washington, D.C.: The Commission. Norton, R. E. 1989. Who wants to work in Washington? Fortune (August 14~: 77-80, 82. Office of Scientific and Engineering Personnel. 1989. Responding to the Changing Demography: Women in Science and Eng~neenng. Internal report. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences. Packard, D. 1986. The loss of governmental scientific and engineering talent. Issues in Science and Technology 2~3: Spring): 126-13' U.S. Civil Service Commission. 1970. Scientists and Engineers in the Federal Personnel System. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1974. Scientific and Engineenng Manpower Management. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1964. The Special Features of the Federal Personnel System of Interest to the Scientist and Engineer. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (out of print). U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services. 1986. Altemative Pay Systems in the Federal Govemment. Hearings before the subcommittee, April 15 and 30 and May 14, 1986. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. , Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes. 1982. Critical Need for Energy Research and Development: The Role of the Midwest Research Labs. Hearing before the subcommittee, March 22, 1982. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1979. Federal R&D .T aborator~es Directors' Perspectives on Management. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO. 1984. Federal White Collar Special Rate Program. Report to the Subcommittee on Compensation and Benefits, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO. 1987. Federal Work divorce: Pay, Recruitment, and Retention of Federal Employees. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO. 1989a. Managing Human Resources: Greater OPM Leadership Needed to Address Critical Challenges (GAO/GGD-89-19~. Washington, D.C.: GAO. 1989b. The Public Service: Issues Affecting Its Quality, Effectiveness, Integrity, and Stewardship (GAO/GGD-89-73~. Washington, D.C.: GAO. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board. 1988. Attracting Quality Graduates to the Federal Govemment: A New of College Recruiting. Washington, D.C.: MSPB. U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). 1984a. Progress Report on Implementing the Recommendations of the White House Science Council's Federal Laboratory Review Panel, vol I: Summary Report. Washington, D.C.: OSTP. 1984b. Progress Report on Implementing the Recommendations of the White House Science Council's Federal Laboratory Review Panel, vo! I: Status Reports. Washington, D.C.: OSTP. 1983. Report of the White House Science Council's Federal Laboratory Review - Panel. Washington, D.C.: OSTP. Vincent, M. K. 1987. Loss of Doctorates from WES, 19S0-1987 (Miscellaneous Paper 93

0-87-2~. Vicksburg, Miss.: Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Office of Technical Programs and Plans. Waldrop, M. M. 1989. New recruits hard to find. Science 24S(July 21~:251. Weil, V. 1988. Policy incentives and constraints on scientific and technical information. Science, Technology, & Human Values 13~&2~:17-26. Weisbrod, B. A. 1989. Rewarding performance that is hard to measure: The private nonprofit sector. Science 244:541-545. Witham, F. 1970. Scientists and Engineers in the Federal Govemment, Personnel Bibliography Series Number 3a Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Wyatt Company. 1989. Study of Federal Employee Locality Pay: Executive Summary. Wyatt: Philadelphia. Zuckerman, H. A. 1988. Introduction: Intellectual property and diverse rights of ownership in science. Science, Technology, & Human Values 3~&2~:7-16. 94

QUANTITATIVE INPUTS TO FEDERAL TECHNICAL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT Charles E. Falk National Science Foundation (retired) Opinions may differ on the key requirements for effective management systems; however, everyone seems to agree that adequate information input is an absolute necessity. This axiom applies also to the federal government's management of its science and engineering work force. This paper deals with the quantitative information that is, or certainly should be, used in the management of this critical resource. Failure to do so can produce not only management in a vacuum but, even worse, actions based on incorrect anecdotal information. Thus any evaluation of the effectiveness of the federal technical personnel management system should assess both the adequacy of available data and whether such data are being used by those who operate and manage the system. To assist this facet of the study, this paper will explore the types of information required, briefly describe the data systems that provide this information, analyze some pertinent data readily available at this time, and finally make some recommendations related to the development and use of quantitative information on federal scientists and engineers. Data Categories Work Force Characteristics Personnel data requirements can be broken down into two major categories: descriptive and dynamic. The first, descriptive of the existing or prospective work force, should place the federal technical work force into proper perspective with respect to the overall national pool of scientists and engineers to ascertain whether acquisition of new personnel is likely to be restricted by supply shortages. It should also depict the characteristics of the work force, including demographic characteristics such as age, sex, and race (the first to provide indicators of likely attrition and the other two to show to what extent major human resource pools are used). Educational data such as highest degree obtained should be available to show what specific educational pools will have to be tapped. Grade-leve} data can be used as a surrogate to experience and level of expertise and responsibility. Finally, information on the type of primary work activity- such as R&D, operation, or management-provides important information on the types of training and experience required. All descriptive data should be presented by occupation and agency so that specific requirements can be identified. The agency data and information on the number and characteristics of scientists and engineers engaged in work related to various areas of 95

critical national interest such as defense, energy, or environment provide insight into how changes in national priorities are likely to influence future requirements for specific occupations. Comparisons with similar characteristics of technical personnel in other employment sectors such as industry or academe can i(lenti* the relatively 1lninile nearly of the federal sector. All of the data mentioned thus far are quantitative that is, they deal with the number of individuals having specific characteristics. Another class of information probably of equal importance in determining the effectiveness of programs is the quality of the individuals involved. Although it is difficult to develop quantitative quality indicators, educational attainment that is, highest degree and grade level- data-can be used at least as partial quality indicators. Dynamic Data One of the most important aspects of personnel management involves the dynamics of the work force. Related data provide information on the magnitude and characteristics of new hires. Furthermore, other data (e.g., on separations and length of government serviced can be used as indicators of work satisfaction. Data elements required for a good understanding of the dynamics include the following: . . Turnover data that is, information on length of service, both in the federal government and in a specific agency, coupled with separation rates provide information on job satisfaction. Data on types of separation provide important information on inability to retain personnel. Moreover, data on job satisfaction of the total work force, based on such information as a recent survey of the Senior Executive Service personnel, provide important insights. Salary comparisons with other agencies and, especially, other employment sectors are unquestionably one of the most important sets of potential dissatisfaction indicators. However, such data must be presented with sufficient detail to make meaningful comparisons possible. Thus it is essential to know the age and occupation distributions of the personnel involved, for a younger work force is likely to be at a lower pay level while certain occupations such as engineering, even at a given age, require higher rates of pay. Data on career patterns of scientists and engineers within the government can be compared with patterns in other employment sectors to illuminate potential sources of work dissatisfaction. Although it may be possible to generate such data from the federal employment base, for the federal government is a single employer, it may be difficult to obtain similar data for comparisons with other employment sectors. Quantitative Information Sources Human resource data are generally developed from two sources: employers and employer-based data usually are limited because they are derived employees. Although from personnel files, this is not the case for the federal government. 96

Descriptive Data Office of Personnel Management: OPM maintains an extensive data bank based on the periodic reports (monthly, quarterly' or at pay-period intervals) it receives from most federal agencies and departments. The principal omissions are the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Postal Service, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the uniformed military. Among the 58 data elements of the system are most of the descriptive data requirements mentioned above-namely age, sex, race, citizenship, educational level, occupational classification, functional classification, salary, and grade. Summary statistical tables of occupations by sex, salary, and grade are published biennially by OPM in the report Occupations of Federal White-Collar arid Blue-Collar Workers. The National Science Foundation (NSF) uses OPM data to produce an annual set of detailed statistical tables called Federal Scientists and Engineers: 19--. These reports present annual snapshots of the federal science and engineering work force and contain such descriptive data as occupation, agency, sex, highest degree level, primary work activity, management or supervisory status, median salary, and years or service. Thus between these two reports there exist regularly published statistics that cover most of the required descriptive data. Some of the tabulations needed for sophisticated analyses such as median salary by age and occupation, necessary for salary comparisons between agencies or other employment sectors, can in principle be derived but are not available on a regular basis or sometimes not at all. The principal advantage of the OPM data base is that it includes information on almost every federal employee who is classified in a science or engineering occupation; there is no sampling. An advantage of the published NSF data is that they show OPM data in compilations compatible with NSF data from other employment sectors. A disadvantage of the NSF tables is that NSF's definitions of scientist and engineer changed in 1984. Prior to this date individuals were included regardless of their highest academic degree; subsequently, only those with at least a baccalaureate degree have been included. Although this makes time-series analysis difficult, this deficiency is probably not serious except for engineers and computer specialists. National Science Foundation: Descriptive data also can be obtained from the reports of the NSF's Scientific and Technical Personnel Data System (STPDS). These data are based on information specially generated for NSF from the decennial census, supplemented by information from regular surveys of the S&E work force identified in the census and of new S&E baccalaureate, master's, and doctorate recipients. The principal advantage of these data are better functional detail and classification by areas of critical national interest. Another possible advantage is that the information is provided by the individuals involved and thus may be more accurate. A major disadvantage is that the information is derived from a sample (about 3-4 percent in the case of most groups, 13 percent in the case of new doctorates). Thus small data cells will have relatively large sampling errors. National Research Council: With the support of several federal agencies, the Research Council's Office of Scientific and Engineering Personnel collects and analyzes data on the nation's science and engineering doctorates biennially. Data elements are generally 97

the same as those in the NSF surveys, but the NRC survey involves a sample that is somewhat larger than those in the above-mentioned NSF surveys. Others: The Department of Defense (DoD) is in the midst of a survey of its S&E work force. The survey questions cover characteristics, possible quality indicators (college grade-point average, class standing, patents granted, publications, and awards), and job satisfaction. The OPM data base does not cover the same universe as NSF's STPDS or the doctorate surveys of the NRC. OPM data identitr individuals who are working in S&E occupations and can independently identifier individuals by their academic discipline. The NSF system is based on adherence to 2 out of 3 criteria (field of degree, occupation, and self classifications; the NRC system uses field of degree as its inclusion criterion. Consequently, the NSF system also covers individuals who have degrees in science and engineering but are not working in science and engineering occupations. Dynamic Data Information on the dynamics of the federal work force can be derived from the OPM data base. OPM data, which are collected monthly and compiled quarterly, include accession and separation rates. The latter provide information on different types of separation, such as resignations, retirement, discharge, and death. Accession data cover new hires and transfers. Accession and separation rates are reported on a fiscal year basis, and OPM officials indicate that these data are used primarily by federal central management agencies such as OPM and the Office of Management and Budget. Although specific operational agencies provide the data, they seldom request summaries or special compilations from OPM. Mobility data developed periodically, but relatively infrequently, by NSF cover mobilities between sectors of employment, field of degree, and occupation. Information on mobility between federal agencies could be produced by OPM. Projections Estimates of likely future supply and demand relationships are extremely important for federal policies that can affect either one. For example, direct educational support can boost supply, and increases in highly technical programs such as those of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) can stimulate demand. Although periodic projections are made by the Department of Labor, these generally cover all occupations and so provide a limited amount of detail on scientists and engineers. Several divisions of NSF produce more detailed projections of demand and supply of scientists and engineers, although some are limited to doctorates. A problem with the NSF projections is their relative infrequency, some being published as many as 8-10 years apart. The NSF and especially the OPM data can be used by individual agencies to obtain an overall picture of the federal S&E work force, to obtain information about their own corps of scientists and engineers, and to compare themselves with other 98

agencies and sectors of employment. However, it is important to determine whether these data are made readily available to the agencies and whether the agencies use them. Certainly some of the descriptive data are published biennially by NSF and OPM. However, operating agencies seem to seldom make use of the dynamic data collected by OPM, data that one might consider the most important for personnel management. Furthermore, it is not clear how useful such relatively highly aggregated data are for agencies' personnel management. Of course, it is possible that agencies themselves compile their own personnel data or develop projections of their own S&E demand and then relate them to the broader national projections produced by the NSF and the Department of Labor. Clearly any future study of the processes of federal S&E personnel management should examine these possibilities. Descriptive Data The numerical information shown below comes from NSF reports that compile OPM data in a form compatible with other NSF human resource data. Overall Magnitude The federal government is the largest single employer of scientists and engineers in the United States. NSF indicates that in 1988 there were 411,800 federally employed scientists and engineers, who constituted 7.5 percent of the total U.S. science and engineering work force. This is somewhat lower than the 10 percent reported in 1976. The NSF data indicate that in 1987 there were 27,532 federally employed S&E doctorates, accounting for about 6.6 percent of the national total. Occupational Fields OPM reports that in 1988 engineers were by far the largest group, accounting for 50 percent of the total federal scientists and engineers (Figure 1). The relative occupational distributions essentially have not changed from 1978 but those for doctorates are significantly different. Physical scientists made up the largest proportion (36 percent of doctorates), followed by life scientists (26 percent), engineers (14 percent), psychologists (10 percent), social scientists (7 percent), and mathematicians and computer scientists (6 percent). Agency Distribution In 1988, as reported by OPM, DoD employed the largest proportion (49 percent) of federal scientists and engineers, followed by the Department of Agriculture (USDA, 12.8 percent), Department of Interior (6.8 percent), NASA (5.5 percent), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 3.9 percent), and Department of Commerce (3.7 percent). This relative distribution has remained essentially unchanged since 1978, except that the domination by DoD was somewhat smaller that year, only 44 percent compared with the 49 percent reported in 1988. However, relative increases in the total number of scientists and engineers varied greatly by agency. Thus the number 99

P. - hologists (2.0~o) Mathematicians (4.0~o) Social Scientists (6.1~o) / Computer Scientists (lO.l~o) Physical Scientists (12.1~o) Life Scientists (lS.2~o) . Engineers (505~o) SOURCES: National Science Foundation, Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1988, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Pnot~ng Once; OPM data. Figure I. Federal scientists and engineers, by occupation, 1988. 220 200 ~0 1 60 1 40 - ~ 20 ~7 o1 00 - , , 80 - , 60 - , 40 - , 20 O / 1 L~ , ~ _ / / \ / \ / ~ / \ / \ / \ / \ /' \ / \ / ~ / \ / ~ \ \ l r r r 1 1 1 1 1 DoD USDA Interior BASE HHS Comm EPA DoE Vet Adm TVA DOT Other Selected Federal Agencies V~'l 1988 ~1978 TOTAL SOURCES: National Science Foundation, Federal Scientists and Eng'1'eers: 1988 and Federal Scientific and Technical Personnel: 1974 Ig77, and 1978, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office; OPM data. Figure 2. Federal scientists and engineers, by agency, 1978 and 1988. 100

of S&E employees in DoD increased by 44 percent during that period, while in the Veterans Administration, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, and Environmental Protection Agency increases were only in the 2~30 percent range (Figure 2~. The Department of Commerce actually experienced a decrease of 2 percent. Agency distributions by occupation are not too different from the overall distribution. DoD is still the leader in terms of engineers (67 percent), physical scientists (32 percent), mathematicians (56 percent), computer scientists (53 percent), and social scientists (33 percent). Only in the life sciences and psychology are other agencies ahead, led by USDA (63 percent) and the Veterans Administration (51 percent), respectively. Because several agencies may work on a single issue of national concern, one cannot assume that distribution by agency reflects national interest or priority. For example, although EPA ranks only seventh among the agencies in terms of total S&E employment, the proportion of federal scientists and engineers who engage in environmentally related activities ranks second (Figure 3). All Other (23.57e) Space (4.9~) Tec h Dev (4.9%) Health (4.9~) \ /// 1 \< Food (5 97~ Energy (6.9~) \ - \ \ ye Environ merit ( 1 0.8%) \ Defense (38.2~) SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1986, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Pnat~g Office, 1987. Figure 3. Federal scientists and engineers, by area of national interest, 1986. 101

Areas of National Interest To assess future federal requirements for scientists and engineers, it is useful to know what proportions are working now in areas of national interest. This will permit the development of some first-order dollar/manpower relationships. Of course, the substantive nature of future expansions of specific areas also has a major influence on future S&E requirements. Not surprisingly, NSF-generated data show that in 1986 defense activities used by far the greatest proportion of federal scientists and engineers (39 percent); this is true for scientists (26 percent) as well as for engineers (50 percent). Environmentally oriented activities were in second place, making up 11 percent of the total, and were also in second place with respect to scientists (16 percent) but in third Second olace among engineers was the area place with respect to engineers (6 percent). ~ ~ ~ of energy (9 percent), although with respect to all scientists and engineers, energy came in third (7 percent). Among scientists, food accounted for third place (~! percent). 70 - - c u 10- ~ 1 20 O - 4~ Bache~or's Master's Ph.D. 1~/~ federal S&E i\ \] National SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1988, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989. Figure 4. Federal scientists and engineers, by highest academic degree earned, 19XS (in percent). 102

Highest Degree The distnbution of federal scientists and engineers by highest academic degree earned, as reported by OPM, is not too different from the national distnbution derived from NSF data (Figure 4~. Exceptions are that the proportion of baccalaureates is about 15 percent higher in the federal goverrunent, whereas the proportion of doctorates Is lower by about 23 percent. These figures are not too surprising if one considers that academe, which constitutes about 15 percent of the national S&E work force, concentrates heavily on doctorates. Academic degree distributions of scientists and engineers do vary considerably by occupation. For instance, 69 percent of the psychologists and 29 percent of the physical scientists in the federal government are Ph.D.s. The highest baccalaureate proportions are found in the computer sciences (78 percent) and life sciences (62 percent). Primary Work Activity Federal scientists and engineers are similar to the national total in that about 25 percent were engaged in R&D in 198S, about 6 percent were primarily engaged in management, and less than ~ percent were in R&D grant and contract ad~n~stration (Figure 5~. Unknown ~ /~ Other (34 7~) / \~, - \ \ R&D (24.8~) I \~\\ / Design (8.92) \ \ \ \/ \ /a to Collec tion . Proc essi n9 ( 7 c Management (5.9~) Natural Resource Operations (7.9%) SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1988, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989. Figure 5. Federal scientists and engineers, by primal work actively, 1988. 103

Sex and Race In 1988 about 14 percent of federal scientists and engineers were female, and about 7 percent were black or Hispanic. These percentages are about the same as the national proportions. These relatively low figures have important implications for the future if the federal government or the nation should have difficulties in attracting sufficient numbers of scientists and engineers into their respective work forces. Salary The salaries of federal scientists and engineers, compared with those in other employment sectors, can be an important indicator of the federal government's competitiveness in the human resources marketplace. If one examines average salaries, developed from NSF surveys, the government seems to be at just about the same level as industry or academe, but this is not the case when an analysis is made by major occupational groups (Table 1~. In the case of engineers, the average government salary is 2-5 percent lower than those of the other two sectors; for social scientists the federal figure is up to 40 percent higher. These data, which are so different from anecdotal information, are really not too meaningful. Further analyses are needed in terms of age and academic degree distributions. Although these data are in the NSF data bank, no published information is available. One set of data that offers some insight at a more meaningful comparable level was provided by NSF's Surveys of Recent Science and Engineering Graduates. Table 2 shows such information for 1986. Compared to industry, the federal government does not seem to have very competitive salaries among new master's graduates in all fields TABLE 1. Average Salary of Scientists and Engineers, by Sector of Employment and Occupation, 1986 Four-Year Federal College or Occupation Government Industry University Physical scientists Environmental scientists Life scientists Psychologists Social scientists engineers TOTAL $39,000 40,100 ~,~uo 39,300 40,700 40,500 $39,800 $41,500 37,700 ~J,~`JU 32,200 28,700 41,200 $39,600 $40,800 40,800 34,700 39,400 39,600 42,500 $39,200 SOURCE: National Science Foundation, U.S. Scientists and Engineers: 1986, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. 104

TABLE 2. Median Salaries of Recent Science and Engineering Graduates, by Sector of Employment and Occupation, 1986 Four-Year Federal College or Occupation Government Industry University B.S. M.S. B.S. M.S. B.S. M.S. Scientists $22,500 $26,300 $23,600 $34,000 $19,100 $22,600 Environmental scientists 18,400 26,300 21,600 31,000 17,000 17,000 Life scientists 18,600 * 18,000 * 16,000 * Engineers 28,500 34,000 30,000 36,300 19,600 29,700 TOTAL $27,300 $30,000 $29,100 $35,000 $19,100 $22,900 NOTE: The federal government employs too few physical scientists, psychologists, and social scientists for comparisons to be made with industry and academe. * Too few federally employed master's degree recipients to compare sectors. SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Charactenstics of Recent Science and Eng~neenng Graduates: 1986, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. for which data exist. For new baccalaureates the situation is somewhat different. At the overall level the government seems to be competitive. However, a field analysis shows that this must be attributable to favorable situations in the physical sciences, psychology, or the social sciences, because in the environmental sciences, engineering, and the life sciences the government was about 15 percent below industrial salaries InterectinsJlv ~O ~ ~ one narrowest gaps were in engineering at both the baccalaureate and the master's levels. Age Age distribution, particularly the proportion of those beyond the age of 55, will have a significant impact on the federal government's requirements for S&E replacements during the next decade. The 1986 distribution, compiled from OPM data, shows that 14 percent of the S&E work force are older than 55. Furthermore, there seems to be no significant variation in age distributions among the agencies that employ the greatest number of scientists and engineers. Dynamic Data Although considerable dynamic data are collected by OPM, very few compilations are made or published. Length of Government Service Length-of-service data published by OPM may provide some insight to what extent fresh 105

TABLE 3: Federal Scientists and Engineers in Selected Agencies, by Length of Service, 1988 (in percent) Years Agency Less than 5 5-14 15-24 More than 25 Defense 25 34 24 16 Agriculture 16 36 28 21 Interior 14 43 27 17 NASA 20 24 20 36 Health & Human Services 26 31 29 14 Commerce 18 33 30 19 TOTAL 22 34 25 17 SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1988, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989. points of view are injected into governmental science and technology activities. The data in Table 3 show that 17 percent of all government scientists and engineers have more than 25 years of federal service, and 22 percent have less than 5 years. These proportions do not seem excessive, but there are variations among agencies. NASA, for instance, seems to have an unusually large group, 36 percent, in the greater-than-25-years category; however, this is not attributable to a relatively small less- than-5-years group but rather to a considerably smaller 5-24-years group. The Interior Department has a relatively small group, 14 percent, in the less-than-5-years category because its 5-24-years group is unusually large. , Accession and Separation These are probably two of the most important data elements that are not made available in regularly published form but that can be accessed by agencies. One might argue that there is no need to publish these data since they are mostly used for internal personnel management. On the other hand, such publicly available compilations (for example, by occupation and agency) would be useful for external reviews of the federal S&E work force as well as for studies by academics and other interested groups. Although accession and separation data usually can be generated on request, this often involves delays and expense to the user. A fringe benefit of published data would be the feedback received from users which, if acted upon, could make the data even more useful to analysts. The following example derived from a special OPM run involves resignation rates, which can be indicative of job satisfaction. In 1988 the resignation rate of federal 106

scientists and engineers was 2.1 percent, compared-to 2.0 percent in 1978. This rate is fairly small, although the change may indicate some increase of unrest. In 1988 computer scientists had the highest resignation rate (3 percent). However, the resignation rates of physical scientists showed the greatest change from 1978 to 1988 from 1.4 percent to 2.1 percent. Separation Reasons and'}ob Satisfaction When separation rates are too high, especially among high-quality or high-grade personnel, it seems important to know the reasons for such separations. Furthermore, to prevent high separation rates or to improve effectiveness and efficiency, it is useful to know more about specifics of job dissatisfaction. No published compilations on job satisfaction were found, with the exception of a summary of a 1988 survey of former members of the Senior Executive Service. More than half of the Senior Executives surveyed left their jobs, in part, for monetary reasons: 57 percent because of the possibility of continued ceilings on executive salaries, 35 percent to obtain higher pay outside the government, and 42 percent because of possible changes in the retirement system. Also almost half gave one of the following nonmonetary reasons: criticism of federal workers (47 percent), politicalization of their agency (44 percent), knowledge and skills not being used appropriately (42 percent), and incompetence of immediate supervisors (39 percent). Quality Indicators It is extremely difficult to develop indicators that reflect the quality of personnel, especially of more experienced employees. For scientists and engineers engaged in fundamental research, bibliometric data could be a quality indicator. For newly graduated applicants, one could examine their SAT or GRE scores as well as the distribution of newly hired recent graduates of quality-rated universities. As for newly hired mature scientists and engineers, the quality of their previous employer and their position in their previous organization could possibly provide some insights into the quality question. As indicated earlier, DoD and OPM are experimenting with surveys that may provide data that could be used to develop some quality indicators. Findings and Questions Use of Data A valuable data resource exists in OPM's Central Personnel Data File. Although OPM uses such data to develop pay policies, it is not clear to what extent this information is being used by other centralized units responsible for policies and practices that affect scientists and engineers in all federal agencies. Moreover, a cursory examination of the system seems to indicate that personnel units in individual agencies are not using this available central resource, and the reasons for this should be explored. Any future examination of the personnel management of federal scientists and engineers 107

should evaluate the extent to which these data are being used or, in the case of Individual agencies, possibly being duplicated. Development of Quantitative Information Any more detailed study of federal S&E personnel management should investigate the extent to which individual agencies are maintaining summaries of the descriptive and dynamic characteristics of their own S&E work force and have developed projections of their future needs. Publication of Dynamic Statistics Evaluations should be made of the need for periodical published compilations of data from OPM's Central Personnel Data File. Missing Quantitative Information Some data important to evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the federal S&E work force do not exist. Efforts should be made periodically to generate quantitative information on job satisfaction, reasons for separations, and quality of newly hired as well as experienced scientists and engineers. The current experimental efforts of the DoD and OPM are steps in the right direction. Analyses of Future Federal S&E Personnel Needs Analyses of personnel needs caused by changes in national priorities must not use agencies as surrogates for areas of national interest, for activity in such areas often is widely dispersed among many agencies. For example, the EPA is the seventh largest employer of scientists and engineers, yet the number of federal S&E employees who report environment as their primary area of involvement is the second largest group. Occupation Similarly, care has to be taken not to assume concentration of particular occupations on the basis of agency missions. For example, the largest number of life scientists are employed by the departments of Agriculture and Interiors not HHS. Also the largest number of psychologists are in the Veterans Administration, not HHS. Salary Data These data should always be reported by occupation, age, and highest degree. Failure to do so- that is, to report just median or average salaries only by agency or occupation is likely to lead to misleading comparisons among sectors of employment, agencies, or occupations. 108

Projections Federal agencies that develop national projections of the demand and supply of scientists and engineers should be encouraged to update and publish them more frequently. Bibliography National Science Foundation. 1981. Federal Scientific and Technical Personnel: 1976, 1977, and 1978. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1987. Characteristics of Recent Science and Eng~neenng Graduates: 1986. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1987. Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1986. Printing Office. 1987. U.S. Scientists and Engineers: 1986. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1988. Doctoral Scientists and Engineers: A Decade of Change. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1989. Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1988. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Labor. 1989. Occupational Outlook Handbook: 1988/89. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 1989. The Senior Executive Service--~ews of Former Federal Executives. Washington, D.C.: MSPB. U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM). 1987. Occupations of Federal White- Collar and Blue-Coliar Workers. Washington, D.C.: OPM. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govemment 109

MEETING FEDERAL WORK FORCE NEEDS WITH REGARD TO SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS: THE ROLE OF DIE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT John M. Palguta Deputy Director, Office of Policy and Evaluation U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board The Environment The concept of work force management encompasses a number of related tasks. Recruiting, training, motivating, and retaining employees and planning for future work force needs are all part of the picture. Management of the approximately 2.2 million members of the federal civilian work force (not counting the U.S. Postal Service) is especially challenging given the worldwide scope and impact of government operations, the wide diversity in its various tasks and missions, and the massive number of highly skilled employees and occupations required to accomplish the goals and objectives of government. Created under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was assigned major, but by no means sole, responsibility for federal work force management. Indeed, a major thrust of the Reform Act was to provide greater flexibility and creativity to federal personnel management. This flexibility is achieved in part through greater delegation of personnel management authority and responsibility to each federal agency. Congress continues to play a major role in providing the framework of civil service law within which work force management in the executive branch must operate. The CSRA also established the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) as the successor agency to the U.S. Civil Service Commission. MSPB serves as part of the checks and balances built into the federal merit system by the CSRA. In addition to government-wide responsibility for adjudication of employee appeals, MSPB is charged with the conduct of special studies of the civil service system and annual oversight reviews of OPM. Reports of these studies are addressed to the President and Congress. Many of the MSPB studies over the last 10 years have dealt with the issue of recruitment and selection. This is one of the more crucial components of effective work force management inasmuch as each new federal employee serves as a building block upon which so much of the success of government must depend. Entry-level recruitment-that is, recruitment of employees at the start of a career ladder represents an especially important element in this process because it involves the potential of a long-term mutual commitment and investment. Indeed, the realization that government and the nation are best served by employees selected for their ability to do the job led to the establishment, more than a century ago, of a merit-based civil service system through passage of the Civil Service Act of ISS3. The importance of an effective recruitment program for scientists and engineers was recently underscored by an MSPB study of federal employee turnover. In its report

of that study, MSPB (1989a) notes that turnover rates vary widely based on occupation, agency, geographic location, and employee demographics, yet overall turnover among many engineering and scientific occupations is lower than the government-we average. For example, only about 5 percent (or less) of all engineers, computer specialists, chemists, physicists, and geologists left the government during 1987 compared to an average turnover rate of 9 percent for government as a whole. Further, almost half of the turnover among these engineers and scientists was attributable to retirement rather than resignation. The point is that, so far, the federal government has been able to retain its engineers and scientists at a reasonable rate once it recruits them. This further accentuates the need to be concerned about the initial intake of these individuals to assure that high-quaTity candidates are available and selected. A high retention rate is of little value if the individuals being retained are only marginally adequate. The duties performed by federal engineers and scientists can greatly affect the quality of our national defense. environment. and health. The effectiveness of these individuals depends in part on the training and developmental opportunities they are provided, the quality of their supervision, the ability of their organizations to make good use of their skills, and their willingness to remain with the government long enough to make a significant contribution. It also depends, of course, on what they bring into government in the way of fundamental skills, knowledge, and abilities. The government's skill as a recruiter, therefore, has a major impact on the competency level of its work force. The Federal Government as Recruiter In its 1988 report on the federal government's ability to attract college graduates to employment, MSPB found that: The Government is not perceived as an "employer of choice" by many graduates of some of the country's most highly rated academic institutions. Furthermore, even among those graduates who have a positive view of the Government as an employer, many are perplexed by the "civil service hiring labyrinth" and find little active encouragement on the part of most federal agencies. This raises concerns about the future quality of the federal work force and its ability to effectively and efficiently carry out the necessary functions of Government." Part of that report dealt with the perceptions of deans or college placement officials from nine highly rated schools of engineering with regard to the attitudes and experiences of the students within the engineering curriculum. Engineering positions account for one of the ten most populous occupational areas in the federal government typically staffed with recent college graduates at the career entry level. Furthermore, although the total number of federal employees has remained remarkably stable for more than 20 years, the number and thus the proportion of employees who are in engineering and scientific occupations has steadily increased. From 1965 to 1985 the number of engineers employed by the federal government increased by 50 percent to approximately 103,000. To maintain a viable work force of scientists and engineers, 112

normal attrition alone requires that several thousand new engineers and scientists be hired each year. For example, in 1985 there were approximately 87,500 employees in the six most populous engineering disciplines and approximately 5,000 hires into entry-level (OS-5 and -7) positions in those occupations. (The total number of positions in each of the SLY most populous engineering disciplines were electronics engineers, 24,033; general engineers, 19,569; civil engineers, 16,755; mechanical engineers, 13,583; aerospace engineers, 8,700; and electrical engineers, 4,810.) Despite the relatively large numbers, federal agencies to date have been able to fill most of their scientific and engineering vacancies. Unfortunately, numbers do not tell the whole story. The MSPB study also found that the government's ability to hire its "fair share of the best and brightest" is, for the most part, severely limited. This limitation appears to be most strongly linked to perceptions of noncompetitive salaries and a poor public image of the federal government as an employer. Although the federal government's ability to systematically assess the quality of its employees is rather rudimentary, there is enough anecdotal evidence to cause concern. For example, in his prepared testimony in March 1986 before the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology of the Committee on Science and Technology, David Packard, chairman of the board of Hewlett-Packard and a former deputy secretary of defense, noted that: Defense Department data show that the aptitude scores of newly hired [DoD] scientists and engineers are declining relative to national norms, [and that] faced with problems in recruiting, federal agencies often have to choose between accepting a less qualified candidate or leaving a position vacant. Given that 70 percent of all federal engineers work for the Department of Defense, this is a worrisome finding. Nor is this an isolated perception. In a 1986 MSPB survey returned by a representative cross-section of more than 16,000 federal employees, the Board asked supervisors whether the quality of applicants for different categories of job vacancies in their work group had improved, remained the same, or worsened during the previous four years. Commenting on the quality of the applicants for GS-5-7 entry-level professional or administrative positions, more than a third (36 percent) of the supervisors thought that applicant quality had declined. Three years later, a similar MSPB survey revealed that 42 percent of all supervisors who tried to fill GS-5-7 entry-level professional or administrative positions believed that applicant quality had declined. Obstacles to Effective Recruitment If the federal government is not recruiting a sufficient number of well-qualified engineers and scientists, the question remains "Why not?" Effective recruitment of well- qualified candidates requires that at least three interdependent conditions exist: I. An effective recruiter has the ability to make employment opportunities known to prime candidates. Even the most desirable job opportunities will go begging if ~3

qualified candidates are not aware of them. An effective recruiter has the ability to interest highly qualified candidates in seeking employment once they are aware of the opportunities. Jobs with noncompetitive compensation packages or with duties and responsibilities that hold little intrinsic interest to candidates are understandably more difficult to fill. In addition, organizations that have the reputation deserved or not- of being an undesirable place to work also will have difficulty recruiting quality candidates. An effective recruiter has a hiring process in place that allows selection to occur in a timely manner and in a way that identifies those most likely to be successful on the job. Being able to entice the ''best and brightest" to apply for a job will be of little value if it takes months to process their applications. On the other hand, a speedy selection process is only useful if it also makes valid qualitative distinctions among candidates. Based on these criteria, the federal government is not, for the most part, an effective recruiter of entry-level scientists and engineers. Except for the individual efforts of a few federal agencies at selected universities, the federal government is not seen as having an effective presence on college campuses. For example, when MSPB asked informed representatives from nine different schools of engineering if there were ways the federal government could improve its recruitment efforts, eight of the nine said there were and offered suggestions. The suggestions fell into two categories: (~) better and more active recruitment and (2) increased entry-level salaries. One respondent summed up the first point by noting, "Federal agencies must aggressively recruit students. Notice of vacancies and requesting submission of an application will not get the top students to apply." Another respondent said: Private industry is a formidable competitor for highly motivated engineering/computer science students, and particularly in the high tech fields, seems to offer more interesting career opportunities. Students have the impression that starting salaries are better in industry and that the differential continues over several years and adversely affects total potential career income. On the issue of salary, although different methods for calculating salary comparisons between the federal government and private industry yield different results, all of the major comparisons that have been done show that the federal government pays less, often significantly less, at the entry level for scientists and engineers. For example, the Department of Labor's Professional, Administrative, Technical, and Clerical survey concluded that, as of March 1987, a federal engineer at a GS-5 salary level of $19,303 made 50 percent less than a private sector counterpart at $2S,95S, and at a GS-7 salary level of $23,956, an engineer in the federal government still made more than a third less than a private sector counterpart at $32,295. Despite the salary differentials in some locations, the federal government still attracts at least some proportion of available candidates for its entry-level science and engineering positions. Assuming more than one qualified candidate is available for a given position, the competitive process for distinguishing among these candidates is an ~4

"unassembled" examination. Candidates do not assemble for a written test but rather are assigned a rating based on their education and experience as described in their applications. In the past, all applicants submitted their applications to OPM, which assigned each candidate a rating and then waited for a federal agency to request a list of names for a specific vacancy. Even if an agency had identified a candidate and submitted that person's application, it could still take months for the application to be rated and a determination made as to whether the candidate was among the "top three" compared to other candidates--including veterans entitled to extra credit for "veterans preference." Currently, however, because the number of applicants for federal science and engineering positions has been so meager, the majority of scientists and engineers are reportedly hired into government through "direct hire" authorities. OPM may and increasingly has delegated direct hire authority to agencies when there is a shortage of candidates. Such an authority allows a federal agency to directly recruit, rate, rank, and hire qualified candidates. Because the agency controls the entire process, it can work rather quickly. Unfortunately, the current environment requires that the agency concentrate more on finding a qualified candidate to hire rather than trying to select the best-qualified from among a number of well-qualified applicants. This transition to a more active role on the part of agencies also has created some confusion for the applicants. If an outside applicant should be interested in federal employment, perhaps because of the allure of an agency's mission or the unique facilities available in some agencies, he or she may find it difficult to discover how to apply for a job. In some cases the applicants can apply directly to the agency, but in other cases they must apply through OPM. Compounding the problem, not all agencies have accepted the increased responsibility for recruiting and disseminating information, which goes along with their increased examining and hiring authority. Even when multiple outside candidates are available for a particular vacancy, the unassembled rating process historically has not done a very precise job of ranking them. Notwithstanding the impreciseness of the rating process, civil service law still requires selections to be made from among the three candidates assigned the highest ratings. Scores assigned to new college graduates, however, tend to cluster at the high end with little differentiation among them. In the past, applicants interested in different geographic areas would apply to different OPM regional offices to be rated. It was not unusual for the same applicant to receive different ratings from different offices even though each regional office applied the same criteria. Therefore, the ability of the federal government to meet even the last criteria of an effective recruiter-the ability to make valid qualitative distinctions among applicants is suspect for engineers and scientists. The Role of OPM In a recent assessment of the first 10 years of the OPM, the MSPB Board (1989b) noted that under the Civil Service Reform Act, OPM was expected to: delegate personnel management authorities judiciously to other federal agencies, including authority to conduct ~5

. . . competitive examinations, to enhance the operation of the federal civil service system within the context of the merit system principles; establish and maintain an aggressive oversight program to ensure that federal personnel management authorities are being used in accordance with the merit system principles and to gather data and analyses that will help improve the civil service system; conduct or facilitate the conduct of research and demonstration projects to ultimately develop more effective or efficient methods of human resource management; and execute, administer, and enforce civil service laws, rules, and regulations, for the president, as one aspect of the provision of leadership and guidance to the federal civil service system. This leadership is to be evidenced by active improvement efforts in a number of important personnel management areas, including the government's ability to recruit and retain highly qualified employees. Although actual practice is more muddled, a reasonable division of labor in the recruitment of scientists and engineers is for OPM to play a major role by providing leadership, guidance, and oversight of the process. On the other hand, individual federal agencies are usually in the better position to carry primary responsibility for actual recruitment, examination, and hiring. Through both necessity and deliberate planning, OPM is starting to move in this direction (MSPB, 1989c). Ironically, decentralization of examining and hiring authority was largely the situation that existed in the mid to late 1960s until individual agency Boards of Examiners were consolidated into centralized Interagency Boards staffed by the then Civil Service Commission. The philosophy behind this earlier centralization of examining authority was somewhat akin to that of the old typing pools, which was thought to be a more cost-efficient method of carrying out a repetitive function. It also was intended to provide greater quality control to the process and assure its integrity. Unfortunately. under centralization, quality proved to be an elusive variable to measure, let alone provide. It's also difficult to judge whether the integrity of the process was any greater under centralized examining because, except for some relatively isolated incidents, the integrity of the decentralized process was not found to be seriously compromised. On the other hand, timeliness of response to applicants (and, many would argue, the general responsiveness to legitimate agency needs) clearly suffered under centralization. What was different, however, was the greater number of applicants available in the late 1960s and early 1970s compared to today. The earlier excess supply of applicants relative to demand forgave some inefficiency, whereas today's tight labor market requires more efficient and effective recruiting, examining, and hiring-with little margin for error. Although OPM seems committed to the goal of greater decentralization of examining authority, many federal agencies still need to shift gears and accept greater responsibility for active on-campus recruitment. The few agencies that already do so report generally favorable results. OPM should provide centralized assistance through general oversight and coordination, centralized job information, and research into more ,, ~6

effective screening and selection techniques. Fortunately, there are indications that OPM is starting to accelerate its efforts in these areas. Even the best recruitment efforts, however, cannot entirely overcome the obstacles presented by low pay and poor image. Congress shares responsibility and ultimately must be involved in any long-term solution to the issue of noncompetitive salaries and the negative image of federal employment. Although the government's current compensation system is generally seen as counterproductive and ineffectual, there is not yet agreement on the best solution to this problem. The illogic of the pay situation was highlighted in a recent analysis by OPM and the Wyatt Company in a study of federal white-colIar pay (OPM, 1989~. Part of their analyses shows that an engineer hired into a federal position at the GS-5 level in January 1986 would have received a salary of $~8,710, compared to a private sector counterpart who would have received the significantly higher starting salary of $27,670. However, because of the more rapid rate of advancement in the federal government, after four years both engineers could expect to be paid an average annual salary of $39,000. To achieve the goal of recruiting highly qualified engineers and scientists, how much better it would be for the government to have salaries that more closely match the private sector at the front end, even if that meant less rapid salary increases for the next few years. A recent budget proposal by OPM recognizes this fact by calling for a 5 percent increase in salary levels targeted specifically to GS-5 and -7 entry-level positions. In addition, over time OPM has authorized special salary rates for close to 200,000 hard-to-fill white-colIar positions in specific occupations and geographic areas. Unfortunately, this patchwork approach does not obviate the need to reexamine the government's whole approach to compensation setting (see also MSPB, 19896~. The fundamental changes needed in the federal compensation system will require congressional legislation, but OPM still has a significant role to play by proposing legislation. To their credit, OPM's proposed Civil Service Simplification Act of 1986 would have addressed some compensation-related problems, but it did not pass. OPM, as of this writing, is working on a new legislative proposal that will again attempt to address some of the issues requiring changes in the laws covering pay. A built-in limitation of the effectiveness of any OPM proposal tray be OPM's stated belief that for any compensation legislation to be viable, it must be budget neutral. Unfortunately, no empirical evidence suggests that the most effective legislation would meet that criteria. The federal personnel situation is not entirely grim, however. The relatively modest turnover rate among engineers and scientists suggests that the perception of the government as an undesirable employer is not fully shared by those in the best position to judge- that is, current employees. Indeed MSPB surveys have consistently found a very high level of job satisfaction among federal employees even though they also expressed dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the work environment, such as pay. For example, a representative sample of almost 16,000 federal employees were surveyed in the summer of 1989, and 70 percent agreed with the statement "In general, ~ am satisfied with my current job." Additionally, among those same employees, SS percent agreed that they find their work meaningful. Efforts to improve the image of the federal government as an employer should build on the fundamental value of and interest in the work to be done within government. Image improvement, of course, must be a joint effort on the part of OPM, Congress, and the administration. a, 117

Conclusions Efforts to manage the federal work force today must operate in an environment that is significantly different from 20 years ago. Although some of the related organizational and decision-making processes in place 20 years ago were effective at that time, there is evidence that they are effective no longer. Shifting demographics, the rapidly changing international climate, and the declining image of federal employment all argue for some fundamental shifts in the way federal personnel management is carried out. This may be especially true as the government struggles to recruit motivate, and retain a large cadre of well-qualified engineers and scientists. A ~ . ~ It ~ ~ ~ ^~^ ~ ~ ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ A rOCCIlI 1Vl~rD repOrl ~lY0VC) round mae support among teaera1 agency managers and personnel specialists for the concept of "simplification" of the federal personnel system insofar as that concept embodied the goals of increased decentralization and delegation of personnel authorities. "One size fits all" solutions to the problems of managing the huge federal work force no longer work, if they ever did. The role of OPM in this changing environment is also being redefined. Rather than serve as the central hiring hall for government, OPM's role is better seen as providing guidelines and helping to provide the tools for individual federal agencies to wield in conjunction with an increase in their delegated personnel management authorities, including examining authorities. It is no longer a question of "doing more with less" but rather of "doing the best with what we have." Although hampered by its own resource cutbacks, OPM has undertaken a number of recent and promising initiatives on a number of fronts. Part of the challenge will be in OPM's ability to follow through on these efforts. Even in areas where OPM's influence is less evident such as the training and development of engineers and scientists and the degree to which their skills and abilities are well utilized-OPM has an impact by setting the policies, guidelines, and often the structure (e.g., the federal position classification system) governing activity in these areas. Recommendations MSPB has suggested that the future activities of OPM should reflect the following qualities: . OPM should continue its renewed efforts to delegate personnel management authorities to the agencies but within the following parameters: Delegations must not be abdications. OPM should closely monitor the ability of each federal agency to manage its responsibilities in a manner consistent with the underlying merit system principles. Delegations should be accompanied, where appropriate, with the necessary support structures or guidance to assist in the use of these delegations. When centralized examinations are still a useful option because of the number of applicants or the nature of the process, OPM has sought and should continue to seek methods for making the process as fast and efficient as possible. In this regard, OPM also should continue to

. encourage active involvement by other federal agencies in the development of the examinations. OPM must continue recent initiatives to develop its internal research capability so that it can provide timely legislative proposals, recommend Presidential initiatives, and develop improved personnel management tools that can be adapted to the varied needs of individual federal agencies. OPM needs to demonstrate leadership in causing or influencing constructive change to the federal civil service system in response to the changing demands and pressures. One measure of success might be the introduction within the next five years of a fair and equitable compensation structure consistent with the goal of attracting and retaining a hi~hIv oualifiec] and motivated work force . . O O ~9. ~ Individual federal agencies, for their part, need to accept greater responsibility for recruiting and selecting new scientists and engineers. Part of that responsibility includes an ongoing college relations program. Furthermore, individual managers within many agencies need to play a more active role in the process. This is not an activity to be left solely to the personnel office it's a shared responsibility. Finally, solutions to the problems facing the federal government as it tries to recruit and retain well-qualified engineers and scientists must, of necessity, extend beyond the scope of OPM's role. For example, if a basic problem is ultimately that this nation's schools, colleges, and universities are producing an insufficient number of engineers and scientists, the long-range solution must aim at correcting that deficiency-something clearly beyond OPM's mandate, but not beyond the scope of federal involvement at some level (e.g., see Commission on Workforce Quality, 1989~. In the same vein, an argument can be made that federal managers need even more flexibility to address unique staffing problems, but that those flexibilities extend beyond what OPM can provide without changes to current civil service law. Congress, therefore, must be involved. The point is that we need more than a cosmetic reconfiguration of existing organizational and decision-making processes; some broader and more fundamental changes must be considered. Although some restructuring or further delegations of personnel authorities within the executive branch may well be necessary, we cannot afford to stop our search there. The stakes are simply too high. Bibliography Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency. 1989. Investing In People: A Strategy To Address America's Workforce Crisis. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 1988. Attracting Quality Graduates to the ~ _ ~ _ _ ~ MY , ~ T ~ r a_ to rot · . · ~ r ~ · . _~ _c ~ raw ' General ~ovemment: A Blew of college Kecru~f~ng. Washington, L).~.: MSPB. 1989a. Who Is heaving the Federal Govemment? An Analysis of Tumover. Washington, D.C.: MSPB. 1989b. U.S. Office of Personnel Management and the Merit System: A Washington, D. C. : MSPB. Retrospective Assessment. ~9

. l989c. Delegation and Decentralization: Personnel Management Simplification Efforts in Federal Govemment. Washington, D.C.: MSPB. 19896. OPM's CIassipcation and Qualification Systems: A Renewed Emphasis, A Changing Perspective. Washington, D.C.: MSPB. U.S.Office of Personnel Management (OPM). 1989. Federal White-Coliar Pay System: A Report on a Market-Sensitive S - y. Washington, D.C.: OPM. 120

DIFFERENCES IN RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND UTILIZATION PROCESSES: A COMPARISON OF TRADITIONALLY OPERATED FEDERAL LABORATORIES, M&O FACILITIES, AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS Sheldon B. Clark Senior Research Scientist, Labor and Policy Studies Program Oak Ridge Associated Universities Introduction Concerns about the growing inability of the federal goverrunent to attract and retain the "best and brightest" scientists and engineers in the civil service have been persistent and well documented. Inadequate compensation is sometimes singled out as the most important factor limiting the government's ability to recruit and retain a highly qualified science and engineering (S&E) work force. On the other hand, low S&E salaries are considered by some to be merely a symptom of a more general problem-the inflexible policies and procedures of the civil service personnel system. Civil service laboratories,' which employ a significant proportion of the federal S&E work force, tend to view this external personnel system as a monolithic adversary that has little appreciation for the special needs of the research enterprise, especially its researchers and managers. This paper examines, in comparison with personnel systems unlike the federal civil service system,2 some of the elements believed to hinder the federal government's ability to attract and retain high-quality scientists and engineers. One of the alternative systems considered here is the management-and-operating-contractor (M&O) model, which the Department of Energy (DOE) uses for most of its laboratories. (M&O facilities were formerly referred to as government-owned, contractor-operated [GOCO] facilities.) Another group of alternative systems discussed in this paper includes two federal personnel demonstration projects. Also considered is a special-case federal agency, which has personnel policies and procedures that are markedly different from those of civil service agencies. For some problems, examples are drawn from traditional civil service labs that have developed means of coping with particular limitations of the civil service system. 1 The term acidic service laboratories is used in this paper to mean those government labs that are staffed by employees of the U.S. government who are covered by federal personnel law as contained in Title 5 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 2 In this paper these personnel systems are referred to as Alternative systems." 121

Alternative Systems Considered DOE M&O Contractor Facilities DOE has a system of 67 M&O facilities operated by a variety of contractors- private-sector firms, universities, and university consortia. Since each of the operating contracts is negotiated separately with DOE, personnel policies and procedures vary significantly from one installation to another. The four M&Os that serve as the basis for comments in this paper are Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Oak Ridge Associ- ated Universities (ORAU). ANE is managed by the University of Chicago; SNE by the Sandia Corporation; ORNE by Martin Marietta; and OR\U by a consortium of 55 colleges and universities. Demonstration Projects Demonstration projects are conducted or supervised by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to determine whether a specified change in personnel practices or procedures will result in improved federal personnel management. Such projects are typically designed to yield more flexible personnel systems that are more responsive to the needs of individual agencies. This paper examines two demonstration projects affecting white-colIar workers in the demonstration laboratories: one involving two Department of the Navy labs, which began in July 1980 and is still under way; and one involving the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which began in January 1988 and was approved for five years. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) From its inception in 1933, TVA was given broad authority to establish its own personnel policies and procedures without regard to most civil service rules. One indication of the differences between TVA and civil service agencies is the volume of regulations governing its personnel system. TVA has fewer than 250 pages of policy guidance for personnel issues, compared to the more than 900 pages of regulations published by OPM to cover the same areas. The TVA personnel manual, which provides procedural guidance to personnel staff, contains about 800 pages, compared to the more than 6,000 pages that serve a similar purpose for OPM. TVA's system provides for a great deal of management discretion and much employee involvement through employee unions. TVA's ability to make relatively major and timely changes in personnel policies and procedures can be valuable in meeting new or changing demands. By comparison, civet service agencies operate under a personnel system based more heavily on external controls and limited options for managers in the personnel process (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 1989~. · e ~· · . ~ Selected Civil Service Laboratories In addition to the above organizations, which have personnel systems that do not operate under normal civil service policies and procedures, a few positive examples in 122

this paper are drawn from civil service labs that have devised methods of overcoming particular limitations imposed by the civil service system. These examples happen to be from the U.S. Army laboratory system (Clark et al., 1987), but they should be considered neither unique to that organization nor necessarily typical of it. In fact, the Army lab directors who reported on these methods of coping with civil service limitations stirred considerable interest among other Army lab directors. Problems Identified in Civil Service Policies and Procedures Identifying problems associated with the federal government's difficulty in attracting and retaining highly qualified scientists and engineers has long been the topic of many intra-agency, interagency, and external reviews. One way to gain insight into what the laboratories perceive to be their problems in this area is to examine the objectives of the demonstration projects undertaken to overcome these problems. Navy Demonstration Project The two Navy demonstration laboratories are the Naval Weapons Center (NWC) in China Lake, Calif., and the Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC) in San Diego. This demonstration project involved 3,076 white-collar employees at NOSC and 4,579 at NWC as of January 1988. About 50 percent of these employees were scientists and engineers. Two control laboratories also were chosen-the Naval Air Development Center in Warm~nster, Pa., and the Naval Surface Weapons Center in Dahlgren, Va., and White Oak, Md. Prior to beginning the project, NWC identified its problems as (a) difficulties in recruiting adequate numbers of qualified personnel due to noncompetitive starting salaries and (b) troubles in retaining qualified senior personnel because of limited promotional opportunities above the GS-12 level. Many GS-12 scientists and engineers were leaving NWC for jobs in industry after 5-8 years because they saw little likelihood of being promoted to the GS-13 level. NOSC believed that its line managers (a) lacked flexibility in making work assignments because the General Schedule (GS) position . . ^. . . . were hindered in their ability to administer personnel resources effectively because the classification process was in the hands of personnel specialists rather than line managers. The Navy demonstration instituted changes to the GS system in the areas of classification, performance appraisal, and pay. The project was designed to demonstrate that the effectiveness of civil service labs could be enhanced by allowing greater managerial control over personnel functions and by expanding opportunities available to employees through a more flexible personnel system (U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO], l98Sb). c~ass~cat~on process required too much paperwork and time and (b) NIST Demonstration Project The NIST demonstration involves both NIST labs-one in Gaithersburg, Md., and one in Boulder, Colo. This project covers all 3,050 NIST white-collar employees, 123

more than 50 percent of whom are scientists and engineers. A comparison group consists of white-collar employees in selected Department of Commerce laboratories in Boulder. The project uses many of the same interventions that the Navy demonstration uses to meet similar objectives. One major difference is that NIST has set the goal of making the project budget-neutral throughout the five-year demonstration period, not just the first year, as required by law. NIST intends to accomplish this goal, despite the higher salaries expected under the new personnel system, by using fewer employees or employees with lower GS grades. The objectives of the NIST demonstration are as follows: 1. To improve hiring procedures and to be more competitive for high-quality researchers through direct hiring and selective use of higher entry salaries and recruiting allowances; 2. To increase the motivation and retention of staff through higher pay potential, pay for performance, more responsive personnel systems, and selective use of retention allowances; 3. To strengthen the manager's role in personnel management by delegating personnel authority to him or her; and 4. To increase the efficiency of personnel systems by installing a simpler and more flexible classification system. The system is characterized by pay banding; automation; and a reduction of guidelines, steps, and paperwork in classification, hiring, and other personnel tasks. (OPM, 1989) Recruitment of Scientists and Engineers Interrelationship of Problems The issues of recruitment, retention, and utilization may be conceptually different, but in practice they are inextricably linked. In the present context they share a common origin, the civil service personnel system, that influences all three through its policies and procedures. This centralized and external personnel authority slows down the hiring process, limits compensation options, and restricts the authority of managers to handle personnel matters. In addition to the effects of the policies and procedures themselves, such centralization of authority has been shown to be associated with poor morale, which in turn is associated with high turnover rates. Realizing that recruitment, retention, and utilization overlap in many respects, we shall now discuss certain elements of each and indicate how the alternative personnel systems are different from the traditional civil service system. Role of University Interactions In studying the disadvantages civil service laboratories have in recruiting scientists and engineers, one of the primary emphases has been on salary offers that are not competitive with those of private industry. NIST, for example, reports that 50 percent of its newly hired scientists and engineers had another job offer at a higher salary than NIST (OPM, 1988). 124

Clark et al. (1987), on the other hand, point out that salary is not necessarily the determining factor in recruiting success. They report that labs successful in recruiting high-quality scientists and engineers differed from their less successful counterparts in the perceived importance of developing and maintaining university ties. As one DOE lab director stated. "You have to recruit al] the time not i~.ct when vile need to hire , _ ~ ~ . . _ , ~ ~ T · · . . . . e . . · someone. un~verslcy contacts are too important not to mamta~n. cabs with successful recruiting programs were emphatic about the significant positive effects of maintaining close ties with universities through such activities as faculty and student research participation programs, consulting arrangements, lecture programs, participation in academic professional societies, and equipment-sharing programs. They felt that strong university relationships enhance the image of the lab and also its ability to recruit and retain highly qualified scientists and engineers. Non-Sala~y Attractions Unable to offer competitive salaries to new hires, at least one Army lab uses other incentives to overcome this disadvantage. To get a recruit to "sign on," the lab offers such perquisites as the following: support for participation in professional meetings, liberal sabbatical policies, opportunities for advancement, awards programs, and office refurbishing. It also offers a "Care" program designed to treat scientists and engineers with professional and personal dignity. This program includes such elements as flextime, alternative work schedules, work-at-home arrangements, and educational assistance. Although not many scientists and engineers take advantage of these programs, the knowledge that they exist seems to make a difference in how they fee} about the lab (CIark et al., 1987~. Special characteristics of the work environment in many civil service labs that help to overcome salary discrepancies include relatively stable missions and funding; national prominence; quality, quantity, and diversity of research services, equipment, and personnel; opportunity to focus full-time on research activities; rewarding research; and freedom from grant writing (Committee to Study Strategies, 1988~. Monetary Incentives Unlike civil service labs, DOE M&O contractors are not limited by the rigidity of the civil service salary schedule. (It should be noted, however, that OPM has historically approved differential salary rates and given direct-hire authority to agencies for certain hard-to-hire positions. GAO also has endorsed this practice [GAO, 1988b]~. Although their pay schedules have to be approved by DOE, the contractors develop multiple occupation-based pay schedules to reflect market rates. In the NIST demonstration project, in addition to higher starting salaries, recruitment and retention allowances are possible for all S&E positions. These allowances may not exceed $10,000 and are determined on the basis of relevant market factors such as special qualifications, turnover rates, and salary offer issues. One early outcome of the NIST demonstration, however, is that some salary inequities now occur between new hires and existing staff, caused by the flexibility in starting salaries (OPM, 1989). 125

Timeliness of Employment Offer A major recruiting problem for civil service labs is the length of time the hiring process takes. Many labs report that it may take six months or more from the time an application is made until an offer is extended to a scientist or engineer. These delays also are common for other personnel actions (e.g., reassignment, promotion). None of the alternative personnel systems considered here has experienced undue delays in extending employment offers. One conclusion reached by OPM after the first year of the NIST demonstration was that there had already been a substantial reduction in the time necessary for making an offer of employment. Whereas it used to require three months to a year to hire a scientist or engineer under OPM procedures, it now can be accomplished within a few weeks (OPM, 1989~. Retention of Scientists and Engineers Turnover One of the most effective deterrents to excessive turnover is to hire the "right" individuals in the first place a tenet that underscores the importance of the recruiting process. According to one survey of scientists and engineers, the factors most affecting job satisfaction are the employee's interest in the assigned projects, role in decision making, authority, potential for recognition, relative compensation, and compatibility with colleagues (CIark et al., 1987~. In evaluating the Navy demonstration, OPM found that job satisfaction was affected less by pay and more by the work itself and the amount of control employees exercised over that work (GAO, 198Sb). The effects of high turnover are far-reaching, especially at the senior-researcher level and above. When senior staff resign or retire, the continuity and stability of research programs can be jeopardized and institutional memory can be significantly diminished. When top-notch senior researchers leave, recruiting success also may be affected. Some civil service labs count on their ability to employ noted scientists and engineers to attract promising young researchers (Clark et al., 1987~. Another potential effect of high turnover is the loss of mentoring. When senior researchers and managers terminate, they cannot be mentors. When junior researchers and managers resign at a high rate, the senior researchers and managers may become unwilling to invest the time necessary for mentoring, since they do not realize a payoff for the loss in productivity associated with being a mentor. OPM (1988) conducted a special study of the turnover rates at the Navy demonstration labs compared to the control labs. They found no differences in the turnover rates of scientists and engineers older than 40, but found lower turnover rates at the demonstration labs for younger scientists and engineers. Two generally accepted explanations for the decreasing turnover rate of civil service employees who are older than 40 are the lack of portability of federal pensions (i.e., they have too much invested in the Civil Service Retirement System to leave) and the relative amount of job security that federal employment offers. Consistent with the desired outcome, OPM also found that there was a lower rate of turnover among the high-performing scientists and engineers at the Navy 126

demonstration labs than at the control labs. Those in the demonstration labs who did leave were more likely to remain in the federal government than their control lab counterparts, probably because their higher salaries made private sector jobs relatively less attractive to them than to the scientists and engineers in the control labs. Position Classification Systems The position classification structures for the alternative personnel systems are the mechanisms by which line managers assume more responsibility for the personnel function. These classification systems tend to be simpler and require less paperwork than the civil service classification system. Perhaps more importantly, the new classification systems give labs more flexibility in managing salaries, including starting salaries. The changes in the classification system in the Navy demonstration project primarily involved combining the IS separate GS grade classifications into broad pay bands and simplifying the classification process. Instead of GS grades, there are five separate career paths (professional, technical, technical specialist, administrative, and clerical). Within each career path, employees are placed into one of several broad pay bands, which include at least two former GS grades (GAO, 198Sb). The NIST classification system has a similar design: there are four career paths (S&E professional, S&E technical, administrative, and support), each of which has a separate pay structure containing five pay bands. Each pay band replaces one or more GS grades, and salary ranges for adjacent pay bands within a career path overlap. To accommodate supervisory pay differentials, the pay bands are extended from 3 percent to 6 percent for supervisory personnel. NIST anticipates that pay banding will have several desirable effects: broader pay-for-performance salary ranges, fewer classification decisions, simpler processes for personnel classification, less paperwork, and more authority for line managers (OPM, 1989~. TVA uses a position classification system similar to that of civil service agencies, but it includes several pay schedules that are established through collective bargaining. The manner in which grades are assigned to particular positions also differs from the practice in the civil service, primarily because of the role that unions play in making that determination. The classification of management positions, however, is very similar to that followed by civil service agencies. Compensation and Pay Structure In studies of federal S&E employment, two problem areas that are consistently identified are entry-level salaries and senior-level salaries. In addition, pay freezes and the federal pay cap often are blamed for the widening salad differential between the government and private industry and the accelerating defection of the most experienced scientists and engineers to the private sector. The inflexible civil service pay schedule, with its inability to give performance its due weight, provides few incentives for hard work. With respect to policies and procedures governing pay structures and compensation, the alternative personnel systems considered here are rich with possibilities. 127

Role of Performance Appraisal Systems Most of the alternative personnel systems have objectives-based performance appraisals very similar in design to those required throughout the civil service, but they are generally used quite differently. Many of the alternative systems have pay-for-performance compensation programs tied to the performance appraisal systems. TVA has separate and structurally different performance appraisal systems for managers and nonmanagers. Managers are given ratings that are tied to the pay-for-performance compensation plan. but the ratings of nonmana~ers and executives are not - A----- ~----I- ~- Sala~y and Other Compensation DOE M&O contractors develop salary schedules based on market analyses. All salary schedules and benefits programs have to be approved by DOE, and each contractor must provide a defensible basis for its own salary and benefits structure. Individual approval is required for each salary in excess of a certain amount (currently $70,000), but these salaries are not subject to the federal pay cap. Certain kinds of performance bonuses also are acceptable under the M&O contracts. Because the pay bands incorporate at least two GS grades, the Navy demonstration labs have more discretion in determining the starting salary offers for new employees. Employees' salaries are then adjusted annually on the basis of performance and can include a salary increase within the same band, a one-time bonus or performance award, and/or a promotion to a higher band. In addition to these performance-based pay increases and bonuses, employees are also eligible for the same general pay adjustments (comparability) granted to employees under the GS system. OPM found that, as of January 1986, employees at the Navy demonstration labs were paid salaries 6 percent higher than those in the control labs. This was attributed to higher starting salaries given to entry-level scientists and engineers and the larger-than-average salary increases given to employees both within a pay band and through promotions between the bands. Salary costs have increased at a rate of about percent per year since the beginning of the project and are expected to continue to increase (GAO, 198Sb). The NIST pay-for-performance system bases salary adjustments on performance evaluations. Pay increases consist of comparability increases, performance increases, and bonuses and awards. One element of the pay-for-performance process requires the rank-ordering of peers by using the results of the performance appraisal, a procedure that managers fee} may unduly increase employee anxiety (OPM, 1989~. What NIST considers to be one of its most serious recruiting and retention problems cannot be addressed by the demonstration project the federal pay cap. It is viewed as an area of increasing concern under the new personnel system, which allows capable individuals to advance more rapidly. This rapid advancement could result in an increase in the number of NIST employees at the pay cap. On the other hand, TVA has the authority to adjust total compensation to whatever it deems fit. TVA is only subject to the statutory salary ceiling, not to a ceiling for total compensation. Mechanisms by which total compensation is increased without exceeding the pay cap have in the past included the following: paying the full cost of medical and dental insurance premiums; paying the employee's share of social security; 128

and offering cash relocation incentives, supplemental retirement benefit payments, recruitment bonuses, and retention bonuses (MSPB, 1989~. One of the striking contrasts between TVA and civil service agencies is in the character of their relationships with unions; TVA has a history of using the collective bargaining process as the principal means by which compensation and personnel policies for its nonmanagerial employees are determined. Pay policies, salaries, job classifications, and the coverage and cost to employees of health insurance plans are among the issues largely decided through collective bargaining. The process for setting salaries of white-colIar employees differs markedly from the civil service process because of the role of union negotiation. Although TVA initiated a pay-for-performance system for its white-collar employees, it abandoned it in 1988 (after 7 years) because of underfunding and perceived inequities in the distribution of performance awards. It currently has no mechanism for rewarding top-perforniing nonmanagers other than the negotiated salary increases or periodic step increases that are generally available to all employees. Managers are paid under a pay-for-performance system that has no comparability or cost-of-living component, but TVA can give bonuses to management employees who are in shortage occupations or who accept hard-to-fill positions. Retirement Civil service benefits for new government employees have recently become less attractive. Those hired after 1984 no longer have the automatic cost-of-living adjustments that were built into pre-1984 retirement packages. Retirement with full benefits is not available until age 57 instead of 55. The ability of demonstration projects to alter current federal benefits is highly restricted by law. As would be expected from the diversity of the contractors, DOE's M&O facilities have a wide variety of retirement programs, ranging from those typical of large private firms to those available to employees of colleges and universities. TVA has its own retirement system. Other Personnel-Related Problems Personnel Ceilings and Reductions in Force: Another constraint imposed by the civil service system is the limitation on the number of full-time-equivalent personnel a lab may employ. This ceiling, coupled with budgetary constraints, becomes a particular problem during periods of retrenchment, little growth, or low turnover, especially given the civil service restrictions on the lab's ability to remove the least productive personnel. Effective personnel management is hindered, since the ceilings tend to grow slower than budgets. Managers, who are best able to make decisions about how to allocate money and personnel to meet their programmatic commitments, are prevented from making the most productive decisions (IOM, 1988~. Neither the DOE M&O facilities nor TVA are subject to such double constraints. DOE contractors in particular can better adjust to changing or diminishing funding by shifting researchers from one program to another or, if necessary, laying people off. Unlike civil service labs, these decisions can be made entirely on the basis of skills, abilities, and performance. Some traditionally operated civil service labs have been successful in dealing with personnel ceilings by significantly increasing their personnel pools through the use of university-based programs to bring 129

adjunct personnel (e.g., graduate students, faculty, postdoctoral fellows) into the lab (Clark et al., 1987). Aging Work Force: Concerns about the aging work force (especially at the senior- researcher and senior-manager levels) have been voiced by all of the organizations discussed in this Caper. For example' approximately 40 percent of the NIST work force . _ _ _ _ . ._ _ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~- ~ a · ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ will be eligible for retirement during the five-year demonstration period (OA( ), lYbba), and more than 60 percent of the senior managers and key researchers at one Army lab are already eligible to retire (Clark et al., 1987~. This trend underscores the necessity of civil service labs' being able to attract qualified scientists and engineers to fill the depleting ranks and especially of their improving the retention of senior staff to assume leadership roles. Conclusion As concern grows about the role of the federal civil service personnel system in the increasing inability of government laboratories to attract and retain high-quality scientists and engineers, there has been a call for more demonstration projects to address the shortcomings of the civil service system. Opponents of demonstration projects claim that they create interagency competition for scientists and engineers. Even those who support the use of demonstration projects to identity viable alternatives to the civil service admit that it is extremely difficult to carry out a controlled study in a dynamic environment. According to GAO (198Sb), the Navy's demonstration project showed that a pay-for-performance system with simplified personnel procedures for classifying, appraising, and paying civil service employees is workable. It also showed that line managers could be given authority and responsibility for making personnel decisions. On the other hand, there was little evidence to support the conclusions that managerial flexibility to assign work had been enhanced by the project, that starting salaries higher than those permitted in the General Schedule were given, or that the salary increases and bonuses available to employees with good performance ratings made them more likely to stay at the demonstration labs than the employees who received poor ratings (and smaller salary increases and bonuses). It should be noted, however, that there were significant problems in the evaluation of this project: initial differences between the demonstration and control labs (different geographic regions, different organization and economic environments) and much missing data (some not available, some not standard, some not collected) (GAO, 198Sb). It is too early to reach conclusions about the NIST demonstration, but OPM (1989) reported several general impressions: managers feel that employee mobility could be reduced because of the differences between the new NIST personnel system and the rest of the civil service system; some evidence suggests that salary inequities can result from the flexibility in setting starting salaries; and supervisors feel that OPM has been too involved in the areas that were intended to increase the responsibilities of supervisors. On the other hand, there already has been a significant reduction in the time necessary for making an offer of employment, and most employees still feel optimistic about the eventual outcomes of the project. 130

As the federal government seeks ways to simplify its personnel system through greater deregulation and delegation of authority, the personnel system of TVA may be a useful example of a system that is already subject to fewer specific regulations and procedures. The considerable variability in the personnel systems used by DOE M&O contractors reflects their diverse private-sector origins. To consider this model for all federal labs, however, would require a major rethinking of the proper role and structure of the government laboratory system. Personnel systems need to be customized to the organizations they serve. It is not reasonable to expect that a single model will fit all organizations or that a system, once developed, can remain static. The organizations themselves and the environments in which they exist are dynamic. Every organization needs a uniqueness in its personnel system, an opportunity to mold it to its own identity, and the freedom to change it when change is needed. Bibliography Clark, S. B., M. G. Finn, and L. B. Smalley. 1987. Productivity Management Procedures in Department of the Army and Department of Energy Laboratories: Implications for Action and Compendium of Project Activities (ORAU Report No. ORAU- 279~. Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak Ridge Associated Universities. Committee to Study Strategies to Strengthen the Scientific Excellence of the National Institutes of Health Intramural Research Program, Institute of Medicine (IOM). 1988. A Healthy N H Intramural Program: Structural Change or Administrative Remedies? Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Kennedy, R. B. 1989. Recruitment of White Female Engineers at the US Army Missile Command, FY79-FY89 (MICOM Technical Report No. CPS-89-2~. Redstone Arsenal, Ala.: U.S. Army Missile Command. NTIS No. AD-A211522. Wilson, L.. I. 1985. The Navy's experiment with pay, performance, and appraisal. Defense Management loumal 21~3~:30-40. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1988a. Federal Workforce: Infom~ation on the National Bureau of Standards Personnel Demonstration Project (GAO Publication No. GAO/GGD-88-59FS). Washington, D.C.: GAO. 1988b. Federal Workforce: Observations in the Navy's Personnel Management Demonstration Project (GAO Publication No. GAO/GGD-88-79~. Washington, D.C.: GAO. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 1989. The Tennessee Valley Authority and the Merit Principles Washington, D.C.: MSPB. U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Implementation Report: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Personnel Management Demonstration Project (OPM Publication No. PSO-204~. Washington, D.C.: OPM. 1988. Tumover in the Navy Demonstration Laboratories, Z980-1985 (OPM Publication No. PSO-101~. Washington, D.C.: OPM. 131

IlIE POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS AND THE RECRUITMENT OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS James P. Profaner Professor of Government and Politics George Mason University This paper examines the major factors that affect the recruitment of scientists and engineers in the political recruitment process and concludes that those factors are similar to the factors that affect PAS (political appointments requiring Senate confirmation) appointments in general. It further argues that the difficulties in attracting the best executives to public service are even greater in recruiting the best scientists and engineers. In addition, the nature of the science and engineering professions presents further impediments to recruiting and retaining the highest quality personnel. These negative factors, however, are often outweighed by opportunities present in the public service: the chance to work at the cutting edge of many areas of research, the challenge of tackling the toughest problems facing our society, and the opportunity to make a contribution to the public good or to serve an admired president. The analysis and conclusions of this paper are based on systematic data from various studies and the considered judgments of experienced people. But it must be emphasized that defining "quality" and estimating the motives of potential government executives are inherently judgmental activities. The Pressures of Transition At the beginning of each new presidential administration, the President is faced with the daunting task of recruiting 3,000 to 4,000 political appointees. The Office of Presidential Personnel has the task of coordinating this effort, but it is directly responsible for the recruitment and selection of about 550 executives to lead the executive branch. Other political appointees include about 650 noncareer Senior Executives and about 1650 Schedule C appointments at the GS-15 level and below. A certain proportion of these political positions are appropriate for those with science and engineering backgrounds. The pressures of the task seem overwhelming because it must be done under the additional burden of other transition pressures involving budget, policy, politics, etc. A flood of applications has inundated recent administrations, often amounting to 1,500 applications per day in the early part of the transition (National Academy of Public Administration, 1983~. By June 1989 the Bush administration had received more than 45,000 applications for political appointments.' One of the main difficulties for the Interview with Chase Untermeyer, the White House, June 6, 1989. 133

President's personnel recruiters is to separate the wheat from the chaff, satisfying political obligations or appeasing those who are not appointed, and matching the right people with the right positions. The real challenge is actively to recruit the best and the brightest, rather than merely sifting through the resumes that come in "over the transom." All of this is complicated by the inability of the President's personnel recruiter to do much preparation. Although presidential candidates Carter and Reagan had initiated some planning for political recruitment, because of political sensitivities, preparation can never be very thorough. Candidate George Bush refused to let his personnel recruiter, Chase Untermeyer, do any planning or even to recruit a staff until after the election.2 One of the constant headaches of the President's personnel recruiter is to deflect political pressures for appointments so that those best qualified for the positions can be appointed. A tension that affects every presidential recruitment operation is between political pressures for patronage and the professional qualifications needed to perform the duties of the job. All Presidents legitimately demand loyalty, but the balance with competence is difficult to maintain. Impediments to Recruiting the Best and Brightest Although presidential appointments are prestigious, and many welcome an invitation to join an administration, Presidents do not always convince their first choices to accept presidential appointments. There will always be plenty of people eager to join an administration (as indicated by the 45,000 applications in 1989), but the real problem is finding those who are not looking for a job because they are successful and satisfied with their present position. For the highest positions, cabinet secretaries and executive level IT positions, there is usually not too much problem because of the prestige of the positions and the relatively close relationship to the president. But for the ~rnd-leve} executive positions impediments to accepting a position and the quality of the experience in office have become increasingly important factors during the past several decades. The relatively low level of pay is one of the major factors that keeps the President from recruiting the best and brightest for a period of government service. This reality is so widely recognized that it is not important to recite the results of salary surveys here. The main systematic analyses include the reports of the Quadrennial Commission and the Report of the National Commission on the Public Serv~ce.3 The recent pay raise legislation passed in 1989 will help to ameliorate but not fully solve the problem. Although pay levels may be the most highly visible and easy to document 2 Ibid. 3 The most recent Quad Come report was High Quality Leadership--Our Govemment's Most Precious Asset, report of the U.S. Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries (December 1988~. The Volcker Commission findings are in Facing the Federal Compensation Crisis, report of the Task Force on Pay and Compensation to the National Commission on the Public Service (Washington, 1989~. See also the Report of the President's Commission on Compensation of Career Federal Executives (February 26, 1988~. 134

impediment to presidential recruitment, other factors discourage the best and brightest from joining an administration. Among the most important of those factors are the series of laws and regulations that are meant to prevent appointees from taking advantage of their government positions to enrich themselves unethically. Regulations have been fashioned to require financial disclosure of personal finances when accepting a position, to remedy any potential conflict of interest (including blind trusts and recusals), and to limit emolovment and representation activities after leaving the. government. This is not the place for a close analysis of the specifics of the legal restrictions, but systematic data as well as anecdotal evidence show that these restrictions have a chilling effect on presidential recruitment. In a survey of all presidential appointees between 1964 and 1984, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) found that while less than 5 percent of appointees in the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations had problems with financial disclosure forms, 26 percent of Carter appointees and 34 percent of Reagan appointees had "significant difficulty" filling out financial disclosure forms. Some complained of sizable legal and accounting fees merely to fill out the required forms. There was a corresponding increase in the number of appointees who felt that the financial disclosure requirements have gone too far: from 40 percent in the Carter administration to 64 per cent in the Reagan administration (NAPA, 1985; Mackenzie, 1986a).4 During the 19SOs the restrictions became more burdensome and chilling, particularly the new postemployment restrictions that seemed to cause a number of senior federal executives at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and elsewhere to leave the government.5 Norman Augustine (1989), chairman and CEO of Martin Marietta, argues that complex ethics rules are a significant deterrent to attracting high quality federal executives: ·__r _ _ A ~r _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~^ By_ ~^ ~ ^ by_- ~^ it 4_~ ~ ~a ~- ,!~ Exceptional career public servants are leaving government in alarming numbers, and qualified replacements are becoming harder and harder to recruit. The rash of resignations that preceded the effective date of the new "revolving door" ethics rules punctuates this concern. Former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci (1989) has similar concerns: In my experience, the best people tend to be the most ethical. Yet, in the name of ethics, we are driving the best out of government. In other words, extreme and often absurd ethical standards are lowering the level of ethics. 4 The NAPA 1985 survey was sent to 936 present and former presidential appointees. The response rate was 57 percent, and respondents were highly representative of the total target population of appointees. 5 The chilling effect of postemployment restrictions was emphasized by several people interviewed for this paper: Stephen Andriole' former director of the Cybernetic Technical Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense; and Jeffrey Newmeyer, chief scientist of Lockheed Missile Systems. For examples of problems with the new ethics restrictions, see Linda S. Dix, 'recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers in the Federal Government: Results of a Literature Review, earlier in this appendix. 135

In every organization, there has to be an element of trust. A certain amount of regulation and even conflict of interest legislation is healthy, but a legislative effort to eliminate every conceivable conflict of interest creates a web of red tape and frustrations and demoralizes managers. While recognizing the legitimate intent behind the ethics requirements and the very real abuses that they were intended to remedy, NAPA (1985) has recommended a reexamination of financial disclosure and conflict of interest legislation.6 Other problems face presidential recruiters. How do you convince a successful manager, scientist, or engineer to leave his or her job, step out of a career path for a short period of time (the average PAS term in position is 2.0 years), move a family to Washington, buy a house in an expensive housing market, and put up with the very real pressures of a political appointment?7 The NAPA survey found that the proportion of presidential appointees who reported that they made a "significant financial sacrifice" to accept their appointment increased from 40 percent in the Johnson administration to 52 percent in the Carter administration to 64 percent in the Reagan administration. In addition, "quality-of-life" factors declined. Those who reported working more than 60 hours a week increased from 64 percent in the Johnson administration to 77 percent in the Reagan administration. Those who reported that their jobs caused "stress in personal life or family relations" increased from 51 percent in the Johnson administration to 73 percent in the Reagan administration (NAPA, 1985~. Although these data are discouraging, most appointees also reported that their periods of public service were among the most rewarding professional experiences of their lives. The point here is not to paint too bleak a picture but to isolate impediments to recruiting people for public service. Another trend that affects the appointment process and the management of the government is the increasing length of time that transpires between when the President nominates a person and when that person takes office. These delays are attributable to internal executive branch clearances (including FB! investigation and financial clearances) and the Senate investigation and confirmation process. The average length of time has increased from 7 weeks during the Johnson administration to 14 weeks in the Reagan administration and probably longer in the Bush administration (NAPA, 1985~. The reasons for this trend include new conflict of interest laws, more thorough White House clearance procedures, delays in Senate confirmation, and more thorough FB! full field investigations. In addition to the delay in the average time that it takes to complete individual appointments, presidential administrations seem to take a longer time to complete their initial set of presidential appointments. Although comparable data have not been kept over the years, it was the consensus among published sources that in 1981 the Reagan administration had been slower than other recent administrations to fill its PAS positions (Pfiffner, 1988~. In 1989 it was generally conceded that the Bush administration was 6 See also Mackenzie (1986b) and National Commission on the Public Service (1989~. 7 In addition to the short average time of PAS appointees in office, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb emphasized the psychological uncertainty of serving At the pleasure of" the President and one's immediate superior. 136

slower than the Reagan administration: on August 10, 156 of 394 of the top executive branch positions had been filled, but there were no nominations for 160 of the positions (Pfiffner, 1990~. By the end of 1989 the administration had not filled 46 of 116 PAS positions in independent agencies (40 percent) and 70 of 320 PAS positions in executive departments (22 percent) (Garcia, 1989~. The effect of these delays in recruiting presidential appointees depends on which positions are not filled. But where the incumbents of positions are, in effect, lame ducks for the first year of an administration, there will most likely be delays in the implementation of policy and management initiatives and possibly the recruitment of scientists and engineers at both the political and career executive levels. Quality and the Number of Political Appointees The creation of this panel was prompted in part by the concern that it is becoming more difficult to attract the best and brightest scientists and engineers to the federal service. The Report by the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government (1988) stated, ''It is generally agreed that the quality [of government technical personnel] has eroded." In 1989 Energy Secretary James Watkins said that the Energy Department did not have the officials with the skills necessary to run the country's nuclear weapons complex.8 This concern has been accompanied by a perception that there has been a decline in quality of some political appointees, which in turn has had a negative effect on the quality of political appointees in the government. Elliot Richardson (1987), former secretary of Defense; Health, Education, and Welfare; and Commerce, has noted "the increase in turnover and the decline in quality of second- and third-echelon political appointees"' in the federal government. Richardson7s concern is based on the observation that during the past 20 years there has been an increase in the number of political appointees in the government, a deeper penetration of political appointees into the career ranks, an increase in the turnover of appointees, and an increase in the emphasis on political loyalty in presidential administrations. These factors have had a negative effect on the recruitment and retention of scientists and engineers to the extent that the professional quality of appointees, institutional memory, and organizational stability have decreased. The number of political appointees has increased during the past several decades. Although authoritative and comparable data are hard to find, there is no doubt about the trend. The number of PAS positions has increased from 152 in 1965 to 527 in 1985; noncareer Senior Executive Service (SES) positions increased from 582 in 1980 to 658 in 1986; Schedule C positions increased from 911 in 1976 to 1,665 in 1986. In 1986 there were 946 Schedule C's at the GS-13-15 levels, more than the total number of Schedule C's under President Ford (Ingraham, 1987). Although the absolute numbers of political appointees in relation to the total civilian work force may not seem high, the ratio of political to career positions at the mid-executive levels is increasing (e.g., the deputy 8 Energy Chief Says Top Aides Lack Skills to Run U.S. Bomb Complex, New York Am es, June 28, 1989, p. 1. See also Reversing Course at the Energy Department, Washington Post, January 24, 1990, p. 1. 1 OF

assistant secretary level). The increasingly rapid turnover of these political appointees aggravates the situation, with PAS appointees' time in position averaging 2.8 years in 1965 and 2.0 years in 1984 (NAPA, 1985~. From 1979 to 1986, noncareer SES executives stayed in office an average of 20 months (Ban and Ingraham, 1986~. Among the difficulties caused by the increasing number of political appointees is difficulty of recruiting high-quality people for positions that are lower in prestige than executive level ~ or IT positions for relatively low pay. This is exacerbated by the centralization of White House control of political recruiting that reached a peak during the Reagan administration. In the 1950s and 1960s, even presidential appointees at the subcabinet level were often, in effect, chosen by cabinet secretaries in conjunction with the White House (Mann, 1965~. With centralization in the White House Personnel Office has come a greater emphasis on ideological or personal loyalty to the President as the primary criterion for appointment. According to Elliot Richardson (1987), the quality of political appointments has suffered from "the elimination from the pool of eligible prospects of those who cannot meet the ideological litmus test." The argument is that cabinet secretaries are more likely to value competence and merit in selecting their subordinates who will run programs than is the White House, which is likely to be especially sensitive to the political claims of those who have supported the president's campaign. Richardson (1987) noted, A White House personnel assistant sees the position of deputy assistant secretary as a fourth-echelon slot. In his eyes that makes it an ideal reward for a fourth-echelon political type a campaign advance man, or a regional political organizer.9 The Special Case of Scientists and Engineers The impact of the above trends on the recruitment of PAS positions has the effect of narrowing the pool of candidates from which potential nominees are selected. The negative aspects of the job (low pay, financial disclosure, long hours, etc.) when combined with the political criteria often employed (ideological or personal loyalty) have a constraining effect on recruiting the best and the brightest for all presidential appointments except for the highest levels (e.g., cabinet positions). But good scientists and engineers are a special subset of potential appointees, and effectively recruiting them presents several additional problems. Often scientists and engineers get into their professions because they prefer a rational, academic research atmosphere rather than the uncertain world of politics with its necessary compromises. It is less likely that they will become involved in partisan politics than, for instance, lawyers or business people. Thus it is less likely that scientists and engineers will possess the kinds of political credentials that are often demanded in order to get past an initial screening by president's personnel office. As one presidential recruiter put it: "These people did not do a lot to help this 9 For a full analysis of these issues, see National Commission on the Public Service (1989~. 138

man get elected; they are just looking for an easy in." When asked for advice for scientists and engineers who might want to work in the public service at the.PAS level, the recruiter replied: "If you are interested in serving, get involved in the political process early, not after the election." This mind-set on the part of presidential recruiters necessarily narrows severely the pool of people who will be considered for presidential positions. Scientists and engineers are not likely to become involved in presidential campaigns and those who do may not be those who are also experienced enough to fill successfully senior PAS positions. President Reagan's first personnel recruiter, Pendleton James, added that, even if offered a job in an administration, some scientists wilt turn it down for fear that their professional reputations might become "tainted" by political service. None of this is meant to imply that politics and political credentials are illegitimate in presidential recruiting, the point is that in looking for the best persons to run major programs for the government, the excessive use of political criteria may prematurely narrow the field and exclude those who might be best for the job but do not happen to have the right political experience. The argument is that an excessively political approach is particularly effective at eliminating scientists and engineers early in the recruitment process, for they are less likely to be involved in politics as a typical part of their professional lives. The above analysis looked at the problem of recruiting scientists and engineers from the perspective of the political recruitment process. But the nature of the science and engineering professions themselves also impede recruiting the best and brightest for government service. The "tribal" values of scientists tend to cherish and give prestige to theoretical rather than applied or practical work. Thus academic or scholarly prestige comes in theoretical advances in the disciplines and publishing those ideas in scholarly journals. Those who do applied work are a bit lower on the pecking order in their disciplines, and those who do administrative work are even lower. Thus good scientists are less likely to get the administrative experience that qualifies them for public service positions running major programs. Finally, those who pursue scientific and engineering careers are often people who have a craftsman type of personality. That is, they focus on a single problem and enjoy the challenge of sticking to it until it is solved. These people are less likely to be good at or enjoy the job of a high-level executive that calls for the ability to move quickly from problem to problem in a very fluid environment. The political atmosphere of presidential positions intensifies these characteristics of high-level executive jobs (Maccoby, 1976). This is one form of the common problem of promoting very good professionals (accountants, doctors, lawyers, scientists, or engineers) from the work of their professions to management or executive positions. Those who are adept at one set of skills may not be adept at the other. 4° Interview with Pendleton James, January 12, 1990. ,, Interview with lames Trefil, Robinson Professor of Physics, George Mason University, January 25, 139

The Role of Leadership and Vision All of the above obstacles to recruiting scientists and engineers can be mitigated by visionary leadership. In recruiting for PAS positions, the role of the President is crucial. The President does not have time to be personally involved in recruiting for most PAS positions, but his attitude is decisive. He sets the tone for his recruiters, and by his final choices indicates whether he values professional qualities or prefers political loyalty over professional competence. Another aspect of presidential leadership that affects the willingness of scientists and engineers to leave their professional careers to spend several years in public service is the value that is placed on the work they will be doing. Although it is impossible to measure easily, morale during the early years of NASA and during the Apollo program was high and made it easier to attract the best scientists and engineers to work on a program that was professionally challenging and clearly valued by the President, the government, and U.S. citizens. 2 The mission to Mars might become such a program. Unfortunately, to undertake such ambitious goals is very expensive, and in a time of constrained budgets is unlikely to happen. The role of the President's science adviser is symbolically important insofar as it symbolizes the President's attitude toward scientists and science. The reestablishment of the position in the Executive Office of the President gave a positive boost to perceptions of the value that the President and the government place on science. The relationship of the science adviser to the President is something that is watched in the science and technology community and thus affects those scientists who are likely recruits for presidential positions (Stubbing, 1988). If the science adviser is perceived to have made politically driven compromises of his or her professional values, scientists may see this as evidence that if they come to work for the government, they may be pressured to compromise their own objectivity.'3 Of course most scientists and engineers in the government are not at the PAS level, but the quality of scientists and engineers at lower, operational levels is influenced by the quality of those at the PAS and SES levels. Several scientists who were interviewed for this project emphasized that in order to retain good scientists in the career service, they must respect the technical competence of their superiors.'4 Thus federal executives who want to recruit and retain good scientists and engineers will create the kind of atmosphere that will be attractive to them. They will set up professional recruitment and outreach efforts and will obtain the resources to do it well. 5 They will project a vision of the mission of the agency or program that will inspire and attract those who seek professional challenges. They will be sensitive to the professional values of scientists and engineers. They will ensure that the professional 12 Interview with Richard Stubbing, public policy program, Duke University (former associate director, Office of Management and Budget). 43 Interview with Jeffrey Newmeyer, chief scientist at Lockheed Missile Systems, February lo, 1990. 44 Interviews with Jeffrey Newmeyer and Stephen Andriole. ,5 Interview with Stephen Blush, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy. 140

products of scientists and engineers are given due consideration; that is, they will ensure that scientific research will have the chance to have an impact on policy, when that input is appropriate. Finally, they will be sure to buffer the professional work of scientists and engineers from the political whims of superiors and insulate them as much as possible from budget swings that are inherent in the political world of the federal government. The importance of "buffering the technical core" of organizations is especially appropriate in this context. This buffering role is one of the main responsibilities of chief executives and managers according to Thompson (1967~. Conclusion One of the conclusions of this paper is that the ability to recruit and retain good scientists and engineers in the federal government is undercut by the combination of two factors. On the one hand is the difficulty of scientists and engineers gaining the type of political experience that provides them with the political credentials to be acceptable to a presidential recruitment operation. In addition, even if offers are made, scientists may be unwilling to serve in policy positions for fear that their professional values or objectivity might be compromised by political considerations. On the other hand is the need for career scientists and engineers to have high levels of respect for the technical credentials of their political superiors. Thus federal recruitment of scientists and engineers at high levels is caught between the demand on the part of presidential recruiters that they have unquestioned political credentials and the demand on the part of career scientists and engineers that their political supervisors have impeccable scientific credentials. These two factors, in addition to the others mentioned above, reduce the ability of the federal government to recruit the best and brightest scientists and engineers. This paper may seem to have painted an excessively negative picture of the prospects for recruiting top quality scientists and engineers for the federal government. The purpose of the project, however, is to examine problems in the process and potential avenues for improvement. Thus in accentuating the negative, the tone of this report should not overshadow the continuing very high quality of most political appointees and the scientists and engineers who have chosen public service. It must also be emphasized that any arguments about the level of quality of federal employees is inherently judgmental. On the other hand, just because the factors involved cannot be quantified is not sufficient reason to make no judgement at all. The problems are real, and they should be addressed. Bibliography Augustine, N. R. 1989. Show our public servants some respect. Washington Post. August 13, p. B7. Ban, C., and P. Ingraham. 1986. Short-Timers: Political Appointee Mobility and Its Impact on PoliticaZ-Career Relations in the Reagan Administration. Paper presented at the National Convention of the American Society for Public Administration, Anaheim, Calif. 141

CarIucci, F. 1989. Public service: Are we sacrificing quality? Op-ed article written for the National Commission on the Public Service, November 1989 (unpublished). Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government. 1988. Science and Technology and the President. New York: The Commission. Garcia, R. 1989. Presidential Nominations to Full-Time Positions in Executive Departments Dunng the 101st Congress and Presidential Nominations to Full-Time Positions in Independent and Other Agencies, Cast Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Ingraham, P. 1987. Building bridges or burning them? Public Administration Review September/October 1987. Maccoby, M. 1976. The Gamesman. New York: Simon and Schuster. Mackenzie, G. Calvin. 1981. The Politics of Presidential Appointments. New York: The Free Press. 1986a. The ·n-and-Outers: Presidential Appointees and Transient Govemment in Washington. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1986b. If you want to play, you've got to pay: Ethics regulation and the presidential appointments system, 1964-84. In G. Calvin Mackenzie (ed.), The In- and-Outers, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Pres, 1986. Mann, D. E. 1965. The Assistant Secretaries. Washington: Brookings. National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). 1983. Amenca's Unelected Govemment. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co. -1984. Recruiting Presidential Appointees. Transcript of a group discussion of former White House Personnel Directors, December 13, 1984 (unpublished). 1985. Leadership in Jeopardy: The Fraying of the Presidential Appointments System. Washington, D.C.: NAPA. National Commission on the Public Service. 1989. Politics and Performance: Strengthening the Executive Leadership System. Report of the Task Force on the Relations Between Political Appointees and Career Executives. Washington, D.C.: The Commission. Pfiffner, I. P. 1987. Political appointees and career executives: The democracy- bureaucracy nexus. Public Administration Review January/February:57-65. 1988. The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running. Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole. 1990. Establishing the Bush presidency. Public Administration Review January/ February:67-69. , and R. G. Hoxie, eds. 1989. The Presidency in Transition. New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency. Richardson, E. L. 1987. Civil servants: Why not the best? Wad Street loumal, November 20. Stubbing, R. 1988. Agenda Item for the Next President and Congress: Federal Science and Technology (R&D) Policy for the 1990s. Unpublished. Thompson, I. D. 1967. Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. Trattner, I. H. 1988. The Prune BooL Washington: Center for Excellence in Government. 142

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