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APPENDIX B
COMMISSIONED PAPERS
Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers
in the Federal Govemment: Results of a Literature Review by Linda S. DO 77
.
.
.
Quantitative Inputs to Federal Technical Personnel Management
by Charles E. Falk
95
Meeting Federal Work Force Needs with Regard to Scientists and Engineers:
The Role of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management by John M. Paiguta 111
Differences in Recruitment, Retention, and Utilization Processes: A Companson
of Traditionally Operated Federal Laboratones, M&O Facilities, and
Demonstration Projects by Sheldon B. Clark 121
The Political Appointments Process and the Recruitment of Scientists
and Engineers by James P. Pfiffner
75
133
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RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND UTILIZATION
OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
IN DIE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
Results of a Literature Review
Linda 5. DO
Staff Officer
Office of Scientific and Engineering Personnel
Introduction
One activity to be undertaken under the aegis of the Committee on Scientists and
Engineers in the Federal Government was a literature review to determine what earlier
research had revealed about the ability of the federal government to recruit, retain, and
utilize scientific and engineering talent effectively. The following summarizes
information compiled from sources listed in the bibliography. The most recent studies
of this issue, focusing on specific agencies, are the 1988 examination of the intramural
program at the National Institutes of Health (Institute of Medicine, Committee to Study
Strategies, 1988) and a three-year effort conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis
(IDA), studying 25,000 scientists and engineers in 66 Department of Defense (DoD)
laboratories. Although the DoD data are still being analyzed, preliminary findings are
included here (see also IDA, 1989a and 1989b; Millburn, 1989a and 1989b).
Furthermore, the usefulness of data collected in that study has led the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) to design a survey questionnaire to be mailed to a
representative sample of scientists and engineers in all other federal agencies.
In spite of efforts of the past two decades to encourage U.S. scientists and
engineers to consider federal employment, some federal agencies have been unable to
employ the numbers considered essential for completion of their missions, leading some
within the science policy community to conclude:
The federal system plods along for the most part, fostering mediocrity and
lacking the means to attract or encourage the genius needed for technical
inspiration and organizational leadership. (Packard, 1986)
A recent General Accounting Office (GAO, 1989a) study found that federal operations
are so affected bv serious human re.c.Ollrce nrohlP.mc that the onvPrnmpnt rennet mart
r ~--- ad,-AIL ~~A=L 1416_~
. ~ ~ ~ · ~
the needs ot its citizens. Prom surveys of installation heads, personnel directors,
personnel officers, and OPM in 1989, GAO found that 40-71 percent had greater
difficulty in hiring good employees than in 1984 and 40-77 percent said that retention
had worsened. (In contrast, only 2-20 percent of those interviewed felt recruitment and
retention had improved between 1984 and 1989.) This is particularly true in technical
fields and seems to occur at all civil service levels. But of particular concern is the fact
that many experienced and competent senior executives are leaving federal service for
employment in the private sector. In fact,
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Among the very best those who have won presidential merit awards-
the average quit rate in 1986 and 1987 ran at 24% annually, with 75% of
the departees going to industry. (Norton, 1989)
A similar assessment was made by federal lab directors. Less than 10 percent
"think that salaries or bonuses are good enough. One half of the directors say that pay
is too low and is not competitive with industry, and one half say that bonuses are too
small" (IDA, 1989a). As a result, GAO has delineated specific areas that federal
agencies should examine closely to encourage more scientists and engineers to engage in
federal employment: (~) recruitment and staffing practices, (2) salary and benefits, and
(3) planning for the types and numbers of people needed. Perhaps the major problem
facing those who pursue federal employment, at least in Washington, D.C., is that they
must put their lives and finances "on public display in the fishbowI-on-the-Potomac"
(Norton, 1989~.
Recruitment of Scientists and Engineers
Both the number of vacancies and the level of recruitment difficulty vary within
.
.
and between federal agencies, (e.g., see Frascinelia, 1989~. For instance, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has "experienced problems hiring and retaining
sufficient numbers of technical personnel to implement the Superfund program" (GAO,
1989a) because of high employee turnover, inadequate pay, and insufficient training of
staff. Recruitment difficulties have also been experienced at the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), which has been "unable to hire a single senior biomedical research
scientist from industry or academe in the past ten years" (Norton, 1989~. Similar
problems have been reported by the following agencies (GAO, 1987 and 1989b):
Social Security Administration
Internal Revenue Service
National Science Foundation, particularly in scientific and engineering
occupations, since 1985
Department of the Army (electronics engineers, general engineers, physicists,
computer scientists, and research psychologists)
Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs,
Department of State
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Office of Energy Research, Department of Energy
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Department of Health and Human Services
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
However, other federal agencies fill vacancies in scientific and engineering disciplines
quite easily or encounter problems sporadically. When directed by an executive order of
the President (December 1985) to provide information about problems that they have
encountered in recruiting and retaining scientists and engineers, three agencies (the U.S.
Geological Survey, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of
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Transportation) noted no significant problems. In addition, within a federal
organization, the significance of the difficulty of recruiting qualified scientists and
engineers sometimes varies; the Department of the Army was cited to illustrate this
point. In its 1982 study, the Laboratory Management Task Force noted that
[DoD] departure rates seem to be reasonable. Because of the substantial
populations of GS-12 and -13, the majority of attrition occurs at these
levels. As a result, there are significant losses at these critical levels which
are hard to replace.
That study further showed that in 1981 the 7.4 percent increase in the number of
DoD scientists and engineers at GS-5-15 almost balanced the 6.4 percentage who left.
However, a more recent study shows serious shortages in five fields at DoD
labs-artificial intelligence, computer engineering, computer networking, signal
processing, and systems engineering- with recruitment difficulties also experienced in
acoustics, biomechanics, ceramics, control system engineering, digital communications,
fiber optics, human factors, robotics, and weapons design (IDA, 1989a). Thus, GAO
(1987) has concluded that "some agencies are experiencing difficulty in recruiting and
retaining scientists and engineers while others are not." Nonetheless, it has been shown
that "weaknesses in the government's recruitment and hiring processes have been major
impediments to obtaining quality people" (GAO, 1989a) and often result in agencies
having "to choose between accepting a less qualified candidate or leaving a position
vacant" (Packard, 1986~.
Retention of Scientists and Engineers
Attrition of scientists and engineers from the federal government has been a
major issue of the 19SOs. For instance, between 1981 and 1984 the Air Force
TABLE 1: Quit Rates for DoD Engineers (in percent)
Fiscal Year Quit Rate Fiscal Year Quit Rate
1975 1.8 1981 2.3
1976 1.5 1982 2.2
1977 2.0 1983 3.2
1978 2.4 1984 3.3
1979 2.5 1985 3.6
1980 2.4
SOURCE: General Accounting Office, Federal Work Force: Pay, Recruitment, and Retention of Federal
Employees (GAO/GGD-87-37), Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1987.
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experienced a 164 percent increase in the number of resignations of civilian scientists
and engineers, with resignations occurring at all grade levels (Packard, 1986~. This is
compounded by the fact that in a recent year only 1,792 of 2,445 vacant engineering
positions in the Air Force were filled, after 2,737 job offers were made for them
(recruitment success rate of 73.3 percent) (GAO, 1987~. The overall quit rate for
engineers in DoD averaged 2.47 percent for the period 1975-1985 (see Table 1~.
Although the average annual DoD quit rate was 2.1 percent for the 1975-1982 period, it
has remained around 3.4 percent since then, but staff have found no reason for this
Jump.
Factors Affecting Recruitment and Retention
of Scientists and Engineers
Several organizational, personal, and economic factors influence one's decision
not to work for a federal agency or to leave federal employment: noncompetitive
federal salaries, advancement opportunities, the nature of the work, geographic location
of work, etc. In addition, exogenous factors affect attrition: "the state of the labor
market, the particular occupation, and the age, sex, and education of employees" (GAO,
1987~.
Several of the studies examined revealed that the changing demography of the
U.S. work force, together with competition from the private sector for high-quality
scientists and engineers, hinders the ability of the federal government to recruit and
retain the quality needed to be effective. Several other reasons have been given for the
current situation:
Restrictions imposed not only by budgetary constraints but also by personnel
· ~
cell .lngs
Salary increases determined more by length of service rather than by quality of
one's performance
Noncompetitive federal salaries for scientists and engineers. (Packard, 1986)
These factors received regular attention in studies that zeroed in on the inflexibility of
the civil service system, as shown in the report following a comprehensive examination
of the Army laboratories:
The personnel policies and procedures of a laboratory and its parent
organization are important in attracting and retaining good scientists and
engineers and in providing them rewarding careers. Undue bureaucratic
complications and delays in recruiting, for example, can put a laboratory at
a serious disadvantage in competing for talented science and engineering
graduates. Uncompetitive salaries and benefits, of course, also impede
recruiting and retaining good personnel. Laboratories must provide
opportunities for advancement and increased responsibilities. Similarly,
their promotion and termination procedures and practices must be
regarded as straightforward and fair. (Committee on Army Manpower,
1983)
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Further, the 1983 White House Science Council, report (Office of Science and
Technology Policy, 1983) concurred on the widespread nature of the problem:
Almost all of the Federal laboratories . . . suffer serious disadvantages in
their abilities to attract, retain, and motivate scientific and technical
personnel required to fulfill their niissions. The principal disadvantage is
the inability of the Federal laboratories, particularly those under the Civil
Service system, to provide scientists and engineers with competitive
compensation. . . . Furthermore, cumbersome procedures for hiring new
staff make it hard to bring in new talent even when other obstacles have
been overcome.
The rigidity of the Civil Service promotion and salary system limits rewards
for outstanding scientists and engineers. . . . Promotion is linked to management
responsibilities, and current rules do not allow for adequate recognition of
scientific performance alone. Recent personnel ceilings imposed strictly on a
numerical basis without distinguishing among types of staff have adversely
affected the laboratories' R&D activities. . . . This personnel situation leaves the
Federal laboratories vulnerable to weak scientific leadership if senior qualified
personnel cannot be replaced and to declining quality of research because of
inadequate infusion of young talent.
Thus it was not surprising to read the conclusion of a report assessing the ability of NIH
to recruit and retain scientists:
The combination of increasingly burdensome and unnecessary constraints
along with lower salaries and less flexible administrative policies creates
justified concern about NTH's ability to continue its past successes in
building the staff necessary to sustain the quality and vitality of the
intramural program. (Committee to Study Strategies, 1988)
Personnel Ceilings
The 1979 GAO study of federal laboratories reports that "the directors were
concerned over the adverse effect of personnel ceilings on their operations, [advocating
for themselves] more personnel control, including hire and fire authority." Although 51
percent of the managers surveyed had control over the type of people hired and in what
disciplines, the other 49 percent said that they must Beget approval or operate within
parameters set by higher organizational levels.' Following close on the heels of the
GAO study, DoD's Laboratory Management Task Force (1980) focused two of its five
major recommendations on the issue of personnel ceilings: stabilize laboratory
personnel ceilings and repeal high grade ceilings. Similar recommendations came from
both the U.S. Defense Research and Engineering Independent Review of DoD
~ A 1983 panel of distinguished scientists, chaired by David Packard, studied five aspects of federal
laboratories admission; personnel; funding; management; and interaction with universities, industry, and users
of research results operated by the six agencies receiving the largest portion of federal R&D funding
(NASA and the departments of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and Health and Human Services).
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Laboratories (Hermann, 1982) and the Laboratory Management Task Force's 1982 study
of scientists and engineers in DoD laboratories, the latter finding that
Ceilings by themselves are not an intrinsic barrier to maintenance of an
effective S&E [science and engineering] work force beyond a critical mass
required to operate a laboratory. What does appear to be important is the
maintenance of a stable ceiling consistent with workload to facilitate
planning and management within the DoD labs. . . . The majority of
Technical Directors did report significant adverse impacts of . . . total
ceilings including reduced ability to meet mission requirements, deletion of
specific technologies that should be addressed, reduced ability to hire and
promote experienced and deserving personnel as well as overall reduced
quality of work.
Still other adverse effects of personnel ceilings that hinder recruitment of scientists and
engineers include inadequate staffing levels, increased contracting out of agency work
and subsequent reduction of in-house expertise, inability to respond to requests for work,
increased S&E workload, and increased use of temporaries (IDA, 1989a).
Noncompetitive Salaries
Among the stipulations of Section 5305 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
is the requirement that unless the President and Congress agree on alternative pay rates,
Federal white-collar employees' salaries under the General Schedule are to
be adjusted each year to maintain comparability with private sector salaries
for similar levels of work. (GAO, 1987)
However, beginning in 1979, such adjustments have not been made. The result is that
by 1987, federal employees received salaries averaging 23.S percent less than their
counterparts in private industry (GAO, 1987~. In fact, the salaries for federal employees
in the upper echelons "have sunk far below the norms of corporate America" (Norton,
1989) during the past decade.
Data obtained in 1987 by GAO from OPM as well as from the two federal
agencies employing the most scientists and engineers DoD and NASA- show that
scientists and engineers, like many other employees in the federal government, are paid
lower salaries than their counterparts in the private sector. Of the seven occupations
examined by GAO (1987), three are relevant to this study of scientists and engineers in
the federal government: chemists, engineers, and computer specialists (Table 2~.
However, these data show no relationship between the pay gap and quit rate in these
occupations.
In a later report, GAO (1989) noted that the differences in salary for federal
employees and their private-sector counterparts ranged from 26 percent on the General
Schedule of Salaries to 65 percent for senior executives. Salary discrepancies are
particularly prevalent for scientists and engineers, but such discrepancies depend on
one's place of employment. In general, a federal scientist earns about $3,000 more than
his counterpart in business and industry, whereas a federal engineer earns $700 less than
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TABLE 2: 1985 Pay Gaps and Quit Rates (in percent)
Occupation Pay Gap Range Quit Rate
Chemist 27.9-50.7 2.3
Accountant 27.2-46.0 2.3
Engineer 19.4-46.0 3.3
Buyer 24.7-34.9 3.2
Computer specialist 5.9-29.1 2.8
Clerk-typist 10.1-11.1 13.8
Secretary 4.0-9.3 6.9
All General Schedule workers 19.2 5.2
SOURCE: General Accounting Office, Federal Work Force: Pay, Recruitment, and Retention of Federal
Employees (GAO/GGD-87-37), Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1987.
his peer in the private sector (IDA, 1989b). However, at EPA salaries for chemists and
engineers "trailed private sector pay by $7~800 to $41~300, or 25 to 68 percent' (GAO,
1989a). In addition, a recent comparison of salaries found that a DoD scientist earns an
average of $5,000 more than the national average but a DoD engineer earns about
$1,000 less than the national average (IDA, 1989b). In 1986, when federal laboratories
received $18 billion (or one-third) of the federal R&D budget and employed about one-
sixth of all U.S. research scientist and engineers, David Packard, chairman of Hewlett-
Packard Company, warned:
At the heart of the problem is pay, with rigidity and inertia of the
personnel administration system being a less important but contributing
factor. . . . The [pay] problem is particularly acute in the scientific and
engineering fields, where industrial pay scales have risen faster than the
rest. [Because Congress links congressional and civil service pay and
hesitates to raise its own pay], the result is not only lower federal salaries
but also severe salary compression at the senior levels. (Packard, 1986)
From information provided by 13 federal organizations in response to a December 1985
executive order of the President, GAO (1987) reported that 11 of these organizations
experienced recruitment and retention problems because of the noncompetitive nature
of federal salaries. Such problems tended to be agency-specific:
.
The U.S. Geological Survey noted its inability to hire about 10 percent of their
"prime candidates" in engineering positions (3-4 from a vacancy pool of 40) each
year.
The Department of Transportation cited recruitment difficulty only for entry-
level
83
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technician positions in the Boston area, where competition with high-technology
industry is great.
Both the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards
and Technology) and NASA cited noncompetitive salaries as a major contributor
to the loss of technical, scientific, and engineering candidates.
NASA noted that from FYi983 to FYl985, its scientist and engineer losses, other
than retirement, increased from 294 to 361 employees.
The salaries that B.S. engineers can draw from industry particularly affect NASA's ability
to recruit them:
Top pay for a beginning engineer at NASA is $25,000-that includes a
30% premium for hard-to-fi~} jobs like those in engineering and medicine.
Top graduates . . . can command up to $40,000 in business. (Norton,
1989)
Similarly, the effect of the federal pay schedule on the retention of high-level
talent was keenly noted in a study of the 118 doctoral scientists and engineers at the
U.S. Army's Waterways Experiment Station in Vicksburg, Miss. During the period
January 1980 to June 1987, 32 doctorates (or 27 percent) left WES:
Those who left did so primarily for a higher salary. The private sector
attracted 41 percent, universities 22 percent, and other Federal agencies 16
percent. (Vincent, 1987)
GAO's 1989(b) study, which looked at all scientists and engineers (as opposed to the
1987 examination of chemists, engineers, and computer specialists), found that
"noncompetitive compensation further exacerbates the problem by creating higher rates
of turnover, which, in turn, create the need for more recruiting by federal agencies."
Because low salaries were making recruitment and retention of highly capable scientists
and engineers difficult for the national labs, the Committee on Army Manpower (1983)
recommended higher starting salaries for "new graduates possessing unique and needed
skills so that these salaries are competitive," and Packard (1986) urged Congress "to act
quickly to halt the erosion of scientific talent before the vitality of the laboratories is
seriously undermined." Thus it was with much backing of the scientific community that
adjustments were made to the General Schedule of Salaries to enable supervisors to hire
engineers in entry and mid-level grades at "rates which exceed normal General Schedule
salaries for other employees at the same grades" (GAO, 1987~.
Nonetheless, it is felt by
many that our Jack ot pay comparan~ty with the private sector means that we are
becoming less able to compete for the shrinking pool of citizen S&E graduates"
(MilIburn, 1989b). In fact, the Committee to Study Strategies to Strengthen the
Scientific Excellence of the National Institutes of Health Intramural Research Program
(1988) urged increasing
NTH's flexibility in pay . . . so that it may compete more effectively for
people critical to the continued success of the various programs and
otherwise to adrn~nister more effectively its public responsibilities.
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The committee also noted that although "there is merit in the claim that an unfavorable
pay disparity exists and is growing," the magnitude of the problem may be overstated.
Inadequate Fringe Benefits
Several studies of federal compensation have shown that "the federal
government's pay and benefits structure has serious implications for the quality of the
federal workforce" (GAO, 1989b). The low level of fringe benefits provided by federal
employers contributes to a number of resignations by scientists and engineers,
particularly at grades GS-13 and above (Laboratory Management Task Force, 1982~. In
fact, Packard (1986) stated, "Federal health and life insurance provisions and annual and
sick leave allowances are far less generous than those offered by many private
companies and universities." Furthermore, the Office of Science and Technology Policy
and the Office of Management and Budget urged "legislative action to permit continuity
of pension plans for scientists and engineers who move between Federal laboratories
and universities" (OSTP, 1984a). On the other hand, some attribute low attrition among
federal employees in general to this very "lack of portability of civil service retirement
benefits" (GAO, 1987), implying that the loss of federal scientists and engineers could be
compounded by a change in retirement programs.
Other Factors
Still other factors influencing federal recruitment and retention of scientists and
engineers have been noted not only in earlier studies but also recently by the press,
including weak leadership within federal agencies, ownership of intellectual property,
and ethics laws.
Weak Agency Leadership: Several studies have focused on the leadership in national
laboratories, but in some instances the assessment of problems encountered by the labs
can apply more broadly to other federal agencies. Me Committee on Army Manpower
(1983) noted that
The quality and stability of its own leadership over the years is a primary
factor in determining the laboratory's reputation in its field. It is also a
primary factor in maintaining talented and productive scientific and
· . .
engineering personne ..
But for one to lead an agency effectively-that is, use employees effectively and
efficiently he or she must thoroughly understand the mission of the agency, a task
complicated by several factors. First, the missions of agencies frequently change:
The great national research centers financed by the government utilize
large numbers of scientists and engineers. The missions of some of them,
especially of those related to defense, have changed since their
establishment. It is important that their present and future missions be
clear-cut and of high priority, and that their use of scientists and engineers
be unmistakably in the national interest. In maintaining these major
85
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IlIE POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS AND THE
RECRUITMENT OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
James P. Profaner
Professor of Government and Politics
George Mason University
This paper examines the major factors that affect the recruitment of scientists and
engineers in the political recruitment process and concludes that those factors are
similar to the factors that affect PAS (political appointments requiring Senate
confirmation) appointments in general. It further argues that the difficulties in attracting
the best executives to public service are even greater in recruiting the best scientists and
engineers. In addition, the nature of the science and engineering professions presents
further impediments to recruiting and retaining the highest quality personnel. These
negative factors, however, are often outweighed by opportunities present in the public
service: the chance to work at the cutting edge of many areas of research, the challenge
of tackling the toughest problems facing our society, and the opportunity to make a
contribution to the public good or to serve an admired president.
The analysis and conclusions of this paper are based on systematic data from
various studies and the considered judgments of experienced people. But it must be
emphasized that defining "quality" and estimating the motives of potential government
executives are inherently judgmental activities.
The Pressures of Transition
At the beginning of each new presidential administration, the President is faced
with the daunting task of recruiting 3,000 to 4,000 political appointees. The Office of
Presidential Personnel has the task of coordinating this effort, but it is directly
responsible for the recruitment and selection of about 550 executives to lead the
executive branch. Other political appointees include about 650 noncareer Senior
Executives and about 1650 Schedule C appointments at the GS-15 level and below. A
certain proportion of these political positions are appropriate for those with science and
engineering backgrounds.
The pressures of the task seem overwhelming because it must be done under the
additional burden of other transition pressures involving budget, policy, politics, etc. A
flood of applications has inundated recent administrations, often amounting to 1,500
applications per day in the early part of the transition (National Academy of Public
Administration, 1983~. By June 1989 the Bush administration had received more than
45,000 applications for political appointments.' One of the main difficulties for the
Interview with Chase Untermeyer, the White House, June 6, 1989.
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President's personnel recruiters is to separate the wheat from the chaff, satisfying
political obligations or appeasing those who are not appointed, and matching the right
people with the right positions. The real challenge is actively to recruit the best and the
brightest, rather than merely sifting through the resumes that come in "over the
transom."
All of this is complicated by the inability of the President's personnel recruiter to
do much preparation. Although presidential candidates Carter and Reagan had initiated
some planning for political recruitment, because of political sensitivities, preparation can
never be very thorough. Candidate George Bush refused to let his personnel recruiter,
Chase Untermeyer, do any planning or even to recruit a staff until after the election.2
One of the constant headaches of the President's personnel recruiter is to deflect
political pressures for appointments so that those best qualified for the positions can be
appointed. A tension that affects every presidential recruitment operation is between
political pressures for patronage and the professional qualifications needed to perform
the duties of the job. All Presidents legitimately demand loyalty, but the balance with
competence is difficult to maintain.
Impediments to Recruiting the Best and Brightest
Although presidential appointments are prestigious, and many welcome an
invitation to join an administration, Presidents do not always convince their first choices
to accept presidential appointments. There will always be plenty of people eager to join
an administration (as indicated by the 45,000 applications in 1989), but the real problem
is finding those who are not looking for a job because they are successful and satisfied
with their present position.
For the highest positions, cabinet secretaries and executive level IT positions,
there is usually not too much problem because of the prestige of the positions and the
relatively close relationship to the president. But for the ~rnd-leve} executive positions
impediments to accepting a position and the quality of the experience in office have
become increasingly important factors during the past several decades.
The relatively low level of pay is one of the major factors that keeps the
President from recruiting the best and brightest for a period of government service.
This reality is so widely recognized that it is not important to recite the results of salary
surveys here. The main systematic analyses include the reports of the Quadrennial
Commission and the Report of the National Commission on the Public Serv~ce.3 The
recent pay raise legislation passed in 1989 will help to ameliorate but not fully solve the
problem.
Although pay levels may be the most highly visible and easy to document
2 Ibid.
3 The most recent Quad Come report was High Quality Leadership--Our Govemment's Most Precious
Asset, report of the U.S. Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries (December 1988~. The
Volcker Commission findings are in Facing the Federal Compensation Crisis, report of the Task Force on Pay
and Compensation to the National Commission on the Public Service (Washington, 1989~. See also the
Report of the President's Commission on Compensation of Career Federal Executives (February 26, 1988~.
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impediment to presidential recruitment, other factors discourage the best and brightest
from joining an administration. Among the most important of those factors are the
series of laws and regulations that are meant to prevent appointees from taking
advantage of their government positions to enrich themselves unethically. Regulations
have been fashioned to require financial disclosure of personal finances when accepting
a position, to remedy any potential conflict of interest (including blind trusts and
recusals), and to limit emolovment and representation activities after leaving the.
government.
This is not the place for a close analysis of the specifics of the legal restrictions,
but systematic data as well as anecdotal evidence show that these restrictions have a
chilling effect on presidential recruitment. In a survey of all presidential appointees
between 1964 and 1984, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) found
that while less than 5 percent of appointees in the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford
administrations had problems with financial disclosure forms, 26 percent of Carter
appointees and 34 percent of Reagan appointees had "significant difficulty" filling out
financial disclosure forms. Some complained of sizable legal and accounting fees merely
to fill out the required forms. There was a corresponding increase in the number of
appointees who felt that the financial disclosure requirements have gone too far: from
40 percent in the Carter administration to 64 per cent in the Reagan administration
(NAPA, 1985; Mackenzie, 1986a).4 During the 19SOs the restrictions became more
burdensome and chilling, particularly the new postemployment restrictions that seemed
to cause a number of senior federal executives at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and elsewhere to leave the government.5
Norman Augustine (1989), chairman and CEO of Martin Marietta, argues that
complex ethics rules are a significant deterrent to attracting high quality federal
executives:
·__r _ _ A ~r _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~^ By_ ~^ ~ ^ by_- ~^ it 4_~ ~ ~a ~-
,!~
Exceptional career public servants are leaving government in alarming
numbers, and qualified replacements are becoming harder and harder to
recruit. The rash of resignations that preceded the effective date of the
new "revolving door" ethics rules punctuates this concern.
Former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci (1989) has similar concerns:
In my experience, the best people tend to be the most ethical. Yet, in the
name of ethics, we are driving the best out of government. In other words,
extreme and often absurd ethical standards are lowering the level of ethics.
4 The NAPA 1985 survey was sent to 936 present and former presidential appointees. The response rate
was 57 percent, and respondents were highly representative of the total target population of appointees.
5 The chilling effect of postemployment restrictions was emphasized by several people interviewed for
this paper: Stephen Andriole' former director of the Cybernetic Technical Office of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency; Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense; and Jeffrey Newmeyer,
chief scientist of Lockheed Missile Systems. For examples of problems with the new ethics restrictions, see
Linda S. Dix, 'recruitment, Retention, and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers in the Federal
Government: Results of a Literature Review, earlier in this appendix.
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In every organization, there has to be an element of trust. A certain
amount of regulation and even conflict of interest legislation is healthy, but
a legislative effort to eliminate every conceivable conflict of interest
creates a web of red tape and frustrations and demoralizes managers.
While recognizing the legitimate intent behind the ethics requirements and the
very real abuses that they were intended to remedy, NAPA (1985) has recommended a
reexamination of financial disclosure and conflict of interest legislation.6
Other problems face presidential recruiters. How do you convince a successful
manager, scientist, or engineer to leave his or her job, step out of a career path for a
short period of time (the average PAS term in position is 2.0 years), move a family to
Washington, buy a house in an expensive housing market, and put up with the very real
pressures of a political appointment?7 The NAPA survey found that the proportion of
presidential appointees who reported that they made a "significant financial sacrifice" to
accept their appointment increased from 40 percent in the Johnson administration to 52
percent in the Carter administration to 64 percent in the Reagan administration. In
addition, "quality-of-life" factors declined. Those who reported working more than 60
hours a week increased from 64 percent in the Johnson administration to 77 percent in
the Reagan administration. Those who reported that their jobs caused "stress in
personal life or family relations" increased from 51 percent in the Johnson
administration to 73 percent in the Reagan administration (NAPA, 1985~.
Although these data are discouraging, most appointees also reported that their
periods of public service were among the most rewarding professional experiences of
their lives. The point here is not to paint too bleak a picture but to isolate impediments
to recruiting people for public service.
Another trend that affects the appointment process and the management of the
government is the increasing length of time that transpires between when the President
nominates a person and when that person takes office. These delays are attributable to
internal executive branch clearances (including FB! investigation and financial
clearances) and the Senate investigation and confirmation process. The average length
of time has increased from 7 weeks during the Johnson administration to 14 weeks in
the Reagan administration and probably longer in the Bush administration (NAPA,
1985~. The reasons for this trend include new conflict of interest laws, more thorough
White House clearance procedures, delays in Senate confirmation, and more thorough
FB! full field investigations.
In addition to the delay in the average time that it takes to complete individual
appointments, presidential administrations seem to take a longer time to complete their
initial set of presidential appointments. Although comparable data have not been kept
over the years, it was the consensus among published sources that in 1981 the Reagan
administration had been slower than other recent administrations to fill its PAS positions
(Pfiffner, 1988~. In 1989 it was generally conceded that the Bush administration was
6 See also Mackenzie (1986b) and National Commission on the Public Service (1989~.
7 In addition to the short average time of PAS appointees in office, former Assistant Secretary of
Defense Lawrence Korb emphasized the psychological uncertainty of serving At the pleasure of" the
President and one's immediate superior.
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slower than the Reagan administration: on August 10, 156 of 394 of the top executive
branch positions had been filled, but there were no nominations for 160 of the positions
(Pfiffner, 1990~. By the end of 1989 the administration had not filled 46 of 116 PAS
positions in independent agencies (40 percent) and 70 of 320 PAS positions in executive
departments (22 percent) (Garcia, 1989~.
The effect of these delays in recruiting presidential appointees depends on which
positions are not filled. But where the incumbents of positions are, in effect, lame ducks
for the first year of an administration, there will most likely be delays in the
implementation of policy and management initiatives and possibly the recruitment of
scientists and engineers at both the political and career executive levels.
Quality and the Number of Political Appointees
The creation of this panel was prompted in part by the concern that it is
becoming more difficult to attract the best and brightest scientists and engineers to the
federal service. The Report by the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and
Government (1988) stated, ''It is generally agreed that the quality [of government
technical personnel] has eroded." In 1989 Energy Secretary James Watkins said that the
Energy Department did not have the officials with the skills necessary to run the
country's nuclear weapons complex.8
This concern has been accompanied by a perception that there has been a decline
in quality of some political appointees, which in turn has had a negative effect on the
quality of political appointees in the government. Elliot Richardson (1987), former
secretary of Defense; Health, Education, and Welfare; and Commerce, has noted "the
increase in turnover and the decline in quality of second- and third-echelon political
appointees"' in the federal government. Richardson7s concern is based on the
observation that during the past 20 years there has been an increase in the number of
political appointees in the government, a deeper penetration of political appointees into
the career ranks, an increase in the turnover of appointees, and an increase in the
emphasis on political loyalty in presidential administrations. These factors have had a
negative effect on the recruitment and retention of scientists and engineers to the extent
that the professional quality of appointees, institutional memory, and organizational
stability have decreased.
The number of political appointees has increased during the past several decades.
Although authoritative and comparable data are hard to find, there is no doubt about
the trend. The number of PAS positions has increased from 152 in 1965 to 527 in 1985;
noncareer Senior Executive Service (SES) positions increased from 582 in 1980 to 658 in
1986; Schedule C positions increased from 911 in 1976 to 1,665 in 1986. In 1986 there
were 946 Schedule C's at the GS-13-15 levels, more than the total number of Schedule
C's under President Ford (Ingraham, 1987). Although the absolute numbers of political
appointees in relation to the total civilian work force may not seem high, the ratio of
political to career positions at the mid-executive levels is increasing (e.g., the deputy
8 Energy Chief Says Top Aides Lack Skills to Run U.S. Bomb Complex, New York Am es, June 28,
1989, p. 1. See also Reversing Course at the Energy Department, Washington Post, January 24, 1990, p. 1.
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assistant secretary level). The increasingly rapid turnover of these political appointees
aggravates the situation, with PAS appointees' time in position averaging 2.8 years in
1965 and 2.0 years in 1984 (NAPA, 1985~. From 1979 to 1986, noncareer SES
executives stayed in office an average of 20 months (Ban and Ingraham, 1986~.
Among the difficulties caused by the increasing number of political appointees is
difficulty of recruiting high-quality people for positions that are lower in prestige than
executive level ~ or IT positions for relatively low pay. This is exacerbated by the
centralization of White House control of political recruiting that reached a peak during
the Reagan administration. In the 1950s and 1960s, even presidential appointees at the
subcabinet level were often, in effect, chosen by cabinet secretaries in conjunction with
the White House (Mann, 1965~.
With centralization in the White House Personnel Office has come a greater
emphasis on ideological or personal loyalty to the President as the primary criterion for
appointment. According to Elliot Richardson (1987), the quality of political
appointments has suffered from "the elimination from the pool of eligible prospects of
those who cannot meet the ideological litmus test."
The argument is that cabinet secretaries are more likely to value competence and
merit in selecting their subordinates who will run programs than is the White House,
which is likely to be especially sensitive to the political claims of those who have
supported the president's campaign. Richardson (1987) noted,
A White House personnel assistant sees the position of deputy assistant
secretary as a fourth-echelon slot. In his eyes that makes it an ideal
reward for a fourth-echelon political type a campaign advance man, or a
regional political organizer.9
The Special Case of Scientists and Engineers
The impact of the above trends on the recruitment of PAS positions has the
effect of narrowing the pool of candidates from which potential nominees are selected.
The negative aspects of the job (low pay, financial disclosure, long hours, etc.) when
combined with the political criteria often employed (ideological or personal loyalty) have
a constraining effect on recruiting the best and the brightest for all presidential
appointments except for the highest levels (e.g., cabinet positions). But good scientists
and engineers are a special subset of potential appointees, and effectively recruiting
them presents several additional problems.
Often scientists and engineers get into their professions because they prefer a
rational, academic research atmosphere rather than the uncertain world of politics with
its necessary compromises. It is less likely that they will become involved in partisan
politics than, for instance, lawyers or business people. Thus it is less likely that scientists
and engineers will possess the kinds of political credentials that are often demanded in
order to get past an initial screening by president's personnel office.
As one presidential recruiter put it: "These people did not do a lot to help this
9 For a full analysis of these issues, see National Commission on the Public Service (1989~.
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man get elected; they are just looking for an easy in." When asked for advice for
scientists and engineers who might want to work in the public service at the.PAS level,
the recruiter replied: "If you are interested in serving, get involved in the political
process early, not after the election." This mind-set on the part of presidential recruiters
necessarily narrows severely the pool of people who will be considered for presidential
positions. Scientists and engineers are not likely to become involved in presidential
campaigns and those who do may not be those who are also experienced enough to fill
successfully senior PAS positions. President Reagan's first personnel recruiter,
Pendleton James, added that, even if offered a job in an administration, some scientists
wilt turn it down for fear that their professional reputations might become "tainted" by
political service.
None of this is meant to imply that politics and political credentials are
illegitimate in presidential recruiting, the point is that in looking for the best persons to
run major programs for the government, the excessive use of political criteria may
prematurely narrow the field and exclude those who might be best for the job but do not
happen to have the right political experience. The argument is that an excessively
political approach is particularly effective at eliminating scientists and engineers early in
the recruitment process, for they are less likely to be involved in politics as a typical part
of their professional lives.
The above analysis looked at the problem of recruiting scientists and engineers
from the perspective of the political recruitment process. But the nature of the science
and engineering professions themselves also impede recruiting the best and brightest for
government service. The "tribal" values of scientists tend to cherish and give prestige to
theoretical rather than applied or practical work. Thus academic or scholarly prestige
comes in theoretical advances in the disciplines and publishing those ideas in scholarly
journals. Those who do applied work are a bit lower on the pecking order in their
disciplines, and those who do administrative work are even lower. Thus good scientists
are less likely to get the administrative experience that qualifies them for public service
positions running major programs.
Finally, those who pursue scientific and engineering careers are often people
who have a craftsman type of personality. That is, they focus on a single problem and
enjoy the challenge of sticking to it until it is solved. These people are less likely to be
good at or enjoy the job of a high-level executive that calls for the ability to move
quickly from problem to problem in a very fluid environment. The political atmosphere
of presidential positions intensifies these characteristics of high-level executive jobs
(Maccoby, 1976). This is one form of the common problem of promoting very good
professionals (accountants, doctors, lawyers, scientists, or engineers) from the work of
their professions to management or executive positions. Those who are adept at one set
of skills may not be adept at the other.
4° Interview with Pendleton James, January 12, 1990.
,, Interview with lames Trefil, Robinson Professor of Physics, George Mason University, January 25,
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The Role of Leadership and Vision
All of the above obstacles to recruiting scientists and engineers can be mitigated
by visionary leadership. In recruiting for PAS positions, the role of the President is
crucial. The President does not have time to be personally involved in recruiting for
most PAS positions, but his attitude is decisive. He sets the tone for his recruiters, and
by his final choices indicates whether he values professional qualities or prefers political
loyalty over professional competence.
Another aspect of presidential leadership that affects the willingness of scientists
and engineers to leave their professional careers to spend several years in public service
is the value that is placed on the work they will be doing. Although it is impossible to
measure easily, morale during the early years of NASA and during the Apollo program
was high and made it easier to attract the best scientists and engineers to work on a
program that was professionally challenging and clearly valued by the President, the
government, and U.S. citizens. 2 The mission to Mars might become such a program.
Unfortunately, to undertake such ambitious goals is very expensive, and in a time of
constrained budgets is unlikely to happen.
The role of the President's science adviser is symbolically important insofar as it
symbolizes the President's attitude toward scientists and science. The reestablishment of
the position in the Executive Office of the President gave a positive boost to perceptions
of the value that the President and the government place on science. The relationship
of the science adviser to the President is something that is watched in the science and
technology community and thus affects those scientists who are likely recruits for
presidential positions (Stubbing, 1988). If the science adviser is perceived to have made
politically driven compromises of his or her professional values, scientists may see this as
evidence that if they come to work for the government, they may be pressured to
compromise their own objectivity.'3
Of course most scientists and engineers in the government are not at the PAS
level, but the quality of scientists and engineers at lower, operational levels is influenced
by the quality of those at the PAS and SES levels. Several scientists who were
interviewed for this project emphasized that in order to retain good scientists in the
career service, they must respect the technical competence of their superiors.'4
Thus federal executives who want to recruit and retain good scientists and
engineers will create the kind of atmosphere that will be attractive to them. They will
set up professional recruitment and outreach efforts and will obtain the resources to do
it well. 5 They will project a vision of the mission of the agency or program that will
inspire and attract those who seek professional challenges. They will be sensitive to the
professional values of scientists and engineers. They will ensure that the professional
12 Interview with Richard Stubbing, public policy program, Duke University (former associate director,
Office of Management and Budget).
43 Interview with Jeffrey Newmeyer, chief scientist at Lockheed Missile Systems, February lo, 1990.
44 Interviews with Jeffrey Newmeyer and Stephen Andriole.
,5 Interview with Stephen Blush, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy.
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products of scientists and engineers are given due consideration; that is, they will ensure
that scientific research will have the chance to have an impact on policy, when that input
is appropriate. Finally, they will be sure to buffer the professional work of scientists and
engineers from the political whims of superiors and insulate them as much as possible
from budget swings that are inherent in the political world of the federal government.
The importance of "buffering the technical core" of organizations is especially
appropriate in this context. This buffering role is one of the main responsibilities of
chief executives and managers according to Thompson (1967~.
Conclusion
One of the conclusions of this paper is that the ability to recruit and retain good
scientists and engineers in the federal government is undercut by the combination of two
factors. On the one hand is the difficulty of scientists and engineers gaining the type of
political experience that provides them with the political credentials to be acceptable to
a presidential recruitment operation. In addition, even if offers are made, scientists may
be unwilling to serve in policy positions for fear that their professional values or
objectivity might be compromised by political considerations.
On the other hand is the need for career scientists and engineers to have high
levels of respect for the technical credentials of their political superiors. Thus federal
recruitment of scientists and engineers at high levels is caught between the demand on
the part of presidential recruiters that they have unquestioned political credentials and
the demand on the part of career scientists and engineers that their political supervisors
have impeccable scientific credentials. These two factors, in addition to the others
mentioned above, reduce the ability of the federal government to recruit the best and
brightest scientists and engineers.
This paper may seem to have painted an excessively negative picture of the
prospects for recruiting top quality scientists and engineers for the federal government.
The purpose of the project, however, is to examine problems in the process and
potential avenues for improvement. Thus in accentuating the negative, the tone of this
report should not overshadow the continuing very high quality of most political
appointees and the scientists and engineers who have chosen public service.
It must also be emphasized that any arguments about the level of quality of
federal employees is inherently judgmental. On the other hand, just because the factors
involved cannot be quantified is not sufficient reason to make no judgement at all. The
problems are real, and they should be addressed.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
personnel management
